During the discussion of one of the articles devoted to battle cruisers, an interesting discussion arose about the times of the Russian-Japanese war. Its essence boiled down to the following. One side argued that 152-203-mm guns had shown negligible effectiveness in battles against battleships and armored cruisers, and that heavy 305-mm guns played a key role in the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima. The second side believed that a large number of 152-203-mm shells hitting Russian ships led to a tangible decrease in their combat effectiveness, that is, the role and effectiveness of six-eight-inch artillery was much higher than it was assumed by opponents.
Let's try to understand this issue.
Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal, and (before the creation of the time machine) there will not be any accurate data on how many and what shells (armor-piercing, high-explosive) hit the Russian ships in Tsushima. Even for the Eagle that survived the battle, there are conflicting data, what can we say about the three dead Russian battleships of the Borodino type … However, we can assume that, having studied the effectiveness of fire in other battles of the Russian-Japanese war, we will see some kind of interconnection, trends and can draw conclusions that will help us deal with what happened in Tsushima.
So, without claiming the absolute accuracy of the data, but realizing that minor errors do not change the result as a whole, let's try to compare the number of shells consumed by the Japanese and Russian squadrons in the battle on January 27, 1904, as well as in the battle at Shantung (the battle in the Yellow Sea) held on July 28, 1904 with the number of hits that the Russian and Japanese gunners were able to achieve. Let's start with the January 27 fight.
The expenditure of the shells of the Japanese squadron (hereinafter, data from the series of articles by V. Maltsev "On the question of accuracy in the Russian-Japanese war" are used) amounted to 79 - 305 mm; 209-203 mm; 922 - 152 mm, also 132 -120 mm and 335 75 mm, but we will ignore the latter, since we are considering the hits of shells from 152 mm and higher.
At the same time, it is known that the ships of the Russian squadron were hit by 8 - 305-mm shells, 5 - 203-mm, 8 - 152-mm and nine more shells 152-203 mm, the exact caliber of which, alas, was not determined, 6-75 -mm and one 57-mm. Thus, the percentage of hits for different calibers was:
For 305 shells - 10, 13%;
For 203-mm shells - not less than 2.39%, and possibly higher (up to 6, 7%, depending on how many of the nine shells of an unknown 152-203-mm caliber were actually 203-mm);
For 152-mm shells - not lower than 0.86%, and possibly higher (up to 1.84%, depending on how many of the nine shells of an unknown 152-203-mm caliber were actually 203-mm).
As you can see, the range of values turned out to be very large, and it does not make it possible to judge the firing accuracy of 152-mm and 203-mm calibers separately. But we can make a general calculation for shells of six- and eight-inch caliber - in total, the Japanese used up 1,131 of these shells and achieved 22 hits. In this case, our comparison of the percentage of hits takes the form:
For 305 shells - 10, 13%;
For shells of 152-203 mm caliber - 1.95%.
Thus, we see that the accuracy of the Japanese 305-mm artillery was 5, 19 times higher than that of the 152-203-mm guns. But due to the fact that the number of shells fired by six- and eight-inch guns significantly exceeded the number of consumed 305-mm ammunition (1131 versus 79, that is, 14, 32 times), then for one hit of a 305-mm projectile there were 2, 75 hits with a caliber of 152-203 mm.
Now let's look at the indicators that the Russian squadron achieved in the battle on January 27, 1904.
At the same time, 3-305-mm shells, 1-254-mm, 2 - of an unknown caliber 254-305 mm, 1-203-mm, 8- 152-mm, 4 -120-mm and 6-75- mm.
As you can see, the situation has changed exactly the opposite - here we reliably know the number of hits of medium-caliber shells, but with large-caliber shells - a problem. Therefore, we represent the calculation of the percentage of hits as follows:
For large-caliber shells (254-305 mm) - 9, 23%;
For medium-caliber projectiles (152-203 mm) - 1.27%, including:
For shells with a caliber of 203 mm - 3, 57%;
For shells with a caliber of 152 mm - 1, 18%.
Thus, we again see a big difference in the accuracy of large and medium caliber artillery. In the battle on January 27, the Russian ten- and twelve-inch guns fired 7, 26 times more accurately, but taking into account the fact that 152-203-mm shells were fired much more than 254-305-mm (708 versus 65), then for each hit 254 -305-mm shell had one and a half hits of 152-203-mm caliber.
Thus, we see an interesting trend - medium-caliber artillery fire is much less accurate than large-caliber artillery. But on the other hand, six- and eight-inch guns in battle manage to use up many times more shells than heavy guns, so the number of hits of 152-203-mm shells is still higher. Without a doubt, the difference in the number of hits is significant, but nevertheless, in this parameter, large and medium-caliber artillery differs by no means dozens of times - we see that one heavy projectile hit 1, 5 for the Russians, and 2, 75 for the Japanese. medium caliber.
Let us now see the results of the battle at Shantung on July 28, 1904.
As we can see in the table, there are as many as 51 "unidentified" hits, which does not allow for analysis in the context of each caliber. Nevertheless, it would not be a big mistake to assume that the overwhelming majority of them belong to 152-203-mm shells, so for our calculation we will attribute them all to medium-caliber artillery hits. In this case, the percentage of hits will take the form:
For shells of 254-305 mm caliber - 10, 22%;
For shells, caliber 152-203 mm - 1.78%.
Thus, we see that the accuracy of the Japanese shooting has no fundamental changes in comparison with the battle on January 27. In the battle in the Yellow Sea, the 254-305-mm cannons showed an accuracy that was 5, 74 times higher than that of medium-caliber artillery. At the same time, the Japanese achieved 65 hits with a caliber of 254-305-mm and only 83 hits with a caliber of 152-203 mm, that is, for one 254-305-mm projectile hitting the target, there were only 1, 28 hits of six- and eight-inch shells. And it must be understood that 83 hits of 152-203-mm shells is the maximum possible figure, if we assume that at least a few of the 51 hits of an unknown caliber fell on the share of large-caliber or, on the contrary, small-caliber artillery, then the indicated ratio will be even lower. As we can see, the firing accuracy of medium-caliber artillery has decreased slightly. Why was there such a drop in the ratio of hits between large-caliber and medium-caliber artillery - from 2.75 medium-caliber hits to one large-caliber one, to some 1.28?
The main reason is the significantly longer combat ranges in the first phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea. That is, on July 28, 1904, there were such periods of time when only large-caliber artillery could operate on both sides, and in the battle on January 27 there were almost none. As we said above, in the battle on January 27, the Japanese used up 79 large-caliber shells and 1,131 medium-caliber shells, that is, for one consumed 305-mm shell there were 14, 31 pieces of 152-203-mm shells. At the same time, in the battle at Shantung, the Japanese used up 636 rounds of 254-305-mm caliber and only 4 661 rounds of 152-203-mm caliber. That is, in the battle on July 28, 1904, the Japanese spent 7, 33 pieces of 152-203-mm shells for each large-caliber projectile, or almost half as much as in the battle on January 27. Shooting accuracy also decreased, but insignificantly - only by 1, 09 times, which is also quite explainable by the increased distances of the battle. Hence the difference in the hit ratio.
And here are the results of the Russian artillery
In total, the Russian battleships used up 568 large-caliber shells and 3 097 152-mm shells (not counting those that were spent on repelling mine attack attacks, since hit statistics were not presented for them). As we can see, 12-13 shells of unknown caliber hit the Japanese ships (let's assume that there were 13 - this will "benefit" medium-caliber artillery in our calculations). We will act with them in the same way as in the case of determining the percentage of hits of the Japanese squadron - that is, we will attribute all these hits to the medium-caliber (in our case, six-inch) artillery. Then the percentage of hits will take the form:
For shells of caliber 254-305 mm - 2, 82%;
For shells, caliber 152 mm - 0, 64%.
So, the accuracy of the Russian six-inch guns turned out to be 4, 36 times worse than heavy guns, and for one hit with 254-305-mm shells there were only 1.25 hits of 152-mm. And this, again, is the maximum, because we recorded all 13 shells of an "unidentified" caliber in six-inch hits!
And now let's try to move on to the Tsushima battle. The generally accepted figures for the consumption of shells by the 1st and 2nd Japanese combat units are as follows:
305 mm - 446 pcs.;
254 mm - 50 pcs.;
203 mm - 1 199 pcs. (284 - "Nissin" and "Kasuga", 915 - cruiser Kamimura, excluding the battle with "Admiral Ushakov");
152 mm - 9 464 pcs. (including 5,748 shells from the 1st combat squadron and 3,716 shells from the cruisers of the 2nd Kamimura squadron, but also excluding the shells consumed by the "Admiral Ushakov");
In total, in the Battle of Tsushima, the ships of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments used up 496 large-caliber (254-305-mm) and 10 663 medium-caliber projectiles (152-203-mm). In other words, for one large-caliber projectile, the Japanese used 21, 49 medium-caliber projectiles. Why did this ratio increase relative to the battles on January 27 and July 28, 1904?
Primarily because 6 Japanese battleships and 4 armored cruisers took part in the battle on January 27, the 1st combat detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) fought in the battle on July 28, to which the third cruiser (Yakumo) joined only in the second phase, and Asama's participation was quite episodic. Thus, in both cases, the number of battleships participating in the battle exceeded the number of armored cruisers. At the same time, 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers of the Japanese fought in the battle of Tsushima, that is, the ratio of the number of barrels of large-caliber and medium-caliber artillery increased significantly in favor of the latter.
Suppose also that in Tsushima the Japanese ships demonstrated the best accuracy among those achieved earlier, that is, the percentage of hits with 254-305-mm shells reached 10.22% (as in the battle in the Yellow Sea), and for 152-203-mm shells - 1, 95%, (as in the battle on January 27). In this case, the Japanese achieved 51 hits with large-caliber shells (rounded up) and 208 with medium-caliber shells. In this case, the number of hits of medium-caliber shells on one large-caliber shell will be 4, 08 pcs.
Of course, it may well be that the Japanese in Tsushima were shooting more accurately - maybe 20, maybe 30%, who knows? Let's say the Japanese shot 25% more accurately, so their hit rates were 12, 78% and 2.44%, respectively. In this case, 64 large-caliber and 260 medium-caliber shells fell into the Russian ships (again, rounding up the fractional values). But this will not in any way affect the ratio between the hits of large-caliber and medium-caliber shells - for one hit with a caliber of 254-305 mm, there will be 4, 06 pieces. 152-203 mm shells - that is, almost the same value, the difference is only due to rounding.
We see that the ratio of the percentage of hits in the battles of January 27 and July 28, 1904 in the Japanese fleet changed insignificantly. In the first case, the Japanese gunmen of medium-caliber artillery fired 5, 19 times worse than their colleagues operating heavy guns (1, 95% and 10, 13%, respectively), in the second case - 5, 74 times (1, 78% and 10, 22%). Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that this attitude changed greatly in the Battle of Tsushima.
Thus, we come to the conclusion - if in the battle in the Yellow Sea, Russian ships for each hit of a 254-305-mm projectile were followed by 1.28 hits of shells with a caliber of 152-203-mm, then in the battle on January 27 there were 2, 75, and under Tsushima, probably already 4, 1. This ratio is noticeably higher (3, 2 times!) Than in the battle at Shantung, so it is not surprising that the same Vladimir Ivanovich Semyonov, who participated in both battles, perceived the Japanese fire in Tsushima as a hail of shells, which was not in battle 28 July 1904 Although a purely psychological aspect cannot be ruled out - in the battle on July 28, V. I. Semenov was on the armored cruiser Diana, while the enemy, of course, concentrated the main fire on the battleships of the first Pacific squadron. At the same time in Tsushima this, in every respect, a worthy officer was on the flagship battleship "Suvorov", which was subjected to the most intense shelling. It is clear that when your ship is being fired upon, the enemy's fire may seem more intense than when you observe the firing of another ship from the side.
But back to the effectiveness of the fire of Japanese armored ships. Our calculations led to the fact that 210-260 shells of 152-203-mm caliber hit the Russian ships from the force. Is it a lot, or a little? Even simply dividing this number of hits by 5 of the most modern Russian battleships (4 types "Borodino" and "Oslyabyu"), we get a maximum of 42-52 hits on the ship. Most likely, taking into account hits on other ships, there were no more than 40-45. Thus, the first thing that can be paid attention to - the number of hits by medium-caliber Japanese artillery in Russian ships was large, but not excessive, hundreds of shells are out of the question - in the worst case, up to fifty. Could such a number of hits cause significant damage to our battleships?
Considering what we know about the effectiveness of artillery with a caliber of 152-203 mm, it is rather doubtful. For example, in the same Tsushima battle, the armored cruiser Aurora received about 18 or even 21 hits, but was not seriously injured or out of action. The same can be said about the "Pearl", which received 17 hits (including small-bore). True, the armored cruiser Svetlana was sunk by medium-caliber artillery, but this is a ship with a displacement of less than 4,000 tons.
In the battle in the Korea Strait, when three Russian ships fought four armored cruisers Kamimura, "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" received 30-35 hits with 152-203-mm shells each. It must be said that only Thunderbolt had armor protection for artillery, but even in Russia, most of the guns were out of order not due to the impact of enemy shells, but due to breakdowns of the lifting arcs, that is, a structural defect in the machines. For the rest, despite the defeat of unarmored parts and pipes, both cruisers did not receive particularly heavy damage, and in fact their protection was much more modest even than the relatively weakly armored Oslyabi.
A detailed analysis of the damage received by the squadron battleship Peresvet in the battle in the Yellow Sea shows that 22 hits of 152-203 mm caliber (this also includes shells of unknown caliber, which, most likely, were 152 mm) did not inflict on the ship how many - some serious damage (except for the numerous damage to the 75-mm guns). The same can be said about the 17 "medium-caliber" hits in the "Retvizan", received by him in the same battle.
According to some reports, the shell, whose fragments disabled the centralized fire control system on the battleship "Eagle", was eight-inch. According to the available descriptions, three six-inch shells hit the conning tower in succession, but did not cause any harm, and then a 203-mm shell hit it, ricocheting from the sea surface, which caused the above damage. On the other hand, the descriptions of the damage to the "Eagle" have become the subject of so much speculation that it is absolutely impossible to guarantee the veracity of the above.
The First World War also did not demonstrate the special power of artillery with a caliber of 152-203 mm in cases where high-explosive shells were used. Thus, the famous German corsair, the cruiser Emden, with a normal displacement of 3,664 tons, received about 50 152-mm high-explosive shells in its last battle and, although it was completely disabled, it still did not sink (the ship threw itself on the rocks) … The British light cruiser "Chester" suffered significant damage from 17 150-mm high-explosive German shells fired at it from a distance of 30 cables or less, lost 30% of its artillery, the fire control system was disabled - but still we are talking about a weakly armored ship with a displacement of 5,185 tons. The very small Albatross, with a displacement of only about 2, 2 thousand tons, received over 20 hits from 152-203 mm Russian shells and, of course, completely lost its combat effectiveness, but was able to reach the Swedish coast and threw itself on the rocks.
Perhaps the only undoubted success of medium-caliber artillery was the destruction of the British armored cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth by M. Spee's squadron in the battle at Coronel, but there the Germans used high-explosive and armor-piercing shells in approximately equal proportions, despite the fact that out of 666 spent 210 -mm shells armor-piercing were 478, but out of 413 152-mm shells armor-piercing were only 67.
But back to the Tsushima battle. As we said earlier, we do not know the number of hits in the dead battleships, nor the damage caused by them, with the exception, perhaps, of the battleship "Oslyabya", about which there is evidence of eyewitnesses who served on it. It is also known that medium-caliber artillery cannot claim to destroy a single heavy Russian ship. "Suvorov", despite the heaviest damage, was sunk by torpedoes. "Alexander III", according to eyewitnesses, had a very large hole in the bow of the hull. Apparently, as a result of the hits of enemy shells, the armor plates were either dented into the hull, or split and, perhaps, even fell off from it - the analysis of the damage of the ships of the Russo-Japanese war shows that only 305-mm were capable of such a "feat" shells. As far as can be judged, it was this hole that ultimately led to the death of the ship, since during the turn, the ship tilted, and the open ports of the 75-mm gun battery went under water, which caused the flooding to become an avalanche and the ship capsized. The battleship Borodino exploded after being hit by a 305-mm shell from the battleship Fuji. The key role in the sinking of the Oslyabi was played by the hit of a 305-mm shell in the bow of the ship, in the area of the waterline under the bow tower, which caused extensive flooding …
Incidentally, it is "Oslyabya", perhaps, is one of the three armored ships, in the death of which the Japanese medium-caliber artillery played a somewhat noticeable role. The fact is that when the ship landed with its bow, according to the recollections of the survivors, the fight for survivability was greatly complicated by a large number of holes through which water entered, and which arose as a result of the "work" of artillery with a caliber of 152-203 mm. But "Dmitry Donskoy" really received decisive damage from medium-caliber artillery fire. But, firstly, we are talking about a completely outdated "armored frigate", and secondly, even he, taking part in the Tsushima battle, defended transports, helped "Oleg" and "Aurora" to repel attacks much like numerous Uriu cruisers, and then he fought as many as six enemy armored cruisers, the latter being unable to defeat him and lagging behind. And only the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was a more or less modern ship that was killed by medium-caliber artillery fire, which hit the unarmored parts of the hull caused extensive flooding, heel and, as a consequence, the inability to fight.
What is the conclusion?
Without a doubt, in theory, hits from six- and eight-inch shells could, with luck, inflict damage on our battleships, to a certain extent reducing their combat effectiveness. However, we have no practical confirmation of this thesis. All hits in the Russian squadron battleships of shells with a caliber of 152-203 mm, the consequences of which we know for certain, did not cause them significant damage. At the same time, there is reason to believe that in Tsushima our battleships got about twice as many shells on the ship as in the same battle in the Yellow Sea. Accordingly, we can assume that some of them could have inflicted significant damage on the battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. But at the same time, we do not have a single reason to believe that it was precisely the “hail of six- and eight-inch shells” that led to the fatal drop in the combat effectiveness of the best ships of the Z. P. Rozhestvensky - to squadron battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabe type, that is, he decided the fate of the battle.
In general, an analysis of the clashes between the Russo-Japanese and World War I shows that 152-203-mm shells were relatively effective for inflicting heavy, and in some cases, decisive damage only to weakly protected warships with up to 5,000 tons of displacement.
