There is hardly a topic in the modern information field that is more controversial than the potential legalization of private military companies in Russia. Both President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke positively on this topic. The idea of legalizing such organizations has had and still has strong support among retired military personnel, in the State Duma and in part of society.
However, this is Russia, and things are still there. Bye. The last attempt of the deputies of "Fair Russia" to bring PMCs out of the "shadow" failed at the stage of agreeing the bill with the government, and the reasons for refusing to approve the bill not only ran counter to common sense, but were also flagrantly illiterate legally. However, this is the Russian government, it is difficult to expect anything else from it.
The legalization of PMCs is somewhat complicated by the fact that the public does not have a strong opinion on this issue and instead of understanding it carries a set of myths in their heads. The author published in due time an educational program article on private military companies in Russia, familiarization with it is strongly recommended before speaking on the topic … Although it is superficial and far from exhaustive, it gives some idea of the subject.
In connection with the sharp increase in the scale of the activities of such formations in Africa, one should expect that the resistance of the amusing alliance of the "systemic" liberals, the Ministry of Defense and the FSB "adjoining them" will be overcome, and one way or another, with some or other reservations, but private military companies will be legalized.
It makes sense to identify those opportunities for their recruitment and use, which must necessarily be legal for domestic PMCs in the future.
One of the most popular activities of such organizations is the protection of ships from pirates and terrorists. Given that PMCs are capable of exerting a truly tectonic impact on this area of activity, it makes sense to dwell on their participation in ensuring maritime security in more detail.
Maritime security or MARSEC has become one of the most coveted areas of activity for any PMC, small or large. It is much easier and safer to repulse an attack of pirates on boats from a high-board ship than to guard a convoy with a VIP-person somewhere in not the calmest regions of Iraq, and it is not necessary to repulse attacks often, pirates, as a rule, do not even have enough warning shots, but just a demonstration of weapons.
With the growing number of pirate attacks on merchant ships in the Indian Ocean, PMC guards are firmly "registered" on the decks. And although there were excesses with them (from the hunt for people for fun, to the "urban legend" of mercenaries - pseudo-pirate detachments trained and equipped by NATO special services, which no security team has supposedly survived the clashes with. However, this may well turn out to be true) However, the statistics stubbornly assert that the presence of such a group on board the vessel guarantees safety with a probability close to 100%.
But time passed and new methods were born. One of them was the emergence of the so-called "arsenal ships". Do not confuse this with the projects of the Pentagon's missile cruisers, everything is simpler.
It's just a "floating weapon".
As you know, pirates are not a global force, their attacks are seriously limited in place. First of all, it is the Gulf of Aden and the waters to the east and southeast. The second region with a high risk of pirate attacks is the Strait of Malacca. Pirates are different there, and there, of course. The third "hot spot" is the Gulf of Guinea. There are others that are less stressful.
Arsenals of private military companies ply in the areas of entry and exit from these waters, relatively speaking, on the border of the "pirate zone". When the ship approached, with the owner of which the PMC had a contract, a security group climbed aboard, which accompanied him throughout the dangerous area. At the end of the section, the group left for another arsenal ship.
This tactic made it possible to solve a lot of problems. For example, there was no need to deliver weapons to the sovereign territory of any country, to resolve all permissive issues and obtain licenses - weapons were always at sea. Similarly, the fighters were also on these ships, and in the case of them there was no need to ensure their flights from countries where the ship could enter after passing through the danger zone.
In fact, the presence of such arsenal ships at sea at some point would make the extensive presence of navies in the same Gulf of Aden almost unnecessary.
In Russia, as indicated in the article at the link, the pioneer of organizing such a scheme was the company Moran Group and personally V. Gusev. Unfortunately, it was the effectiveness of their tactics that played a cruel joke on them, forcing competitors to crack down on annoying Russian "unsportsmanlike" methods. However, the business survived, but it was very expensive for V. Gusev.
It is worth taking a closer look at this experience.
Currently, the number of pirate attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden is negligible. This is due to the extensive presence of warships from different countries in the region. In theory, however, it is much easier and cheaper for the state to do it.
Legalized PMCs may well be present in such regions in the same way as the Moran group was present. Moreover, you can go further, and instead of sending warships to the Navy, involve PMCs, whose task could be assigned not only to finding guard groups on ships, but also aerial reconnaissance using UAVs, helicopters and aircraft, and even the release of ships, the crews of which could hide from a pirate attack in the ship's "citadel".
In fact, the Navy would have only one task left - hostage rescue operations, for which in dangerous regions sometimes ships with special forces specially trained and equipped to perform such tasks could be present, no more than one per region.
Why is such a scheme more profitable?
The fact that PMCs are private structures and do not use public money. Arsenal ships are bought and rebuilt at their own expense. Fighters, equipment, going out to sea are paid by clients - shipping companies. If the state engages PMCs to solve some problems (for example, aerial reconnaissance), then the necessary equipment (for example, patrol aircraft) PMCs will have to buy. Naturally, when working for the same Navy, PMC services will cost the state money, but less if you do everything yourself.
Relatively speaking, if sending some duty forces to the Gulf of Aden for several months would cost the fleet a billion rubles, then the starting price in the tender for the same, but by the hands of "private traders", would be, for example, eight hundred million. At the same time, the state would take back part of the money paid under the contract as taxes.
Even greater prospects open up if mercenaries are viewed not as something alien, which has to be endured by force, but as a kind of reserve for emergencies.
In most countries where private military companies are legalized, various restrictions are imposed on their equipment, so Eric Prince's structures (from “Black Water” onwards) have never been able to obtain permission from the US authorities to buy the weapons they wanted - light armed airplanes, for example. Prince's people, however, are still fighting in Libya on such planes, and in a funny way, against the same client who is supported by Russia - Marshal Haftar. But the planes do not formally belong to Prince …
Nothing interferes (in theory, in practice - our mentality interferes) to "unscrew the screws" and give PMCs the right to have guns on ships, up to 76-mm caliber, heavy machine guns, anti-sabotage grenade launchers, to have "door" machine guns on helicopters and airplanes. When entering the port, you can oblige them to hand over all equipment and weapons for storage, so that even technically it would not be possible to use all this on the territory of the Russian Federation (and this should be strictly prohibited). Then, in the event of some kind of emergency, all these forces could be hired in an organized manner as an auxiliary fleet, simultaneously on the basis of a special procedure, mobilizing personnel into the ranks of the RF Armed Forces. In fact, allowing the existence of such structures, Russia would shift the formation of part of the reserves in case of hostilities onto the shoulders of private traders.
Similarly, the formation of anti-piracy forces, the recruitment of personnel and fighters, the purchase of weapons and ammunition would be on the shoulders of private traders. And those tasks that the Navy would have dumped on them would have been paid for by the state, but at a much lower cost than if the fleet itself did it.
Naturally, it will be necessary to somehow dock this order with the same UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but this is not such a big problem.
And of course, having at hand, plus to the Armed Forces, controlled military forces, with experience of a global presence in different parts of the planet, is very useful in light of the growth in the number and strength of various terrorist organizations. As already mentioned in the commentary on the raising of the St. Andrew's flag on the sub-ship of project 22160, a process of changing the nature of threats is taking place in the world - purely criminal piracy is declining, while terrorism is increasing, and in some cases, non-state entities are already able to challenge national governments. In such a situation, every barrel and every ship is important.
Let's compare a similar situation with what we have now.
The navy came up with flawed "anti-piracy" ship, extremely limitedly suitable for anti-piracy and almost unsuitable for anti-terrorist missions. For thirty-six billion rubles, a series of six such ships is being built, crews are being formed, which will be "turned off" from the real security of the country. Then these forces (in theory, in practice - not a fact) will be sent to the "pirate-dangerous" regions of the world and for the money of the Russian budget they will do something there, apparently, unsuccessfully.
If everything was organized "according to the mind", then a tender would be announced for tasks to combat piracy, with qualification requirements for participants, including the need to purchase ships, vessels, aviation, etc., and strictly in the Russian Federation (a list of what you can buy abroad would also be - we do not do much at all or do badly, or do it very expensively. More often than not, it is both bad and expensive). The starting price of the tender would have been calculated in advance as, for example, 75% of the cost of a military cruise of the Navy ships, after which the winning PMC would start preparing such an expedition. With a "patent" from the Russian Federation.
And thirty-six billion would have been spent on real warships, not a useless semi-civilian "ersatz".
Of course, the functionality of PMCs would be limited in comparison with the Navy - so it is unlikely that they could stop and inspect all ships and boats in a row that they would consider suspicious. But they could "transfer" these contacts to someone, the same Chinese, NATO or anyone else.
A separate topic is assistance to the Navy and the Special Operations Forces in carrying out special operations. Sooner or later, but over time, the ships of Russian PMCs would "become familiar" in different parts of the world, and no one would notice that there were completely different people among the guards, and there were a couple of extra boats or containers on board. And this, too, would not cost the state money.
In some cases, the FSB could also hire such structures, for example, to dramatically increase its forces in a particular region.
And there is a purely economic effect from such events. If the Navy would simply save money on the fight against piracy by delegating it to "independent operators", then private clients would rather hire PMCs for themselves for money that would then be taxed in Russia, and PMCs themselves, under licensing conditions, are forced to buy weapons and equipment in the Russian Federation, at least a little, but would feed the domestic military-industrial complex and the shipbuilding industry (or ship repair). In general, this is beneficial for the country.
But most importantly, unusual tasks would have been removed from the Navy. The fleet is an instrument of war, or of deterring war. To dilute its already meager resources into something incomprehensible is just a crime, especially in today's poorly predictable world. In such conditions, it would be a very reasonable decision to shift some of the "non-core" tasks onto third-party contractors, and even at their expense. It would also be very nice to receive, albeit a weak, low-quality, but still organized and trained military force, which could be used as a kind of reserve in secondary directions, almost free of charge.
Alas, a reasonable approach is not in honor in Russia. Officials are concerned that “if it didn't work out,” the FSB does not want to do unnecessary work, the Ministry of Defense does not understand what it wants at all, the liberals in the Government do not want their Anglo-Saxon deities to be angry with them, and are ready to pay any price for it, people wants it to be "like in the USSR" (having long forgotten how it was there, in the USSR), and in the end we have what we have.
But if, as one song says, “the mind wins someday,” then such opportunities cannot be missed.
In the meantime, we can only hope for the best.
