In this article we will talk about the only combat campaign of the aircraft carrier "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (hereinafter - "Kuznetsov"), during which his aircraft attacked the real enemy - the "barmaley" of Syria. But before proceeding with its description, it is necessary to say a few words about the state of the ship and the air group at the time of the start of the campaign.
Without a doubt, in theory, the most useful carrier-based combat aircraft for an aircraft carrier of the Russian Federation would be a heavy multifunctional fighter capable of effectively destroying both air and surface and ground targets. But in the 90s, the Kuznetsov air group was formed from heavy Su-33 fighters, which, unfortunately, were not multifunctional and were a deck modification of the Su-27, specialized in air defense missions. However, in the future, Kuznetsov's carrier-based aircraft was reinforced with lighter MiG-29KR and MiG-29KUBR fighters. Why did this happen?
As we have already said, the MiG-29K in its original incarnation (80s) was a deck modification of the MiG-29M, that is, it was multifunctional, and in addition, it was a “4+” generation aircraft, while the Su- 33 did not claim to be larger than the usual 4th generation. When India, wishing to get a new aircraft carrier, opted for the Vikramaditya, the MiG-29K, apparently, looked preferable for them to the specialized Su-33 precisely because of its versatility and the ability to use more modern weapons (missiles like RVV-AE). In addition, it is unclear whether it was possible at all to "land" the heavy Su-33 on the deck of the aircraft carrier "Gorshkov" which became "Vikramaditya" and how much the restructuring and modernization of the aircraft carrier such a decision made.
On January 20, 2004, India signed a contract of $ 730 million for the development and supply of 16 carrier-based fighters (12 MiG 29K and 4 MiG 29KUB), and then, on March 12, 2010, signed an additional contract for the supply of another 29 MiG 29K for a total amount 1, 2 billion dollars. However, one should not think that the Indian sailors received the same MiG-29K, which once underwent flight tests at the Kuznetsov. The aircraft was significantly modified, both the glider and the onboard radio electronics, so that the "Indian" version of the MiG-29K quite legitimately attributed to itself one more asterisk, positioning itself as the "4 ++" generation.
Without a doubt, limited funding and the fact that the products of RSK MiG, probably from the very formation of the Russian Federation, have not been a priority for the state, could not but affect the MiG-29K. It is known that engines with a deflected thrust vector (RD-33OVT) and a radar station with an active phased array (Zhuk-A) were developed for aircraft of this family, and there is no doubt that with appropriate funding everything could seats”on Indian planes, but unfortunately this did not happen. If the MiG-29K received all the aforementioned novelties, it could, perhaps, claim the title of the best carrier-based aircraft in the world, but even without them it looks good against the background of the French Raphael and the American Super Hornet, somewhat inferior. but in some ways surpassing the latter.
And on February 29, 2012, a contract was signed for the supply of 20 single-seat MiG-29KR aircraft and 4 MiG-29KUBR to the Russian Navy. The letter "P" in this abbreviation means "Russians" and is needed to distinguish it from the Indian model. The fact is that aircraft for the domestic armed forces are equipped with slightly different systems and electronics (alas, not always better) than aircraft supplied to other countries. Usually, export models of weapons are called the same as their domestic counterparts with the addition of the letter "E" ("export"), but in the case of the MiG-29K, the export configuration was the primary one - so the letter "R" had to be added to domestic fighters. Well, there can be a lot of possible reasons why the decision was made to supply the MiG-29K to the fleet.
The first is the shortage of carrier-based aircraft for the Kuznetsov air group. In total, according to the author of this article, 26 serial Su-33s were produced (the pilot batch is not taken into account, especially since the aircraft included in it have long been dismantled). Of these, at the time of the decision to purchase the MiG-29K, 5 were lost (for today - 6, taking into account the plane that fell from the deck during the trip to Syria, but more on that below). Thus, by 2012, 21 vehicles remained in service. At the same time, the typical composition of the aircraft group of the aircraft carrier was supposed to include 24 Su-33s.
The second is the degree of physical wear and tear of the aircraft. Although our deck "Sushki" are still far from serving their deadlines, it is impossible to call them young either - in 2015, when the contract for the supply of MiG-29KR / KUBR was to be fulfilled, the planes were executed at 21-22 of the year. Taking into account the time required to fine-tune and master the MiG-29KR in combat units (which could have taken three years), the age of the Su-33 would have reached a quarter of a century. Taking into account the operation in the conditions of the "wild 90s", as well as the fact that the Su-33 are our first carrier-based aircraft for horizontal take-off and landing, it cannot be ruled out that the resource of all or part of the aircraft by this time would have been largely used up.
The third is obsolescence. Sadly to admit it, but in the 2010s, the Su-33s were already quite far from the cutting edge of technological progress. At one time, the Sukhoi Design Bureau "put on the deck" a 4th generation aircraft without major modifications, thereby greatly simplifying its debugging and serial production, and the Su-33 is still capable of fighting the Super Hornets of our "sworn friends", but … In terms of its capabilities, the aircraft has not gone too far from the classic Su-27, but today even the modification of the Su-27SM3 is, in general, of little relevance. At the same time, the MiG-29KR is a much more modern aircraft.
Fourth, the impossibility of replenishing the Kuznetsov air group with heavy Su aircraft. The resumption of production of the obsolete Su-33 was very costly and did not make any sense. The creation of a carrier-based version of more modern fighters of the Su-27 family (Su-30, Su-35) was completely unpromising for two reasons - firstly, spending serious money and time in the presence of a good MiG-29K was excessive wastefulness, and the second - throughout apparently, the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" simply could not accept the deck-based analogues of the Su-30 and, moreover, the Su-35. Without a doubt, both the Su-30 and (even more so!) The Su-35 are much more perfect than the Su-27, but you have to pay for everything, and first of all - in weight. The Su-30 and Su-35 are corny heavier than the Su-27, respectively, their deck modifications would be even heavier than the Su-33. At the same time, even the Su-33 for our aircraft carrier, in general, is heavy and it is impossible to go for any significant increase in the weight of the new aircraft.
Fifth, the support of the RSK MiG team. The Sukhoi Design Bureau was already sufficiently provided with both state orders and state aid, so that the acquisition of a medium-sized batch of twenty-ninths made it possible to keep the RSK MiG afloat.
Sixth - issues of foreign economic activity. It is known that it is much easier to conclude export contracts for the supply of military equipment if it is in service with the seller's country, and this fully applies to aircraft. So one could expect that the armament of our only aircraft carrier, the MiG-29K, would give this aircraft family a greater export potential.
The seventh is internal political. The fact is that in 2011 another “fateful” decision was made to destroy … well, not complete destruction, but a powerful blow to the naval aviation of the Russian Navy. Strike aircraft (Tu-22M3, Su-24, with the exception of the regiment on the Black Sea) and fighters (MiG-31, Su-27) were withdrawn from its structure and transferred to the Air Force. In essence, the fleet had only anti-submarine (IL-38), carrier-based aircraft (Su-33, training Su-25UTG) and helicopters. Perhaps the strengthening of carrier-based aviation by the MiG-29KR / KUBR regiment became a kind of "compensation" for the above, "bargained for" by the admirals.
In general, regardless of the true reasons for this decision, RSK MiG fulfilled the contract, delivering four aircraft in 2013 and ten each in 2014-2015. However, a new military unit, the 100th separate shipborne fighter aviation regiment (OQIAP) was formed only on December 1, 2015. Before that, the MiG-29KR and KUBR were actually at the stage of fine-tuning and flight tests, and naval aviation was not transferred - with one exception. The first three MiG-29KR, built in 2013, were transferred to the 279th Aircraft Corporation for trial operation, and our best deck pilots had the opportunity to "try" the new aircraft.
But this, of course, did not solve the issue of combat training of the newly formed 100th OQIA, especially since after just a month of the formation of the regiment of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" it was repaired: from January to mid-June 2016, the ship was in the 35th shipyard in Murmansk, where the restoration of technical readiness took place, and then until August stood at the dock of the 82nd shipyard in Roslyakov. And only since September, the pilots of the 279th (on the Su-33) and the 100th (on the MiG-29KR / KUBR) separate naval fighter regiments were able to start (resume) takeoffs and landings on the deck of the ship.
Accordingly, by October 15, 2016, when the first and so far the only combat campaign of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" began, the 100th OQIAP was, of course, not ready for military service. Recall that in the days of the USSR, a combat pilot was given up to three years to fully master the course of combat training (and each type of aircraft required its own, unique course). During this time, the pilot had to conduct more than one hundred exercises and trainings, and only after that he could receive permission to conduct hostilities. Of course, the pilots of the 100th separate shipborne fighter aviation regiment, formed and received its materiel less than a year ago, could not have such an admission.
Nevertheless, due to the transfer of three MiG-29Kr 279 okiap in 2013, several of our naval pilots still had enough experience in flying MiGs to use the latter in combat conditions. Yes, in fact, the regiment flying on the Su-33 should have been given more time to restore the skills of "working with the deck" after the repair of the aircraft carrier. The same goes for the crew of our only heavy aircraft carrier. In other words, "by and large in Hamburg," neither the crew nor the Kuznetsov air group could be considered "ready for the march and battle," but nevertheless the ship was sent for combat service to the shores of Syria. Who made the decision to send the ship that did not restore its combat effectiveness? The answer to this question is very easy. Zvezda TV channel on February 23, 2017 reported:
"The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that the initiative of the sea voyage of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov to the Syrian Arab Republic was his personal, the head of state said this during a meeting with the military."
But to understand why such an order was given is much more difficult. Why was the aircraft carrier needed off the coast of Syria at all? The first answer that comes to mind is the desire to give our sailors experience "in conditions close to combat." Strictly speaking, these conditions were combat conditions, but you still need to understand that the lack of the "barmaley" (fortunately!) Of their own aviation and a somewhat serious air defense system does not allow gaining experience in dealing with them and, no doubt, strongly makes it easier to destroy the fighting force and infrastructure of fanatics who think they are fighting in the name of Allah.
However, if it was only about gaining the necessary experience, then there was no point in rushing things - the operation in Syria lasts, and lasts, and lasts, so that it was possible to calmly complete the course of combat training of the aircraft carrier and only then send it to the Mediterranean Sea. at least not even in 2016, but in 2017. Thus, the indicated reason, for all its thoroughness, could not serve as a basis for the urgent sending of "Kuznetsov" to military service.
But in this case … oddly enough, there are only three options left:
1. The situation on the Syrian fronts was developing in such a way that the domestic air group, based at the Khmeimim airbase, could not cope with the volume of tasks facing it and needed to be strengthened. That is, in the presence of our only aircraft carrier off the coast of Syria, there was a military necessity.
2. The need for the presence of the aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean was not military, but political. It is generally known (unfortunately, not to everyone) that the fleet is one of the most important political instruments, and it could have turned out that the presence of a squadron led by the aircraft carrier became necessary in some kind of equation of our foreign policy "solitaire".
3. The incompetence of the President, as the supreme commander in chief, who sent an unprepared ship into battle, despite the fact that there was no objective need for this.
Oddly enough, but option number 1 - military necessity - is not as absurd as it might seem at first glance. Of course, purely technically, it would be much easier to send an additional ten and a half combat aircraft to Khmeimim, and that's the end of it. But only on one condition - that the airbase is able to receive them. The fact is that no airfield is a "dimensionless box" into which any number of squadrons can be "folded". In the USSR, for example, specialized military aviation bases provided for the basing of one regiment, and the largest ones - two regiments of combat aircraft, that is, we are talking about 30-60 machines. At the same time, the maximum known number of aircraft at the Khmeimim airbase was 69 aircraft.
Unfortunately, the author does not know the exact number of aircraft at this Syrian airbase during the period of Kuznetsov's presence there. There is information that the peak load of Khmeimim was reached in 2015 - early 2016, but somewhere in March 2016 the number of our aircraft was reduced from 69 to 25 aircraft. On the other hand, in March 2016, additional combat helicopters began to be transferred to Syria, and then long before the end of 2016, our air group was reinforced with aircraft, but the author, unfortunately, does not know how many.
It should be understood that during the period when the decision was made to reduce our presence in Syria, it seemed that everything slowly went smoothly - all the parties involved in the Syrian civil war agreed to sit down at the negotiating table. One could hope that it will lead to something, but it will lead. But alas, the illusions were dispelled very quickly - the negotiations very quickly reached a dead end and in April large-scale hostilities resumed. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that the air group in Khmeimim received reinforcement up to the maximum possible values for this air base. If this assumption is correct, then further strengthening of our Syrian group by the forces of the Aerospace Forces was no longer possible, and only the fleet could help.
Option number 2 also has every right to life. Let us recall that it was in the late summer and autumn of 2016 that a significant aggravation of the foreign policy situation around the Syrian crisis took place.
So, on August 24, the Turkish armed forces began (together with the "Free Syrian Army") the operation "Shield of Euphrates", carried out on the territory of Syria. Of course, no one was interested in the opinion of the Syrian leadership, moreover, in November 2016, Turkish President Erdogan directly stated that the goal of the "Shield of Euphrates" was to overthrow Assad. But, in general, the ambivalent nature of this operation was felt long before this announcement. It is interesting that, in all likelihood, the actions of the Turks did not cause delight in Washington either. Five days after the start of the operation, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmush said that one of the objectives of the operation is "to prevent the Kurds from creating a corridor from Iraq to the Mediterranean."The United States did not like this, and they demanded that the Turks stop the attacks of the Kurdish detachments. However, Turkey's EU minister Ömer Celik said:
"Nobody has the right to tell us which terrorist organization is worth fighting and which one to ignore."
Russian-American relations have also fallen into disrepair. At first, everything seemed to be going well - on September 9, 2016, Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov (no introduction needed) and US Secretary of State John Kerry drew up a "multi-stage" plan to resolve the situation in Syria, and his first step was to be a ceasefire, but he held out only a week and was denounced due to numerous violations. In response, the US military intensified, launching several airstrikes on Deir ez-Zor (Deir al-Zor) on September 17, killing at least 60 members of the Syrian government army. The Barmalei militants immediately launched a counterattack. Then a blow was struck on a humanitarian convoy near Aleppo, with the United States blaming the Russian Federation and the Syrian army for it.
Mutual accusations between the Russian Federation and the United States could not be resolved, as a result of which on October 3, the US State Department announced the suspension of its participation in bilateral channels of communication with Russia, established in order to maintain the cessation of hostilities in Syria, and suspended negotiations on the implementation of the peace agreement in this country. …
In other words, in September-October 2016, the situation developed in such a way that all the efforts of the Russian Federation to de-escalate the conflict in Syria did not lead to anything, and moreover, the armed forces of Turkey and the United States took decisive action. Under these conditions, there is no doubt that the dispatch of a large (by today's standards, of course) formation of the Russian Navy to the conflict zone could be of great political importance.
And, finally, option number 3 - we will not "spread like a head along the tree", we only note that if the above options number 1-2 are actually incorrect, and there was no extreme military or political necessity in the presence of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" off the coast of Syria, then the dispatch of a non-ready ship to the area of hostilities can only be regarded as the incompetence of the official on whose initiative this was done.
In general, we only know for sure that on October 15, 2016 the aircraft carrier multi-purpose group consisting of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov", the heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) "Peter the Great", two large anti-submarine ships "Severomorsk" and "Vice-Admiral Kulakov", as well as support vessels (and more than likely - one or two nuclear submarines) entered combat service.
Without a doubt, the creations of the Soviet shipbuilding school have always been distinguished by a very unusual, so to speak, "swift" beauty. The author of this article does not have the slightest doubt that dear readers already remember very well how the silhouettes of the TAKR project 1143.5, TARKR project 1144 and BOD project 1155 look, but he cannot deny himself the pleasure of posting a couple of beautiful photographs.
Looking at the magnificent proportionality of the nuclear-powered cruiser, it is very easy to forget that she is the largest non-aircraft-carrying warship in the world. Which of you, dear readers, paid attention to a human figure frozen on the very nose of Peter the Great? Below in the photo we see only a small part of the TARKR … and we can understand its true dimensions much better.
And the carrier-based aircraft? Take your time for just a two minute video:
But back to the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov". The ship entered combat service with an incomplete air group. In the last article, we already analyzed the situation when in 1995 the ship went into combat service with 13 Su-33s and 2 Su-25UTGs instead of 24 Su-33s in the state. It was just that at that time there were only 15 pilots who received permission to fly from the deck, and there was absolutely no need to take aircraft of two squadrons for them. So, most likely, a similar situation developed in 2016 - after an eight-month downtime in repair, having only a month and a half before the release, a significant part of the pilots of the 279th okiap, most likely, simply did not have time to obtain the appropriate admission. Just remember that flights from the deck are very difficult, and after downtime, even those who have already landed and taken off from the aircraft carrier more than once need additional training. But another option is also possible - only those vehicles that managed to equip the SVP-24, an aiming and navigation system for working on ground targets, went to Syria, which significantly improves the accuracy of unguided weapons.
However, the above is only the author's guess. The fact is that the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" went to sea with an incomplete air group, which, according to some information, included:
Su-33 - 10 units. (side numbers 62; 66; 67; 71; 76; 77; 78; 84; 85; 88);
MiG-29KR - 3 units. (41; 47; 49);
MiG-29KUBR - one or two units, board number 52, but possibly also number 50;
Ka-31 - 1 unit (90);
Ka-29 - 2 units. (23; 75);
Ka-27PS - 4 units. (52; 55; 57; 60);
Ka-27PL - 1 unit (32);
Ka 52 - 2 units.
And only 14-15 planes and 10 helicopters. Attention is drawn to the "motley" nomenclature, which even includes such "exotic" for our aircraft carrier as an AWACS helicopter and fire support helicopters.
The trip of our ships to the shores of Syria caused a lot of negative reviews in the foreign press. The aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" received many derogatory reviews. For example, on December 6, the American agency Bloomberg reported: "Putin is showing off his clumsy aircraft carrier … Admiral Kuznetsov should have stayed off the Russian coast. Or, better yet, go to a landfill. As a pile of scrap metal, it will do much more good than as an instrument of power projection. Russia ".
But the NATO military, obviously, had a completely different attitude towards the Russian AMG. As the commander of the "Kuznetsov", Captain 1st Rank S. Artamonov said:
“Foreign fleets, of course, showed interest in us. During the entire cruise, we recorded the presence of 50-60 ships of NATO countries next to us. In certain places (for example, from the Norwegian Sea to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea), our group was simultaneously accompanied by 10-11 of them”.
For example, in the English Channel our AMG was accompanied simultaneously by the British destroyer Duncan, the frigate Richmond, the Dutch and Belgian frigates Eversten and Leopold the First - and this, of course, not counting the closest attention of NATO aircraft and helicopters.
How did the power plant of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" show itself in the campaign? Vladimir Korolev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said:
“This trip was unique in terms of technical readiness. All eight boilers, the entire main power plant of the ship is in service."
On the other hand, "Kuznetsov" was smoking quite a lot on the way to Syria (although off the coast of Syria and on the way back - much less). Of course, the Internet immediately exploded with giggles about "a rusty Russian aircraft carrier running on wood."
However, the fact that the aircraft carrier regularly kept a cruising speed of 18 knots during the campaign went unnoticed behind the discussion of the "smoke" and it seems that its suspension did not cause any complaints this time. As for the smokes themselves, you need to understand that Kuznetsov is far from the only warship that smokes.
The author is not an expert in the field of boiler control, but as far as he knows, black smoke is one of the signs of incomplete combustion of fuel, and can be observed when an over-enriched mixture is supplied to the engines in order to squeeze the maximum out of them. At the same time, according to some information, the state of Kuznetsov's boilers today is such that the ship can confidently hold 18-20 knots for quite a long time, but not more. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the smoke is a consequence of movement at the maximum speed for TAKR today. Well, and besides, we must not forget that the last repairs were done in a great hurry before the release on October 15, and, perhaps, some adjustments to instrumentation and automation had to be done on the go. The latter is also supported by the fact that Kuznetsov smoked much less in the Mediterranean and on the way back. In general, the fact that the Kuznetsov was smoking does not in any way indicate that it is incapable of combat, but on the other hand, it is obvious that, having not had a single major overhaul since 1991, the ship really needs at least a partial replacement boilers.
The results of the operation are well known. The TAKR air group began flying in the skies of Syria on November 10, the first combat sortie took place on November 15, the last one on January 6, 2017. During this time, the Su-33 and MiG-29KR flew 420 sorties (including 117 at night), hitting up to 1,252 targets, and besides this, to support them, aircraft and helicopters of the TAKR made another 700 sorties.
During this period, two aircraft were lost - Su-33 and MiG-29KR. Alas, the Russian Ministry of Defense does not indulge the details of the combat use of our AMG, leaving room for various conjectures and fantasies.
For example, the website of the IHS Jane's, referring to satellite images from November 20, reported that at the Khmeimim base there were eight Su-33 carrier-based fighters and one MiG-29KR. Accordingly, many immediately concluded that "Kuznetsov" only delivered aircraft to Syria, and it "worked" mainly from the Khmeimim airbase. The American television channel Fox News added fuel to the fire, claiming, with reference to "US officials", that 154 sorties were made from the deck of the Russian TAVKR.
At the same time, an unnamed source told Interfax the following word for word:
“The pilots gained experience in taking off from the deck, landing on the Khmeimim and returning to the cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov. Such flights were especially active at the very beginning, during the study of the theater of military operations."
That is, it is possible that satellite images were recorded by our aircraft that landed on the Khmeimim after completing a combat mission and before returning to the aircraft carrier. But for sure, alas, nothing can be asserted here. Perhaps all 420 sorties were carried out from the ship, perhaps a smaller number. To our deep regret, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, indicating the total number of sorties, did not specify whether they were all made from the deck, or some of them were made from the Khmeimim airbase. However, the words of the TAKR commander indirectly indicate that 420 sorties were made precisely from the deck of the ship:
“In total, the aircraft from the“Admiral Kuznetsov”made 420 sorties, of which 117 - at night. In addition, more than 700 sorties were made to support combat operations. What does it mean: a carrier-based fighter takes off or sits down, a rescue helicopter is sure to hang in the air. And not because we are not confident in our technique. It should be! We are at the sea, and it has its own laws."
It is clear that it would be strange to provide flights from the Khmeimim airbase in this way - it is not at sea.
According to our TV channels, carrier-based aircraft destroyed targets in the area of such settlements as Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, Aleppo, Palmyra. At the same time, the MiG-29KR was usually used against relatively closely spaced targets (up to 300 km from the aircraft carrier) Su-33 - against targets at a distance of over 300 km. The strikes of our carrier-based aircraft were quite successful, for example, on November 17, 2016, it was reported that a group of militants and three well-known field commanders of terrorists were destroyed during the Su-33 airstrike.
During the hostilities, we lost two fighters - one Su-33 and one MiG-29KR. Fortunately, the pilots in both cases survived, but, unfortunately, the reasons for these accidents are still not clear.
In the case of the MiG-29KR, the following is more or less reliably known: on November 13, three MiGs took off, completing the assigned task, the aircraft returned to the aircraft carrier. The first of them sat down regularly. However, when the second plane caught on the second cable of the aerofinisher, it broke and became entangled in the third, as a result of which the MiG stopped thanks to the fourth cable. Before the troubleshooting, landing on the ship became impossible, but the aerofinishers could have been quickly "brought to life", so the third MiG, still in the air, was not ordered to land on the coastal airfield.
But the versions of what happened later, alas, differ. According to one of them, the malfunction was not corrected in a timely manner, as a result of which the MiG ran out of fuel, including an emergency reserve, and the pilot was forced to eject. Another version says that the MiG still had enough fuel in its tanks, but the fuel supply to the engines suddenly stopped, which is why it fell into the sea. What can you say about this? If the first version is correct, then it seems that the crew of the aircraft-carrying cruiser, who failed to eliminate the malfunction at the standard time, is to blame, as well as the officer who performed the function of the dispatcher and did not send the MiG to the coastal airfield in time. But remember that the ship left for combat service "unprepared for a campaign and battle" … On the other hand, if the second version is correct, then the reason for the loss of the MiG is a technical malfunction - and here you need to remember that the MiG-29KR and KUBR, in general, then, at that time, state tests did not pass (which were supposed to be completed in 2018).
As for the loss of the Su-33, the following happened here - the plane successfully landed, the air arrestors seemed to work normally, but at the moment when the pilot turned off the engines, and the aircraft was still moving forward (the air arrestor gradually extinguishes its energy), the cable broke. The aircraft's speed was not enough to take off and go around, but, alas, it was enough for the Su-33 to roll off the deck into the sea.
In this case, the "control room" of the ship worked as it should - the situation was under control, and the pilot received the order to eject in time. On the one hand, it seems that the aerofinisher is to blame for the cause of the accident (it broke off), but there is another version of what happened.
The fact is that landing on an aircraft carrier requires jewelry precision. The aircraft should land along the center line with a deviation of no more than 2.5 meters. And the means of objective control showed that the "landing" Su-33 was in the "green zone", but then, it is not clear how, there was a shift of 4.7 m from the center line. As a result, the hook of the cable with an almost two-fold deviation from the norm led to the fact that the aerofinisher received a breaking force 5-6 times greater than the calculated one, and, of course, could not withstand this.
In the first case, of course, the manufacturers of the aerofinisher are to blame, but with the second, everything is more complicated. It can be assumed that the landing system had some kind of malfunction, and while the pilot and the ship's "dispatcher" believed that the Su-33 was landing normally, in fact it was following the wrong trajectory.
I must say that both of these accidents caused a real rampage "on the Internet": they were presented as the complete inability of our only aircraft carrier to operate in conditions "close to combat". In fact, both of these accidents say only one thing - you should go into battle on serviceable equipment, having passed all the required training and passing all the necessary tests. The most banal phrase: "Regulations are written in blood" now and forever and forever and ever will remain true. We cannot count on the fact that everything will be in perfect order if the ship is in battle, which has been sailing for 27 years without overhaul, which eight months before the voyage stood in the dock and at the wall "to restore technical readiness", and had only a month and a half for restoration of combat effectiveness. And at the same time we are also going to use aircraft from it that have not "passed" the GSE.
However, the "Internet commentators" are far from such subtleties: "Ha-ha, to lose two planes in some kind of Syria … That's just the case - US aircraft carriers!" By the way, what about the USA?
"RIA-Novosti" published an interesting article entitled "How we will count: incidents on the aircraft carrier" Admiral Kuznetsov "and the experience of the US Navy." In it, the respected author (Alexander Khrolenko) gave a small overview of accidents and flight accidents in the US Navy. Let me quote a short excerpt from this article on the aircraft carrier Nimitz:
“In 1991, an F / A-18C Hornet crashed while landing on its deck. In 1988, in the Arabian Sea aboard the Nimitz, the electric trigger of the six-barreled Vulcan cannon of an A-7E attack aircraft jammed, and 4000 rounds per minute riddled the KA-6D tanker aircraft, which burned along with fuel and seven other aircraft. In 1981, while landing on the Nimitz, an EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare plane crashed into a Sea King helicopter. The collision and fire exploded five Sparrow missiles. In addition to the EA-6B Prowler aircraft and the Sea King helicopter, nine Corsair attack aircraft, three Tomcat heavy interceptors, three Viking anti-submarine defense aircraft S-3 Viking, A-6 Intrudur were burnt. 14 military sailors). Thus, the Nimitz alone lost more than 25 aircraft and helicopters."
And this despite the fact that the United States, for a second, has almost a century of experience in operating aircraft carriers with horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, and first used them in battle in World War II …
