And so the Gotland Cycle has come to an end. We gave a full description of the battle at Gotland (as far as we could) and now it remains only to "summarize what has been said", that is, to bring the conclusions from all the previous articles together. In addition, it will be interesting to consider the conclusions that the Germans made based on the results of the battle at Gotland.
The following can be said right away. No "shame" of the Russian fleet off the island of Gotland on June 19, 1915 took place. In fact, the following happened:
1. The communications service of the Baltic Fleet managed to quickly reveal the enemy's intentions to concentrate the entire bulk of the warships in Kiel for the imperial review, at which the Kaiser was to be present;
2. The headquarters of the fleet promptly (no more than 12 hours) developed and brought to the immediate performers a rather complicated plan of the operation for shelling the German port, which provided for the use of heterogeneous forces with the allocation of a demonstration group, long-range cover forces, as well as the deployment of submarines on the routes of possible following the enemy. Perhaps the only drawback of the plan was the change in the target of the attack - at the insistence of the new commander of the fleet, V. A. Kanin, Memel was chosen instead of Kohlberg;
3. The deployment of surface ships was carried out in accordance with the plan, however, the shortcomings of the material part of domestic submarines affected, as a result of which it was necessary to assign them patrol areas not where the situation required. Nevertheless, the headquarters of the fleet, having only one fully combat-ready submarine (we are talking about the English E-9 under the command of Max Horton), assigned her exactly where her presence could bring the greatest benefit;
4. Heavy fog prevented the bombardment of Memel, but thanks to the precise and professional actions of the communications service of the Baltic Fleet, a detachment of Commodore I. Karpf was discovered (in Russian-language sources it is erroneously indicated as "Karf"), which was laying a minefield in the northern part of the Baltic;
5. Intelligence specialists ensured prompt decryption of German radio messages and their forwarding to the flagship of the commander of the Special Purpose Detachment, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev, which allowed the latter to intercept I. Karpf's ships without any problems. The detection and guidance of its own forces on the enemy detachment should be considered a brilliant success of the Baltic Marine Radio Intelligence Service (functioning under the name of the Baltic Fleet Communications Service), as well as a model of interaction with ships of the fleet;
6. Contrary to popular belief, M. K. Bakhirev and his 1st brigade of cruisers did not undertake any difficult maneuvers in the battle with the Augsburg, Albatross and three destroyers. An analysis of their maneuvering, according to Russian and German sources, shows that throughout most of the battle, Russian ships constantly and at full speed went to cross the enemy's course or in pursuit, trying to use as much artillery as possible on it. An exception to this rule arose only when the German destroyers set up a smoke screen and the ships of the 2nd semi-brigade "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" changed course to get around it - but in this case, their maneuver should be recognized as correct and fully consistent with the current situation;
7. Contrary to the no less widespread opinion about inaccurate firing of Russian ships, the 203-mm artillery of the armored cruisers "Bayan" and "Admiral Makarov" achieved (taking into account various assumptions) from 4, 29% and up to 9, 23% of hits on the "Albatross", which testifies to the excellent training of Russian artillerymen. The absence of hits on the Augsburg is explained by the high speed of the latter, which is why it was able to stay at the limit of visibility, which on that day did not exceed 4.5-5 miles, and the fact that the cruiser quickly left the battlefield.
8. Further actions of M. K. Bakhirev was determined by two factors, which, unfortunately, were often underestimated by Russian historiography. First, he mistakenly identified the Albatross minelayer as an Undine-class cruiser. Secondly, the communications service of the Baltic Fleet, which had worked so brilliantly before, subsequently, alas, misinformed the Russian commander by transmitting to the flagship Admiral Makarov information about the presence of a strong German detachment, including armored ships, at the northern tip of Gotland. As a result, M. K. Bakhirev could only guess what was going on in general and why I. Karpf brought his ships out to sea. If the Russian commander realized that he had driven the Albatross minelayer onto the stones, he would have easily guessed the purpose of the German operation, and so … retreat, M. K. Bakhirev saw his main task as quickly linking up with long-range battleships ("Tsesarevich" and "Glory") in order to be able to give the Germans a decisive battle;
9. As a result, M. K. Bakhirev did not give a serious rebuff to the Roon detachment, but in fact only fired back at it. Without a doubt, starting a decisive fight with an enemy armored cruiser, having already felt a shortage of shells, and on the eve of a battle with another strong German detachment would be completely unwise. In essence, Mikhail Koronatovich made the only correct decision based on the information he possessed. In addition, M. K. Bakhirev provided the commander of "Rurik" A. M. Pyshnov with the necessary and sufficient information so that he could intercept the German detachment and impose a battle on Roon;
10. “Rurik” was able to intercept the unit of “Roon” and acted stubbornly and persistently, first trying to close the distance with the German ships, and then giving them a fight, bringing the “Roon” to a course angle of 60 so that, while continuing to converge, be able to act on to the enemy with all the board. As soon as "Roon" turned away, trying to get out of the battle, "Rurik" followed him and again turned directly to the German detachment. Unfortunately, at that moment the false news about the periscope made A. M. Pyshnova to make an evasion maneuver and thereby interrupt the battle. However, after that "Rurik" turned after the German ships and pursued them for some time. However, his superiority in speed was not so great (if any) that it quickly approached the Roon. It could take hours, and this time "Rurik" did not have, especially since M. K. Bakhirev told A. M. Pyshnov "To be afraid of the enemy's approach from the south." Therefore, after an unsuccessful pursuit, "Rurik" turned away and followed the cruisers M. K. Bakhirev;
11. The poor shooting of the Rurik (did not hit anyone) should be attributed to the considerable distances of the battle and poor visibility (Roon, to which Rurik transferred fire immediately after the German armored cruiser was identified on it as well did not achieve a single hit), but also to the detraining of the Rurik team, because due to damage to the hull on a stone bank on February 1, 1915, the ship was under repair for six months before the operation and was not able to conduct combat training. Perhaps there were other reasons (almost complete wear of the main battery guns, unless they were changed during the repair);
12. The British submarine E-9 demonstrated a traditionally high level of combat training and was able to hit the armored cruiser Prince Adalbert with a torpedo, which rushed to the aid of I. Krapf's detachment;
As we can see, neither the staff officers, nor the intelligence of the Baltic Fleet, nor the special purpose detachment and its commanders deserve reproach for anything. The headquarters in the shortest possible time developed a plan for the operation, which did not proceed as planned, but still led to significant losses for the Germans. The success of the E-9 cannot be attributed to the actions of the Russian ships, but Max Horton achieved it, among other things, because his submarine was sent exactly to the area from which the cover detachment came out, that is, the merit of the staff officers of the Baltic Fleet in torpedoing Prince Adalbert "Is undeniable. "Guidance" of the detachment of M. K. Bakhirev on the forces of I. Karpf should be considered a model of radio intelligence operations. The commanders and crews of the special purpose detachment acted professionally and aggressively where this was not associated with unjustified, excessive risk. The maneuvering of Russian ships should be considered optimal in all cases. The fact that from the detachment of I. Karpf the 1st brigade of cruisers managed to destroy only the slowest ship - the minelayer Albatross (which, by the way, was practically not inferior to the Russian cruisers in speed) is by no means caused by gaps in tactics, combat training, or the lack of determination of the Russian crews. The sailors of the 1st cruiser squadron did not achieve greater success only because they were forced to go into battle on ships of pre-dotsushima projects. Be at the disposal of M. K. Bakhirev modern high-speed cruisers - the result of the battle would have been completely different. As for the cruiser "Rurik", it, in general, also acted exemplary for a ship that had been under repair for six months before the operation.
Analysis of the decisions of Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev leads to the conclusion that the commander of the Russian forces did not make any mistake. All his actions were timely and correct - of course, taking into account the amount of information that M. K. Bakhirev disposed.
But about the German sailors, oddly enough, we cannot say anything of the kind.
Without a doubt, the forces of the Kaiserlichmarine in the Baltic were small. But the more careful the German admirals should have been when planning their operations! They completely relaxed and did not expect any trick from the Russians. The only excuse for them can be that the Russian fleet, with its long passivity, itself provoked them to do this, but … "Regulations are written in blood," and you never need to make discounts for yourself - no matter how sluggish and indecisive the enemy may seem. The Germans forgot this common truth, for which, in fact, they paid.
So what do we see? Of the three armored cruisers that could take part in the cover of the Albatross, in fact only one was involved - the Roon. The other two - "Prince Adalbert" and "Prince Heinrich" posed as a distant cover. The Russian battleships "Slava" and "Tsesarevich" left their bases and went to the Abo-Aland skerry position, where they were in full readiness to immediately go to sea as soon as necessary. They provided long-range cover for the ships of M. K. Bakhirev. And what were the armored cruisers of Rear Admiral von Hopmann doing, which took almost four hours just to get out of the mouth of the Vistula? You can call it whatever you like, but the phrase "long-range cover" is completely inapplicable to them.
Apparently, Commodore I. Karf could not even think of fearing Russian ships in the middle (especially the southern) part of the Baltic. His actions are irrefutable evidence that the only thing he feared were Russian cruisers patrolling at the throat of the Gulf of Finland. That is why he so easily divided his forces and sent Roon with Lubeck to Libau shortly before she was intercepted by the 1st cruiser brigade.
If the Germans considered the possibility of countering the Russian fleet in any way seriously, they should have transferred Prince Adalbert and Prince Henry to Libau, where they were much closer to the mine-laying area, and from where, if anything, they could really provide assistance to the detachment of I. Karpf. But nothing of the kind was done.
In general, the first mistake of the Germans - the lack of long-range cover, was made at the planning stage of the operation, the second - the dispatch of "Roon" and "Lubeck" with part of the destroyers to Libau was made by I. Karpf himself. Then his squadron was intercepted by a brigade of cruisers M. K. Bakhirev, and …
The German description of the battle of "Augsburg", "Albatross" and three destroyers with Russian cruisers is very contradictory, and this is a fact, and the following is the personal opinion of the author of this article. So, when comparing domestic and German sources, a strong impression is created that I. Karpf simply panicked and fled from the battlefield. The destroyers, having gathered at first to go into a heroic and suicidal torpedo attack on where, as a superior Russian detachment, seeing the running flagship, changed their point of view and fled after him. Subsequently, the German commanders were ashamed of their actions and tried to give their actions "a little tactical brilliance." So, for example, according to Russian data, "Augsburg" fled, and then was covered by a smoke screen of destroyers and, for some time, ceased to be visible. Then, when the cruiser M. K. Bakhirev went around the curtain, "Augsburg" appeared again - firing at the Russian cruisers, he continued to retreat and soon disappeared into the fog. But as described by I. Krapf, this episode looks like this - "Augsburg" retreated, then returned and, trying to divert the attention of the Russian cruisers to itself, fired at the "Admiral Makarov" for 13 minutes, and when it failed, it retreated again.
The only ship of I. Karpf's detachment, which absolutely did not deserve reproach for anything, is the minelayer "Albatross". The crew heroically fought to the last and managed to bring their wounded ship to the Swedish territorial waters, which saved it from death. Of course, the Albatross was interned and did not take part in further hostilities, but was later returned to Germany.
However, the feat of the Albatross crew once again testified that heroism is a means of atonement for someone else's incompetence. We have already said above that I. Karpf should not have let go of "Roon" and "Lubeck", but now we will not talk about that. Even when faced with a Russian squadron without the support of an armored cruiser, the Albatross, in general, did not need to die, because I. Karpf immediately called Roon for help. Had she come, this help, in time, and most likely the Albatross would have survived, because even alone, Roon was stronger than Bayan and Admiral Makarov combined, and Rurik was still too far away. But "Roon" did not come to the rescue in time, and why? Due to the mistake of his navigator, who managed to get lost and lead the ship to a completely different place where he was called and where he was needed. As a result, no help came, and the Albatross was forced to throw itself onto the rocks, but what did the armored cruiser do next?
One of two things - either the Roon's commander lied in his report, or common sense was not considered a quality necessary for commanding Kaiserlichmarin warships. The fact that the commander of the armored cruiser decided that he was between two Russian detachments is, in principle, understandable - having "lost" his position as a result of a navigator's mistake and having found a Russian detachment "in the wrong place", it is easy to imagine that you met with another enemy detachment and that there are at least two of these detachments. But then what? The Roon, in the opinion of its commander, found itself "in a vice", because the Russians seemed to be from the north and from the south. The southern Russian detachment threatened the ships of Commodore I. Karpf, the northern one did not threaten anyone and went to the north. And the commander of "Roona", whose task was, in fact, to help I. Karpf, instead of turning to the south, runs after the northern detachment, enters into battle with him, after a while "thinks over" ("Well, this is me, because my commander needs help in the south! "), pulls out of the battle and hurries back to the south …
And how would you like to assess the actions of von Hopmann, who was with his armored cruisers in Danzig and received a radiogram at 08.12, from which it irrefutably followed that German ships were fighting at sea? Who, for 35 minutes after that, kept the Olympic calm, without doing anything? But then, after another three hours (when his ships already obviously did not decide anything and could not help anyone), von Hopmann rushed forward, not waiting for the destroyers. And even those that were taken with them, the rear admiral did not bother to put in anti-submarine security. Without a doubt, von Hopmann "reacted", but the price was a huge hole in the board of the "Prince Adalbert" and the death of ten people. Is it too much for a line in a report?
In general, neither the conception of the German operation, nor its execution, nor the actions of the German commanders during the battle deserve approval. Only the heroism of the Albatross crew and the excellent training of the Lubeck artillerymen, who instantly took aim at the Rurik from the maximum distances for themselves, looks like a bright spot against the general background.
What is the outcome of the battle at Gotland?
As you know, the "Albatross" threw itself on the stones and did not take part in the war anymore, and the torpedoed "Prince Adalbert" was out of action for two months. "Admiral Makarov", "Bayan" and "Rurik" received minor damage.
During discussions of the Gotland battle, the author of this article repeatedly faced regrets that only a minelayer was thrown on the stones, and not a cruiser, as M. K. Bakhirev. But in fairness, it must be said: the naval war in the Baltic was in many ways a mine war, and here the importance of a fast minelayer can hardly be overestimated. At the same time, “the Kaiser has a lot of light cruisers,” and from this point of view, the loss of the Albatross for the Kaiserlichmarin was much more sensitive than the “Undine-class cruiser”, as M. K. Bakhirev.
Well, how did the Germans react to this battle?
Unfortunately, most sources do not provide an answer to this question. And in vain, because otherwise statements like those made by A. G. Patients. in his book Tragedy of Errors:
“I’m ready to bet anything that in the Royal Navy after such a“victory”the entire command staff of the squadron - both the admiral and the commanders of the ships - would go to court. In fact, this "victory" put an end to all claims of the ships of the Baltic Fleet for some role in this war. The enemy no longer took them into account and was not afraid, their own high command no longer counted on them."
would hardly be possible.
But back to the German command. 9 days after the battle, on June 28, 1915, Henry of Prussia presented to the Admiral Staff a report on the circumstances of the battle, based on the reports of I. Karpf and his commanders. In his report, the Grand Admiral generally approved the actions of the German forces, reproaching I. Karpf only for separating Lubeck and Roon from the detachment too early. The chief of the Admiral Staff, Admiral G. Bachmann, apparently bewitched by the colorful theses of the report on the "selfless support of the ships" and "the desire to get closer to the enemy," generally agreed with Prince Heinrich, but noted that, in his opinion, the torpedo attack was stopped at the moment, when the Russian cruisers were already within the range of the Whitehead mines, and that the continuation of the torpedo attack would have forced the Russian cruisers to turn away, and this gave the Albatross hope of salvation. However, he agreed that in this case the ships of M. K. Bakhirev would have been destroyed by the Albatross anyway, even in Swedish waters.
However, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not share such a wonderful unity of views at all and demanded explanations "about the reasons that prompted both at the beginning of the operation and during its implementation to deviate from the basic principle - the concentration of forces." Naturally, von Hopmann, being the commander of the German intelligence forces in the Baltic, could not give a sane answer to this question. Therefore, he set off "all bad", starting to paint the obsolescence of most of his ships and (attention!) The power of the Baltic Fleet, which clearly did not intend to sit behind the minefields of the Gulf of Finland any longer. “The general conduct of the struggle in the Baltic Sea is based on the assumption that the Russian fleet has very limited initiative and capacity. Without this premise, the overall superiority of the forces of the Russian fleet … … makes us expect retaliatory strikes at any time."
One can only guess what Prince Heinrich thought when reading this report by von Hopmann, but, according to the author, he grabbed his head. Without a doubt, the Kaiser saw at the root and after the report of H. Bachmann asked him a key question - why did the German forces at the right moment were dispersed? And now, as an answer to this question, von Hopmann suggests taking into account the "power of the Russian fleet", but since this fleet is really powerful and no longer sits behind minefields, this all the more required the concentration of German forces! Which was not done. In fact, von Hopmann wrote the following in his report: "We expected that the Russian fleet would remain passive and did nothing in case of its intervention." That is, with his report, von Hopmann, one might say, “buried” himself!
Under these conditions, Prince Henry simply had no choice but to "take the fire upon himself" - he reported to the Kaiser that he approved of the division of forces made by the junior flagship, although earlier he himself reproached him for this. But this approval of a higher authority (after all, Heinrich of Prussia bore the rank of Grand Admiral) took the "thunder and lightning" away from von Hopmann's head, and that was the end of the matter. According to the Admiral Staff, the loss of the Albatross minelayer was "the result of poor visibility and the underestimation of the enemy, which existed until that time, however, is quite justified."
In other words, the statement of A. G. Patients that “the enemy did not take into account the Baltic Fleet anymore” is true … exactly the opposite. In fact, it was after the battle at Gotland that the Germans came to the conclusion that they still underestimated the Russians, and they did it completely in vain.
Immediately after the battle, the Admiralstab transferred the light cruiser Bremen and the newest destroyer V-99 to the Baltic (oddly enough, both of them died in the same year 1915, the first on mines, the second under fire from Novik). And some two days after the battle, on June 21, 1915, the Kaiser signed an order to transfer to the Baltic:
1. 4th battleship squadron - seven battleships of the Braunschweig and Wittelsbach types under the command of Vice Admiral Schmidt;
2. 8th destroyer flotilla - eleven pennants under the command of frigatten-captain Hundertmark;
3. Two submarines.
The chief of the Admiral Staff reported on these measures to the State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Administration (that is, to the Minister of the Navy) Tirpitz:
“The naval forces of the Baltic Sea, after the failure of the“Prince Adalbert”and the loss of the“Albatross”of great moral importance, must be strengthened so that they to achieve the greatest possible success … The protracted nature of military operations against Russia may require the final abandonment in the Baltic Sea of part or all of the reinforcements sent there now."
In other words, the battle at Gotland, which took place on June 19, 1915, or "Shame at the Island of Gotland" (according to some of our historians and publicists) entailed a complete change in ideas about the necessary outfit of forces in the Baltic. Before the battle at Gotland, it was believed that the missions of the Kaiserlichmarin here could be performed by three armored cruisers. After the battle, the Germans considered it necessary to use seven squadron battleships and two armored cruisers to solve the same problems. Of course, such a change in attitudes towards the Russian Baltic Fleet is infinitely far from "no longer taken into account."
And what about von Hopmann? Formally, he retained his post, but now reported directly to Vice Admiral Schmidt, commander of the 4th battleship squadron. As far as the author knows (but this is inaccurate), von Hopmann never again held positions that imply the independent leadership of the detachments of the fleet.
And the last thing. As we said earlier, the main purpose of the Memel raid was to influence the public opinion of the German population. The shelling did not take place, but information about the appearance of Russian cruisers in the southern Baltic and the death of the Albatross received wide publicity - for example, on June 20 (the day after the battle) Revel newspapers published a telegram from Stockholm about the battle near Gotland. According to numerous intelligence reports, the death of the minelayer made a tremendous impression on the public circles of Germany, and, in fact, Admiral G. Bachmann spoke of it as having "great moral significance." Thus, in this sense, the Russian operation ended in complete success.
Thank you for the attention!
