The Third Reich was preparing for an attack on the USSR very thoroughly, by the time the war began, a grouping of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of the satellite countries of Germany, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions, in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - it put up 141 divisions, 181 divisions were concentrated to strike the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for war, literally in a few years turning its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because according to the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100,000 troops. an army, without combat aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, powerful navies, general conscription, into the best army in the world. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, the fact that in the period before the Nazis came to power, with the help of the "financial international", it was possible to preserve the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.
The myth that "intelligence reported on time." One of the most persistent and dangerous myths, which was created even under Khrushchev, and in the years of the Russian Federation was even more strengthened, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but "stupid", or in another version "enemy of the people ", Stalin brushed aside these messages, believing more" friend "Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army were brought to full combat readiness, it would be possible to avoid a situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would be possible to stop the enemy at the border. In addition, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began to mobilize and was accused of "unleashing a war", Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that one would have to forget about the creation of the "Anti-Hitler Coalition".
There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big "But" - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the People's Commissariats of State Security and Defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports on the "final and firmly established" date for the start of the invasions of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates have been reported. April, May, June dates were reported about the invasion of the Wehrmacht and the beginning of the war, but they all turned out to be disinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever announced the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have learned about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive that spoke about the date of the invasion of the USSR came to the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single scout had time to report this.
The same famous "telegram" by R. Sorge that "an attack is expected early in the morning on June 22 on a wide front" is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar ciphers; moreover, no responsible head of state would take any serious action on the basis of such messages, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages on a regular basis. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Krasnaya Zvezda" published materials of a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where there were confessions of SVR Colonel Karpov: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev's times … Such "fools" are simply launched … ". That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the start of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the personality cult.
Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various "deserters" began to cross the border and the signals went through the border service to Moscow.
Intelligence was also mistaken in the size of the Wehrmacht grouping, allegedly thoroughly revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. The total number of the armed forces of the Reich by Soviet intelligence was determined at 320 divisions, in reality at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the forces of the Reich were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its blow - it was logical to assume that it was against England. A completely different picture would have developed if intelligence had reported that 148 of the 214 divisions of the Reich were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of building up the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to the intelligence of the USSR, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, the build-up of forces was significant, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping had doubled against England. What conclusions could be drawn from this? It could be assumed that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which he had long planned to do and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east, they reinforced the grouping for more reliable cover for the "rear". Hitler was not planning a war on two fronts? This is Germany's unambiguous suicide. And a completely different picture would have developed if the Kremlin knew that in February, out of all 214 German divisions in the east, there were only 23, and by June 1941 there were already 148.
True, there is no need to create another myth that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with the Western special services, she lacked experience.
Another myth, they say, Stalin is to blame for the fact that the main direction of the strike of the German armed forces was incorrectly determined - the most powerful group of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that it was there that the main blow would be. But, firstly, this is the decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), the Wehrmacht command deployed at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, and against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO), the German command concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 tank divisions. And according to the initial development of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main attack precisely in the south-western strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data, it is now we can put together all the pieces of the puzzle. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, there were actually 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of the KOVO and OVO was a completely correct step for our command. True, the problem is that our reconnaissance missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group of Gaines Guderian were transferred to the Brest region in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against KOVO.
T-2
What were the armed forces of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war with the USSR?
The Wehrmacht grouping in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units, they were distributed mainly in the theaters of military operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany's allies were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, a total of 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - nine).
T-3
The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they like? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks per staff - 51 light tanks Pz. Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tank Pz. Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 unarmed command tanks. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. In a tank division equipped with German tanks, according to the state they had: 65 light T-2 tanks, 106 medium T-3 and 30 T-4 tanks, as well as 8 command tanks, in total - 209 units. The tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, had 55 light tanks T-2, 110 light Czechoslovakian tanks Pz. Kpfw. 35 (t) or Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t), 30 T-4 medium tanks and 14 Pz. Kpfw. 35 (t) or Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t), total - 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t) tanks were modernized, their 30 and 50 mm frontal armor was now not inferior in armor protection to the T-3 and T-4 medium tanks. Plus, the quality of sighting devices is better than in Soviet tanks. According to various estimates, the Wehrmacht had about 4,000 tanks and assault guns in total, with more than 4,300 allies.
Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t).
But it must be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht's tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions reinforced: 6 thousand motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion, which could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, organize a crossing; A motorized communications battalion is a mobile communications center based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers, which could provide stable control of divisions on the march and in battle. According to the state, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached 2300 units. Plus 1289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1570 units. Therefore, the tank divisions were organizationally a perfectly balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this unit of the 1941 sample, with minor improvements, remained until the end of the war.
Armored divisions and motorized divisions were reinforced. Motorized divisions differed from ordinary Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and divisions of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in the infantry division, two light howitzer divisions and one heavy artillery division in the artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in the infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle-rifle battalion, which was not in standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900-2000 vehicles and 1300-1400 motorcycles. That is, the tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.
The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world not only to understand the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but were also the first to put this idea into practice in practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 battalions of self-propelled tank destroyers, 4 more batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht's tank divisions. Units of assault guns supported the infantry on the battlefield, this made it possible not to distract tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. The divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became the highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.
Infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht numbered 16,500-16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the Wehrmacht infantry division in the state, there were 5375 horses: 1743 riding horses and 3632 draft horses, of which 2249 draft horses belonged to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus a high level of motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the armed forces of Germany, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles of various types and more than 1 million horses.
Artillery
The artillery of the German Armed Forces was traditionally strong: up to a quarter of the barrels of German divisions were 105–150 mm guns. The organizational structure of the Wehrmacht's military artillery made it possible to provide a significant reinforcement of infantry units in battle. So, in the infantry regiments were 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150-mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for the advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry, motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while the commanders of the infantry and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht had a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers, and the commanders of tank divisions had a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.
The tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the state, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft installations based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quadruple 20-mm anti-aircraft machine guns. The company was part of the anti-tank battalion. ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move in the march. Plus anti-aircraft battalions with 8-12 88-mm Flak18 / 36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy's air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.
To strike at the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns in each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12 150 mm units in each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211 mm mortars and three 173 mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211 mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery battalions (9 149, 1 mm heavy guns in each battalion); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240-mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank battalions (36 37 mm Pak35 / 36 anti-tank guns in each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Virtually all of the RGK's artillery was concentrated on the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.
To ensure comprehensive preparation for hostilities, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 battalions of artillery instrumental reconnaissance, 52 separate sapper battalions, 25 separate bridge building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road construction battalions.
Aviation: 4 air fleets of the Luftwaffe, plus allied aviation, were concentrated to strike the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a crucial role in supporting the actions of the ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new modification Bf.109F, they exceeded in speed and climb rate not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also new arriving in the Red Army Air Force "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3".
The Reich Air Force had a large number of communications and command and control units and subunits, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions, which provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division had in its composition air surveillance, warning and communications subdivisions, logistic and technical support subdivisions. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft battalions with 88-mm Flak18 / 36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm automatic Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft guns, including quad mounts of 20-mm Flakvierling38 / 1 assault rifles. At the same time, the anti-aircraft divisions of the Air Force interacted well with ground forces, often advancing directly with them.
In addition to the military itself, numerous auxiliary paramilitaries such as Speer's Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps, and the Imperial Labor Service also added striking power. They performed tasks for the rear, technical and engineering support of the Wehrmacht. There were many volunteers from Western and Eastern Europe who were not formally at war with the USSR.
Summing up, I must say that this military machine at that time had no equal. It was not for nothing that Berlin, London and Washington believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But they miscalculated, once again …
