In the previous article, "The transition of the Cossack army of the hetmanate to Moscow service," it was shown how, in the incredibly difficult and cruel conditions of the merciless national liberation and civil war (ruins), the Dnieper Cossacks of the Hetmanate passed into Moscow service. This war, like any civil war, was accompanied by multilateral military intervention. The process was accompanied by a continuous series of betrayals, betrayals and desertions of the Cossack hetmans and gentry together with the troops to various participants in the conflict. At the end of this long-term Ukrainian turmoil, the Cossack Colonel Mazepa, who in 1685 was elected hetman, began to acquire more and more importance. His almost quarter-century hetmanship was fundamentally different from all the previous ones precisely by his immaculate service to Moscow. It seemed that he finally put the Dnieper people at the service of the new empire. However, it all ended, as always in Ukraine, with a monstrous and treacherous betrayal on the eve of the Poltava battle. But first things first.
Ivan Mazepa was born into a Ukrainian noble Orthodox family in the Kiev region. Studied at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, then at the Jesuit Collegium in Warsaw. Later, at the behest of his father, he was received at the court of the Polish king Jan Casimir, where he was one of the "resting" nobles. Closeness to the king allowed Mazepa to get a good education: he studied in Holland, Italy, Germany and France, was fluent in Russian, Polish, Tatar, Latin. He also knew Italian, German and French. I read a lot, had an excellent library in many languages. In 1665, after the death of his father, he took up the post of subordinate of Chernigov. At the end of 1669, his father-in-law, general transport train Semyon Polovets, helped him to advance in the circle of the right-bank hetman Doroshenko: Mazepa became a captain of the hetman's court guard, then a clerk. In June 1674, Doroshenko sent Mazepa as an envoy to the Crimean Khanate and Turkey. The delegation took 15 left-bank Cossacks to the Sultan as slaves-hostages. On the way to Constantinople, the delegation was intercepted by the chieftain of the kosh, Ivan Sirko. The Zaporozhye Cossacks who seized Mazepa forwarded him to the left-bank hetman Samoilovich. The hetman entrusted the educated Mazepa with the upbringing of his children, awarded him the rank of a military comrade, and a few years later granted him the rank of general esaul. On behalf of Samoilovich, Mazepa traveled to Moscow every year from the Dnieper "winter" stanitsa (embassy). During the reign of Sophia, power was actually in the hands of her favorite, Prince Golitsyn.
Educated and well-read Mazepa won his favor. When, after an unsuccessful Crimean campaign, it was necessary to shift the blame on someone else, Golitsyn blamed it on Hetman Samoilovich (however, not without reason). He was deprived of the hetmanship, exiled to Siberia with a crowd of relatives and supporters, his son Grigory was beheaded, and Mazepa was elected to the hetmans, mainly because Golitsyn, who loved him, wanted it so much.
When the young and energetic Peter I ascended the Russian throne in 1689, Mazepa once again used his gift to charm those in power. The hetman constantly advised the young monarch in Polish affairs, and over time a close personal friendship developed between them. The young Tsar Peter, carried away by the sea, sought to open access to the sea coast and by the beginning of his reign on the southern borders of the country, favorable conditions had developed for this. Another European coalition, in which Russia was also a member, actively acted against the Turks, but 2 campaigns to the Crimea during the reign of Princess Sophia ended unsuccessfully. In 1695, Peter announced a new campaign on the Black Sea coast, with the aim of occupying Azov. It was not possible to accomplish this the first time, and the huge army retreated to the north in the fall. The next year, the campaign was better prepared, an efficient flotilla was created, and on July 19, Azov surrendered and was occupied by the Russians. Mazepa with the troops took part in both campaigns of Peter to Azov and won even greater trust of the tsar. After the capture of Azov, Tsar Peter outlined broad state programs for consolidation in the south. In order to strengthen the communication of Moscow with the Azov coast, the tsar decided to connect the Volga with the Don, and in 1697, 35 thousand workers began to dig a canal from the Kamyshinka river to the upper reaches of the Ilovlya, and another 37 thousand worked to fortify the Azov, Taganrog and the Azov coast. The conquest of Azov, the Azov nomadic hordes by Moscow, the construction of fortresses in the lower reaches of the Don and on the Azov coast became decisive events in the history of the Don and Dnieper Cossacks. In foreign policy, Peter set a goal to intensify the activities of the anti-Turkish coalition. To this end, in 1697 he went abroad with an embassy. The preservation of the southern borders was entrusted to the Don and left-bank Dnieper Cossacks with the prohibition "to disturb the busurman at sea a lot." They performed this service with dignity, and in February 1700 Mazepa became a knight of the Order of St. Andrew established by Peter. Peter personally placed the insignia of the order on the hetman "for many of his noble and zealous loyal services in his military labors."
However, during his trip abroad, Peter became convinced of the impracticability of the idea of a "crusade" of Christian princes against the Turks. The political environment in Europe has changed dramatically. This was the time of the beginning of two great wars. Austria and France began a war between themselves for the right to plant their claimants to the Spanish throne (war for the Spanish succession), and in the north, the war of the alliance of European countries against Sweden began. Peter had to either wage the war against Turkey alone or postpone the struggle for the seizure of the Baltic Sea coast. The second choice was facilitated by the fact that Sweden turned against itself all its not weak neighbors: Denmark, Poland and Brandenburg. Many lands of these countries were captured by Sweden under the previous kings Gustav Adolf and Karl X Gustav. King Charles XII was young and inexperienced, but he continued the warlike policy of his ancestors, in addition, he intensified repression against the oligarchy of the occupied Baltic lands. In response, the Master of the Livonian Order, von Patkul, became the inspiration for the coalition against Karl. In 1699, Russia secretly joined this coalition, but only after the conclusion of peace with Turkey did it join the hostilities. The beginning of the war was tragic. The fact is that the basis of the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Russian army during the two previous centuries was deliberate (permanent and professional) rifle troops. But they with great distrust (and this is putting it mildly) reacted to Peter's reforms and in his absence they raised a mutiny, which was brutally suppressed. As a result of the tsar's "search" and terrible repressions, the streltsy army was liquidated. The country was left virtually without a permanent combat-ready regular army. The terrible defeat at Narva was a cruel retribution for these thoughtless reforms.
Fig. 1 Archery execution. In the background is Tsar Peter
The way for Karl to Moscow was open, but Karl, after some deliberation, launched an offensive on Poland and was tightly occupied by this war from 1701 to 1707. During this time, he defeated the Polish and Saxon armies, made the northern German principalities dependent, as well as Saxony and Silesia, completely captured Poland and forced the Saxon Elector Augustus to renounce the Polish crown. Instead, Stanislav Leshchinsky was elevated to the Polish throne. In fact, Karl became the supreme manager of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and it lost its independence. But Peter used this long-term respite with dignity and effectively to create a new regular army virtually from scratch. Taking advantage of the fact that Russia is waging a war in a secondary direction for the Swedes, Peter I began to conquer Ingermanland, and in 1703 he founded a new fortress city, St. Petersburg, at the mouth of the Neva. In 1704, taking advantage of the uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the invasion of Poland by Swedish troops, Mazepa occupied the Right-Bank Ukraine. He repeatedly proposed to Peter I to unite both Ukraine into one Little Russia, which Peter refused, since he respected the previously concluded agreement with Poland on the division of Ukraine into Right and Left Bank. In 1705, Mazepa made a trip to Volhynia to help Peter's ally, Augustus. The successes of the Russians in Courland in the same year prompted Charles XII to make a new decision, namely: after the defeat of August II, return to action against Russia and capture Moscow. In 1706, Peter met with Mazepa in Kiev, and Mazepa enthusiastically set about building the Pechersk fortress laid by Peter. But 1706 was the year of political setbacks for the Russian state. On February 2, 1706, the Swedes inflicted a crushing defeat on the Saxon army, and on October 13, 1706, Peter's ally, the Saxon elector and the Polish king August II, renounced the Polish throne in favor of the supporter of the Swedes Stanislav Leszczynski and broke the alliance with Russia. Moscow was left alone in the war with Sweden. It was then that Mazepa conceived a possible transition to the side of Charles XII and the formation of "independent possession" from Little Russia under the rule of the puppet Polish king, as clearly evidenced by his correspondence with Princess Dolskaya. The Dnieper Cossacks, primarily their foreman, were weighed down by the Moscow power, but the transition to the service of the Polish king, following the example of previous times, was also closed.
Poland itself lost its independence and was under Swedish occupation. The opportunity for the Dnieper Cossacks to get rid of Moscow's dependence lay in the war between Moscow and Sweden, but only if the latter won. Famous phrase Mazepa, uttered by him in the circle of the closest on September 17, 1707: "Without extreme, last need, I will not change my loyalty to the royal majesty." Then he explained that it could be for "extreme need": "Until I see that the tsarist majesty will not be able to protect not only Ukraine, but also his entire state from the Swedish potential." After Augustus' abdication from the Polish crown, Charles XII remained in Saxony for almost a year, and in the summer of 1707 the Swedish army marched east. Small numbers of Russian troops were in Vilna and Warsaw to support the allied part of the Polish army, but it was incapable of combat and surrendered the cities to the Swedes without a fight. Having passed through Poland, the Swedish army occupied Grodno in January 1708, then Mogilev, then lodged in the region west of Minsk throughout the spring, receiving reinforcements and conducting combat training.
Along with the threat from the west, Russia was very restless on the Don. There, a part of the Cossacks, having united with the naked people and the fugitives under the leadership of Kondraty Bulavin, instigated a rebellion, for which there were reasons. Since 1705, salt production was transferred from a private industry to a state one. On the Don, the center of salt production was the Bakhmut region, where Kondraty Bulavin was ataman. The trade was in the hands of homely Cossacks, but it was very time consuming. Cossacks at the salt pans “welcomed every rabble” and a large number of fugitive people accumulated in the area of the salt pans. Meanwhile, by a tsarist decree of 1703, the Cossacks were prohibited from accepting fugitives on pain of death. All those who arrived on the Don later than 1695 corresponded, every tenth of them was sent to work in Azov, the rest were sent to their former places of residence. In 1707, Prince Dolgorukov with a detachment was sent to the Don to withdraw the fugitive people from there, but was attacked by Bulavin and his nakedness and was killed. Finding himself at the head of the dissatisfied element, Bulavin embarked on the path of open rebellion against Moscow and called on the entire Don to do so. But the Cossacks did not support Bulavin, ataman Lukyanov gathered an army and defeated the rebels on Aydar. Bulavin with the remnants of supporters fled to Zaporozhye and the Rada allowed them to settle in Kodak. There he began to gather around him the dissatisfied and send out "lovely letters." In March 1708, he again went to the Don in the Bakhmut region. The Cossacks expelled against Bulavin did not show firmness, and confusion broke out among them. Bulavin took advantage of this and defeated them. The rebels pursued the Cossacks and took Cherkassk on May 6, 1708. The atamans and the foreman were executed, and Bulavin proclaimed himself ataman of the Army. However, on June 5, 1708, during a showdown between the rebels, Bulavin was killed (according to other sources, he shot himself). Bulavin's revolt coincided with Karl's speech against Russia, and therefore the reprisal against the rioters was abrupt. But the search showed that out of 20 thousand rebels of the natural Cossacks there was an insignificant minority, the rebellious army consisted mainly of fugitives. By the end of 1709, all the instigators of the rebellion were executed, among them were several Cossacks and chieftains. Ataman Nekrasov with 7 thousand rebels fled to the Kuban, where he surrendered under the protection of the Crimean Khan. His detachment was settled on Taman, where it united with the schismatics who had fled before.
Taking into account all the complexity of the internal and external situation, Peter I tried in every possible way to make peace with Sweden. His main condition was the abandonment of Ingermanland to Russia. However, Charles XII rejected Peter's proposals, transmitted through intermediaries, wishing to punish the Russians.
Finally, in June 1708, Charles XII began a campaign against Russia, while he set himself the following goals:
- complete destruction of the state independence of the Russian state
- the approval of the vassal on the Russian throne of either the young noble nobleman Yakub Sobessky, or, if he deserves, Tsarevich Alexei
- rejection of Pskov, Novgorod and the entire north of Russia from Moscow in favor of Sweden
- the accession of Ukraine, Smolensk region and other Western Russian territories to Poland, a vassal and obedient to the Swedes
- division of the rest of Russia into specific principalities.
Karl had to choose his path to Moscow, and in this choice the decisive role was played by the Little Russian hetman Mazepa, Tsar Peter and … Belarusian peasants. Mazepa reassured Karl that the Cossacks and Tatars were ready to unite with him against Russia. By that time, Mazepa had announced his plans to the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, and he ordered the Crimean Khan Kaplan-Girey to render all possible assistance to Mazepa. General Levengaupt's corps moved from Riga to join Karl with a huge baggage train, but it was intercepted by Peter and Menshikov near the village of Lesnoy and was severely beaten. Rescuing the remnants of the corps, Levengaupt threw a baggage train of 6,000 carts and wagons and it went to the winners. The Swedes fully felt the "rejuvenation" in food and forage, which was greatly facilitated by the Belarusian peasantry, who hid bread, horse feed, and killed foragers. In response, the Swedes fought in the occupied territory. Karl moved to Ukraine to join with Mazepa. Russian troops retreated, evading decisive battles.
Mazepa's plans were no longer a secret for his entourage. Colonels Iskra and Kochubey sent a report to Peter about Mazepa's betrayal, but the tsar unconditionally trusted the hetman and gave him both colonels, who were executed with a cruel and painful death. But time did not wait, and Mazepa set about fulfilling his plan. He made a decisive bet on the victory of the Swedish king. This fatal mistake had dramatic consequences for the entire Dnieper Cossacks. He announced to the foremen the need for treason to Moscow. Mazepa left a strong and reliable army from Serdyuk to guard the treasury, supplies and provisions in the Baturin fortress, and he himself allegedly went to the front against the expected Swedes. But on the way, Mazepa announced that he had withdrawn his army not against the Swedes, but against the Moscow Tsar. Troubles began in the army, most of the Cossacks fled, no more than 2000 remained around him. Having received evidence of Mazepa's betrayal, Menshikov in November 1708 took by storm and destroyed Baturin to the ground, and the entire garrison of Serdyukov was destroyed. In Glukhov, Colonel Skoropadsky was elected the new hetman as tsar and loyal foremen. The Polish king Leshchinsky made a connection with Karl and Mazepa, but on the way he was intercepted and defeated at Podkamnia. All routes of communication between Karl and Poland and Sweden were cut by Russian troops, he did not even receive courier messages. Due to illness, poor food and ammunition, the Swedish army needed rest. That is why the Swedes turned to the south, to the Ukraine, in order to rest there and continue their attack on Moscow from the south. However, in Ukraine, the peasants also greeted foreigners with hatred, and just like the Belarusians fled to the forests, hid bread, horse feed, and killed foragers. In addition, in Ukraine, the Russian army stopped the scorched earth tactics, and the Russian government explained Mazepa's treacherous behavior to the Ukrainians. An intercepted letter from Mazepa to the Polish king Stanislav Leshchinsky, sent from Romen on December 5, 1708, was circulated in Polish and Russian copies. The Russian command spread it, knowing well that nothing could so hopelessly undermine the authority of the betrayed hetman as by exposing his intention to give Ukraine to Poland. … Turks and Crimeans to help Mazepa and Karl were also in no hurry to speak. But the koshevoy ataman of the Zaporozhye army Konstantin Gordienko with the army went over to the side of Charles. Tsar Peter ordered the army and the Don Cossacks to destroy Zaporozhye in order to "destroy the entire nest of rebels to the ground." On May 11, 1709, after resistance, the Sich was taken and destroyed, and all the defenders were destroyed. Thus, the entire Dnieper region was in the hands of Moscow. The main centers of separatism, on whose help Mazepa and Karl were counting, were destroyed. Karl's troops were surrounded around Poltava. A Russian garrison was located in Poltava itself, and Karl began a siege. But Menshikov with a detachment made his way into the fortress and reinforced the besieged with people and a baggage train. Peter began rapprochement and on June 20 took up positions for a general battle 4 miles from the Swedish camp. The Moscow troops prepared their positions well. King Charles went on reconnaissance, personally supervised, but was wounded in the leg by the Cossacks. Since the time of King Gustav Adolf, the Swedish army has been one of the strongest in Europe, behind it there were many brilliant victories, including in the Northern War. Peter attached great importance to this battle, did not want to, and did not have the right to take risks, and, despite the twofold superiority in forces, chose defensive tactics. The Russian command successfully applied military tricks. A defector from German servicemen was planted on the Swedes, and they received information about the imminent approach to the Russians of a large Kalmyk detachment of 18 thousand sabers (in fact, the detachment had 3 thousand sabers).
Charles XII decided to attack Peter's army before the Kalmyks would approach and completely disrupt his communications. The Swedes also knew that Russian recruits had a distinctive shape. Peter ordered the veteran and seasoned soldiers to be changed into recruits, which inspired the Swedes with an unfounded illusion and they fell into a trap. On the night of June 27, Karl moved his troops against the Russian army, covered by an advantageous system of redoubts. The highest courage was shown on both sides, both monarchs served as an example. The mortal battle continued, but not for long. The Swedes failed to take the redoubts. Already during the battle, the Swedish commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Renschild, saw the ranks of recruits on the Russian flank and sent the main blow of his best infantry there. But the invincible Swedish fusiliers instead of recruits ran into the disguised guards regiments and in the main direction of the attack fell into a fire bag and suffered heavy losses. The Swedes everywhere were not able to withstand the heavy fire of the Russian units, they got upset and began to retreat, and after the shock of King Charles they fled. The Russians went over to persecution, overtook them at Perevalochna and forced them to surrender. In the battle, the Swedes lost over 11 thousand soldiers, 24 thousand prisoners and the entire train were taken. Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. It should be said that from the thousands of Ukrainian Cossacks (there were 30 thousand registered Cossacks, Zaporozhye Cossacks - 10-12 thousand) about 10 thousand people went over to the side of Charles XII: about 3 thousand registered Cossacks and about 7 thousand Cossacks. But they too soon died in part, while others began to flee from the camp of the Swedish army. Such unreliable allies, of which there were about 2 thousand, King Charles XII did not dare to use in battle and therefore left them in the train under the supervision of cavalry regiments. Only a small detachment of volunteer Cossacks took part in the battle. Peter I, also did not fully trust the Cossacks of the new hetman I. I. Skoropadsky, and did not use them in the battle. To look after them, he sent 6 dragoon regiments under the command of Major General G. S. Volkonsky.
Fig. 2 Karl XII and Hetman Mazepa after the Battle of Poltava
After the battle, King Charles, accompanied by his convoy and Mazepa's Cossacks, fled to Turkey. There, in Bender, on September 22, 1709, Mazepa died. After his death, the Cossacks who left with him were settled by the Sultan in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where they were given several transports to "feed" them. So this adventure of Mazepa ended, which had great negative consequences for the Dnieper army and for the entire Cossacks. The vile example of Mazepa, who perfidiously betrayed the empire after many years of good service, for many decades gave rise to a large tribe of envious people and sneakers in the actions of the Cossack chiefs to strengthen the economic and military foundations of the Cossacks, to see only dangerous symptoms of separatism.
Even after almost a century, the most (I'm not afraid of this word) outstanding of the glorious galaxy of Cossack leaders, Don Ataman Matvey Ivanovich Platov did not escape such a parallel. Despite the impeccable many years of service to the empire, for enviable successes in strengthening the Don economy and the Army, he was slandered, repressed, imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, but managed to avoid death and was nevertheless rehabilitated to the great chagrin of Russia's enemies. In the history of the Cossacks, Bulavin's revolt and Mazepa's betrayal were disastrous for the liberty of the Cossacks. The threat of the complete elimination of their independence really loomed over them. Under Hetman Skoropadsky, a collegium was appointed from representatives of Moscow, which controlled all his activities. The existence of the free Cossacks came to an end, it finally turned into a service class. The Army Circle was replaced by a meeting of the village chieftains and two elected officials from each village, at which the Army chieftains and the military foreman were elected. Then the elected chieftain was approved (or not approved) by the tsar. As before, only the stanitsa meetings remained. After the abandonment of Azov, according to the Prut Treaty, the garrison of Moscow troops from Azov was withdrawn to Cherkassk, and its commander, in addition to defensive tasks, was instructed to see that "no instability and no disagreeable actions would occur from the Don Cossacks …". Since 1716, the Don Army was transferred from the management of the Ambassadorial Order to the jurisdiction of the Senate. The Don diocese was losing its independence and was subordinated to the Voronezh Metropolitan. In 1722, Hetman Skoropadsky died, Tsar Peter did not like his deputy Polubotok and repressed him. The Little Russian Cossacks were left without a hetman at all and were ruled by a collegium. This is the "noble beheading" of the Cossack liberties made by Tsar Peter. Later, during the period of "woman's rule", the Dnieper Cossacks were partially revived. However, Peter's lesson did not go for the future. In the second half of the 18th century, a fierce and uncompromising struggle of Russia for Lithuania and the Black Sea region unfolded. In this struggle, the Dnieper showed themselves unreliable again, rebelled, many treacherously betrayed and ran over to the enemy's camp. The cup of patience overflowed and in 1775, by the decree of Empress Catherine II, the Zaporozhye Sich was destroyed, according to the words in the decree, "as a godless and unnatural community, not suitable for the extension of the human race," and the riding Dnieper Cossacks turned into hussar regiments of the regular army, namely Ostrozhsky, Izumoksky, Akhtyrsky and Kharkovsky. But this is a completely different and rather tragic story for the Dnieper Cossacks.
A. A. Gordeev History of the Cossacks
Istorija.o.kazakakh.zaporozhskikh.kak.onye.izdrevle.zachalisja.1851.
Letopisnoe.povestvovanie.o. Malojj. Rossii.i.ejo.narode.i.kazakakh.voobshhe. 1847. A. Rigelman
