Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon

Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon
Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon

Video: Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon

Video: Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon
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On June 12, Napoleon's army crossed the Neman River at Kovno and sent the main blow to the junction between the 1st and 2nd Western armies, with the aim of separating them and defeating each one individually. The advance detachments of the French army, after crossing the Niemen, were met by a patrol of the Black Sea hundreds of the Life Guards Cossack regiment, who were the first to enter the battle. Napoleon invaded Russia with 10 infantry and 4 cavalry corps totaling 390 thousand people, not counting the main headquarters and the transport units and guards subordinate to him. Of these soldiers, only about half were French. In the course of the war, until the end of 1812, more replenishment, rear, sapper and allied units with a total number of more than 150 thousand people arrived on the territory of Russia.

Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon
Cossacks in the Patriotic War of 1812. Part II. Invasion and expulsion of Napoleon

Rice. 1 Ferry of the Great Army across the Neman

Napoleon's invasion of Russia forced the Russian people to exert all their strength to repel the aggressor. The Cossacks also took an active part in the Patriotic War and fought with all their might. In addition to the numerous regiments that guarded the extended borders of the empire, all the available forces of the Don, Ural and Orenburg Troops were mobilized and deployed in the war against Napoleon. The Don Cossacks bore the brunt of the blow. From the very first days, the Cossacks began to inflict tangible injections on the Great Army, which became more and more painful as it moved deeper into Russian lands. From July to September, that is, during the entire offensive of the Napoleonic army, the Cossacks continuously participated in rearguard battles, inflicting significant defeats on the French. So Platov's corps, when retreating from the Neman, covered the junction of the 1st and 2nd armies. Ahead of the French troops was the Polish Uhlan division of Rozhnetsky. On July 9, near the town with the symbolic name of Mir, Platov's Cossacks used a favorite Cossack tactical technique - the venter. A small detachment of Cossacks imitated a retreat, lured the Uhlan division into a ring of Cossack regiments, which was then surrounded and defeated. On July 10, the vanguard of Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, was also defeated. From July 12, Platov's corps operated in the rear of Davout's corps and Napoleon's main army. Napoleon's maneuver to separate the Russian armies and defeat them separately failed. On August 4, the armies united at Smolensk, and on August 8, Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. On the same day, Platov defeated the vanguard of Murat's corps at the village of Molevo Bolota.

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Rice. 2 Cossack Venter under Mir

During the retreat of the Russian army, everything was destroyed: residential buildings, means of food, fodder. The surroundings along the path of Napoleon's army were under constant supervision of the Cossack regiments, which prevented the French from obtaining food for the troops and fodder for horses. It should be said that before the invasion of Russia, Napoleon printed a huge amount of Russian bank notes of excellent quality. Among the merchants, peasants and landowners there were "hunters" to sell food and fodder to the French for a "good price." Therefore, the Cossacks, in addition to military affairs, throughout the war had also to protect the irresponsible part of the Russian man in the street from the temptation to sell food, fuel and fodder to the French for "good money." The main quartermaster of his army was set up by Napoleon in Smolensk. As it deepened into the borders of Russia, the supply routes between the quartermaster and the army increased and were threatened by the attack of the Cossack cavalry. On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Cossack regiments formed the reserve of the army and provided the flanks. For health reasons, Platov did not participate in the battle. At a critical moment in the battle, the combined Cossack corps, commanded by General Uvarov, raided the rear of the left flank of the French army and defeated the rear. To eliminate the threat, Napoleon threw a reserve at the Cossacks instead of the last decisive attack. This prevented an unfavorable outcome of the battle for the Russians at a decisive moment. Kutuzov hoped for more and was dissatisfied with the results of the raid.

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Rice. 3 Raid of Uvarov's corps on the French rear

After the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army left Moscow and blocked the path to the southern provinces. Napoleon's army occupied Moscow, the Kremlin turned into Napoleon's headquarters, where he was preparing to accept proposals for peace from Alexander. But the parliamentarians did not appear, Napoleon's troops were under siege, because the nearest environs of Moscow were occupied by Russian cavalry. The area adjoining Moscow from the west, north-west, north and north-east was in the zone of operations of the Separate Cavalry Corps of the curtain of the Major General and Adjutant General, and from September 28 - Lieutenant General Ferdinand Vincengerode. The veil troops operated at different times until: 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 separate squadrons and a command of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 ranger battalions and 22 regimental guns. Partisans set up ambushes, attacked enemy carts, intercepted couriers. They daily made reports on the movement of enemy forces, handed over captured mail and information received from prisoners. The corps was divided into partisan detachments, each of which controlled a specific area. The most active were the detachments under the command of Davydov, Seslavin, Figner, Dorokhov. The tactical basis of partisan actions was the tried and tested Cossack reconnaissance, Cossack patrols and beckets (outposts), dexterous Cossack venteri (deceitful and double ambushes), and rapid rearrangements in lavas. The partisan detachment consisted of one or three Cossack regiments, reinforced by the most experienced hussars, and sometimes by rangers, or riflemen - light infantrymen trained in loose formation. Kutuzov also used mobile Cossack detachments for reconnaissance, communications, guarding the supply routes of the Russian troops, attacking the supply routes of the French army, for performing other special tasks in the rear of Napoleon's army and on the tactical foreground north of the Main Russian Army. The French could not leave the borders of Moscow, fires began in the city itself. The arsonists were seized, cruel reprisals were carried out over them, but the fires intensified and the cold came.

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Rice. 4 Shooting of arsonists in Moscow

General Denisov was the orderly chieftain on the Don in the absence of Platov. They were declared a general mobilization from 16 to 60 years old. 26 new regiments were formed, which during September all approached the Tarutino camp and abundantly replenished the forces of the veil. Kutuzov called this event as "a noble replenishment from the Don." In total, 90 regiments from the Don were sent to the active army. Cossacks and regular light cavalry units blocked Moscow. Moscow was on fire, funds to feed the occupation army on the ground could not be obtained, communications with the main quartermaster base in Smolensk were under the threat of attacks by Cossacks, hussar regiments and partisans from the local population. Cossacks and partisans every day captured hundreds, and sometimes even thousands of enemy soldiers who broke away from their units, and sometimes destroyed entire detachments of the French. Napoleon complained that the Cossacks were "plundering" his army. Napoleon's hope for peace negotiations remained futile.

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Rice. 5 Fires in Moscow

At the same time, the Russian army, retreating to Tarutin, stood on the way to the rich food southern provinces, not touched by the war. The army was continuously replenished, put itself in order and established communication and interaction with the armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein. Platov's Cossack corps was at Kutuzov's headquarters as an operational and mobile reserve. Meanwhile, Emperor Alexander made an alliance with the Swedish king Bernadotte and the Swedish army landed in Riga, strengthening Wittgenstein's army. King Bernadotte also helped to settle friction with England and to conclude an alliance with her. Chichagov's army joined with Tormasov's army and threatened Napoleon's communications west of Smolensk. Napoleon's army was stretched along the Moscow-Smolensk line, in Moscow there were only 5 corps and a guard.

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Rice. 6 The French in the Kremlin's Assumption Cathedral

Directly opposite the Tarutino camp was Murat's corps, which fought slow-paced battles with the Cossacks and cavalry. Napoleon did not want to leave Moscow, for this would show his failure and error in his calculations. However, the hungry and cold situation in Moscow and on the Moscow-Smolensk line, which was continuously attacked by the Russian cavalry, all this raised the question of withdrawing the army from Moscow. After much thought and advice, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow and set out for Kaluga. On October 11, according to the old style, Napoleon ordered the abandonment of Moscow. The corps of Ney, Davout, Beauharnais headed towards Kaluga. A huge train with refugees and looted property moved with the corps. On October 12, the corps of Platov and Dokhturov quickly overtook the French, blocked their road at Maloyaroslavets and managed to hold it until the main forces approached. Moreover, during a night raid on the left bank of the Luzha River, the Cossacks almost captured Napoleon himself, darkness and chance saved him from this. The heroic defense of Maloyaroslavets, the approach of the main Russian forces, the shock of the real possibility of being captured prompted Napoleon to stop the battle and give the order for the army to retreat towards Smolensk. In Moscow, with small units, Berthier remained, with the task of blowing up the Kremlin, for which all his buildings were mined. When it became known, General Vincennerode arrived in Moscow with an adjutant and the Cossacks for negotiations. He informed Berthier that if this was done, then all the French prisoners would be hanged. But Berthier arrested the parliamentarians and sent them to Napoleon's headquarters. The veil corps was temporarily headed by the Cossack general Ilovaisky. When the French retreated, terrible explosions followed. But due to the oversight of the French and the heroism of the Russian people, many barrels of gunpowder were not set on fire. After leaving Moscow, General Ilovaisky and the Cossacks were the first to occupy Moscow.

The retreating army of the invaders, leaving Mozhaisk, passed the Borodino field, covered with up to 50 thousand corpses and the remains of guns, carts and clothes. Flocks of birds pecked at the corpses. The impression for the retreating troops was terrifying. The persecution of the occupiers was carried out in two ways. The main forces, led by Kutuzov, went parallel to the Smolensk road, to the north, between the main Russian and French forces, was the lateral vanguard of General Miloradovich. North of the Smolensk road and parallel to it, a detachment of Kutuzov Jr. moved, squeezing parts of the foe from the north. The direct pursuit of the French army was entrusted to Platov's Cossacks. On October 15, the corps of Berthier and Poniatovsky, who left Moscow, joined the main French army. Platov's Cossacks soon overtook the French. In addition, from the troops of the veil, several mobile detachments were formed, consisting of Cossacks and hussars, who continuously attacked the retreating columns of the occupiers, and again the most active were under the command of Dorokhov, Davydov, Seslavin and Figner. Cossacks and partisans were tasked not only to chase and beat the enemy on the march, but also to meet his warheads and destroy their routes, primarily the crossings. Napoleon's army strove to reach Smolensk with the fastest marches. Platov reported: “The enemy is running like never before, no army could retreat. He throws on the road all the burdens, the sick, the wounded, and no historian's pen is able to depict the pictures of horror that he leaves on the high road."

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Rice. 7 Cossacks attack retreating French

Nevertheless, Napoleon found the movement not fast enough, blamed Davout's rearguard troops for this and replaced them with Ney's corps. The main reason for the slow movement of the French were the Cossacks, who constantly attacked their marching columns. Platov's Cossacks delivered prisoners in such numbers that he reported: "I am forced to give them to the townsfolk in the villages for their escort." At Vyazma, Davout's corps fell behind again and was immediately attacked by Platov and Miloradovich. Poniatowski and Beauharnais turned their troops around and saved Davout's corps from total annihilation. After the battle at Vyazma, Platov with 15 regiments went north of the Smolensk road, Miloradovich's corps with the Cossacks of the Orlov-Denisov corps moved south of the retreating French. The Cossacks walked along country roads, ahead of the French and attacked them from the head, where they were least expected. On October 26, Orlov-Denisov, joining up with the partisans, attacked divisions from the Augereau corps, which had just arrived from Poland for replenishment, and forced them to surrender. On the same day, Platov attacked the Beauharnais corps while crossing the Vop River, brought it into full combat capability and recaptured the entire train. General Orlov-Denisov, after the defeat of Augereau, attacked the warehouses of French military supplies near Smolensk and captured them and several thousand prisoners. The Russian army, pursuing the enemy along the destroyed road, also suffered from deficiencies in food and forage. The troop transports did not keep up, the five-day supplies taken in Maloyaroslavets were used up and there was little opportunity to replenish them. The supply of bread to the army fell on the population, each resident was required to bake 3 bread. On October 28, Napoleon arrived in Smolensk, and the units arrived within a week. No more than 50 thousand people reached Smolensk, cavalry no more than 5 thousand. The supplies in Smolensk, thanks to the attacks of the Cossacks, were insufficient and the warehouses were destroyed by demoralized hungry soldiers. The army was in such a state that there was no need to even think about resistance. After 4 days, the army set out from Smolensk in 5 columns, which made it easier for the Russian troops to destroy it in parts. To complete the setbacks of the French army, severe cold began at the end of October. The hungry army also began to freeze. The Don Cossack regiment of Stepan Panteleev went into a deep raid, tracked down his captured comrades, and on November 9, after a dashing raid, Ferdinand Vintzengerode and other prisoners were freed near Radoshkovichi, 30 miles from Minsk. The vanguard of Miloradovich and the Orlov-Denisov Cossacks cut the French way to Orsha near the village of Krasnoye. The French began to gather near the village, and Kutuzov decided to fight there and sent additional forces. In a three-day battle near the Red, Napoleon's army, in addition to the dead, lost up to 20 thousand prisoners. The battle was led by Napoleon himself, and all the responsibility was on him. He was losing the halo of an invincible commander, and his authority was falling in the eyes of the army. Having set out from Maloyaroslavets with an army of 100 thousand and absorbing guard garrisons along the way, after the Red one he had no more than 23 thousand infantry, 200 cavalry and 30 guns. The main goal of Napoleon was a hasty exit from the ring of the troops surrounding him. Dombrowski's corps was already barely holding back Chichagov's army, and the corps of MacDonald, Oudinot and Saint-Cyr were thoroughly battered by the replenished army of Wittgenstein. In mid-November, Napoleon's army arrived in Borisov for a crossing. On the opposite bank of the Berezina was Chichagov's army. To mislead him, the French engineering units began to build crossings in two different places. Chichagov concentrated at the Ukholod Bridge, but Napoleon threw all his strength into building bridges at Studenka and began to ferry the army. Platov's units engaged in a battle with the French rearguard, overturned it and subjected the bridges to artillery fire. In an effort to avoid a breakthrough of the Cossacks to the western bank, French sappers blew up the bridges that had survived the shelling, leaving the rearguard units to their fate. Chichagov, realizing his mistake, also arrived at the crossing. The battle began to boil on both banks of the Berezina. The losses of the French amounted to at least 30 thousand people.

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Rice. 8 Berezina

After the defeat at the Berezina on December 10, Napoleon arrived at Smorgon and from there went to France, leaving the remnants of the army at the disposal of Murat. Leaving the army, Napoleon did not yet know the full extent of the disaster. He was confident that the army, having withdrawn to the boundaries of the Duchy of Warsaw, where there were large reserves, would quickly recover and continue the war against the Russian army. Summing up the results of the military failure in Russia, Napoleon saw them in the fact that his calculation of a peace treaty after the occupation of Moscow turned out to be wrong. But he was sure that he was wrong not politically and strategically, but tactically. He saw the main reason for the death of the army in the fact that he gave the order to retreat with a delay of 15 days. He believed that if the army had been withdrawn to Vitebsk before the cold weather, Emperor Alexander would have been at his feet. Napoleon valued Kutuzov low, despised his indecision and unwillingness to engage in battle with the retreating army, which, moreover, was dying of hunger and cold. Napoleon saw an even greater mistake and his inability to see that Kutuzov, Chichagov and Wittgenstein allowed the remnants of the army to cross the Berezina. Napoleon attributed much of the blame for the defeat to Poland, whose independence was one of the goals of the war. In his opinion, if the Poles wanted to be a nation, they would rise up against Russia without exception. And although every fifth soldier of the Great Army of the invasion of Russia was a Pole, he considered this contribution insufficient. It must be said that most of these Poles (as well as other soldiers of the Great Army) did not die, but were captured, and a significant part of the prisoners, at their request, was later turned into the same Cossacks. As many historians of the war with Napoleon claim, ultimately his Grand Army "emigrated" to Russia. In fact, the imposition of "captive Lithuania and Nemchura" into the Cossacks, followed by their sending to the east, was a common thing at all times of the centuries-old Russian-Polish-Lithuanian confrontation.

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Rice. 9 Arrival of captured Poles to the village for enrollment in the Cossacks

During the war, Napoleon completely reconsidered his attitude to the military art of the Cossack troops. He said that “we must give justice to the Cossacks, it was they who brought success to Russia in this campaign. Cossacks are the best light troops among all existing ones. If I had them in my army, I would go through the whole world with them. " But Napoleon did not understand the main reasons for his defeat. They lay in the fact that Napoleon did not take into account his own forces in relation to the space of the country and the forms of warfare in these spaces by its people since ancient times. On the endless expanses of the East European plain, the huge Persian army of King Darius and, no less huge, the Arab army of Marwan was once destroyed. They were exhausted and exhausted by space, not seeing the enemy and unable to destroy him in open battle. Napoleon's army found itself in similar conditions. He had only 2 major battles, near Smolensk and on the Borodino field near Moscow. The Russian armies were not crushed by him, the results of the battles were controversial. The Russian armies were forced to retreat, but did not consider themselves defeated. Within the vast spaces, since ancient times, the best qualities of the light Cossack cavalry have been manifested. The main methods of warfare by the Cossack units were ambush, raid, ventilation and lava, perfected by the once great Genghis Khan, then inherited by the Cossacks from the Mongol cavalry and had not yet lost their importance by the beginning of the 19th century. The brilliant victories of the Cossacks in the war against Napoleon attracted the attention of all of Europe. The attention of the European peoples was drawn to the internal life of the Cossack troops, to their military organization, to training and economic structure. In their everyday life, the Cossacks combined the qualities of a good farmer, cattle breeder, and business executive, lived comfortably in the conditions of people's democracy and, without breaking away from the economy, could maintain high military qualities in their midst. These successes of the Cossacks in the Patriotic War played a cruel joke in the theory and practice of European military development and over the entire military-organizational thought of the first half of the 19th century. The high cost of numerous armies, tearing off large masses of the male population from economic life, once again gave rise to the idea of creating an army on the model of the Cossack way of life. In the countries of the Germanic peoples, troops of the Landwehr, Landsturms, Volkssturms and other types of people's militias began to be created. But the most stubborn implementation of the organization of the army on the Cossack model was shown in Russia and most of the troops, after the Patriotic War, were turned into military settlements for half a century. But "what is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the bull." Once again it was proved that it is impossible to turn men into Cossacks by an administrative decree. Through the efforts and efforts of the military settlers, this experience turned out to be extremely unsuccessful, the productive Cossack idea was turned into a parody, and this military-organizational caricature became one of the significant reasons for Russia's defeat in the subsequent Crimean War. However, the war with Napoleon continued and during the war the Cossacks became synonymous with valor not only in the Russian, but also among the allied armies of the European peoples. After the next defeat of Napoleon's army at the crossing of the Berezina River, the pursuit of his troops continued. The army was advancing in 3 columns. Wittgenstein went to Vilna, in front of him was Platov's corps of 24 Cossack regiments. Chichagov's army went to Ashmyany, and Kutuzov with the main forces went to Troki. On November 28, Platov approached Vilna and the very first shots of the Cossacks made a terrible commotion in the city. Murat, left by Napoleon to command the troops, fled to Kovno, and the troops went there. On the march, in conditions of terrible icy conditions, they were surrounded by Platov's cavalry and surrendered without a fight. The Cossacks captured the baggage train, artillery and treasury of 10 million francs. Murat decided to leave Kovno and retreat to Tilsit in order to join up with MacDonald's troops retreating from Riga. When MacDonald retreated, General York's Prussian corps, which was part of his troops, separated from him and announced that they were going over to the side of the Russians. His example was followed by another Prussian corps under General Massenbach. Soon the Chancellor of Prussia announced the independence of Prussia from Napoleon. The neutralization of the Prussian corps and their subsequent transfer to the side of the Russians was one of the best operations of Russian military intelligence in this war. This operation was led by the chief of staff of the Wittgenstein corps, Colonel Ivan von Diebitsch. A natural Prussian, he graduated from a military school in Berlin in his youth, but did not want to serve in the Prussian army that was then allied to Napoleon and entered service in the Russian army. After being seriously wounded near Austerlitz, he was being treated in St. Petersburg. There he was assigned to the General Staff and drew up a sensible memo on the nature of the future war. The young talent was noticed and upon recovery was appointed chief of staff in the corps of General Wittgenstein. At the beginning of the war, through numerous classmates who served in the Prussian army, Diebitsch came into contact with the command of the corps and successfully convinced them not to fight, but only to imitate a war with the Russian army and save forces for the coming war with Napoleon. The commander of the Northern French group, Marshal MacDonald, who was in charge of the Prussians, knew about their double-dealing, but he could not do anything, since he had no authority to do so. And when Napoleon retreated from Smolensk, the Prussian commanders, after a private meeting with Dibich, abandoned the front altogether, and then went over to the side of the Russians. The brilliantly carried out special operation brightly lit the star of the young commander, which never faded away until his death. For many years, I. von Diebitsch headed the headquarters of the Russian army and, by duty and the behest of his soul, successfully supervised secret and special operations and is rightfully considered one of the founding fathers of Russian military intelligence.

On December 26, a decree of the emperor was issued with a symbolic and meaningful title: "On the expulsion of the Gauls and eighteen languages." The question arose before Russian policy: to limit the war with Napoleon to the borders of Russia, or to continue the war until Napoleon was overthrown, ridding the world of the military threat. Both points of view had many supporters. The main supporter of the end of the war was Kutuzov. But the supporters of the continuation of the war were the emperor and most of his entourage, and it was decided to continue the war. Another coalition was formed against Napoleon, consisting of Russia, Prussia, England and Sweden. England became the soul of the coalition, which assumed a significant part of the costs of the belligerent armies. This circumstance is very atypical for the Anglo-Saxons and requires a comment. The trip to distant Russia ended in a great catastrophe and the death of the largest and best part of the army of the French Empire. Therefore, when Napoleon severely undermined his strength and severely wounded and froze the legs of his empire in the vast expanses of the East European plain, the British immediately joined in to finish off and overthrow him and did not skimp, which is rare among the Anglo-Saxons. The Anglo-Saxon political mentality has the outstanding feature that, with a violent desire to destroy everyone, everything and everyone that does not meet their geopolitical interests, they prefer to do it not only with someone else's hands, but also with someone else's wallets. This skill is revered by them as the highest political aerobatics and there is a lot to learn from them. But centuries pass, and these lessons are not useful to us. The Russian people, as our unforgettable prince-baptist Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshko said, is too simple and naive for such a politeness. But our political elite, a significant part of which, even in its outward appearance, cannot deny (often does not deny) the presence in its veins of a powerful stream of Jewish blood, for many centuries has been completely fooled by Anglo-Saxon antics and tricks. It's just shame, disgrace and shame and defies any rational explanation. In fairness, it should be noted that some of our leaders have sometimes demonstrated in history enviable examples of agility and dexterity in politics, that even the British Bulldog was drooling with envy and admiration. But these were only brief episodes in our endless silly and simple-minded military-political history, when the sacrificial masses of Russian infantry, cavalry and sailors died in thousands in wars for interests alien to Russia. However, this is such a global topic for analysis and reflection (and by no means for the average mind) that it deserves a separate and deepest study. I, perhaps, will not agree on such a titanic work, I dare to offer this abundant, albeit slippery, topic to the mighty head of Wasserman.

At the end of December 1812, the Russian army crossed the Niemen and began a foreign campaign. But that's a completely different story.

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