Recently, the Chinese agency Sina released an article, the brief meaning of which is as follows: Russia builds its Project 6363 Varshavyanka submarines faster than anyone else in the world. A developed state spends four to seven years on a non-nuclear submarine, while Russia manages a single Varshavyanka in about two and a half years.
At the end of the article, the Chinese edition asks the question: will China be able to surpass Russia? The timing of the construction of Chinese submarines in China is usually kept secret, but not so long ago, China won the right to supply a version of its project 041 submarine to Thailand, and now it will not be possible to hide the timing of the construction of submarines.
Let's give a hint to the Chinese edition: they are approximately equal to the world average for boats of this class and range from 3 to 4 years. And so it will be with Thai submarines.
Varshavyanki are being built really faster.
But it's not that simple.
Mass export submarine
Sina, however, confused something: the boats of Project 636 were not built in the USSR, these boats are a development of the export version of Project 877 and saw life after the collapse of the USSR. But they were built really quickly. However, the name "Varshavyanka" was born in relation to 877 boats and the Chinese could confuse them.
Project 636 was, in a sense, a breakthrough. Firstly, domestic shipbuilders were able to achieve a really very fast construction time for these boats. Secondly, this was done without prejudice to performance characteristics - the boats turned out to be really good. For its time, of course.
We will not repeat propaganda clichés about “black holes in the ocean”, a nickname that the 636 project inherited from its predecessor, the Project 877 boats. Being a “black hole” is not good, it’s bad, because only a few can find a zone with a low background noise for the enemy more difficult than with an elevated one - the boat should not stand out against the background of the natural acoustic background. But we must admit that the secrecy of this submarine for its time was very good and really even now allows, in some cases, to reach the distance of launching a torpedo at a western nuclear submarine, albeit not for long.
“Varshavyanka” turned out to be easy to operate, with good habitability, with a hydroacoustic complex, good for its time, and serious modernization potential.
This was all the more important because this project was originally intended for export. Therefore, they began to build them for the Chinese. Indeed, the boat's export potential turned out to be excellent.
At the moment, ten such submarines of various modifications are in the ranks of the Chinese Navy, four in the Algerian Navy, and six in the Vietnamese Navy. Successful "Varshavyanka" repeated the export success of their "ancestor" - Project 877.
Six more submarines of Project 6363 were built for the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, and the same number is being built for the Pacific Fleet.
And here it is worth asking a simple question - if the boat is for export, then why is it being built for the Russian Navy?
And they are building it because the project that was intended for our fleet - 677 "Lada", which is called "did not go".
Not yet a breakthrough
While boats of Project 636 were being built for foreign customers, a completely different ship was created for the Russian Navy. Project 677 (code "Lada") was supposed to be a real breakthrough into the future, "a class" superior to the previous diesel boats in everything.
Single body design. Unlike the Varshavyanka, the Lada are conceived without the traditional two-hull architecture, they have one building. This made it possible to significantly reduce the severity of such a problem as the visibility of submarines in the conditions of the enemy's use of low-frequency acoustic "illumination".
Long waves created by various sources, reaching the double-hull boat, cause its light external structures to vibrate and reflect the wave back into the water column, and such a reflected wave, like the original one, propagates very far. In such conditions, low noise does nothing - the boat may not make any sounds at all, but it will be detected tens of kilometers away. The single-body rigid design is capable of absorbing much more wave energy without reflecting it back, and its visibility is much lower in this type of search.
Smaller dimensions … The size of the boat has been reduced, which also reduces visibility. Firstly, the smaller the boat, the less impact it has on the water column, which is "expanded" during movement - and this also generates a "secondary" infrasound, because the movement of water masses cannot but be accompanied by the appearance of waves. And they learned to detect them, and, due to their great length, they also spread very far. Lada wins here.
The second most important quality of a smaller boat is a less pronounced manifestation of surface wave and electrical (orientation of ions in sea water under the influence of the boat's mass) disturbances caused by a boat moving under water. This has already been written (here and here). At present, the detection of a submarine by surface wave and electrical manifestations using the radar of an anti-submarine aircraft is the main type of search in the US and Japanese navies. The Americans even gave up the technical possibility of setting up a "field" of hydroacoustic buoys - they simply do not need it, they simply "see" during the flight the place under which the submarine is located. The fact that the US Navy's BPA went to medium heights is also known. There is no way to completely eliminate such a detection, however, it is known that the smaller the sub, the less surface disturbances it causes. A trifle, but in some circumstances it will be of decisive importance, so the reduced underwater displacement of the Lada is an important step forward.
All these are far from the only advanced features of Project 677. New Automated Combat Control System, new electronics, less noisy torpedo tubes, a fundamentally new permanent magnet electric motor - if without details, then this technology can also be used to reduce the physical fields of the boat and its visibility …
And, of course, an air-independent power plant. VNEU was supposed to give the boat completely new operational capabilities. If a standard "Varshavyanka" or "Halibut", when leaving the danger zone in a jerk, at the maximum speed, loses its battery charge in less than a few (we will do without details here) hours, then VNEU allows you not to float to charge the batteries for many days. The boat becomes in its properties similar to an atomic one, with the exception of underwater speed.
"Lada" was supposed to be one of the most modern non-nuclear submarines.
Unfortunately for the project, the 90s were going on in our country.
The lead submarine of project 677 B-585 "St. Petersburg" was laid down at the Admiralty shipyards (in the same place where the "Varshavyanka" is being built at a record pace) back in 1997. To date, the ship cannot be considered a full-fledged combat unit and has been in trial operation since 2010. In fact, we can say that it is still not finished, and, apparently, will not be now.
It is known that after a huge number of unsuccessful attempts to bring the "St. Petersburg" to combat readiness, Project 677 was radically redesigned. Perhaps, as in the case of "Ash" and "Borey", starting with the next boat, "Kronstadt", we will simply see another submarine - in the end, "Borey-A" and "Ash-M" even have totally different hulls, by compared to the lead ships, why shouldn't the first serial submarine of Project 677 be reworked as well …
There were a lot of problems with the boat. Most of the information is closed, but it is known that something went wrong with the new electric propulsion scheme, many of the newest systems simply do not work as they should, and most importantly, VNEU did not work out. They simply could not do it, until now. Recent news that these boats will not have it at all, and instead will have lithium-ion batteries - from this series.
A little earlier, under Admiral Vysotsky, it almost cost the project its life, however, and now voices are being heard demanding to stop investing money in Lada.
This is definitely wrong. Modern technology has reached such a level of complexity that it will be impossible to start working on the next generation without having passed this generation, without having worked out all the technical difficulties, without getting rid of "childhood diseases" in the design, without building at least a small series. Refusal to fine-tune the Lada, if it actually happened, would mean for Russia the departure from the club of advanced submarine builders. Fortunately, this did not happen, but the problems with VNEU indicate that it is too early to relax.
With tremendous stress and anguish, with mistakes and failures, this project is moving forward. Let's hope that over time, all issues on the 677 project will be resolved and the boat will be "brought to mind" - we simply have no other choice, and the matter is not even in VNEU and not in the non-nuclear submarines themselves. Or rather, not so much in them.
Electric propulsion in a form similar to the one in which they are trying to implement it on the "Lada" would be vital for our future nuclear submarines …
You cannot retreat.
And with the construction time of the 677th project, the Chinese would be worth comparing themselves and others - "St. Petersburg" was founded in 1997, launched in 2004, and commissioned in 2010. Thirteen years from the laying to the raising of the Andreevsky flag, and the boat is not ready and may never be. B-586 "Kronstadt" - laid down in 2005, launched thirteen years and two months later - affected by the complete redesign of the project. The boat is still under construction, tentatively will be commissioned next year. B-587 - "Velikie Luki" - began to build in 2006, had to be re-mortgaged (!) In 2015. They promise to complete it in 2021.
It must be understood that these three unfortunate ships, most likely, will not become full-fledged combat units. Perhaps only "Velikie Luki", but not a fact.
But the next ones … at the Army-2019 forum, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract for the construction of a pair of Project 677 boats. Apparently, these will be the first fully operational Lada. But the question of VNEU has not been resolved and whether it will be on the new boats is unclear. How quickly the boats will be built is also unclear.
"Varshavyanka" to the rescue? Yes, but there are questions
It was these dramatic events that became the reason that the export boats of Project 6363 ended up in the Navy. The decision turned out to be salutary - by that time there was only one Alrosa of project 877B left on the Black Sea Fleet with vague prospects due to the technical state. Likewise, there is a shortage of new submarines in the Pacific. You have to understand - "Varshavyanka" is in no way equal to the Japanese "Soryu". But such submarines are better than none. When choosing between nothing and an outdated sub, it is worth choosing an outdated sub. This is especially true since each of the "Varshavyanka" that entered the Navy is a carrier of the "Caliber" cruise missiles.
For understanding - in the Pacific Fleet there is still not a single carrier of such weapons. And this is four years after its first combat use! The submarines will have to increase the "total salvo" of the Pacific Fleet. Yes, and purely for submarine warfare, with its torpedoes and mining, they are needed.
But the form in which the Varshavyankas are delivered to the Navy raises questions.
If boats are exported with a flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA), then “our boats” do not have it - the design is simplified. And this is a very important equipment for the timely detection of enemy boats. Unlike the same Indian project 877, ours are still equipped with an insufficient number of antediluvian hydroacoustic countermeasures, which is guaranteed to thwart an attempt to evade an enemy torpedo attack. BIUS and boat electronics are extremely far from even what we ourselves know how to do. All this reduces the combat potential of new submarines, and for no objective reason whatsoever. About the fact that the Navy blockage and with torpedoes, and anti-torpedo delaysIt has also been written more than once, and there are no objective reasons here either, especially with anti-torpedoes for which Russia is the world leader. There are no significant numbers of them in service with the submarine only because someone decided so. As a result, the decision to build a series of "Varshavyanks" for Russia, which saved the Navy's combat personnel, turned out to be half-hearted. And, it is worth repeating, not because we cannot. Because we don't want to.
The submarines under construction could well have onboard sonar antennas.
As a result, brand new submarines are already in need of extensive modernization. However, the Navy is no stranger to pretending that everything is fine anyway.
Most recently, the "Independent Military Review" came out article by M. Klimov "Varshavyanka need an upgrade", dedicated to some aspects of modernization of submarines of projects 6363 and 877, available in service with the Navy.
I would like to add to this the fact that part of the modernization work can be done, starting from the reserve for export boats, for example, the same GPBA. Another important step would be to equip the Varshavyanka under construction and Project 6363 and 877 boats already built and operated by the fleet with lithium-ion batteries. It is very difficult and unreasonably expensive (and long) to integrate VNEU into an already built boat. But replacing the batteries seems to be a much simpler action, which will also significantly increase the duration of the boat's stay under water.
Will this be done? Let's see. There are no reasons for pessimism in this case, but there is no reason for optimism either. But the fact that the problem of having a full-fledged telecontrol of torpedoes and the introduction of a sufficient number of 324-mm anti-torpedoes into the ammunition load will finally be solved is no longer believed at all. But you have to repeat it all the same.
And what about the Chinese?
The main Chinese submarine currently in serial production is Project 041, which in the West is called "type 039A" or "Yuan-class". It is these submarines that will be supplied to both Thailand, which was mentioned above, and Pakistan (in the latter case, through joint construction). It is known that, like our Varshavyanka, the 041 project has a two-body architecture.
It is also known that the Chinese are already ahead of us in introducing full-fledged telecontrol of torpedoes - and we did it for them (for Chinese torpedoes - article "Torpedoes of the Great Neighbor" by M. Klimov). We do not have this for ourselves, but for export - quite. Also of interest are reports on the presence of VNEU on Chinese boats. According to available Western expert estimates, the Chinese VNEU do not show the required performance characteristics and need serious revision, which is being actively pursued. Let's not speculate on these assessments - whatever this VNEU turns out to be, the Chinese have it. However, other sources report that VNEU was dismantled due to low performance characteristics. One way or another, we don't have them at all.
Also known are the work of the Chinese on copying weapons control systems and other systems of Western-style submarines, mainly Thales.
All of the above suggests that our Varshavyanka are likely to yield to the 041 project in battle. And this, we repeat, there are no objective reasons - only organizational, multiplied by the evil will of certain individuals and the thirst for profit from others.
What conclusions can be drawn from all this? We have a lot of work to do. To bring to the "series" of boats of the project 677. To create a VNEU for them. On debugging serial production to a level that allows building these boats in at least four years. For the extensive modernization of "Varshavyanka" and "Halibut". On the introduction of anti-torpedoes and modernization of torpedo control.
Let us sincerely hope that all this will be done. Even if the speed of construction of submarines at the same time grows slightly - up to the world average, for example.
After all, a truly combat-ready submarine force is much more important for us than the praise of a Chinese newspaper for the rapid construction of already obsolete submarines.
