Washington was convinced that if Japan went to war, it would not be against the United States. Nothing could shake the American leadership: Japan's attack on Russia is absolutely guaranteed. Hence the mystery of the Day of Shame, December 7, 1941. The miscalculation of the Americans and the British was that they underestimated the Japanese, their analytical skills. The Japanese saw that they wanted to be used, and that Moscow in the Far East was ready to fight back, and Britain and the United States and the allies would not be able to organize a strong rebuff at the initial stage, which could be used to seize a number of territories, and then on this basis it would already be possible to bargain. about the future world.
On October 18, 1941, the establishment of the Tojo government was officially announced in Japan. The emperor's message was unprecedented: Tojo was told that the new government was not bound by any previous decisions. Tojo's rise to power meant that Japan was ready for war.
On October 16, 1941, a message from Tokyo appeared on the front page of the New York Times about a public speech by the head of Japanese naval intelligence, Captain Hideo Hirada. The United States and Japan, he said, “have come to the point where their paths diverge … America, feeling insecure in the current environment, is undertaking a huge expansion of the fleet. However, America cannot simultaneously conduct operations in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Imperial Navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all the necessary training. Moreover, the Imperial Navy is eager to act if it turns out to be necessary."
However, Washington was still convinced that if Japan went to war, it would not be against the United States. All incoming facts and news were adjusted to this conviction. So, while informing Churchill about the consequences of the new government coming to power in Japan, Roosevelt noted that the situation with the Japanese had definitely worsened, “and i think they are heading north, however, in view of this, you and I are provided with a two-month respite in the Far East."
In the same vein, there was a directive from Stark sent to the commander of the Pacific Fleet Kimmel on October 16: “The resignation of the Japanese cabinet created a serious situation. If a new government is formed, it is likely to be highly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoe cabinet remains in power, it will act with a different mandate that does not provide for rapprochement with the United States. In any case, the most possible war is between Japan and Russia. Since Japan considers the United States and Britain to be responsible for its current desperate situation, there is a possibility that Japan could attack these two powers as well. Thus, in the United States, as before, it was believed that the most possible war is a new Russo-Japanese war. Although they realized that a nationalist and anti-American party prevailed in the Japanese leadership, that is, the likelihood of an attack on England and the United States.
The British took a similar position. London also believed that Japan would attack Russia in the near future. However, considering this perspective from the point of view of British interests, London considered it unwise to allow the Axis powers to beat their opponents individually. The British government wanted to know what the US would do when Japan attacked the Soviet Union. American calculations were based on the fact that the government is formed by General Hideki Tojo. He was closely associated with the Kwantung Army, which was preparing to fight the Russians, and was viewed in Washington as a supporter of further rapprochement with Germany. Similar views were held in London. The leadership of British intelligence in the Far East reported: “The new prime minister is totally pro-German. It is believed that the Japanese will rush to Vladivostok and Primorye as soon as the collapse of Soviet resistance appears to be inevitable … While the Russians are stronger in Siberia, despite possible withdrawals of troops from there, but Primorye and Vladivostok can, no doubt, be captured by the Japanese. Nothing could shake the American leadership - Japan's attack on Russia was absolutely guaranteed.
Hence the mystery of the "Day of Shame" - December 7, 1941. The miscalculation of the Americans and the British was that they underestimated the Japanese. (as "inferior race"), their analytical abilities. Both Tojo and the new foreign minister Shigenori Togo (former ambassador to Moscow) understood the military and economic might of the Soviet Union. The Japanese leadership decided that aggression to the south would be easier. British forces are bound by the war in Europe, and the United States' attention is also focused on the situation in the European theater, which facilitated the actions of the Japanese armed forces in the first phase. And so in the end it happened.
A group shot of the command of the Combined Fleet (the main long-range force of the Imperial Japanese Navy) taken during the last meeting before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the middle of the first row sits the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamomoto.
Group photo of the crews of the Japanese torpedo bombers Nakajima B5N ("Keith") on the deck of the aircraft carrier "Kaga" the day before the raid on Pearl Harbor
Japanese fighters A6M "Zero" before taking off to attack the American base in Pearl Harbor on the deck of the aircraft carrier "Akagi". Photo taken a few minutes before departure
The top military-political leadership of the United States and Japan made the most important decisions on the same day - November 5, 1941. Washington understood that decisive steps by Japan were not far off. It was necessary to determine in advance their line of conduct. On November 5, the US military command presented detailed recommendations to the president. The highest military leaders again pointed out that the main enemy is Germany, and in the war with Japan, strategic defense should be adhered to, since a strategic offensive in the Pacific Ocean will consume huge resources necessary for action in Europe. Skirmishes with Japan should be avoided until the United States has accumulated sufficient military forces in the Pacific.
If Japan will soon take the path of armed aggression, then military action against Japan should be undertaken under one or several scenarios: 1) Japanese aggression against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, British Commonwealth or Dutch India; 2) the advance of the Japanese into Thailand, west of 100 E, or south of 10 N, or the invasion of Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Islands of the Partnership; 3) if war with Japan cannot be avoided, then a defensive strategy should be adhered to in order to retain territories and weaken Japanese military-economic power; 4) considering the global strategy, the Japanese advance against Kunming, Thailand, or "An attack on Russia does not justify US intervention against Japan." Based on all this, the American military believed that relations with Japan should not be ruptured. It was recommended that no ultimatums be presented to Tokyo, so as not to anger the Japanese. F. Roosevelt agreed with these conclusions.
While in the United States they were making plans in anticipation of an attack on others and decided in advance not to help the USSR, in Japan they were already making accurate calculations of an attack to the south and to the United States. The Coordination Committee almost did not interrupt the meetings. On October 23, they agreed that there was no other way but war. However, the US military potential is 7-8 times higher than the Japanese one. Therefore, "there is no way to completely prevail over the United States in the event of a war with them" (that is, the Japanese judiciously assessed their potential). Conclusion: you need to run a short-term campaign with limited goals. On November 5, a decisive meeting of the Emperor's Privy Council took place in Tokyo. The participants decided that negotiations with the Americans should continue for the time being and give Washington two versions of Tokyo's proposals, tentatively called Plan A and Plan B. If the American government does not accept one of these plans by November 25, then there is war.
Plan A stipulated: The Japanese Empire agrees with the principle of non-discrimination in international trade in the Pacific Ocean and in China, if this principle is recognized in the rest of the world; with regard to the Triple Pact, the Japanese are prepared not to expand the sphere of "self-defense" and want to avoid the spread of the European war to the Pacific; after the conclusion of peace between Japan and China, Japanese troops will remain for 25 years in North China, on the Mongolian border and on the island of Hainan. If the United States rejected plan A, then they planned to hand over plan B, which was in the nature of modus vivendi (a temporary agreement when, under existing conditions, it is impossible to reach a full agreement). Japan pledged to refrain from further expansion in exchange for easing US restrictions on trade with it.
The Japanese government agreed with the target date for the start of the war - December 8 (Tokyo time). The deployment of the armed forces began in anticipation of a war with the United States, England and Holland, in order to be ready to start a war. The deployment of the military and diplomatic negotiations now proceeded in parallel. Admiral Nomura became a key figure in negotiations with the United States. When Konoe's government changed, Nomura asked for his resignation. He explained that he did not believe in the possibility of reaching an agreement and did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people." Tokyo reported that the new government sincerely wants to settle relations with America. Nomura remained at his post. He was sent an assistant - Kurusu - an old friend of Nomura, a former Japanese ambassador to Berlin, who signed the Triple Pact. The Japanese ambassadors continued their negotiations, ignorant of the true intentions of their government. Nomura and Kurusu sincerely hoped to find rapport with the Americans.
American intelligence intercepted and decoded all of Tokyo's correspondence with the Japanese embassy in Washington. Therefore, Roosevelt and Hull knew the content of the two plans and the deadline for negotiations with the United States - 25 November. On this day, the Japanese fleet went out to attack Hawaii. But, apparently, the White House did not know why Tokyo associates the success or failure of the talks with the exact date.
Japanese fighters A6M2 "Zero" from the second wave of the air strike on the American base Pearl Harbor take off from the deck of the aircraft carrier "Akagi"
Sinking battleship California at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 after being hit by two torpedoes and two bombs
On November 7, Nomura presented Plan A. On November 10, the President received the Japanese ambassador. When meeting with the Japanese ambassador, Roosevelt limited himself to a lecture on the delights of the world, the need to promote the prosperity of mankind, and other general words. It is clear that the Japanese could not be satisfied with such an answer. The Togolese minister was furious and telegraphed Nomura that the date of 25 November was "absolutely impossible to change." The telegram was decrypted and reported to Roosevelt and Hull. On November 15, Hull informed Nomura that the Japanese proposals for international trade and the Tripartite Pact were unacceptable. Plan A was rejected.
Meanwhile, tensions in Japan were mounting. The 77th Extraordinary Session of the Japanese Parliament opened on November 17. Deputy Toshio Shimada took the floor in the lower house on behalf of the League for the Promotion of the Throne. He implored the government to "stop grazing by the road", for "the nation is being burned by fire." The United States and England do not stop mocking Japan, but, reminded Shimada, even Buddha cannot be laughed at more than three times, in general twice - the maximum for a saint. He said: "Cancer in the Pacific nests in the minds of arrogant American leaders who seek world domination." The Japanese politician said that a "big knife" is needed to fight cancer. He introduced a resolution stating: "It is quite obvious that the main reason for the current conflict of the Axis powers with the British, American and Soviet peoples is the insatiable desire of the United States for world domination …". In this, Shimada was absolutely right.
On November 17, Kurusu flew to Washington and, together with Nomura, met with the American President and Secretary of State. New negotiations, which lasted three days, did not lead to a positive result. Roosevelt again raised the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. This was absolutely unacceptable for Japan, as it destroyed all their political and military successes over a long period of time. Roosevelt also delivered sublime sermons as usual that covered the predatory interests of the United States. It became clear that the two powers would not reach an understanding.
On November 20, Nomura and Kurusu presented Hull with a somewhat relaxed plan B: both governments pledge not to move their forces into any areas of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, with the exception of Indochina, where Japanese troops are already located; Japan and the United States will cooperate to obtain the necessary raw materials from Dutch India; Japan and the US pledge to restore trade relations, and the US will supply Japan with the required amount of oil; The United States pledges to refrain from taking measures that would impede the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Tokyo hoped that the United States would go for modus vivendi. Hull promised the ambassadors to "consider favorably" the Japanese proposals. This reassured Togo, and he obtained a small reprieve from Tokyo, until November 29. This immediately became known in Washington.
Whether or not there was a war in the Pacific depended on the American response. If Washington wanted to delay the war with Japan, then the United States should have opted for modus vivendi. The military considered it reasonable to have such a position - to delay the start of the war so that the main task in Europe could be solved. On November 22, the Department of State drafted an American modus vivendi project for a period of 90 days. Its difference from the Japanese Plan B was mainly in the fact that the Americans demanded the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from South Indochina, and no more than 25 thousand Japanese soldiers were to remain in the northern part. The rest of the American conditions were broadly in line with the Japanese.
Hull, Stimson and Knox met on November 25th. The participants agreed that it was necessary to convey the American proposals to Japan. The three then arrived at the White House, where Marshall and Stark held a new meeting with the president. There is practically no information about him. Only an entry in the diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson: “… we will apparently be attacked, perhaps no later than next Monday (November 30), for the Japanese are known to attack without warning. What should we do? The problem boils down to how we can maneuver so that Japan fires the first shot, and at the same time, avoid a great danger to ourselves. This is a difficult task. At the meeting, it was said that Japan can go towards the South Seas, but the American possessions will not be attacked. Nevertheless, it was decided to convey the American proposals on modus vivendi to the Japanese ambassadors. The military was satisfied with this decision. They received a temporary head start for training in the Pacific Ocean. With such an impression, the American security forces, both ministers - Stimson and Knox and the commanders-in-chief of the army and navy - Marshall and Stark left the White House.
An explosion of ammunition on the USS Shaw during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The explosion occurred at 9.30 am as a result of a fire caused by the hit of three Japanese aerial bombs. The destroyer was badly damaged, but later it was repaired and put into operation again.
However, the day after meeting with the military, the president and secretary of state made a decision that was the opposite of the one previously agreed with the military leaders. Reconnaissance information was received on the movement of Japanese ships south of Formosa (Taiwan), which apparently followed to Indochina. This angered Roosevelt: the Japanese were negotiating a complete truce and immediately sent an expedition to Indochina. The President decided to teach the Japanese a lesson. He summoned Hull and instructed him to take a firm tone in the negotiations. The modus vivendi project was dropped. The State Department prepared the so-called. "Ten-point program". The Americans offered Japan to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact in the Far East; sign a collective agreement on the integrity of Indochina; withdraw all troops from China; both governments will enter into negotiations on a trade agreement, etc.
As a result The United States offered Japan to restore, of its own free will, the position that existed before September 1931, that is, before the Japanese conquest in China. Refuse all seizures and acquisitions in China, which for Tokyo was the main condition for a possible agreement with the United States. And the conquest of Manchuria and other regions of China cost Japan a lot of blood and sweat. Manchuria became the second military-industrial base of the Japanese Empire. Its loss meant an economic disaster for the empire.
On the evening of November 26, Hull handed the document to Nomura and Kurus. In fact, it was an ultimatum. However, at the same time, the Americans left the Japanese with a "window of opportunity" - Washington did not offer Japan to immediately get out of China under the disguised threat of war or tough economic sanctions. The Americans showed Japan what aggression in the south entails for it, but did not close the doors to compromise if Tokyo changed its mind and abandoned the idea of moving south. That is, there was still hope that Japan would attack Russia. US naval intelligence, for example, reported to the government on December 1: “Relations between Japan and Russia remain tense. On November 25, Japan, together with Germany and other Axis powers, extended the Anti-Comintern Pact for five years. Hull's program was not supposed to provoke Japan into a war against the United States, but, on the contrary, discourage her from moving towards the South Seas. Japan was shown that the way there was closed and would entail a war.
Japanese statesmen turned out to be more direct people, they did not comprehend such a sophisticated cunning of American diplomacy. Nomura's dispatch with the text of Hull's response arrived during the Steering Committee meeting. Tojo read the document. The silence was interrupted by someone's exclamation: "This is an ultimatum!" The American response ended the latest hesitation in Tokyo. Events began to "develop automatically."
Thus, Until the very last moment, the masters of Washington tried to induce Tokyo to direct aggression north - against the Soviet Union. As noted by researcher N. Yakovlev: “The facts indisputably indicate that the American response, or ultimatum, of November 26 was the“big club”with which the United States sometimes achieved its goals. At the end of 1941, they wanted to push Japan against the Soviet Union, and themselves stay on the sidelines. If this thesis is not accepted, one should agree either with the political speculators in the United States, who accuse F. Roosevelt of deliberately setting up the Pacific Fleet as bait for Japan in order to get a pretext and involve the American people in the war, or suspect an epidemic of mass insanity in Washington: knowing about the approaching war, they did not take any precautions. But the foreign policy leaders of the United States were of sound mind and memory. "
Washington firmly believed that Japan's attack on Russia would follow when the Soviet Union's martial law deteriorated sharply. At the end of November 1941, the ideal moment came (the first was in the summer of 1941), in the opinion of American leaders, for an attack on the USSR. German and Finnish troops besieged Leningrad, the Wehrmacht broke through to the near approaches to Moscow, in the south reached the Don, and from Japan there were reports of a huge strengthening of the Kwantung Army aimed at the Soviet Far East. The deployment of the Japanese army and air force showed Japan's preparations for a war with the USSR. Of the 51 divisions that the Empire of Japan had in November 1941, 21 were in China, 13 in Manchuria, 7 divisions in the mother country, and only 11 divisions could be used in other areas. Of the 5 air fleets, 3 were on the mainland and on the Japanese islands, and only 2 were free. It was hard to imagine that Japan would start a war against the United States and England, against which only 11 divisions could be thrown (as actually happened), that is, about 20% of the Japanese army.
Intelligence agencies and decryption data reported that the Japanese armed forces were preparing for war in all areas. That is, Japan could attack any of the opponents - the USSR, the USA and England. However, the likelihood that Japan would attack Russia first was the highest. Japan was closest to Russia, which made it possible to use both Japan and Manchuria as a strategic foothold and base. The Japanese already had a combat-ready army in Manchuria. Japan kept most of the fleet in the metropolis. Therefore, actions against Russia could be taken as quickly as possible. In late November - early December 1941, the command of the American fleet believed that the main Japanese aircraft carriers were in the waters of the Japanese metropolis, and it was calm. The Americans believed that the Japanese were about to strike at the Russians.
Thus, until the last moment, the masters of the United States pushed Japan northward and expected the Japanese to attack the Russians. Fortunately, the moment was the most favorable - the Russians were bleeding, holding back the enemy and the walls of Leningrad and Moscow. The Americans' miscalculation was that they underestimated the Japanese. The Japanese military-political leadership realized that they wanted to pave the way for the US victory. Destroy Russia with the help of the Germans and Japanese. Use the Japanese as cannon fodder. The Japanese knew the strength of the Russians well, and did not want the Americans to use them in their game. Having figured out the game of a cunning and cunning enemy, they acted in their own way. On December 7, 1941, they attacked Pearl Harbor, hoping to turn off the enemy with a swift attack for a while, seize the territories necessary for the Japanese Empire, and then come to an agreement. Japan taught a good lesson to the presumptuous masters of the United States, who thought they had everything under control.
American battleships after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In the foreground is the battleship "Oklahoma" (USS Oklahoma (BB-37), which has overturned due to the hit of nine Japanese torpedoes), behind it is the "Maryland" (USS Maryland (BB-46), which was moored next to the "Oklahoma", on the right is burning "West Virginia" (USS West Virginia (BB-48). Photo source:
