On June 13, 1952, a Soviet air defense aircraft MiG-15 shot down a Swedish reconnaissance aircraft "Douglas" DC-3 over neutral waters of the Baltic Sea. It had eight crew members. The Swedes then stated that the plane was performing a training flight.
Half a century later, in 2003, 55 km east of Gotland, the Swedes discovered the body of the plane and lifted it from a depth of 126 m. The tail of the car was torn to pieces by machine-gun bursts. Found the bodies of four people. The fate of four more remained unknown.
This time, the Swedish side admitted that the plane was monitoring Soviet military bases. The information was shared with the United States and Great Britain. NATO then wanted to learn as much as possible about the Soviet air defense in the area of the Latvian and Estonian coasts: it was through this "Baltic corridor" that American and British bombers with atomic bombs were to go to Leningrad and Moscow in case of war.
The downed plane had the name "Hugin" - after the name of the raven of the Scandinavian god Odin, who told him all the news of the world. And that spoke of the purpose of the DC-3. On board were British and American equipment - the result of a secret agreement between neutral Sweden and NATO: equipment in exchange for the results of reconnaissance flights.
Moscow was well aware of the purpose for which the Swedish "transport" cruised along the edge of the territorial waters of the Soviet Union. The information came from Colonel of the Swedish Air Force Stig Erik Constance Wennerström, who worked for Soviet military intelligence for almost 15 years - the famous Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, or, in a simple way, the GRU. The plane was also shot down on his tip.
"EAGLE" - A DIFFERENT PERSONALITY
Perhaps, Vitaly Nikolsky, Major General of the Main Intelligence Directorate, who, as they say in intelligence, led the agent for the last two years before the arrest of the Swede, knew Wennerström better than others, was his curator. I met a retired general Nikolsky in the early 90s of the last century. He visited me at the editorial office of Krasnaya Zvezda, brought back memories of his comrades in arms on partisan days. Once he invited me to his home and said that he was writing a book about the Swedish period of his life.
In Stockholm, Vitaly Aleksandrovich worked "under the roof" of the Soviet military attaché. In the book of memoirs under the trade name "Aquarium-2" (as opposed to "Aquarium" by Viktor Suvorov) Nikolsky was allowed to place a small chapter about Stig Wennerström.
His operational pseudonym is "Eagle", while Nikolsky calls the agent "Viking". On the day that contact was established with our military attaché, Stig Wennerström was the head of the air force section of the Command Expedition of the Swedish Ministry of Defense. Stig was then 54 years old, he looked slender, was always a funny and interesting storyteller. In addition, he is a master in alpine and water skiing, a Swedish curling champion, a shooter, a photographer, a pilot and a motorist. He spoke excellent Finnish, German and English, decently - French and Russian. Not counting, of course, the native Swedish and Danish. He knew how to keep himself in society.
Wennerstrom was distantly related to King Gustav VI Adolf and even served as his adjutant for some time. The Stig had a wide circle of acquaintances in military circles, practically unlimited access to documents of national importance. He gave information mainly on NATO: plans for the defense of Northern Europe, a description of the new British surface-to-air missile of the Bloodhound anti-aircraft missile system, the basics of British air defense, characteristics of the new American air-to-air missiles of the Sidewinder types, Hawk and Falcon, and data on major alliance maneuvers. He also informed about the design developments of the Swedish all-weather interceptor J-35 "Draken", the coordinates of the underground base of the Swedish Air Force being built in the coastal rocks. The Swedes were forced to rebuild the entire air defense system.
Stig Venerstrom graduated from the naval school, flight school, served in the Swedish Air Force headquarters, in November 1940 he was appointed to Moscow as an air force attaché. By that time, Stig, by nature inclined to adventurism, was already passing on secret information to the German counterintelligence. In 1943, Wennerström was in command of the squadron, and in 1944–1945, at the Swedish Air Force headquarters, he was responsible for relations with representatives of the foreign air force. In 1946, the Americans, through General Reinhard Gehlen, one of the former leaders of German military intelligence on the Soviet-German front, and then the creator of the Gehlen Organization, the predecessor of the Federal Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany, received Abwehr documents, in which Wennerstrom was recommended from the best side. After that, he was recruited by the Americans. In the same year, after attending an aviation military parade in Moscow, he wrote a memo on the prospects for intelligence activities on the territory of the USSR. In short, "Viking" was an extremely versatile nature.
Two years later, Lieutenant Colonel Wennerström accompanied (and patronized) the Soviet military attaché in Stockholm, Colonel Ivan Rybalchenko, on a tour of Sweden. Subsequently, the Swede recalled: “As a result of constant joint stay in a car, plane or coupe, we developed a kind of friendship … Once he read an article in a local newspaper about the modernization and strengthening of runways at some military airfield. He lit one of his invariable cigarettes, thought and said: "I must document it." I chuckled: "There is an old adage: a hand washes a hand." He said, still not looking at me: “You can put the question differently. How much do you want for this unfortunate streak? Two thousand?" In the end, they agreed on five. " Sometimes recruiting goes like this.
Wennerstrom was supposed to keep the GRU informed about the strategic plans and military capabilities of the United States. He did it so well that Soviet military intelligence awarded him the rank of major general. True, this version is refuted by some intelligence officers.
RIGHT HAND OF THE MINISTER
Since April 1952, the Swedish Air Attaché in Washington Wennerström was in charge of the purchase of weapons for the Air Force of his country and was well informed about everything related to American developments. Returning to Sweden in 1957, until his retirement in 1961, he was the head of the sector of the operations department of the main headquarters of the armed forces. That is, in fact, the right hand of the Minister of Defense. All classified materials ended up on Wennerstrom's desk. He was also in close contact with NATO headquarters in Denmark and Norway, as he taught strategy at the flight school and was the main expert on disarmament issues.
But back to General Nikolsky. As he told me, they established personal contact with Wennerström in October 1960, when the Soviet military attaché first paid a visit to the Command Expedition. Nikolsky's predecessor, who worked with the Stig, presented the general as the future curator. At the first meeting, Wennerström easily took out a dozen photographic tapes from his safe. The tapes contained a technical description of the American Hawk missile launcher recently received by the Swedes. Nikolsky was even somewhat confused. He had to shove tapes into his pockets.
For six months - until the spring of 1963 - "Viking" handed over to the Soviet curator several thousand frames of a special photographic film "Shield", which was supplied to him by the GRU, with operational documents on military, military-political and military-economic issues. This film did not yield to development without special treatment with reagents known only in the laboratory of the GRU. True, then all this turned out to be not entirely true: after the arrest of Wennerström, the Swedish counterintelligence officers picked up the reagent in a few days. However, no one could deny that the materials reached the GRU earlier than on the desks of high-ranking Swedish officials. Defense headquarters safes were opened to Soviet military intelligence.
Especially valuable was Wennerström's information about the missile armament of the United States and Great Britain, which was planned for deliveries to the Swedes. According to General Nikolsky, all 47 regiments of the Swedish army were studied by the Soviet military station inside and out. The level of their training, the contacts of the leadership with the NATO headquarters were precisely known. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wennerstrom reported details of bringing the US Navy on alert and the entry of a US nuclear submarine formation into the North Atlantic. Perhaps - to block Soviet ships on the way to Havana.
To relay this message, Stig called the embassy's military attaché directly and invited Nikolsky to a restaurant near the Expeditionary Command. It was risky, but the refusal would have been even more suspicious of wiretapping, and the general agreed. In the restaurant, the curator could not resist: "If we observe conspiracy in this way, then I will have to leave the country in 24 hours, and you will be in prison for life." Stig then laughed and said that the contacts of the Soviet military attaché with local residents were personally supervised by him. Indeed, the Expeditionary Command monitored contacts with foreign military attachés, that is, it performed the functions of military intelligence and counterintelligence.
Stig Wennerström's Swedish passport. Photo by Holger Elgaard
RISKY GAMES
The transfer, on the one hand, of cassettes with film, and on the other hand, of monetary rewards and instructions from the Center took place at numerous representative events. Sometimes the Center's written instructions were transmitted in Soviet cigarettes. Vitaly Alexandrovich was always afraid to confuse packs with smoke. Once, during a film screening, Wennerström handed over a dozen cassettes (that's really intelligence!) In the presence of the head of the Swedish counterintelligence service. In espionage practice, this is perhaps the only case.
Conspiracy problems continued. One day Wennerström drove right up to the house where the curator lived in a company car with a siren and a red flashing light. He urgently needed to transfer the scheme of the command post of the government and the defense headquarters in case of an emergency. Although the transfer of these documents did not require haste. There was a case when "Viking" intercepted the curator on the way to work. Nikolsky even threatened to report your lack of discipline to the Center and generally refuse to work with you. This frightened Wennerstrom - he did not want to part with the GRU.
Remuneration to "Viking" - every quarter 12 thousand Swedish kronor in hundreds of banknotes. Larger bills were closely monitored by the fiscal authorities. The amount, according to Vitaly Nikolsky, was small, given the value of information from Viking. The curator left the package, quite large, with new cassettes and money, for example, in the medicine cabinet of his own apartment, where Swedish officers were invited. Only two initiates had the keys. The same first-aid kit hung in Wennerström's villa.
In the spring of 1961, the Stig turned 55, the age limit for a colonel. He had no prospect of becoming a general, he had to resign. Even the king could not legally leave him in the army. The Stig was losing access to important documents. Fearing that the GRU would refuse his services, "Viking" developed a stormy activity, completely forgetting about conspiracy. With the dismissal of Stig, there was no official reason for meeting with the curator. Nikolsky ordered to pick up three caches in the city park for the exchange of small-sized mail. It was agreed to send signals about the investment and withdrawal of the "cargo" in places on the way from the house of the military attache at 2 Linneigatan to the Soviet embassy at 12 Villagata.
DISCLOSURE
Any intelligence agent, especially a large one, among whom, undoubtedly, belongs to Stig Wennerström, who worked for Soviet military intelligence for almost a decade and a half, in his biography there are always many blank spots, unsaid. And - many versions, guesses, conjectures and inventions. Including about his failure.
Yes, Major General Vitaly Nikolsky admitted, Stig clearly neglected conspiracy. The reason for this was probably his naturally adventurous nature. Another reason for the agent's negligence was probably his position in the military hierarchy of his country. Stig, we recall, served in the command expedition department of the Swedish Ministry of Defense, which carried out contacts with foreign military attachés and performed the functions of military intelligence and counterintelligence.
But there were other reasons that can today be considered only as hypothetical - for the lack of compelling reasons and evidence. A month before the dismissal, personnel officers offered two positions to the reserve Colonel Wennerström at five minutes: military adviser to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs or Consul General in Madrid. "Viking" asked Nikolsky for advice. The general sent an encrypted message to the Center with a proposal to agree to Madrid. The center, on the other hand, chose the first proposal. This probably brought the agent's disclosure closer.
BRITISH & CASINO
One of the many versions of the colonel's exposure and failure - everything came from the British counterintelligence MI-5. Its employees drew attention to the fact that the Russians are often better informed than the Swedes about the types of weapons supplied by Great Britain to Sweden. Observation of Wennerstrom has been carried out since the summer of 1962. It was possible to establish that the retired colonel has an account in one of the banks in Geneva, where he was at that time as an expert on disarmament issues at the Swedish Foreign Ministry. A wiretapping of Wennerström's phone was organized. On June 19, 1963, in the attic of Wennerström's house, Karin Rosen, a servant recruited by Swedish counterintelligence, discovered a cache of microfilm. On the morning of June 20, Wennerström, holder of the highest state order of the Legion of Honor, a distant relative of King Gustav VI Adolf, was arrested on his way to work.
Wennerström's biographers name other possible versions of betrayal: an irresistible passion for gambling, pacifist and even pro-communist views of the legendary Swede. According to Western journalists, Moscow blackmailed Wennerström, having information about his intelligence work for the Nazis during World War II.
Another version. On July 20, 1960, SEPO Swedish counterintelligence received from a CIA agent, GRU officer Major General Dmitry Polyakov, who had worked for the Americans for a quarter of a century, information about the existence of a GRU agent "Eagle" in Swedish military intelligence. After that, a trap was “charged” on the "Eagle" and a thorough study and analysis of the personal expenses of Stig Wennerström began.
The version of General Vitaly Nikolsky looks more convincing than others.
In the spring of 1962, the Center decided to arrange a meeting with Wennerström in Helsinki. One of the deputy chiefs of the GRU was sent to the Finnish capital for briefing. Nikolsky does not name him, but according to some reports, it was Lieutenant General Pyotr Melkishev. Actually, the agent could be briefed in Stockholm. But perhaps the boss needed an excuse to travel abroad.
In Helsinki, the distinguished guest is not known for what reason he attracted an employee from the "close neighbors", that is, the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service), to organize the meeting. At the same time, Melkishev used the apartment of the deputy KGB resident in Helsinki, Anatoly Golitsyn. For cover, he was listed as an economic manager in the trade mission. In December 1961, Golitsyn fled to the United States and asked for political asylum. There he informed British intelligence about a man who had come to Helsinki from Sweden to meet with the Geraush general.
Vitaly Nikolsky admitted that Wennerstrom lived in grand style, often traveled abroad. He lived in a luxurious villa in the suburbs of Stockholm, had several servants. The expenses clearly exceeded the colonel's salary of 4,000 crowns a month. Note that he received the same amount from the GRU. Once the Soviet military attaché told his friend and agent just that: one should be more careful in spending in the interests of security. The Stig began to reassure him: they say, his wife is a wealthy woman, works in a bank, the villa is her dowry, two cars in the family are the norm for Sweden. As it turned out later, the Stig passed off wishful thinking in order to calm an overly vigilant Soviet friend. Wennerström's extravagance, along with his carelessness, confidence in the strength of his position, and some other circumstances, became the reason that attracted the attention of counterintelligence in the early 1960s.
PENKOVSKY'S TRACE
The most important reason for the failure, again according to Vitaly Nikolsky's version, is that GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who worked for the British and Americans, learned about Wennerstrem.
All intelligence information about new Western weapons received from foreign sources was passed on by the GRU to the Soviet military-industrial complex. In an impersonal form, of course. But the documents received from Wennerström also ended up in the Committee on Science and Technology, where Penkovsky had worked since 1960. He had no direct relation to the Scandinavian direction, but for a long time he used the documents that Viking - Eagle mined. It was not difficult for Penkovsky to understand that the GRU has a valuable agent in Sweden. The traitor told about this during meetings in London to representatives of MI6 and the CIA who worked with him. From there, the tip was transferred to the Swedish counterintelligence. The rest was a matter of technique.
In July 1962, the Center ordered Nikolsky to hand over the Viking to a station officer working under the guise of the first secretary of the embassy. The logic of the Center was simple: since the agent went to work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, let the diplomat meet with him at receptions. However, they did not take into account one thing: such minor officials, as Wennerstrom was now, are practically not invited to receptions and receptions. And the connection with the Stig was practically cut off.
Vitaly Nikolsky believed that Wennerstrom was the most valuable agent that Russian military intelligence had after Colonel Alfred Redl, who handed over the mobilization plans to Austria-Hungary before the First World War. In Sweden he is called the most famous spy of the Cold War. However, Wennerström did not make it into the book "100 Great Scouts".
After the arrest of Stig Wennerström, the military attaché, as well as the first secretary of the USSR embassy in Sweden, involved in this case, were forced to leave the host country. Nikolsky, fearing provocations, was sent not on a regular ferry trip, but on a dry cargo ship "Repnino", the loading of which was interrupted. The general, the only passenger, was transported across the Baltic on an almost empty ship with a displacement of 5 thousand tons and with a crew of more than 40 people. At home, the blame and responsibility for what happened was placed on Vitaly Alexandrovich. Found a switchman.
Nikolsky, on the other hand, blamed himself only for not insisting on impersonal communication with the agent through hiding places. He believed that the officer to whom the Viking was transferred to contact could attract the attention of the Swedish counterintelligence. Nikolsky does not name him, but knowledgeable people in the GRU point to G. Baranovsky. Despite his low position, he bought an expensive Mercedes-220 right after his arrival in Stockholm. And this at a time when even the embassy counselors were driving a car on duty. Moreover, this young man rented and luxuriously furnished a good apartment, which his colleagues did not have. He flaunted the knowledge of several foreign languages, was not active in terms of rank in contacts with the locals.
The Swedish authorities promised that they would give the press only in the morning about the expulsion of the two Soviet diplomats. But barely dawn, journalists from literally all leading and local media were besieging Nikolsky's apartment. The concierge deceived the journalists, saying that the Russian general had already left for the port. Everyone rushed there. Nikolsky was escorted to the pier only by his deputy, to whom he handed over secret documents and currency before leaving.
LOST Vigilance
By hurrying away on a dry cargo ship, without a decent farewell, the Soviet side, even before the trial, indirectly acknowledged the correctness of the accusation of the Swedish authorities. As Nikolsky told me, the Center accused him of the residency conducting "weak educational work" with the agent, which led to his loss of vigilance. As they would say today, soviet logic. Someone from the management accused Wennerstrom of pathological greed, which made him neglect caution.
The court sentenced "Viking" to life in prison. In his last speech, he denied the charge of harming Sweden's security - he could not be tried for disclosing NATO plans. Even Wennerström said that he worked to prevent a new world war. Indeed, the Cuban missile crisis did not escalate into a nuclear conflict, in part thanks to the information provided by Stig Wennerström.
For Vitaly Nikolsky, the Viking's failure meant the end of his career as a scout. He was removed from operational work. For two months, while the proceedings were going on, he was at the disposal of the head of the GRU. In November 1963, he was appointed head of the faculty of the Military Diplomatic Academy. After another five years, he retired.
Wennerstrom was in prison. There he demonstrated exemplary behavior and worked in a center for juvenile prisoners as a teacher of foreign languages, including Russian. As a result, in 1974, at the age of 68, he was pardoned, released for exemplary behavior and returned home to his wife in the city of Djursholm. We must pay tribute to the Soviet intelligence - they tried to exchange Wennerstrom more than once, but something did not work out.
The materials of the trial, with detailed testimony from Wennerström and data from the official investigation, were declared a state secret for a period of 50 years. In 1959, Nikita Khrushchev canceled his visit to Sweden under the pretext of an anti-Soviet campaign in the Swedish press, but in 1964 he still went to Sweden, despite the scandal surrounding the exposure of Soviet spy Stig Wennerström.
In recent years, Wennerström lived in a Stockholm nursing home. He died a little before he was 100 years old. Vitaly Alexandrovich Nikolsky, who devoted more than 40 years to military intelligence, did not know until the last day of his life whether his ward and friend was still alive.
