The inclusion of Russians as "cannon fodder" on the Western Front was considered by Europeans literally from the first days of the war. The first was an attempt to exert psychological pressure on the enemy - the transfer of 600 Don Cossacks from Novocherkassk to France or Britain. For this, in September 1914, they even managed to form the 53rd Don Cossack Regiment of Special Purpose. The transfer of the unit was supposed to be by sea, which would have taken a total of several weeks. Of course, such a redeployment had no particular military significance. To a greater extent, it was a demonstration of the power of the Russian army in front of the allied forces. But the situation at the fronts in those days was changing rapidly, and sometimes it was not at all beneficial to the allied forces, so the psychological demarche had to be forgotten.
The human resources of the Russian Empire to the allies seemed inexhaustible
The British and the French remembered the "unlimited" army of Russia for the second time already in 1915, when a protracted positional war began to mow down the personnel of their troops. And Russia could not give extra strength to the front, since a predominantly rural country demanded workers in the rear. But the West still had a trump card in this situation - the economic lag of tsarist Russia from European countries. It was in the second year of the war in the imperial army that the deficit of the most essential things began to manifest itself clearly - rifles, shells and uniforms. There was a dependence on imports from the allied states, which very transparently hinted at reciprocal Russian concessions. Alexei Ignatiev, a Russian military attaché in Paris, wrote at the end of 1915 to Russia: “The question concerns the sending of large contingents of our conscripts to France, the sending of which would be a kind of compensation for the services that France has rendered and is going to provide us with respect to supplying us any kind of material part. " We must give it to Ignatiev, who managed to quarrel with the French on this basis. The Parisian establishment carried out relevant research, and it turned out that the Russian soldiers are like the annamite natives of the Vietnamese colonial troops. French officers successfully command troops that do not understand the language, so there will be no problems with Russian speakers either. “The Russians are not natives, not Annamites,” Ignatiev snapped back.
Memoirs of Buchanan, in which he shares his attempts to fool the Russians
Over time, the pressure from the Allies became more and more noticeable - dispatches from Paris and London were sent one after another with requests (and demands) to equip an expeditionary force for support. At the same time, some of the proposals (especially from Britain) looked completely idiotic. For example, Ambassador George Buchanan proposed the idea of transferring 400 thousand Russian soldiers to Europe at once. What to do with the gaps that have appeared on the eastern front? There, according to Buchanan, you can put … the Japanese. The Land of the Rising Sun at that time was in a formal state of war with Germany, as it appropriated the German colonies in China and on the islands of the Pacific Ocean. Why should the Japanese die for the Russians? And here Ambassador Buchanan finds an "elegant" solution - Russia should give Japan the northern part of Sakhalin as payment. In St. Petersburg, such proposals were twisted at the temple and refused.
Nicholas II made concessions
Military historian and émigré Anton Kersnovsky wrote about the deal between the West and the Russian government: "20,000 tons of human meat were sent for slaughter." This is how the historian emotionally described the decision of Nicholas II to transfer 300-400 thousandth contingent of Russian troops to France. The main character in this story was the French politician Paul Doumer, the father of five sons, who all died in the war. Naturally, sentimental Nicholas II was defeated by Domer's arguments and agreed to send 40 thousand soldiers to the Western Front every month.
French emissary Paul Doumer
In reality, they limited themselves to the transfer of several brigades, but this was done secretly from the tsar on the initiative of the army generals. This very clearly shows the authority of Nicholas II, responsibility for his decisions and his influence on the army. It was supposed to send the brigades by sea, and directly from Vladivostok and in fact around the whole world. The first of the units embarked on ships in January 1916, and in May in Mogilev, Russia and France signed an agreement that actually forced us to exchange military equipment and weapons for the lives of soldiers and officers. Russia pledged to supply seven special brigades to the Allies by the end of 1916. And they were not supposed to fight in the most comfortable sectors of the front, along with the colonial troops of the West.
It was decided to send troops from Russia to the suddenly appeared Thessaloniki front. It had to be urgently formed when the Serbs miserably lost the war with the help of the Bulgarians, who took the side of the enemy. And so that all the Balkans did not come under the control of the enemy, the Anglo-French units landed in then neutral Greece. Since the allies did not have enough of their own forces, the Russians who arrived in time had to control the new hot spot.
Routes for the transfer of Russian expeditionary forces to Europe
For this role, in April 1916, the 2nd Special Infantry Brigade was formed in the Moscow Military District. It is worth noting that only the most experienced and trained soldiers went to the brigade. The command of the unit was taken over by Major General Mikhail Dieterichs, who had become widely famous at that time. Later, after the fall of tsarism in Russia, the general would become a prominent member of the White movement, the commander of the Zemskaya Rata, the last large White Guard detachment operating in the Far East. The special infantry brigade consisted of the third (commander - Colonel Tarbeev) and fourth (commander - Colonel Aleksandrov) infantry regiments, as well as a marching battalion. Also in the composition was a group of mounted scouts and a choir with a conductor, but the sappers and artillerymen of the brigade were deprived. They believed the promises of the French about the artillery support of the Russians at all stages. What the tsar took care of was the financial allowance of the expeditionary forces - a private soldier received as much as 40 kopecks per day, which was 16 times more than in Russia. At the same time, the brigade was completely on the French allowance. And the officer's salary was twice the salary of a local French colleague.
Lucky and ruthless Russians
A special brigade embarked on ten steamers not in Vladivostok, but in Arkhangelsk, which provided a fast, but much more dangerous route to France. At the same time, the quality of the French ships left much to be desired - some of the soldiers could settle for the night only on the floor of the cabins and even corridors. The last ships with Russian troops set off on July 31, 1916 and went to sea completely defenseless against the Germans - Britain could not send the promised escort ships. Only incredible luck and miscalculations of the enemy's reconnaissance made it possible to cover the distance to French Brest without losses. The Allies were smart enough not to risk such a valuable resource and not send ships across the Mediterranean, teeming with the German fleet. It should be noted that ordinary Frenchmen warmly greeted the Russians. Flowers, wine, fruits, coffee have become symbols of the hospitality of the war-worn locals. Major General Mikhail Dieterichs was even honored with a Paris meeting with President Raymond Poincaré.
Parade of Russian troops along the Roux-Royal in Paris on July 14, 1916. post card
In the Marseilles camp of the Russian troops
Before leaving for Thessaloniki, the brigade was stationed in Marseilles, where a tragic incident occurred that seriously discredited the Russian expeditionary forces. Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian Army Moritz Ferdinandovich Krause was accused by ordinary soldiers of numerous violations - embezzlement of finances and refusals of leave. Also, an ethnic German was hanged as espionage on the side of the Kaiser. All this led to the fatal group beating of Krause on August 15, 1916. A week later, eight murderers were publicly shot, and they tried to classify the story as casting a shadow on the dignity of the Russian soldier. Krause, along with the executed, was recorded as killed in battle, but the rumor of moral decay among the elite of the Russian army spread throughout Europe.
