After the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda terrorist group were squeezed out of Kabul and the fortified cave complex Tora Bora in November-December 2001, some of the militants retreated to the Gardez region in southeastern Afghanistan. The experience of the operation in Tora-Bora has clearly demonstrated that it is impossible to destroy an enemy who has taken refuge in numerous extended mountain caves with only massive airstrikes. In early 2002, the American command received intelligence that the militants were regrouping in the Shahi-Kot valley. Anticipating the actions of the Islamists, the Americans decided to conduct an air-ground operation. However, the strength and determination of the enemy to fight were not adequately assessed. Due to the fact that the Taliban forces opposing the international anti-terrorist coalition had previously avoided direct and prolonged clashes, the US command was "dizzy with success."
Preparations for Operation Anaconda began in early February 2002. In the course of its implementation, it was planned to land helicopter assault forces in eight key places in the valley, cut off all escape routes, and then destroy the enemy with air strikes. The Shahi Kot Valley is located in a remote mountainous area in Paktika province, between the cities of Khost and Gardez. With a length of about 8 km and a width of about 4 km, it is located at an altitude of 2200 m and is surrounded from the west by mountains with a height of more than 2, 7 km, in the east, the height of the mountains reaches 3, 3 km. The valley has many karst and man-made caves and narrow crevices. There are only two roads leading to the valley, and both of them can be blocked with small forces. Thus, the Taliban had to find themselves "between a rock and a hard place."
The operation was scheduled for the end of February, but due to bad weather conditions that impeded aviation operations, its start was postponed to March 2. The plan provided for a fairly simple scenario of actions. The armed formations of the Northern Alliance (more than 1000 Afghans), friendly to the Americans, were to enter the valley, and three American battalions (1200 people) and special forces of the United States, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Norway and France (several hundred people) were to block all exits from it, which would ensure the encirclement of the enemy. The command of the US armed forces in Afghanistan, which did not have reliable data on the enemy's forces, hoped for an easy victory, in reality, al-Qaeda fighters, of whom there were much more than it seemed in the area, were ready for defense and were determined to fight … It was believed that there were from 200 to 300 militants in this area, armed mainly with small arms, in fact, there were more than 1000 of them. By and large, Operation Anaconda was originally planned as a police action to “clean up” the valley and four surrounding villages: Marzarak, Babulkel, Serkhankel and Zerki Kale.
According to the generals' plan, the mountains and ridges around the valley were supposed to block the battle groups of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division of the US Army and the 1st Battalion of the 87th Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, which formed the Serp "And" Anvil ". Afghans of the "Northern Alliance" and special forces, split into small units, united in the tactical group "Hammer". They were supposed to comb the area and villages immediately after blocking the valley. Air support was provided by US Air Force planes and helicopters and French fighter-bombers. In addition to the American special forces, operatives from Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Norway and New Zealand were included in the units of the Hammer group.
On March 1, 2002, special forces groups with the callsigns "Juliet", "India", "Mako 31" and their supporting American and Canadian sniper pairs moved out of the Gardez area in order to take positions at the exits from the valley. At the same time, they managed to quietly eliminate the observers on a hill that controlled the approaches and enemy crew with a 12, 7-mm DShK machine gun. The Juliet and India groups were mainly composed of Delta soldiers. The Mako 31 group, which consisted of the DEVGRU naval special forces, was tasked with creating an observation post on a hill, from where the landing zone of the Anvil landing group was viewed.
Towards midnight, the forces of the Hammer group began to move into the area in off-road vehicles. It was not possible to drive up unnoticed, because of the bad road and the threat of falling into the abyss, it was decided to turn on the headlights, thereby unmasking itself. Thus, the element of surprise was lost. As the movement proceeded, small groups were separated from the main forces, which took up positions on hills and convenient points for observation and control of the terrain. One of these groups, which did not identify itself on the ground as friendly forces, was incorrectly identified by the operators of the AS-130N gunship patrolling in the air, mistaken for suitable Taliban reinforcements and fired at from onboard guns. As a result, Warrant Officer of the Special Forces Stanley Harriman died, 12 more Afghans and 1 special forces were wounded of varying severity.
The main part of the Hammer tactical group reached their positions by 5.30 am and stood up in anticipation of an air raid on the mountain range, where, as it was assumed, the enemy forces were hiding. The active phase of the operation began in the early morning of March 2, when several large-caliber bombs were dropped on the mountains by an American bomber.
From the very beginning of the operation, everything did not go as planned by the American strategists. The result of the bombing was exactly the opposite of what the Americans had hoped for. Instead of running in panic and hiding, the Taliban drove up several pickups with 14.5mm PGI installations, mortars and recoilless vehicles and began firing at the Hammer group vehicles that had accumulated in a small space in front of the valley entrance. As a result of the shelling, about 40 special forces and the Afghans accompanying them were killed or injured. The spetsnaz attempt to move deeper into the valley met with fierce resistance from small arms fire, heavy machine guns and 82-mm mortars. At that moment, it finally became clear that a surprise attack would not work and the Taliban's defenses were well prepared. The Afghan forces of the "Northern Alliance" attached to the special forces, after the start of the battle, hastily retreated to the village of Karvazi, which is outside the combat zone.
At this point, US CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters began the landing of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions (200 in total) on the eastern and northern edge of the valley to prevent the encircled Taliban from escaping. Almost immediately after the landing, on the way to their blocking positions, soldiers of the 10th division landed from helicopters fell into a "fire bag". Small arms from machine guns to heavy machine guns of 14, 5-mm caliber were fired at the paratroopers from three sides; 82-mm mortars also took part in the shelling. Due to the fact that the second wave of the landing was canceled, Charlie Company had only one 120-mm mortar with limited ammunition at its disposal from the heavy weapons. As a result, the mountain riflemen of Charlie Company (86 men), 1st Battalion, 87th Regiment, 10th Division lay down behind makeshift shelters at the southern entrance to the valley and spent the whole day in a fierce firefight. During the battle, 28 American servicemen were injured of varying severity. From the final extermination they were saved by the actions of aviation, which were corrected by the officer of the Australian SAS, Martin Wallace, who was in the battle formations of the company. In addition to the mountain riflemen of the 10th Division, other groups, taking up positions on the slopes adjacent to the valley, repeatedly requested air support throughout the day.
The defenders were greatly assisted by sniper pairs with large-caliber rifles, who took up positions on the hills. They repeatedly managed to destroy fire spotters, machine gunners and mortar crews at the maximum firing distance. During the battle, successful hits were recorded at ranges of 2300 and 2400 meters.
Air support to American soldiers stuck in the mountains of Afghanistan was provided by aircraft: B-1B, B-52H, F-15E, F-16C. On the first day of Operation Anaconda, aviation dropped over 80 tons of bombs in the Shahi-Kot valley, including a volumetric explosion weighing 907 kg. But the most significant support was provided by five AN-64A Apache helicopters of the 101st Aviation Battalion of the 159th Aviation Brigade. In the daytime, the tasks of direct air support were assigned to combat helicopters, at night - the actions of ground forces were supported by the AS-130N. "Gunships" were not used during daylight hours due to the threat of being hit by MANPADS. At that time, in Afghanistan, the American contingent had only seven AN-64A Apache combat helicopters. During the battle, patrolling along the valley, the Apache crews acted at the request of ground forces or searched for targets on their own, using the entire available range of weapons: Hellfire ATGM, 70-mm unguided missiles and 30-mm cannons. Thanks to the actions of combat helicopters, soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division were able to equip positions for 81-mm mortars, which seriously strengthened their defenses and helped in the future to repel Taliban attacks.
During combat missions on the first day of Operation Apaches, they received multiple combat injuries. The first attack helicopter dropped out of the game shortly after the start of the active phase of the operation. At 0645 hours, a grenade fired from an RPG exploded near the AN-64A of senior warrant officer Jim Hardy. At the same time, the sighting and sighting system and the gun were damaged by shrapnel. A few minutes later, the second helicopter was damaged. The Apache commander, Senior Warrant Officer Keith Harley, was wounded by a bullet that pierced the armored glass of the cockpit canopy, and Captain Bill Ryan, Air Company Commander, who was in the weapons operator's cabin, was also slightly wounded. After the battle, the helicopter counted 13 bullet holes of 12.7 mm. On the dashboard in the cockpit, the oil system alarm went on. Both combat helicopters pulled out of the battle, heading for a forward refueling and supply point located in Kandahar. The Harley helicopter was able to fly only one and a half kilometers, after which, due to the threat of an uncontrolled fall, he made an emergency landing. As it turned out later, the helicopter had completely drained oil and most of the hydraulic fluid. The crew, after landing, despite the wounds, managed to safely leave the firing zone. Pilot Jim Hardy decided to continue the flight in the damaged car, spending another 26 minutes in the air, despite the fact that Boeing guarantees the operation of helicopter systems without oil for 30 minutes. In a short time period, three helicopters were out of order for the Americans due to the strongest anti-aircraft fire. Almost simultaneously with the Apaches, the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was damaged, on board of which was the landing commander, Colonel Frank Wichinski. An RPG grenade exploded under the fuselage of the helicopter, after which the pilot made an emergency landing.
On this day, all seven Apaches had combat damage of varying severity. During the battle on March 2, combat helicopters surpassed all other types of aircraft that provided air support to ground units in terms of the effectiveness of the impact on the enemy.
The soldiers of the Hammer and Anvil groups, fixed on the slopes of the mountains and at the entrances to the valley, as well as sniper couples and observers spent a very “fun” night, during which they had to shoot back from the militants. If it were not for the continuously hanging in the air "gunships", a significant part of the Americans might not have survived this night.
Already on the first day of the operation, when reconnaissance miscalculations became apparent, the number of the landing force had to be increased by attracting additional units. An additional several hundred soldiers and officers were airlifted by helicopters. Only the next day, in the northern part of the valley, where the fire was not so strong, a second wave of assault forces of 200 people was able to land. In addition to small arms, they had several 81 and 120-mm mortars.
Air support for ground forces was provided by A-10A, AC-130H, B-1B, B-52H, F-15E, F-16C, F-14D, F / A-18C, Mirage 2000DS aircraft. In this operation, the F-14D heavy carrier-based fighters ending their combat careers struck with GBU-38 JDAM bombs at previously reconnoitered targets. French fighter-bombers Mirage 2000DS operated from the Manas airbase located in Kyrgyzstan.
However, despite the landing of additional forces and the unwinding flywheel of the airstrikes, the enemy showed no intention of retreating. In this regard, it was decided to land additional special forces on the commanding heights. On the night of March 3, on two CH-47s of the 160th Special Forces Aviation Regiment of the US Army, an attempt was made to deliver a special forces group to the highest point dominating the terrain - Mount Takur-Gar, from where the view blocked the entire valley for 15 km around. The pilots flew helicopters with night vision goggles.
On board the helicopters were soldiers of the special forces unit SEAL BMC USA. The reconnaissance of the area was carried out by the thermal imaging equipment of the AC-130N aircraft, which did not reveal any signs of the enemy's presence in the area. As it turned out later, not far from the top of the mountain, among the large rock debris, several shelters were equipped, covered with stone chips on top. Due to the haste (they wanted to have time to transfer them there before dawn), the operation to deliver the group began almost without preparation, although the officer in command of the landing party asked for a delay. Initially, it was assumed that the landing force would land 1300 meters east of the summit and reach the summit on foot, but due to time constraints and engine problems, one of the helicopters decided to land on the summit itself.
Hovering over the top, the pilots of the helicopter reported that they saw human tracks and other signs of recent activity in the snow and asked the command about further actions. At this point, the helicopters fell into a well-organized ambush. One Chinook was hit by an RPG grenade, which damaged the helicopter's hydraulic system. During the shelling, the foreman of the first article, Neil Roberts, fell out of the open ramp. After it turned out, Roberts survived the fall, and he even managed to turn on the rescue beacon, but later, according to the official version, he was discovered by the Taliban and died. The crew of the damaged helicopter managed to fly a kilometer from the ambush site and landed in the valley, 4 km below the mountain. After examining the damage, it was decided to destroy the downed helicopter. The second Chinook, which was on the approach, which had already received a message about the shelling and the fall of Roberts, made a circle over the supposed location of the special forces, but also came under heavy fire. At the same time, the aircraft controller Sergeant John Chapman was killed, two fighters on board were injured, and the helicopter itself was damaged. Under these conditions, the command gave the order to withdraw and called the AC-130N aircraft, which struck with its artillery at the location of the militants. However, it is not clear what prevented the advance from "combing" the landing site with fire.
To search and rescue Roberts, at 3.45 am, an immediate response team was raised by a ranger unit stationed at Bagram airbase. 22 commandos flew from the Bagram airbase on two MH-47E helicopters to the special operation area. Around this time, the command decided to change the frequencies for satellite radio communications, about which some of the units participating in the operation were not notified, which subsequently led to unjustified losses. The fighters of the search and rescue service who took off from the Bagram airbase, due to communication problems, believed that the Navy Seals were still at the top of Takur-Gar and headed there. Upon arrival at the scene at 6.15 am, they were heavily shelled. The leading helicopter came under fire from RPG-7, DShK machine guns and assault rifles. The right engine was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade hit and the helicopter crashed from a small height to the top, not far from the enemy's firing positions.
This is how the artist depicted the evacuation from a wrecked helicopter.
While in the air, Sergeant Philip Svitak was killed by a machine-gun burst, and both pilots were wounded. As a result of the helicopter crash, Private First Class Matt Commons was killed, and Corporal Brad Cross and Specialist Mark Anderson, who jumped out of the helicopter, came under enemy fire and were killed. The surviving rangers took refuge where they could and engaged in a firefight with the Taliban. The second Chinook managed to avoid serious damage and landed at Gardez.
The fighters who survived the fall of the helicopter and fixed themselves on the top are in a critical situation. The enemy made more and more attempts to kill or capture the Americans. Regardless of the losses, the fanatical Taliban rose to attack over and over again. It was possible to repulse them only thanks to air support. On the afternoon of March 4, during a counterattack aimed at capturing the top of the mountain, rescuer Jason Cunningham was fatally wounded, many fighters were injured, but their evacuation was impossible due to fears that any helicopter that flew to the top would be shot down. Soon the Australian special forces, who had been in that area from the very beginning of the operation, broke through to the defenders. Precise fire from Mako 31 snipers and the organization of unprecedented air support helped the rangers trapped on the summit to avoid complete physical destruction. The complexity of the situation was also in the fact that the positions of the defenders were in close proximity to the positions of the Taliban attacking them, which did not allow aviation to use powerful means of destruction. During the repulsion of one of the attacks, the pilot of the F-15E fighter-bomber had to fire from a 20-mm cannon at the Taliban advancing on the positions of the American special forces until the ammunition was completely used up, which had not been the case in the American Air Force since the days of Vietnam.
The need to rescue the American and allied forces blocked on Takur-Gar and the impossibility of turning the situation in their favor by other methods forced the command of the American forces in Afghanistan to attract additional aviation forces to the operation. Including the USMC aviation was involved from a helicopter carrier, plying not far from the coast of Oman. AH-1W attack helicopters, CH-53E heavy transport helicopters and AV-8B vertical helicopters from the 13th Marine Corps Expeditionary Detachment were urgently prepared for the sortie.
Five AH-1Ws and three CH-53Es appeared in the Shahi-Kot area on the morning of 4 March. From 4 to 26 March, AH-1W helicopters made 217 sorties. At the same time, 28 ATGM "TOU", 42 ATGM "Hellfire", 450 NAR caliber 70-mm and about 9300 shells for 20-mm guns were used. Transport helicopters CH-53E were used to deliver cargo to the landing unit and provided refueling for other helicopters. The positions of enemy mortars and heavy machine guns were destroyed by powerful bombing strikes. So, during the operation, only AV-8B dropped 32 GBU-12 corrected bombs with laser guidance.
Thanks to the actions of combat helicopters, the top of Mount Takur-Gar was cleared of militants, after which the rangers defending it were evacuated. Only by March 12, after a massive bombing raid, did the joint American and Afghan forces succeed in driving the enemy out of the valley, although sporadic skirmishes in the area continued until March 18. A total of 8 US military personnel were killed and 82 injured. The data on the downed American helicopters are contradictory.
It is known that the Americans are doing their best to underestimate their own losses. However, based on the known information, it can be concluded that as a result of the battle, at least two heavy helicopters were destroyed, one MH-47E and one CH-47, another CH-47 was seriously damaged. One UH-60 and several AN-64A were also seriously damaged. One MH-47E helicopter damaged during Operation Anaconda was evacuated from the site of an emergency landing by a Russian Mi-26 helicopter after the end of the fighting in the area and in early April 2002 was delivered to Fort Campbell.
The losses of the enemy are also not reliably known. The total number of Taliban in the area as of March 2 is estimated at more than 1,000 people. The American command said that during the operation it was possible to destroy about half of the militants, which, however, has not been confirmed by anything. It is known that about 30 killed Taliban were found on the top of Mount Takur-Gar, many bodies were torn to fragments as a result of the impact of aviation ammunition.
It is safe to say that the united forces of the "anti-terrorist coalition" failed to achieve other successes, except for ousting the militants from the Shahi-Kot valley. It is only a stretch to consider this a victory, especially since this “victory” came at a very high price. Many Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders who took refuge in caves around Shahi Kot escaped. This was confirmed by the interception of a convoy of three off-road vehicles. The convoy was spotted by an MQ-1 Predator drone, after which a capture group consisting of SEALs and Rangers headed towards it in two MH-60Gs and three MH-47Es. After the leader of the Chinook landed on the route of the convoy, armed men jumped out of the vehicles and opened fire from automatic weapons. After a brief fire contact, during which cars and "bad guys" were processed from helicopter "Minigans" and fired at from small arms, the resistance ceased. American special forces soldiers who approached the convoy found 16 lifeless bodies and 2 wounded at the battle site. Investigations revealed that Al-Qaeda's mid-level commanders were traveling in the vehicles. Among those traveling in the convoy, in addition to Afghans and Pakistanis, there were Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs. Based on the testimony given later by the captured wounded militants, it followed that they fled from the Shahi-Kot area after the start of the operation.
After the completion of Operation Anaconda, the American military leadership drew appropriate conclusions. Much attention was paid to improving the coordination of joint actions between different branches of the armed forces and communication between them. And most importantly, all subsequent operations of this kind were authorized only after a careful study of intelligence obtained from various, independent sources.
