We continue the history of interwar modernization of battleships of the "Sevastopol" type: let's talk about medium-caliber artillery and mine weapons of these warships.
Mine action: what was
At the beginning of the service, he was presented with 16 * 120-mm guns mod. 1907 with a barrel length of 50 calibers. The history of their appearance in the Russian Imperial Navy is as follows: initially they were 120-mm / 50 Vickers guns mod. 1905, which the British installed on the armored cruiser Rurik II ordered from them for our fleet. Our admirals liked the gun, so their production was later set up at the Obukhov plant: they were considered the "model of 1907".
These guns, installed on battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, were equipped … here there is some ambiguity, because for these guns there were 2 types of shells, both of the 1911 model. The semi-armor-piercing 28.97 kg shell contained 3.73 kg of explosive), but the high-explosive, oddly enough, had a slightly higher mass (29 kg), but a lower content of explosives - only 3, 16 kg. Both projectiles had an initial velocity of 792.5 m / s. Firing range at a maximum elevation angle of 120 mm / 50 guns mod. 1907, which was 20 degrees, reached 76 cables, rate of fire - about 7 rds. min. The relatively modest value of the rate of fire is associated with separate loading, which, moreover, was also a cartouche, which, perhaps, should be recognized as the only significant drawback of this artillery system. Separate loading was fully justified, but, in an amicable way, it should have been made separate-case. On the other hand, this drawback was largely leveled out by the location of the guns in armored casemates, and the use of shell casings would add weight to the ship's artillery armament.
The ammunition load was originally 250 rounds per barrel, but was later increased to 300 shots.
Fire control of 120-mm / 50 guns was carried out using the fire control system "Geisler and K" mod. 1910 As far as the author could understand, the centralized fire control system, which consisted of the devices of Erickson, Pollen and Geisler, could well have been used to "work" 120-mm cannons in the event that the main caliber was not used. But in the case when PUS Pollan and so on. were involved in ensuring the firing of 305-mm guns, for 120-mm guns only Geisler and K remained, the capabilities of which were described in detail in the previous article. But there were no separate rangefinders to provide 120-mm / 50 cannon fire. For all about all the battleships "Sevastopol" had only two rangefinders with a 6-meter base, located on the bow and stern superstructures, and which were also supposed to ensure the operation of the main caliber of these ships.
Anti-mine artillery was positioned in such a way that at least four barrels could be fired in any sector (120-130 degrees). The need to clear the upper deck as much as possible led to the fact that the casemates were located along the sides, whose height above sea level did not boggle the imagination, as a result of which the guns were flooded with water. However, the indicated drawback was to one degree or another characteristic of all dreadnoughts of the first generations, but otherwise, in 1914, the Sevastopol PMK fully met its purpose.
Anti-mine caliber: what has become
As for the material part of the guns themselves, there were no changes here - until the very end of the 120-mm / 50 service, the guns were not modernized. But their number was reduced on the "Marat" to 14, and on the "October Revolution" - even to 10 units, so that the original 16 guns were preserved only on the "Paris Commune". This reduction was caused, first of all, by the need to store ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery somewhere, and the cellars of 120-mm shells for these purposes were the best fit. As a result, the "Marat" lost two 120-mm aft guns, and the "October Revolution", in addition to this, four more of the same guns in the central part of the ship. If you look at the Sevastopol-class battleships from the side, then their anti-mine artillery turned out to be assembled in 4 groups of 2 guns, but on the "October Revolution" two central groups lost one barrel each (located towards the stern of the battleship).
As for ammunition, the Soviet battleships received lighter, 26, 3 kg projectile mod. 1928 Their advantage was an increased initial speed, reaching 825 m / s, and, possibly, better aerodynamic quality, thanks to which the firing range was increased from 76 to almost 92 cables. However, the price for this was a significant reduction in the content of explosives in the projectile - from 3, 16-3, 73 to only 1, 87 kg.
A slightly larger amount of modernization awaited the fire control system. Sometimes the author of this article had to come across the opinion that the anti-mine caliber of all three Soviet battleships received new PUS "Casemate" model either 1928 or 1929. On the other hand, A. Vasiliev in his monographs reports that the PUS "Casemate" was installed only on the "October Revolution", while A. V. Platonov generally indicates the Geisler system for all three battleships, but for some reason, different years of release.
Apparently, this was the case. On the battleship "Marat", the anti-mine caliber PUS remained unchanged, that is, the same "Geisler and K" mod. 1911 g.
At the "October Revolution" these CCPs were modernized, and the improved version of "Geisler and K" was named "Casemate", although, perhaps, it was still a separate system. As for the Paris Commune, the process of improving the anti-mine caliber CCD followed the path of improving Geisler and K, including with the addition of new equipment, such as, for example, devices for synchronous data transmission of central pickup TsN-29. And, probably, it will not be a mistake to assume that the best anti-mine missile launchers were received by the Paris Commune, while the worst ones were on the Marat. Unfortunately, the author did not find at least some detailed information about what additional capabilities the upgraded CCPs possessed.
Roughly the same thing happened with rangefinders. A big advantage over the pre-revolutionary MSA was the appearance on battleships of very numerous additional rangefinders for controlling the fire of the main, anti-mine and anti-aircraft calibers. The KDP serving the main caliber was discussed in the previous article. As for the anti-mine …
On the battleship "Marat" were installed six openly standing rangefinders with a three-meter base DM-3 and two more DM-1, 5 - with a one and a half meter base.
The "October revolution" has received … Alas, this is not a weak confusion. According to A. V. Platonov, two openly standing rangefinders with a four-meter base DM-4, five DM-3 and two DM-1, 5 were installed on the battleship. But A. Vasiliev believes that the battleship received not two, but as many as four, and not just open four-meter rangefinder, and full-fledged rangefinder command station KDP2-4. And here, most likely, there are inaccuracies in both respected authors.
The fact is that the KDP-4 is clearly visible in the photographs and drawings of the October Revolution, but not 4, as A. Vasiliev wrote, but only 2.
Thus, it should be assumed that A. V. Platonov, who correctly indicated the number (2) but incorrectly - the type of device, because in fact it was the KDP-4, and not the open DM-4, that was installed on the battleship. At the same time, A. Vasiliev, having correctly indicated the KDP-4, made a mistake in their number.
Well, in the best position predictably turned out to be the battleship "Parizhskaya Kommuna", which, in addition to two DM-3 and five DM-1, 5, which stood openly, had as many as four command and range-finding points KDP-4. However, some mysteries remain here as well.
The fact is that in the USSR there were several KDP-4. The simplest of them, KDP-4 (B-12), had one 4-meter rangefinder DM-4, a stereotube ST-3, a sighting device for the central aiming EP, as well as two telescopic tubes for the gunners of the post. The walls and roof of the KDP were protected by 5 mm armor plates, the mass of the KDP was 6.5 tons, and it was serviced by 5 people, not counting the fire controller.
But, in addition to the above-described KDP-4 (B-12), there were also more advanced modifications, such as KDP2-4 (B-12-4), and further. They had not one, but two rangefinders with a base of 4 m, as well as a slightly different composition of other equipment: they did not have a ST-3 stereoscope, the center sighting sight was of a different brand (VNTs-2, although it is possible that VMTs-4), the walls and the roof were only 2 mm thick, but the number of maintenance personnel increased to 8 people. Apparently, thanks to the thinner walls, the mass of the KDP remained the same, that is, 6, 5 tons. So, unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what type of KDP was installed on the "Paris Commune": some sources give KDP-4, but for example, A. Vasiliev claims that all the same KDP2-4, but at the same time he does not bring B-12-4, but B-12!
In the opinion of the author of this article, this was the case. On the "October Revolution" were installed two KDP-4 (B-12) with one rangefinder and a stereo tube ST-3. And on the "Paris Commune" were installed four KDP2-4 (B-12-4), or even a later version. Of course, this is just an opinion, supported by the study of photographs and schemes of ships, and there is a possibility of error.
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the presence of as many as four command and rangefinder posts, equipped with two (and even one!) Four-meter rangefinder each, gave the Paris Commune's anti-mine caliber a huge advantage over the Marat and a significant "October Revolution". After all, the KDP-4, of course, could be used to ensure the firing of the main caliber, both in the event of a KDP-6 failure, and in conjunction with them.
Further, the author should have described the anti-aircraft weapons of Soviet battleships, but this is a fairly large topic worthy of a separate article. Therefore, we will leave it for a separate material and move on to the torpedo weapons "Marat", "October Revolution" and "Paris Commune".
Torpedo armament
In addition to artillery, battleships of the "Sevastopol" type were also armed with "self-propelled mines": four torpedo tubes with ammunition load of 12 torpedoes were placed in the bows of the ships. Of course, their presence on dreadnoughts was an anachronism and represented a waste of payload - however, in the period before the First World War, by all tactical views, they were considered necessary. Torpedo tubes were installed on all battleships and battlecruisers of Great Britain and Germany, so their presence on ships laid down in 1909 is, so to speak, "an inevitable evil", the same as a ram on battleships of the era of the Russo-Japanese war …
However, it should be noted that the Russian Empire lagged behind the leading naval powers in torpedo business. While the latter switched to 533-mm caliber and more, the Russian navy was forced to be content with only 450-mm torpedoes. And so, during the First World War, the same British fleet was armed with a 533-mm torpedo carrying 234 kg of trinitrotoluene at a distance of just over 4 km (4 110 m) at 45 knots, and the best domestic 450-mm torpedo mod. 1912 g.could hit the target with 100 kg of TNT at a speed of 43 knots at a distance of no more than 2 km. The British torpedo also had a long-range mode - it could pass 9 830 m at a speed of 31 knots. Domestic ammunition had two such modes - 5,000 m at 30 knots. or 6,000 m at 28 knots. In other words, we can say that the small caliber of domestic torpedo weapons led to the fact that in terms of power and range it was outperformed by 533-mm "compatriots" by about half.
Thus, we can say that in the period between the two world wars, the torpedoes of battleships of the "Sevastopol" type finally lost even their theoretical combat value (they never had a practical one). At the same time, as mentioned above, the leadership of the Naval Forces of the Red Army clearly understood the need to strengthen the combat potential of battleships of this type. Obviously, this kind of modernization should have led to significant overloads, and the associated loss of travel speed, and the latter was considered the most important tactical advantage of the "Sevastopol" and the release of internal premises, but at least for the same cellars for anti-aircraft ammunition. In addition, the need for a sharp increase in anti-aircraft weapons required an increase in the size of the crew and additional space for their calculations. It is obvious that the "write-off" of the battleship torpedoes would have freed up at least a little space in the cockpits and cabins.
Nevertheless, oddly enough, nothing of the kind was done. Of the three battleships, only the Parizhskaya Kommuna lost torpedo armament during upgrades - and even then, there is a persistent feeling that this was not done for the above reasons, but only because of the installation of the so-called "blisters" (boules), shoot through which torpedoes would be too difficult. As for the "Marat" and "October Revolution", the torpedo armament on them was not only completely preserved, but also improved by installing modern torpedo firing control devices "MAK" at that time. And all this was done for a reason, because the torpedoists of battleships were constantly improving their combat skills. So, in the period from 1927 to 1939, that is, in 12 years from the battleship "Marat" was made as many as 87 torpedo launches, while 7 torpedoes were lost.
How were the Soviet admirals going to lead battleships of the "Sevastopol" type in dashing torpedo attacks, and against whom? For the time being, these questions remain a complete mystery to the author.
