In previous articles, we analyzed the design features of the battle cruisers Derflinger and Tiger, and, without a doubt, comparing these ships will not take us much time.
Theoretically, 635-kg Tiger shells could penetrate 300 mm of Derflinger's armor belt from 62 cables, and the top 270 mm, probably from 70 cables or a little more, of course, provided that they hit the armor plate at an angle close to 90 degrees. Thus, we can state that at the main battle distances (70-75 kbt), the vertical protection of the Derflinger perfectly protected against the "theoretical" (high-quality) armor-piercing shells of the 343-mm guns of the British battle cruiser.
But not a single armored belt … As we said earlier, the booking scheme for German battlecruisers along Seydlitz inclusive had one significant drawback - the horizontal part of the armored deck was located higher than the upper edge of the "thick" part of the armored belt. So, for example, in the same "Seydlitz", the upper edge of the 300 mm armored belt was (at normal displacement) at a height of 1.4 m above the waterline, and the horizontal part of the armored deck - at a height of 1.6 m. Accordingly, the German battle cruiser had a whole "window" in which enemy shells, to hit the horizontal part or the bevel of the armored deck, it was enough to pierce only the upper, 230 mm armor belt, which did not represent a significant barrier for armor-piercing 343-mm shells. And the armored deck of the Seydlitz (including the bevels) was only 30 mm thick …
So, on the Derflinger-class battlecruisers this "window" was "slammed" because the upper edge of the 300 mm belt was not 20 cm lower, but 20 cm above the level of the horizontal armored deck. Of course, given that the shells hit the ship at an angle to the horizon, there was still a section over 300 mm of armor, hitting which, the shell could still hit the armored deck, but now it was protected not by 230 mm, but by 270 mm of armor, to break through which even the 343-mm "armor piercing" was not so easy. And given the fact that the Derflinger's bevels were protected not by 30 mm, but by 50 mm armor, there were not too many chances that the fragments of the shell that exploded during the passage of 270-300 mm of the armor plate would penetrate them. Of course, 30 mm of horizontal armor looked very modest protection and would not have been able to withstand the burst of a shell on the plate, but they protected it from fragments (besides, flying almost parallel to the deck).
In other words, theoretically, the Derflinger's defense could be overcome with a 343-mm projectile. When 270 mm of armor broke through and 50 mm burst behind it, the bevel could be broken - tests carried out in Russia (1922) showed that from fragments of 305-356-mm shells that exploded not on the armor, but at a distance of one to one and a half meters, it was guaranteed only 75 mm armor protects. But this could only happen if the projectile “passed” the 270 mm armor plate as a whole and exploded next to the bevel or directly on it, but if the projectile exploded in the process of overcoming the 270 mm armor plate, it is already highly doubtful.
As for the armoring of artillery, the forehead of the Derflinger's main caliber towers (270 mm) and barbets (260 mm), the British thirteen-and-a-half-inch 635-kg projectile at a distance of 70-75 kbt, if it could overpower, then with great difficulty and when hit at an angle, close to 90 degrees. Which, of course, was further complicated by the shape of the barbets (it is very difficult to get into the armor having the shape of a circle at an angle of 90 degrees).
So, it turns out that even for some “ideal” armor-piercing projectile of 343 mm caliber, the armor of the Derflinger's hull, if it was permeable at distances of 70-75 cables, was only at the limit of the possible. But the fact is that the Royal Navy did not have such shells in the First World War, and in fact, the greatest thickness that British shells managed to cope with was 260 mm - and then, it was pierced not by 343-mm, but by 381-mm shell … Accordingly, if we start not from the tabular values, but from the actual quality of British ammunition, the Derflinger's booking for the Lion and Tiger-class battlecruisers was invulnerable.
This, of course, did not mean that the Derflinger could not be sunk by 305-343 mm guns. In the end, the fatal damage that led to the death of the same type "Derflinger" "Lyuttsov" was inflicted by 305-mm shells of the battle cruisers "Invincible" and (possibly) "Inflexible" Rear Admiral Horace Hood.
But, without a doubt, the unprecedented level of armor protection (for ships of the "battle cruiser" class) provided "Derflinger" with a great advantage.
At the same time, on it, at last, the main weakness of the German battle cruisers was eradicated - insufficient armor penetration and armor action of 280-mm shells. The new twelve-inch projectile weighed 405 kg - almost a quarter more than the 280 mm. The data in the sources on the muzzle velocity of 280-mm and 305-mm German guns are somewhat contradictory, but in the worst case, the drop in muzzle velocity in comparison with 280-mm is only 22 m / s, which together gives a significantly higher armor penetration of 305-mm ammunition. More or less acceptable protection against them was provided only by 229 mm British armor. Of the nine German 305-mm shells that hit the 229 mm armor plates of the belt and turrets of British ships, four pierced the armor, but one of these four, although not completely destroyed, lost both the warhead and the fuse, and, accordingly, did not explode … Thus, 229 mm armor plates were able to "filter" two-thirds of the German 305-mm shells, and this is still something.
As you know, the "Tiger" received 229 mm armor protection for boiler rooms and engine rooms, as well as towers and barbets up to the level of the upper deck. But it should be understood that even in theory, the armor of these parts of the British cruiser did not provide the same level of protection against 305-mm German shells as that of the Derflinger-class battle cruisers against the 343-mm. Well, in practice, in a real battle, a third of the German shells overcame the 229 mm protection of the British battle cruisers, while the 270-300 mm armor of the Derflingers remained invulnerable to 343-mm shells.
Again, it should be emphasized: the invulnerability of the armor does not mean the invulnerability of the ship. The Derflinger and its sister ships could have been destroyed by 343mm cannon fire, but it was, of course, much more difficult than sinking a British battle cruiser of the Lion or Tiger class with German 305mm artillery.
Even if the Tiger's 229 mm armor plates did not provide it with a level of protection comparable to that of a German battle cruiser, then what can we say about the 127 mm belt and 76 mm barbets covering the feed pipes of the first, second and fourth turrets of the main caliber of the latest British battle cruiser?
It must be said that, while losing significantly in vertical booking, the Tiger, in general, did not have any advantages that allowed it to at least partially compensate for this disadvantage. The horizontal booking of the Derflinger and the Tiger was roughly equivalent. The speed of the "Tiger" only slightly surpassed its German opponent - 28-29 knots versus about 27-28 knots. The location of the towers of the main caliber of both ships is linearly elevated. As we have already said, the British in the Tiger project paid great attention to mine-action artillery - but if its caliber and protection (152 mm and 152 mm) now corresponded to the German ones (150 mm each, respectively), then the unfortunate location of the artillery cellars, which entailed the need the organization of special horizontal corridors for transporting shells and charges to the guns spoiled the business. We have to admit that the Tiger was also inferior to the Derflinger in terms of medium artillery.
In general, the following can be stated. The first generation of British battlecruisers, armed with 305-mm guns, proved to be completely uncompetitive to the German Von der Tann and Moltke. However, the British ships of the "Lion" type, due to the most powerful 343-mm guns and some reinforcement of armor protection, surpassed the "Goeben" and "Seydlitz". The construction of the Derflinger restored the status quo that had existed before the appearance of the 343mm British battlecruisers, since in terms of the aggregate offensive and defensive qualities, the newest German ship was significantly superior to both the Lion and Queen Mary. If the British in the Tiger project were concerned primarily with strengthening its protection, providing the citadel along its entire length, including the areas of the main caliber turrets with at least 229 mm armor and increasing the bevels from 25.4 mm to at least 50 mm, then the Tiger, without a doubt, although it would not have surpassed Derflinger, one could speak of some kind of comparability of projects. So, "Seydlitz", without a doubt, was inferior to "Queen Mary", but still a duel with him was a serious danger for the British battle cruiser. "Queen Mary" was stronger, but not absolutely - but in the case of a duel between "Tiger" and "Derflinger" the latter had an overwhelming advantage.
This could end the comparison of "Tiger" and "Derflinger", if not for one "but". The fact is that just in 1912, when the Germans started building the magnificent Derflinger, the British laid the foundation for the first battleship of the Queen Elizabeth series - the difference in the laying time was less than 7 months. Let's take a look at what kind of ship it was.
As you know, according to the 1911 program, the British built four battleships of the Iron Duke class and the battle cruiser Tiger. According to the program of the next year, 1912, it was planned to build three more "343-mm" superdreadnoughts and a battle cruiser, the projects of which, in general, were almost ready (the battle cruiser, by the way, was to become the second ship of the "Tiger" class). But … as Winston Churchill wrote: "The British Navy always travels first class." The fact is that England has already laid down 10 battleships and 4 battle cruisers with 343-mm cannons, and other countries have reacted. Japan ordered the British battle cruiser with 356-mm cannons, which were somewhat more powerful than the British 13.5-inch. It became known that the new American dreadnoughts also received 356-mm artillery. According to information received from Germany, Krupp experimented with might and main with various models of 350-mm cannons, and they should be received by the latest dreadnoughts of the "Koenig" type. Accordingly, the time has come for a new leap forward. Consider what happened with the British.
Artillery
The story of how Winston Churchill, with the full support and approval of John Fisher, "pushed through" the tab of 381-mm dreadnoughts, on which guns did not exist yet, is well known. Without a doubt, if the efforts of the British gunsmiths were not crowned with success and the 381-mm did not work out, the Admiralty would have firmly sat down in a puddle, having built ships that there would be nothing to arm. Nevertheless, Churchill took a chance and won - the British 15-inch gun became a real masterpiece of artillery art. The external ballistics of the newest artillery system was beyond praise. And the firepower…. The 381 mm / 42 artillery system sent an 871 kg projectile into flight with an initial speed of 752 m / s. The two-gun turrets, created taking into account the operating experience of similar 343-mm turrets, have become the standard of reliability. The maximum elevation angle was 20 degrees - while the firing range was 22 420 m or 121 cables - more than enough for the era of the First World War.
The magnificent main caliber was complemented by 16 152 mm MK-XII guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers - the only reproach to which could only be their low placement, which made the casemate flooded with water, but this, in general, was the norm for battleships of that time. Unfortunately, the British again did not think over properly the design of supplying ammunition to the casemate, which is why 152-mm shells and charges were fed rather slowly, which forced a significant amount of ammunition to be stored directly at the guns in the casemate. The result is known - two German shells, simultaneously piercing the 152 mm armor of the "Malaya", caused the charges to ignite, a fire (cordite was burning), and the flame rose above the masts. All this completely disabled the casemate and resulted in the death of several dozen people. The British themselves considered the placement of medium artillery as the most unfortunate element of the Queen Elizabeth project.
Reservation
If the main caliber of Queen Elizabeth-class battleships deserves the most excellent epithets, then the protection of dreadnoughts of this type is rather ambiguous. In addition, its descriptions, alas, are internally contradictory, so the author of this article cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data set out below.
The basis of the vertical armor protection "Queen Elizabeth" was an armor belt with a height of 4, 404 m. From the upper edge, over a length of 1, 21 m, its thickness was 152 mm, the next 2, 28 m had 330 mm thickness, and on the "terminal" 0, 914 m up to the bottom edge, the armor thickness was 203 mm. At the same time, in the normal displacement, the armor belt was 1.85 m below the waterline. This meant that the most massive, 330 mm part was at 0.936 m under water and 1.344 m above sea level.
The armored belt stretched from about the middle of the barbet of the first tower of the main caliber to the middle of the barbet of the fourth. Further, in the bow and stern, the armor belt thinned, first to 152 mm, and then to 102 mm, ending a little before reaching the stem and sternpost. However, one should not think that the "Queen Elizabeth" was present "gates" in the cellars of the bow and stern towers. The fact is that, in addition to armoring the sides, they were protected by traverses, going at an angle from the main armor belt and closing on the barbet. Thus, the protection of the supply pipes of these towers consisted of two layers of 152 mm armor plates, one of which was at an angle to the center plane - such a protection "Lion" and "Tiger" could only dream of. In addition to 152 mm angular traverses, Queen Elizabeth also had 102 mm traverse in the bow and stern, where 102 mm sections of the armor belt ended. Also worth mentioning is the 51 mm anti-torpedo bulkhead, which also served as additional protection for the artillery cellars.
On top of the main armor belt, the Queen Elizabeth had a second, upper armor belt, 152 mm thick, extending to the level of the upper deck. The casemate also had 152 mm protection with 102-152 mm traverse in the stern. In the nose, 152-mm armor plates "converged" to the barbette of the second turret of the main caliber. The turrets of 381 mm guns had 330 mm frontal armor plates and 229 mm (perhaps 280 mm) side walls, 108 mm - a roof. The barbets up to the level of the upper deck were protected by 254 mm of armor in some places (where the barbette was overlapped by a neighboring barbette or superstructure), which gradually thinned to 229 mm and 178 mm, and below, opposite 152 mm of the armor belt - 152 mm and 102 mm of armor. The forward wheelhouse was protected (according to various sources) with armor of variable thickness 226-254 mm (or 280 mm), aft - 152 mm.
As for the horizontal armor protection, everything is very difficult with it. On the one hand, based on the available drawings, we can conclude that horizontal armor within the citadel was provided by a 25 mm armored deck with bevels of the same thickness. Outside the citadel, the armored deck had 63, 5 -76 mm aft and 25-32 mm in the bow. In addition, within the citadel, the upper deck had a variable thickness in different areas of 32-38-44-51 mm. The casemate additionally had a 25 mm roof. But if the above description is correct, then we come to the conclusion that the horizontal defense of the Queen Elizabeth approximately corresponds to that of the battleships of the Iron Duke class. At the same time, some sources (AA Mikhailov "Queen Elizabeth-class battleships") contain an indication that on the 381-mm superdreadouts, the horizontal protection was weakened relative to the battleships of the previous series.
In general, the following can be said about the protection of ships of the Queen Elizabeth class. It is very good (although not so that absolutely, as we will see below) it protected battleships of this series from shells of 305 mm guns. But a number of its elements (upper armor belt, barbets, etc.) did not represent serious protection against more powerful 356-mm, and even more so 381-mm shells. In this respect, the British again created a ship, very unimportantly protected from the guns of the caliber that it carried itself.
Power plant
Initially, the British designed a superdreadnought with 10 381-mm guns, positioned in the same way as was customary on "343-mm" superdreadnoughts, while their speed was supposed to be 21 knots, classic for British ships. But the extraordinary power of the 381mm artillery meant that even with eight main caliber barrels, the newest battleship was significantly superior to any ten-gun battleship with 343mm cannons. On the other hand, the space and weight of the "saved" tower could be used to increase the power of the suspension and achieve a speed much higher than 21 knots.
Here it is necessary to make a small "lyrical" digression. According to O. Parkes, the battle cruiser Queen Mary, laid down in 1911, cost the British taxpayers £ 2,078,491. Art. (whether the guns were included in this price, unfortunately, is not specified). At the same time, the series of dreadnoughts "King George V", laid down in the same 1911, together with cannons, cost the British treasury an average of 1,960,000 pounds. for the ship. The next Iron Ducs cost even less - 1,890,000 pounds sterling. (although the price without weapons may be indicated).
At the same time, the Tiger turned out to be even more expensive than Queen Mary - O. Parks gives a fantastic sum of £ 2,593,100. with guns. According to other sources, the Tiger was only worth £ 2,100,000. Art. (but maybe no guns). In any case, it can be stated that battle cruisers cost the British more than battleships at the same time. And, despite the hurricane energy of John Fisher, who saw almost the main ships of the fleet in battle cruisers, the British wondered more and more whether they needed ultra-expensive, but at the same time weakly protected ships, which are extremely dangerous to use in a general battle, the path even not in line, but as a fast vanguard of the fleet?
As you know, D. Fisher left the post of First Sea Lord in January 1910. And the new First Sea Lord Francis Bringgeman finally voiced what many have been thinking about for a very long time:
“If you decide to spend money on a fast, heavily armed ship and pay much more than your best battleship is worth, then it's better to protect it with the heaviest armor. You will get a ship that can really cost one and a half times more than a battleship, but which in any case can do everything. Investing the cost of a first-class battleship in a ship that cannot withstand heavy combat is a flawed policy. Better to spend the extra money and have what you really want. In other words, the battle cruiser must be replaced by a fast battleship, despite the high cost."
By the way, oddly enough, but "Queen Elizabeth" did not become super-expensive ships - their average cost with weapons was 1,960,000 pounds sterling, that is, cheaper than battle cruisers.
This approach met with the full approval of sailors, as a result of which the battleship project was redesigned for significantly higher speeds than previously thought. The nominal power of the Queen Elizabeth power plant was supposed to be 56,000 hp, at which the latest dreadnoughts with a normal displacement of 29,200 tons were supposed to develop 23 knots, and when forcing up to 75,000 hp. - 25 knots. In reality, their speed may have been somewhat lower (although the Malaya developed 25 knots during trials), but it was still very high, fluctuating within 24, 5-24, 9 knots.
Of course, such results could not be achieved using coal, so the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships were the first British heavy ships to completely switch to oil heating. The oil reserve was 650 tons (normal) and 3400 tons full, in addition, the full load provided for the availability of 100 tons of coal. According to some reports, the cruising range was 5,000 miles at 12, 5 knots.
In general, the project turned out to be not only successful, but revolutionary in the creation of battleships. Ships, built on the principle of "only big guns", were significantly stronger than squadron battleships, and were named after the first battleship of this type by dreadnoughts. The introduction of 343-mm cannons on battleships opened the era of superdreadnoughts, but if so, then ships of the Queen Elizabeth class could rightfully be called "super-superdreadnoughts" - their advantage over ships with 343-356-mm artillery was great enough for this.
But the main reason why we devoted so much time to the construction of these, in every respect, advanced ships, is that they were supposed to form a "fast wing" necessary for reconnaissance and coverage of the head of the enemy column in a general engagement. That is, battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class were supposed to perform at the Grand Fleet exactly those functions for which battle cruisers were created in Germany. And if so, then the battlecruisers of the "Derflinger" type had to face in battle not with the battlecruisers of the British, or rather, not only with them. Before the Derflingers loomed the prospect of a battle with the Queen Elizabeth squadron, and this was a completely different enemy.
The data on the armor penetration of the 305-mm guns of the German battlecruisers are somewhat different, however, even the most modest of them, given in "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting" (254 mm at 69 kbt and 229 mm at 81 kbt) against the background of real results demonstrated in the Jutland battle, they look somewhat optimistic. But even taking them for granted, we see that neither the artillery of the main caliber, both the turrets and the barbets, nor the waterline covered by 330 mm armor belt, at a standard distance of 75 kbt, in general, are invulnerable to German shells (except in the barbet with great luck, fragments of armor and a projectile will pass, after the latter explodes in the process of breaking through the armor). In fact, only the German 305-mm shells, which pierced the 152 mm armor belt and exploded inside the ship, pose a certain danger - in this case, their fragments will have enough kinetic energy in order to penetrate the 25 mm armored deck and damage the engine and boiler rooms. The German 305-mm shells have practically no chance of going through the barbets as a whole, but there is a good chance, hitting the barbet's armor, pierce it with the combined energy of the impact and explosion of the projectile. In this case, hot fragments will fall into the feed pipes, which may well cause a fire, as happened in the aft towers of the Seydlitz. The shells that fell into the casemate of the British battleship also posed a considerable danger (remember the fire on the Malaya!)
In other words, the armor protection of ships of the Queen Elizabeth type was not invulnerable to 305-mm cannons - these battleships had some "windows", when hit by 405-kg, the German "armor-piercing" could do business. The problem was that even the thickest armor of the Derflinger - the 300 mm section of the armor belt - could be penetrated (calculated) by a 381-mm projectile at a distance of 75 kbt. In other words, the Derflinger's armor, which very well defended the ship against 343-mm artillery fire, did not "hold" fifteen-inch armor-piercing shells at all. Fortunately for the Germans, the quality of such shells in the Battle of Jutland among the British was very low, they could rather be talked about as semi-armor-piercing. There is no doubt that if the British sailors had at their disposal the armor-piercing shells created later under the Greenboy program, the battlecruisers of the 1st reconnaissance group of Admiral Hipper would have suffered much more serious losses. However, even the available shells inflicted very heavy damage on the German ships.
Without a doubt, the excellent protection of the German battlecruisers allowed them to hold out for some time under fire from 381-mm cannons, and their artillery could cause some damage to the battleships of the Queen Elizabeth type. But in general, in terms of the aggregate of their tactical and technical characteristics, the Derflinger-class battle cruisers, of course, were not an equivalent and could not withstand the high-speed British battleships. And this leads us to an amazing dualism in assessing the last of the built German battlecruisers.
Without a doubt, the Derflingers were magnificent ships, as the British themselves admitted. O. Parks writes about the head cruiser of the series:
The Derflinger was a wonderful ship that the British thought highly of."
There is also no reason to doubt that in terms of its qualities the Derflinger left far behind both the Seidlitz, which preceded it, and the entire line of British battle cruisers, including the Queen Mary and Tiger. Thus, "Derflinger" definitely owns the laurels of the best pre-war battle cruiser in the world, and the best of the German battle cruisers.
But at the same time, the Derflinger is also the worst German battle cruiser, and the reason for this is very simple. Absolutely all German battle cruisers were built as a "high-speed wing" with the linear forces of the hoheflotte. And absolutely all battle cruisers in Germany, from Von der Tann to Seydlitz inclusive, were able to fulfill this role more or less successfully. And only the ships "Derflinger" were no longer suitable for this, since they could not resist the "high-speed wing" of the British, made up of battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class.
There is no doubt that this conclusion may seem far-fetched to some. But you need to understand that any warship is not built at all in order to surpass some other ships in one or several characteristics, but in order to fulfill its inherent function. The German admirals needed ships capable of acting as a "fast wing" for the main forces of the High Seas Fleet. They built them, and later the world classification brought them to the list of battle cruisers. The Derflingers became the best battlecruisers in the world … just at the time when the British entrusted the functions of a "fast wing" to fast battleships - a new class of ships that battlecruisers could no longer resist. Thus, the hochseeflotte was deprived of the tool he needed, and this was the only thing that mattered in a naval battle.
Alas, we are forced to state that in 1912 the British naval thought put a check and checkmate on the high-speed heavy ships of the German fleet - having implemented the concept of a high-speed battleship, the British got ahead.
