The first dreadnoughts of the Russian Imperial Navy, the Baltic "Sevastopoli", were awarded the most contradictory characteristics in the Russian-language press. But if in some publications the authors called them almost the best in the world, today it is widely believed that battleships of the "Sevastopol" type were a deafening failure of domestic design thought and industry. There is also an opinion that it was design miscalculations that did not allow the Sevastopoli to be taken out to sea, which is why they stood behind the central minefield throughout the war.
In this article I will try to figure out how fair the above estimates of this type of battleships are, and at the same time I will try to disassemble the most famous myths associated with the first Russian dreadnoughts.
Artillery
If there is anything on which all (or almost all) domestic sources agree, it is in the high assessment of the artillery of the main caliber of the battleships of the "Sevastopol" type. And not without reason - the power of a dozen twelve-inch guns is amazing. After all, if we look at the ships laid down in other countries at the same time as the "Sevastopol", we will see that … "Sevastopol" was laid down in June 1909. At this time, Germany was building recently laid down (October 1908 - March 1909) dreadnoughts of the "Ostfriesland" type (a total of eight 12-inch guns in an onboard salvo) and preparing to lay the battleships of the "Kaiser" type, formally capable of firing 10 twelve inches on board … But due to the unfortunate location, the middle towers could shoot on one side only in a very narrow sector, so that the German dreadnoughts can record 10 twelve-inch guns in the side salvo only with a very big stretch. And this despite the fact that the Kaiser series was laid from December 1909 to January 1911.
In France, Sevastopol has no peers - the Third Republic laid down its first dreadnought Courbet only in September 1910, but it also had only 10 guns in an onboard salvo.
In the United States in March 1909, two Florida-class dreadnoughts were laid with the same 10 twelve-inch guns (in fairness, it must be said that the location of the towers of the American and French battleships allowed full-fledged fire with 10 guns in a salvo, unlike the German Kaisers), but the Wyomings, which had a dozen 12-inch guns, were laid down only in 1910 (January-February).
And even the Mistress of the Seas England, a month after the laying of the domestic "Sevastopol", begins the construction of two dreadnoughts of the "Colossus" - all with the same ten 12-inch cannons.
Only the Italians laid down their famous Dante Alighieri almost simultaneously with the Sevastopol, which, like the Russian dreadnoughts, had four three-gun turrets of twelve-inch guns capable of firing all 12 barrels on board.
On the one hand, it would seem that ten guns or twelve is not too much of a difference. But in fact, a dozen guns gave the ship a certain advantage. In those days, it was believed that effective zeroing required to fire at least four-gun volleys, and where a battleship with 8 guns could fire two four-gun volleys, and a battleship with ten guns - two five-gun, battleships of the "Sevastopol" type were able to fire three four-gun salvo. There was such a practice as shooting with a ledge - when a battleship fired a four-gun salvo and immediately, without waiting for its fall - another one (adjusted for range, say, 500 meters). Accordingly, the chief artilleryman was able to assess the fall of two of his volleys at once relative to the enemy ship - so it was easier for him to adjust the sight of the guns. And here the difference between eight and ten guns on a ship is not too significant - a ten-gun battleship could fire five-gun salvo instead of four-gun, which was easier to observe, but that's all. Well, domestic battleships had the ability to target with a double ledge - three four-gun salvoes, which greatly facilitated the adjustment of fire. It is clear what advantages a quick sighting gives the ship.
Thus, a dozen guns of the domestic battleship, in addition to an increase in firepower relative to 8-10-gun imported dreadnoughts, also gave it the opportunity to quickly target the enemy.
But that's not all. In addition to the superiority in the number of barrels and potentially faster zeroing, the impeccable material part also speaks in favor of the artillery of the first Russian dreadnoughts, namely, the remarkable Obukhov 305-mm / 52 guns (the number after the line is the barrel length in calibers) and the heavy 470, 9 kg shells of the 1911 model
Almost all sources sing hosanna to our twelve-inch girls in chorus - and deservedly so. It is possible that this domestic artillery system was at that time the most formidable twelve-inch weapon in the world.
Comparing Russian cannons to their foreign competitors is not easy, though.
The British armed their first dreadnoughts and battle cruisers with 305 mm / 45 Mark X guns. It was a good artillery system that fired a 386 kg projectile with an initial speed of 831 m / s, but the British still wanted more. And rightly so, because their main opponents, the Germans, created an artillery masterpiece, the 305mm / 50 SK L / 50 cannon. It was much better than the English Mark 10 - it accelerated a 405 kg projectile to a speed of 855 m / s. The British did not know the characteristics of the newest Krupp product, but believed that they should certainly surpass any competitors. However, the attempt to create a fifty-caliber cannon was not crowned with much success: long-barreled artillery did not go well in England. Formally, the new British 305-mm / 50 came close to its German counterpart - 386-389, 8 kg shells accelerated to 865 m / s, but the gun was still considered unsuccessful. There was no particular increase in armor penetration (although, in my opinion, English shells should be blamed for this), but the gun turned out to be heavier, the barrel vibrated pretty much when fired, reducing the accuracy of the fire. But the longer the barrel of the gun, the higher the muzzle velocity of the projectile can be obtained, and the improvement of the 305 mm / 45 British guns has already reached its limit. And since the long-barreled guns did not work for the British, the British took a different path, returning to 45-caliber barrels, but increasing the caliber of the guns to 343-mm … Surprisingly, it was the failure of the British to create a powerful and high-quality 305-mm artillery system largely predetermined their transition to a larger than 305-mm caliber. There would be no happiness, but misfortune helped.
The Russian 305-mm / 52 artillery system was originally created according to the concept of "light projectile - high muzzle velocity". It was assumed that our cannon would fire 331.7 kg shells with an initial speed of 950 m / s. However, it soon became clear that such a concept was completely flawed: although at a short distance a light, accelerated to an unimaginable speed projectile would have superiority in armor penetration over heavier and slower English and German projectiles, but with an increase in the range of combat, this superiority was quickly lost - a heavy projectile was slower lost speed than the light one, and taking into account the fact that the heavy projectile also had great power … They tried to correct the mistake by creating a super-powerful 470, 9-kg projectile, which was not equal to either the German or the English navy, but everything has its own price - the Russian artillery system could fire such shells only with an initial speed of 763 m / s.
Today "on the Internet" the low speed of the Russian projectile is often reproached with our twelve-inch model and is proved with the help of armor penetration formulas (incl.according to the famous Marr formula) that the German SK L / 50 possessed greater armor penetration than the Obukhov 305 mm / 52. According to the formulas, maybe it is so. But the thing is …
In the Battle of Jutland, out of 7 shells in Jutland hitting the 229-mm armor belts of the battle cruisers "Lion", "Princess Royal" and "Tiger" pierced armor 3. Of course, it can be assumed that not all of these 7 shells were 305-mm, but For example, two shells hitting the 229-mm armor belt of the "Lion" did not penetrate it, and it could only be 305-mm German shells (for the "Lyon" was fired upon by the "Lutzov" and "König"). At the same time, the distance between the British and British ships ranged from 65-90 kbt. At the same time, both the Germans and the British marched in wake columns, having their opponents opposite, so it is hardly possible to sin that the shells hit at sharp angles.
At the same time, the notorious shelling of the Chesma in 1913, when the armor elements of the Sevastopol-class battleships were reproduced on the old battleship, showed that 229-mm armor can be penetrated even by a high-explosive projectile even at an encounter angle of 65 degrees at a range of 65 kbt. and at meeting angles close to 90 degrees, it breaks through a 229-mm slab even from 83 kbt! In this case, however, the explosion of the projectile occurs while overcoming the armor plate (which, in general, is natural for a high-explosive projectile), nevertheless, in the first case, a significant part of the land mine was "brought" inside. What can we say about the armor-piercing projectile of the 1911 model? This one repeatedly perforated 254-mm armor (wheelhouse) at a distance of 83 kbt!
Obviously, if the Kaiser's ships were equipped with Russian obukhovka, firing 470, 9-kg Russian shells - out of 7 shells that hit the 229-mm armor belt of "Admiral Fischer's cats", the armor would have pierced not 3, but much more, perhaps, and all 7 shells. The thing is that armor penetration depends not only on the mass / caliber / initial velocity of the projectile, which take into account the formulas, but also on the quality and shape of this projectile itself. Perhaps, if we were to force the Russian and German guns to shoot with shells of the same quality, then the armor penetration of the German artillery system would be higher, but taking into account the remarkable qualities of the Russian shell, it turned out that at the main battle distances of battleships of the First World War (70-90 kbt) the Russian cannon performed better than the German one.
Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the power of the main caliber artillery of the first Russian dreadnoughts was much superior to any 305-mm battleship of any country in the world.
“Excuse me! - a meticulous reader can say here. - And why did you, dear author, completely forget about the 343-mm British guns of British superdreadnoughts that plowed the seas when the Russian "Sevastopoli" were still being completed ?! " I have not forgotten, dear reader, they will be discussed below.
As for mine artillery, the 16 hundred and twenty-millimeter Russian cannons provided ample protection against enemy destroyers. The only complaint was that the guns were placed too low above the water. But it should be borne in mind that the flooding of anti-mine guns was the Achilles heel of many battleships of that time. The British decided the issue radically, transferring the guns to the superstructures, but this reduced their protection, and the caliber had to be sacrificed, limiting themselves to 76-102-mm guns. The value of such a decision is still questionable - according to the views of the time, destroyers attack ships already damaged in an artillery battle, and the entire power of mine-action artillery loses its meaning if it is disabled by that time.
But in addition to the quality of artillery, the fire control system (FCS) became an extremely important element of the ship's combat power. The scope of the article does not allow me to properly disclose this topic, I will only say that the MSA in Russia was dealt with very seriously. By 1910, the Russian fleet had a very perfect Geisler system of the 1910 model, but still it could not be called a full-fledged MSA. The development of a new LMS was entrusted to Erickson (in no case should this be considered a foreign development - the Russian division of the company and Russian specialists were engaged in the LMS). But alas, as of 1912, Erickson's LMS was still not ready, the fear of being left without an LMS led to a parallel order from an English developer, Pollan. The latter, alas, also did not have time too - as a result, the Sevastopol FCS was a “prefabricated hodgepodge” from the Geisler system of the 1910 model, into which separate devices from Erickson and Pollen were integrated. I wrote in sufficient detail about battleship LMS here: https://alternathistory.org.ua/sistemy-upravleniya-korabelnoi-artilleriei-v-nachale-pmv-ili-voprosov-bolshe-chem-otvetov. Now I will confine myself to the statement that the British still had the best MSA in the world, and ours was approximately at the level of the Germans. However, with one exception.
On the German "Derflinger" there were 7 (in words - seven) rangefinders. And they all measured the distance to the enemy, and the average value fell into the automatic sight calculation. The domestic "Sevastopol" initially had only two rangefinders (there were also the so-called Krylov rangefinders, but they were nothing more than improved micrometers of Lyuzhol - Myakishev and did not provide high-quality measurements at long distances).
On the one hand, it would seem that these rangefinders provided the Germans with a quick zeroing in Jutland, but is that so? The same "Derflinger" fired only from the 6th volley, and even then, in general, by accident (in theory, the sixth volley was supposed to fly, the chief artilleryman of the "Derflinger" Haze tried to take the Briton with a fork, however, to his surprise, there was a cover). "Goeben", in general, also did not show brilliant results. But it must be taken into account that the Germans were still aiming better than the British, perhaps there is some merit of the German rangefinders in this. My opinion is this: despite some lag behind the British and (possibly) the Germans, the domestic MSA installed on the Sevastopol was still quite competitive and did not give the "sworn friends" any decisive advantages. During the exercises, battleships of the "Sevastopol" type were fired at targets at a distance of 70-90 kbt in an average of 6, 8 minutes (the best result was 4, 9 minutes), which was a very good result.
True, "on the Internet" I came across criticism of the Russian MSA on the basis of the firing of "Empress Catherine the Great" in the Black Sea, but there it should be borne in mind that both "Goeben" and "Breslau" did not fight the right battle, but tried their best to escape, maneuvering the aiming of our battleship, and the light cruiser also put the smoke screen. All this would have affected the effectiveness of the shooting of German ships, but they had absolutely nothing to do with this - they only thought about running without looking back. At the same time, the firing distance was usually much more than 90 kbt, and most importantly, on the Black Sea dreadnoughts there was ONLY the Geisler system mod. 1910, the instruments of Erickson and Pollen were not installed on these battleships. Therefore, it is in any case incorrect to compare the Black Sea "Maria" and the Baltic "Sevastopoli" in terms of the quality of the FCS.
Reservation
While most of the sources speak of the artillery armament of the Sevastopol-class battleships to a superlative degree, the armor of our dreadnoughts is traditionally weak and completely inadequate. The foreign press of those times generally compared Russian battleships with British battle cruisers of the "Lion" type, which had a 229-mm armor belt. Let's try to compare and we.
Here is the booking scheme for the English "Fisher's cat":
And here is the Russian "Gangut":
Since many of us do not have enough time with a magnifying glass in our hands to look for the thickness of the armor on not too clearly drawn diagrams, I will take the liberty of commenting on the above. I take the scheme of the battleship "Gangut" amidships, paint on the tower to it (do not shoot at the artist and do not rush empty bottles, draws as best he can) and put down the thickness of the armor. After that, with a red felt-tip pen, I depict the most obvious flight paths of enemy shells:
And now a little analysis. Trajectory (1) - hitting the turret, where the "Gangut" has 203 mm armor, the "Lyon" has 229 mm. The Englishman has the upper hand. Trajectory (2) - hitting the barbet above the upper deck. The Gangut has 152 mm there, the Lion has the same 229 mm. Obviously, here the English battle cruiser is in the lead by a wide margin. Trajectory (3) - the projectile pierces the deck and crashes into the barbet below deck. At the "Gangut" the enemy shell will have to overcome first the upper armored deck (37.5 mm) and then 150 mm of the barbet. Even if you just add up the total thickness of the armor, you get 187.5 mm, but you need to understand that the projectile hits the deck at a very unfavorable angle for yourself. The Englishman's upper deck is not armored at all, but the barbet under the deck is thinned to 203 mm. We diagnose the approximate equality of protection.
Trajectory (4) - the projectile hits the side of the ship. The "Gangut" is protected from it by a 125 mm upper armored belt, a 37.5 mm armored bulkhead and a 76 mm barbet, and only 238.5 mm of armor, the "Lion" in this place has no armor at all, so that the projectile will meet the same barbet 203 mm - the advantage of the Russian battleship.
Trajectory (5) - the impact of an enemy projectile will be taken over by the Gangut's tall main 225 mm armored belt, followed by a 50 mm armored bulkhead and then the same barbet, but alas, I do not know whether it had a reservation at this level. I suppose he had an inch. However, even if not, 225 mm + 50 mm = 275 mm, while the English battle cruiser is much worse.
For both the Russian and the English, the main armor belts are almost equal - 225 mm and 229 mm. But the battleships of the Sevastopol class had an armor belt with a height of 5 m, while the British battle cruiser had only 3.4 m. Therefore, where the Russian battleship had 225 mm of armor, the British battle cruiser had only six-inch armor. And the mighty 203-mm barbet behind her thinned to some three inches. Total - 228 mm of British armor against 275 mm + unknown armor of the Russian barbet.
But this is still half the trouble, and the trouble is that this calculation is true only for the middle turret of the battle cruiser. Indeed, in addition to the thickness of the main armor belt, its height and length are important. Using the example of "Trajectory (4)", we have already seen what the insufficient height of the main armor belt of the "Lion" led to, now it's time to remember that if the 225 mm of the Russian dreadnought covered all 4 of its barbets, then the English 229 mm protected only the engine and boiler rooms, yes, the middle tower, since it was wedged between them … The bow and stern towers of the "Lion" were covered not by six, but only by five-inch armor - that is, the total thickness of the armor protecting the cellars did not exceed 203 mm, but on a small section of the stern tower (where a five-inch belt was replaced by a four-inch one) and 178 mm at all!
Trajectory (6) - the Russian ship is protected by 225 mm main armor belt and 50 mm bevel, British - 229 mm armor belt and 25, 4 mm bevel. The advantage, again, is with the Russian battleship. True, the Englishman has 1, 5-2, 5 inch armor of the ammunition cellar, so we can say that the Gangut with the Lyon is approximately equal in protecting the cellars on this trajectory, but the engine and boiler rooms of the Gangut »Are protected somewhat better.
On the whole, the following conclusion suggests itself. The Russian battleship has weaker armoring of the towers and barbet above the upper deck, and everything below is armored as or even significantly better than the English ship. I would venture to argue that the Russian ship has significantly better protection than the British battle cruiser. Yes, the towers are less armored, but how fatal is that? As a rule, a direct hit from an enemy projectile would silence the tower, regardless of whether the armor was pierced or not. Here, for example, is the case with the Princess Royal in Jutland - a German (and, according to Puzyrevsky, 305-mm) shell hits the 229-mm armor plate of the turret and … does not penetrate it. But the slab is pushed inward and the tower is jammed.
By the way, what is interesting, when I wrote that out of seven German shells only three penetrated the 229-mm armor of British ships, I wrote only about hits in the armor belt. And if we count this tower, it turns out that only three armor penetration out of eight? In fact, there was a ninth hit - in the 229-mm armor of the fourth turret of the battle cruiser Tiger. The shell did pierce the armor, and … nothing happened. The effort spent on overcoming the armor plate mutilated the projectile - its unexploded remains, devoid of a "head" and a detonator, were found after the battle … In this case, the armor was broken, but what was the point? The 229-mm armor was not as badly protected as some people think … Generally speaking, there were cases when German 305-mm shells were held even by 150-mm armor. At the same time, the defeat of the tower, with or without armor penetration, in a number of cases caused a fire, which, if penetrated into the cellars, could threaten with detonation of the ammunition. But not always. For example, in the battle at Dogger Bank, a British shell still pierced the barbet of the Seydlitz aft tower - there was a fire, both aft towers were out of order, but there was no explosion. In Jutland "Derflinger" and "Seidlitz" lost 3 towers of the main caliber, including those with armor penetration - but the battle cruisers did not explode. The fact is that in the issue of detonation of the cellars, the main role was played not by the thickness of the tower armor, but by the arrangement of the turret compartments and the supply of ammunition to the guns - the Germans, after the Seidlitz experiment at the Dogger Bank, provided constructive protection against the penetration of fire into the cellars. Yes, and the British had cases when breaking through the armor of the towers was not accompanied by a catastrophe.
In other words, the weak armor of the towers and barbets above the upper deck, of course, does not paint the ship, but does not doom it to death either. But below the upper deck, the Sevastopol-class battleships were much better protected than the British battlecruisers.
"So what? - the reader will ask me. - Just think, you found someone to compare with - with an English battle cruiser, a generally recognized failure in terms of protection, because three of these ships took off in Jutland …"
So, but not so. If we reject the cliches imposed on us by widely disseminated points of view, we will be surprised to find that the same "Lion" received 15 hits with the German main caliber in the Dogger Bank case, but was by no means going to sink or explode. And 12 hits in Jutland did not become a tragedy for him. The Princess Royal "missed" eight hits in Jutland, and Queen Mary, the only battlecruiser of this type to die, received 15-20 hits from vaunted German shells. And after all, the reason for the death of the ship was hit in the area of the bow towers (and, apparently, pierced the barbet of the tower "B"), which was the reason for the explosion of ammunition, tore the ship in two in the area of the foremast … Explosion in the tower "Q", in essence, was already a misericord, a "blow of mercy" that finished off the ship. In other words, the British battle cruiser was killed by a blow to the place of its obvious weakness, where its cellars were covered from the strength of 203 mm of total armor. But if "Sevastopol" with its 275 mm (and even with a plus) of the total protection of the cellars had been in its place, would it have exploded? Oh, something is gnawing at me with serious doubts …
A word to the famous Tirpitz, who seems to be the last person in this world interested in praising the English battle cruisers:
"The advantage in battle of the Derflinger is characterized by the fact that it could penetrate the thickest armor of a British cruiser from a distance of 11,700 meters, and for this the British cruiser had to approach a distance of 7,800 meters."
But excuse me, because the recommended 11,700 meters is just a little more than 63 cables! It seems that Tirpitz was right: already at distances of 70-80 kbt, German shells penetrated English 229 mm at best every other time! And after all, what is interesting - the death of "Queen Mary" is described as "sudden", that is, having "fired" a dozen or so shells, the battle cruiser did not at all give the impression of a trough beaten into the trash, unable to continue the battle?
Why are there battle cruisers! The British armored cruiser "Warrior", which fought with the squadron of Admiral Hipper for 35 minutes, received 15 hits from 280- and 305-mm shells, but remained afloat for another 13 hours after that.
Do I have to remind you that the superbly protected Lutzov was killed by 24 British shells, which turned it into a ruin barely floating on the water?
The vast majority of people interested in the history of the fleet are quite satisfied with the common cliche that "the battle cruisers of Germany showed miracles of vitality, while the English were worthless" eggshells armed with hammers. " But is it really so? Of course, the German cruisers were much better armored, but did this provide them with an overwhelming superiority in combat stability?
This is a rather difficult question, and it can only be answered by undertaking a separate study. But the Russian dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type, occupying an intermediate position in their armor between the English and German battlecruisers, were certainly not "whipping boys" with "useless combat resistance."
The version about the unprecedented weakness of the armor of the Russian dreadnoughts was born as a result of the shelling of the former Chesma, but … it must be remembered that the Chesma was fired by almost the best 305-mm cannon in the world, probably the best 305-mm projectile in the world. And then everything will immediately fall into place.
According to the results of the shooting of "Chesma" (experimental vessel No. 4, if you like), the artillery department of the GUK made an interesting conclusion: when a shell and armor meet at an angle of 70 to 90 degrees (not counting the angle of incidence of the shell), a Russian 305-mm shell at a distance of 70 kbt pierced 305-365 mm armor. And this despite the fact that only the cases when the projectile pierced the armor and exploded behind it were counted - if you lower the requirements to the burst of the projectile at the moment of penetration of the armor, the Russian projectile overcame 400-427 mm armor at the same angles …
In general, if an alternative-historical miracle happened, and the gunners of the German battlecruisers suddenly saw in front of them not six huge, high-board English battlecruisers, but low silhouettes of four Russian dreadnoughts creeping over the waves, then, I'm afraid, the Kaiser would reward for this battle Admiral Hipper posthumously. And the British would certainly not have rejoiced at replacing the German battlecruisers with Russian battleships.
Of course, the same English dreadnoughts, not to mention the German dreadnoughts, carried much more powerful armor than the Russian "Sevastopoli". But she would have helped them in battle, that is the question.
Let's consider a hypothetical duel between the Russian "Sevastopol" and the British "Orion". The answer is obvious to the vast majority of those interested in the history of military fleets. Having removed the reference book from the shelf and opened it on the required page, we read: the thickness of the side armor of the Sevastopol is 225 mm, and that of the Orion is as much as 305 mm! British and Russian shells have a similar muzzle velocity - 759 m / s and 763 m / s, respectively, but the Russian armor-piercing shell weighs only 470.9 kg, and the British one - 635 kg! We close the guide and diagnose that the battle with the Orion would become a perverted form of suicide for the Russian battleship … Isn't that right, isn't it?
But if we take a closer look at the booking of Orion, then …
Tower armor - 280 mm, barbets - 229 mm. This is much better than the Russian 203 mm and 150 mm, but the British defense has practically no chances to keep the domestic armor-piercing projectile of the 1911 model at a distance of 70-80 kbt. In other words, at the main battle distances, the British artillery is completely vulnerable to Russian shells. Yes, the armor of the English turrets is thicker, but what's the use?
The upper armored belt is 203 mm thick, which is better than the 125-mm side and 37.8-mm armored bulkhead of the Russian battleship, but 8 inches is not an obstacle to Russian shells. True, at this level, the Englishman's artillery is better protected, the British battleship has a 178 mm barbet, the Russian has only 150 mm at the top and 76 mm below. But on subsequent series of battleships, the British abandoned the 178 mm barbette in favor of 76 mm, practically equaling the total armor thickness with the Russian dreadnoughts.
And below the Englishman - the main armor belt. Here, it would seem, is the advantage of the English battleship! But no - and the point is not even that the British main armor belt is lower than that of the "Gangut" and has a height of 4, 14 m versus 5 m, because 4, 14 m is not bad either. It turns out that Orion's main armor belt itself consists of two armor belts. Moreover, only the lower one is 305 mm thick, and the upper one is 229 mm thick.
The fact of the matter is that reference books usually give the thickness of the armor, but not the height and not the area of the main armor belt. And the imagination subconsciously believes that on battleships the heights and lengths of the armor belts are approximately the same, and the English 305-mm armor belt is a priori given the palm. They forget that this armor belt does not even reach half of the height of the Russian … Will such armor protect much?
An analysis of the battles of the Russo-Japanese War shows that the main armor belts of the Russian and Japanese battleships (which approximately corresponded in height to the British Orion) were hit by about 3% of the shells that hit the ship. In Jutland, the ratio was better - for example, in the 2, 28-meter belts of 330-mm armor of British battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, only 3 shells out of 25 hitting dreadnoughts of this type hit, or 12%. But the armor belts of the British battlecruisers "Lion", "Princess Royal", which had 3, 4 meters in height and "Tiger", took over a quarter (25%) of the total number of hits.
But the most important thing is to keep the 305-mm Russian armor-piercing projectile at a distance of 70-80 kb, even if the Orion's 305-mm armor could, then twice a third. But behind it there is practically nothing, only an inch (25, 4-mm) bevel …
The conclusion from this comparison is as follows. Yes, the British battleship is better armored, but at a range of 70-80 kb, its protection is quite vulnerable to the effects of Russian 305-mm shells. Here, of course, a counter question arises - how does the armor of our battleships protect from British shells at the same distance?
But before we answer this question, it is worth dwelling on, perhaps, the most common myth about Russian battleships.
