The hostilities began in November 1914, after the Ottoman Empire attacked the Russian Empire, and lasted until March 1918, when the Brest Peace Treaty was signed.
This was the last major military conflict between Russia and Turkey. And it ended tragically for both empires (Russian and Ottoman), both powers could not bear the severity of the First World War and collapsed.
The war began with the fact that on October 29 and 30, 1914, the German-Turkish fleet under the command of the German admiral Wilhelm Sushon fired at Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk (in Russia this event was unofficially called "Sevastopol wake-up call"). On October 30, Emperor Nicholas II ordered the recall of the diplomatic mission from Istanbul; on November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. On November 5 and 6, England and France followed. Turkey's entry into the war interrupted the maritime communication between Russia and its allies across the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Thus, the Caucasian Front between Russia and Turkey arose in Asia.
The reasons and prerequisites that prompted the Ottoman Empire to enter the war
- The difficult socio-economic situation of the empire, it was in the phase of decomposition, in fact it was a semi-colony of great powers (Great Britain, France, Germany). Only desperate measures, such as a successful big war or large-scale reform, could temporarily stabilize the situation.
- Revanchism. Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century lost two wars: Tripolitan (Libyan) with Italy from September 29, 1911 to October 18, 1912, losing Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, (modern Libya), as well as the island of Rhodes and the Greek-speaking Dodecanese archipelago near Asia Minor. The first Balkan war from September 25 (October 8) [3] 1912 to May 17 (30) 1913 against the Balkan Union (Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro), having lost almost all territories in Europe, except for Istanbul with the district (they were able to recapture Adrianople-Edirne during the Second Balkan War - June 29 - July 29, 1913), Crete.
- Union with the German Empire. Only the help of a great power could preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and give it the opportunity to return part of the lost territories. But the Entente powers believed that the Turks' business was small, for them everything was a foregone conclusion. Germany, on the other hand, needed Turkey in order to use its million-strong army to draw off Russia's reserves and resources to the Caucasus, to create troubles for Great Britain in the Sinai and in Persia.
- In the field of ideology, the place of the doctrine of Ottomanism calling for unity and brotherhood of all peoples of the empire was gradually taken by the extremely aggressive concepts of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Turkism, as a doctrine of the so-called unity of all Turkic-speaking peoples under the supreme rule of the Ottoman Turks, was used by the Young Turks to instill nationalistic feelings and sentiments among the Turks. The doctrine of pan-Islamism, which called for the unification of all Muslims under the rule of the Turkish sultan as a caliph, was to a large extent, like pan-Turkism, directed against Russia, but was used by the Young Turks in domestic political affairs, in particular as an ideological weapon in the fight against the Arab national liberation movement. …
The beginning of the war
With the outbreak of the war in Turkey, there was no agreement on whether to enter the war and on whose side? In the unofficial Young Turkish triumvirate, Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha were supporters of the Triple Alliance, but Jemal Pasha was a supporter of the Entente. Despite the open support of Germany, the Ottoman Empire formally observed neutrality in the first 3 months of the war, hoping that the Entente countries were interested in the neutrality of Sultan Turkey and they would be able to get significant concessions from them.
On August 2, 1914, a German-Turkish allied treaty was signed, according to which the Turkish army was actually surrendered under the leadership of the German military mission, and mobilization was announced in the country. Hundreds of thousands of people were cut off from their usual work. Within 3 days, all men between the ages of 20 and 45 had to appear at the mobilization points. Over 1 million people have moved to their home offices. But at the same time, the Turkish government published a declaration of neutrality. On August 10, the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau entered the Dardanelles Strait, leaving the pursuit of the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. With the appearance of these ships, not only the Turkish army, but also the fleet were under the command of the Germans. On September 9, the Turkish government announced to all powers that it had decided to abolish the capitulation regime (special legal status of foreign citizens).
Nevertheless, most of the members of the Turkish government, including the grand vizier, still opposed the war. Then Minister of War Enver Pasha, together with the German command (Liman von Sanders), began a war without the consent of the rest of the government, putting the country in front of a fait accompli. On October 29 and 30, 1914, the German-Turkish fleet under the command of German Admiral Wilhelm Sushon fired at Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk (in Russia this event received the unofficial name "Sevastopol wake-up call"). On October 30, Emperor Nicholas II ordered the recall of the diplomatic mission from Istanbul; on November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. On November 5 and 6, England and France followed. Turkey's entry into the war interrupted the maritime communication between Russia and its allies across the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Thus, the Caucasian Front between Russia and Turkey arose in Asia.
Russian Caucasian army: composition, commanders, training
In 1914, the Caucasian army included: Field Administration (headquarters), Army subordination units, 1st Caucasian Army Corps (as part of 2 infantry divisions, 2 artillery brigades, 2 Kuban Plastun brigades, 1st Caucasian Cossack Division), 2nd Turkestan Army Corps (consisting of 2 rifle brigades, 2 rifle artillery battalions, 1st Transcaspian Cossack brigade). Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Caucasian army was dispersed into two groups in accordance with two main operational directions:
Kara direction (Kars - Erzurum) - approx. 6 divisions in the region of Olta - Sarikamysh, Erivan direction (Erivan - Alashkert) - approx. 2 divisions, reinforced by a significant number of cavalry, in the Igdir region.
The flanks were covered by small detachments formed from border guards, Cossacks and militias: the right flank - the direction along the Black Sea coast to Batum, and the left - against the Kurdish regions, where, with the announcement of mobilization, the Turks began to form the Kurdish irregular cavalry, and Persian Azerbaijan. In total, the Caucasian army consisted of approx. 153 battalions, 175 Cossack hundreds and 350 guns.
With the outbreak of the First World War, an Armenian volunteer movement developed in Transcaucasia. The Armenians pinned certain hopes on this war, counting on the liberation of Western Armenia with the help of Russian weapons. Therefore, the Armenian social and political forces and national parties declared this war just and declared the unconditional support of the Entente. The Turkish leadership, for its part, tried to attract the Western Armenians to their side and suggested that they create volunteer detachments as part of the Turkish army and persuade the Eastern Armenians to jointly act against Russia. These plans, however, were not destined to come true.
The Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis was involved in the creation of Armenian squads (volunteer detachments). The total number of Armenian volunteers was up to 25 thousand people. The first four volunteer detachments joined the ranks of the active army in various sectors of the Caucasian Front already in November 1914. Armenian volunteers distinguished themselves in the battles for Van, Dilman, Bitlis, Mush, Erzurum and other cities of Western Armenia. In late 1915 - early 1916. Armenian volunteer detachments were disbanded, and on their basis, rifle battalions were created as part of the Russian units, which participated in hostilities until the end of the war.
At the initial stage, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army was the Caucasian governor and commander-in-chief of the troops of the Caucasian Military District, Adjutant General I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, his headquarters was in Tiflis. However, he practically did not take part in the development of operations and leadership of the troops, transferring command of the army to his assistant General A. Z. Myshlaevsky and Chief of Staff, General Yudenich. And after the displacement of A. Z. Myshlaevsky in January 1915 - to General N. N. Direct control of the troops was in the hands of the commander of the 1st Caucasian corps, General G. E. Berkhman, who was appointed head of the Sarykamysh detachment - this was the name of the Russian troops operating in the Erzurum direction.
In April 1917, the Caucasian Army was transformed into the Caucasian Front.
The Caucasian army did not have mountain equipment. Only mountain batteries were adapted for operations in mountainous conditions.
Troops for operations in the mountain theater were poorly trained; peacetime maneuvers were usually carried out in broad mountain valleys. During the training of the troops, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War was taken into account. However, the senior and especially the highest command personnel, as in the Turkish army, were poorly trained in how to drive large military formations in independent columns on isolated mountainous areas. There were practically no modern means of communication (radio communication), engineering was not established (before the battle, the troops practically did not dig in, but only indicated positions), there were no ski units, the troops were poorly controlled.
The shortcomings were compensated by the fact that the enemy suffered from the same shortcomings, and the Russian soldier was superior in quality to the Turkish one. The Russians endured difficulties well, defended more stubbornly, were more savvy, were not afraid of direct combat, even with a superior enemy. And the junior, middle command staff as a whole knew their business.
Party plans, Turkish army
The main object of action by the Russian army, in addition to the enemy's manpower, was the Erzurum fortress, located 100 km from the Russian-Turkish border. Erzurum covered Anatolia from land - this main territory of Turkey, where the main objects of the empire's economy were located and had a homogeneous population, most of which were Ottoman Turks. From Erzurum, a direct path opened to Istanbul-Constantinople, which, together with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, with the consent of the Allies in the Entente, was to become part of the Russian Empire. Also, the empire was to include the lands of historical Armenia, which were part of Turkey.
For the Turks, the main object of action after the defeat of the Caucasian army was the capture of Tiflis - the political center of Transcaucasia and the junction of the main routes; Baku is an industrial center (oil); the fortresses of Kars and Batum, which was the best port on the southern coast of the Black Sea. The Ottomans dreamed of capturing the entire Transcaucasia, in the future they planned to raise the Islamic peoples of the North Caucasus against Russia, possibly to raise an uprising in Central Asia.
The two wars waged by Turkey - Tripolitan and Balkan - caused a great upset in the Turkish armed forces. The army was unprepared for a new war. After 1912, the commanding staff experienced a purge, as a result of which a number of commanders were dismissed, and in their place were hastily appointed persons at the discretion of Minister of War Enver Pasha. The German mission, invited by the Turkish government in 1913, somewhat streamlined this matter. However, the weakest side of the Turkish army was its command structure. So, for example, the junior command staff was 75% illiterate, the middle - 40% consisted of non-commissioned officers, without special military education. The senior and higher command personnel, with a general military education, were very poorly prepared to lead troops in modern warfare, and moreover in the mountains.
The mobilization of the 3rd Turkish army, operating against the Caucasian army, was carried out with great difficulty due to an acute shortage of artillery, food and fodder supplies. The 3rd Turkish army consisted of the 9th, 10th, 11th army corps, the 2nd cavalry division, four and a half Kurdish cavalry divisions and two infantry divisions that arrived to reinforce this army from Mesopotamia, under the leadership of Gassan- Izzet Pasha, then the Minister of War Enver Pasha himself arrived. A total of about 100 infantry battalions, 35 cavalry squadrons, 250 guns.
The Kurdish formations were completely unprepared in terms of combat and poorly disciplined. The artillery was armed with guns of the modern systems of Schneider and Krupp. The infantry was armed with a Mauser rifle.
Due to the small number of trained personnel and the lack of telephone and telegraph equipment, communication in most cases was maintained by horse messengers and delegates for communication.
According to the German officers, who had studied the Turkish army well, the Turks could attack, but were not capable of a rapid energetic onslaught. In forced marches, they were not trained, as a result of which there was a danger of decomposition of the troops. The army was poorly equipped and therefore could not spend in the open field in bivouacs for several nights in a row, especially in winter. The organization of the supply took a lot of time and slowed down the pace of the offensive.
All these circumstances were taken into account by the Turkish army command in possible options for operations, which were calculated not on a deep advance, but on an offensive with limited goals from line to line.
