Today, when the ostensibly axiom is imposed on everyone that the military power of the United States is unprecedented and absolute, it is hard to believe that there were times in American military history when the question of the existence of classical national armed forces was very acute: to be such or not to be?
Outstanding scientist-mathematician of Hungarian-American origin John von Neumann, by the way a direct participant in the Manhattan project to create an American nuclear bomb, analyzing the results of its adoption, once noted that the main consequence of this invention is confirmation of the fact that “accumulated in the human brain and knowledge flexibly applied in practice has a greater impact on the conduct of war than the invention of even the most destructive weapon. Mark Mandeles, a well-known expert in the development of the armed forces in the United States, emphasizes that military transformation can bring positive results only if the military-political leadership understands the role of acquired knowledge and the importance of expertise as the basis for making the right decision. An illustration of these thoughts can serve as a rather long period in American military history from the end of the Civil War in the United States (1861-1865) and up to the beginning of the 20th century, within which the country's military-political leadership attempted to create a national military machine, supposedly adequate to the requirements the coming era.
The civil war in the history of the United States was "entrenched" in the memory of descendants not only by significant upheavals in the country's social life, destruction of economic foundations and numerous human tragedies, which, incidentally, is characteristic of internal military conflicts in any country, but also by the implementation of some of the achievements of the scientific revolution that time. For the first time, both the civilian and military leadership of the country were faced with new challenges, the reaction to which, without the baggage of accumulated and analyzed knowledge, strengthened by expertise, and on this basis of understanding what needs to be done, threatened to turn into failure.
WHAT ARMED FORCES ARE NEEDED?
The US Congress, as the embodiment of legislative power, was primarily concerned with the problems of re-creating a single country, providing it with all-pervading economic ties, which, without exaggeration, required huge financial resources. The military threat to the existence of the United States was no longer considered a priority, in connection with which the question of the formation of a national military machine faded into the background.
The congressmen, based on the calculations of the so-called political forecasters, proceeded from the fact that the involvement of the young American state in any military conflict in the Old World in the foreseeable future is unlikely, and in the New there are enough available forces to cope with any local cataclysms. Hence the conclusion was drawn: the country does not need armed forces of the level of advanced European powers.
Legislators considered it acceptable to have limited in composition and size armed forces, which should at least be sufficient to eliminate the internal "Indian threat" in the "Wild West". Accordingly, the military budget was sharply reduced, and then the painful process of reduction of the armed forces, called "reconstruction", began, but in reality led to stagnation in all areas related to the development of the military organization of the state. It was during this period that the measures were carried out, during which, as it became clear much later, the foundations were finally laid for the formation of those armed forces that, having entered the First World War, had many problems and at first suffered failures.
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
The avalanche reductions directly affected the officer corps formed during the Civil War and gaining combat experience. The struggle of officers for the privilege of staying in the ranks resulted in a discussion that unfolded among the generals about the usefulness for the compact armed forces of new military technologies, which had already been partially introduced into the troops. It was about technologies such as magazine rifles, smokeless powder, rapid-fire guns, and some others, as well as the need to train personnel for their correct use.
It looked paradoxical that the military leadership of the country reacted sluggishly to "revolutionary manifestations in military affairs" and the influence of new technologies on tactics, not to mention operational art. Senior government officials, both civilian and military, could not figure out what kind of decision-making mechanism in the event of emergencies should exist and be tested in practice during the necessary training with troops and experiments. Moreover, the resolution of the issue of the geographical distribution of garrisons and bases, issues of redeployment of troops, and in general regarding the allocation of the necessary funds to maintain the combat readiness of the remaining units and subunits, was delayed.
The problems grew like a snowball, but they remained unresolved. At the heart of all these problems, the above-mentioned expert Mark Mandeles concludes, was the prevailing in the American military-political leadership "a clear disregard for military science and the corresponding knowledge obtained on its basis." As military historian Perry Jameson noted, at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, there were only a couple of books in the United States. From them, the commanders could glean some information necessary to turn on the intellectual process to think about the optimization of the troop training system based on tactical principles, the structure of forces, the role and tasks of units and subunits, the methods of selection and supply of the necessary weapons and military equipment to the troops.
OMISSIONS IN RECONSTRUCTION
After the end of the Civil War, there were actually two armies in the United States: the conventional armed forces as a legacy of the army of the northerners with the usual levels of command and an army grouping in the defeated South, directly enclosed in Congress and only by 1877 absorbed by the national armed forces.
A year after the end of the Civil War, by a decision of the Congress, the Ministry of War was formed and the number of regiments as the main operational-tactical unit of the army was determined, which constantly underwent changes throughout the so-called Reconstruction. In addition, Congress established 10 administrative and technical bureaus, later called departments. These bureaus were independent of the Army High Command (GC) and were accountable for their work only to the Secretary of War and Congress. The powers of the Civil Code were very narrow: it did not even have the right to deal with issues of material and technical supply of subordinate units and subdivisions and only made petitions to the minister about the need to implement a useful initiative emanating from one or another bureau.
The main command of the army generally found itself in an ambiguous position, since it was deprived of such essential powers for such an administrative body, such as, for example, planning and conducting maneuvers or experiments and, moreover, organizing interaction with other departments in the interests of the armed forces as a whole. The officers seconded to work in the bureau, although formally assigned to a certain formation, were actually excluded from the normal army service and were completely dependent on the bureau leadership. In short, the country did not create a coherent system of management of the military organization, thanks to which the process of "reconstruction" could meet expectations.
PROGRESS DO NOT STOP
Meanwhile, despite the apathy of the authorities in solving the problems of the development of the national armed forces, the progress of military affairs could not be stopped. The most advanced American generals and officers stepped up their efforts, in fact on an initiative basis, in order to at least not lose the skills acquired during the fierce clashes on the fields of the Civil War.
The fruits of the revolution in military affairs, which were initially realized in Europe, were gradually transferred overseas to become the focus of attention of inquisitive minds from the American officer environment. Rapid-fire artillery guns, loaded from the breech and using metal cases filled with smokeless powder, along with qualitatively new, more powerful and accurate small arms, could not fail to make significant adjustments to the tactics of troop actions. In this regard, the most trained US military leaders did not abandon their attempts to reflect on the nature of future wars and conflicts. In particular, some of them were already aware of the likelihood of an era of prevalence of defense over offensive. Era when the attacking masses will find themselves under the influence of dense and targeted fire from the defending side, reliably sheltered in engineer-equipped shelters. For example, General George McClellan, in an article published in the Harpers New Munsley Magazine in 1874, wrote that "traditional infantry formations are unlikely to be able to cope with heavy defensive fire … unless resistance is found." Ten years later, another extraordinary thinking American Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan was able to predict the nature of future large-scale clashes on the fields of the First World War in Europe and a possible "positional deadlock" in which the opposing sides would find themselves.
It has become obvious to some American leaders associated with military issues that the rapidly changing military-strategic environment will inevitably have an impact on the art of war. It became clear to them that in due time the charters and instructions of the Armed Forces of the European powers, taken as a basis and in most cases not even adapted to local conditions, in the new conditions cannot be a support for the reconstructed American army. Civil War veteran General Emory Upton, who wrote the famous study "Military Policy of the United States" (published in 1904), back in the 80s of the XIX century put forward the idea of reorganizing the infantry under the urgent demands of the fruits of the "revolution in military affairs", and before of all "killing fire of new means of destruction."
In January 1888, Secretary of War William Endicott was forced under pressure from the "army community" to form a commission to consider numerous proposals for revising the directive documents that determined the life of the armed forces. By early 1891, draft separate regulations for infantry, cavalry, and artillery had been drafted and submitted to the Commander of the Ground Forces, Major General John Schofeld, Secretary of War Rajfield Proctor, and President Grover Cleveland, who approved these documents without substantive comment. Nevertheless, the officers "in the field" considered these regulations "overly regulated" and demanded reductions in certain provisions and clarifications on some positions. In 1894, General Schofeld was forced to return to this problem, and all three statutes were significantly revised. And soon the charters and the instructions developed on their basis were tested in the Spanish-American War of 1898.
FIGHT OF VIEWS
On the whole, by the end of the 19th century, two trends had formed in the American military-scientific community: supporters of the concentration of intellectual and physical efforts on, as it seemed then, an urgent "fight against the Indians" and those who considered it necessary to follow the general course of European military thought and prepare for large-scale conventional wars. The first group clearly prevailed and continued to impose the idea that national military involvement in a large-scale war was unlikely and that it was reasonable to concentrate entirely on conflicts such as the "fight against the Indians", which are likely to continue for many years to come. It was the analysis of this type of conflict that many works of American experts were devoted to, in particular, such popular at that time in the United States as John Burke and Robert Utley. Meanwhile, these conflicts could not be avoided by technical progress, in connection with which American specialists had to think about the problems of using such "novelties" as a field telephone, telegraph or radio in the troops, regardless of the scale of the conflicts.
The frigate Vampanoa was ahead of its time, so the old admirals were unable to appreciate it.
The fight against Indians in the Wild West really took most of the time from the command of the small armed forces, which, as Mark Mandeles points out, no longer had enough time for anything: not for theoretical training of officers, not for exercises, not even for drill and execution other duties of routine military service. An active supporter of preparing troops for conventional war, General Schofeld and his associates, realizing the need to withdraw the army from the press of the all-consuming struggle against the Indians, nevertheless complained that they did not have the opportunity to pay sufficient attention to the issues of "classical combat training", the development of plans and the implementation of full-fledged maneuvers and experiments, for which, moreover, the allocation of financial resources was not provided.
Overcoming resistance
And yet, the supporters of shifting the emphasis on preparing troops for conventional wars, as they say, did not doze. At the same time, they relied on constructive ideas and a comprehensive justification, first of all, of precisely this type of activity of the armed forces, expressed in the first years after the end of the Civil War by the unconditional authority of military affairs, Lieutenant General William Sherman, who then held the post of commander-in-chief of the ground forces. In particular, he believed that the army's command corps would inevitably degrade if it was not involved on an ongoing basis in developing plans and conducting exercises with troops. To do this, it is necessary to place the training of officers on a solid and permanent basis for the acquisition of the most modern knowledge in the field of military theory and the study of the latest models of weapons and military equipment.
Following his recommendations, in the 90s of the XIX century, the US ground forces nevertheless began a campaign to conduct exercises with troops that did not focus on punitive actions of the Armed Forces, but were carried out according to the standards of warfare adopted in Europe. On these exercises, which were conducted, however, from time to time, from time to time, the ability of the commanders of the unit-unit link to solve tasks that could be posed if a situation arose similar to the imminent crisis in Europe was tested.
Despite the alleged compliance of these exercises with the requirements of the present, the military leadership of the United States did not fit into the framework of world scientific thought, characteristic of the most developed European powers. Even sending American mediator observers to Europe for similar exercises did not benefit the US Armed Forces due to insufficient training of American officers and their lack of understanding of what the military in European armies is concerned about. Accordingly, the US lawmakers, who received inadequate reports from the American military on the results of the advancement of European military thought, and were already indifferent to the needs of the army, formally had no reason to take emergency measures to radically change the situation.
Meanwhile, supporters of transformations in the US Armed Forces continued their efforts in order to bring the level of training of the national armed forces "at least" to the European level. The aforementioned General Sherman, using his connections in the presidential administration and in Congress, managed to organize the School of Practical Training of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth (by the way, existing to this day, but, of course, under a different name). His successor, no less honored, American General Sheridan, made every effort to form a system of training specialists in the fields of military theory, military technology and logistics against the background of the authorities' indifference to the training of military personnel.
American lower-level officers, among whom the extraordinary-minded Major Edward Wilson stood out, also tried to contribute to the development of the art of war and the reconstruction of the national military machine for the pressing requirements of the time. Edward Wilson, in particular, proposed the concept of using machine guns and the formation on their basis of individual units and even units as a kind of troops within the infantry. However, the views of advanced generals such as Sherman or Sheridan, and even more so majors like Wilson, were not properly received by the political and, most importantly, the military leadership of the United States in order to "meet" the cataclysms of the coming era "fully armed."
ADMIRALS DO NOT WANT TO LEARN
Approximately the same was the case in the other type of American armed forces - in the navy. After the end of the Civil War, lawmakers considered the threat to national security interests unlikely from the sea. The congressmen justified their understanding of the prospects of the country's naval forces as compact and low-tonnage by the fact that the state's efforts now supposedly should be directed to the development of vast territories in the West and the all-round development of trade in order to ensure the restoration of the war-torn economy, which requires substantial cash infusions. As the historian Paul Koistinen points out, the Congress methodically rejected all the initiatives of the interested authorities and individuals regarding the construction of a modern fleet focused on possible major cataclysms in Europe and the intensification of colonial policy aimed at the Caribbean or the Pacific zone, arguing this by a lack of funds. But, as in the case of the ground forces, there were also enthusiasts here who, being preoccupied with finding the right ways to develop the Navy, practically on an initiative basis continued to work on the design and creation of modern warships, naval weapons and theoretical research in the field of naval art. …
A vivid illustration of this is the epic with the high-speed frigate Vampanoa, founded in 1863 as a reaction of the northerners to the successfully applied tactics of the southerners, who created a flotilla of sail-steam raiders who exhausted the enemy by unexpected raids on the coast and seizing its merchant ships. The new frigate was launched only in 1868 due to the difficulties that arose as a result of the loss of some of the advanced technologies during the destructive war. In general, the world engineering community highly appreciated this development of the Americans. In particular, such extraordinary minded practitioners in the field of maritime affairs were noted as Benjamin Franklin Isherwood - the head of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, responsible for the development of the propulsion system and the hull of the ship, as well as John Lenthall - the head of the Bureau of Structures and Repair, responsible for the implementation of all the rest of the work.
Like any new phenomenon, especially in shipbuilding, the frigate "Vampanoa", of course, was not devoid of shortcomings. In particular, they criticized its allegedly insufficiently strong body, a small number of places for coal and water, and some other design features. This ship was originally conceived to perform not only coastal missions, but also as a means of waging war in the ocean. However, this was precisely the main reason for criticism. The head of the selection committee, Captain J. Nicholson, personally reported on the successful sea trials of the Wampanoa to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells. In conclusion, Nicholson noted that "this ship has superiority over all foreign-built vessels of this class." However, a rather noisy campaign was launched against the construction of such ships, in which the main role was assigned, no matter how strange it may seem, to professional sailors led by Admiral Louis Goldsborough.
In addition to the negative opinion clearly imposed "from above", many old school naval officers and admirals ("sailing lobby") were not satisfied with the prospect of retraining to control fundamentally new systems, including steam engines, and the new tactics associated with this. As Admiral Alfred Mahan once noted the "absolute authority" in the American military environment, the massive entry into the Navy of ships of the "Vampanoa" type promised the naval officers significant difficulties in selection for higher positions, and indeed made it unclear the prospect of their status in the previously privileged form of armed forces. The ship's fate turned out to be unenviable: after serving in the US Navy for a small number of years, in the end it was withdrawn from the fleet and sold as an extra burden.
Not appreciating the outlined breakthrough in the development of the national navy, the leadership of the American armed forces, both civilian and military, continued to impose on the navy the routine practice of episodic drills and exercises. Moreover, often the matter was limited to one ship, when any "innovations" were tested on the actions of the crew, and then were recommended to the entire fleet. However, technological advances (steam engines) have been blatantly ignored in terms of their impact on the development of new operational concepts. Even during the first naval exercises in 1873, with the involvement of several warships and support vessels, these issues were practically not given due attention. And only in the early 80s of the XIX century, thanks to the efforts of Admiral Stephen Lewis, who founded and headed the Naval College, and his associates, the system of naval exercises gradually began to be introduced, mainly in the Atlantic. During the exercise, the tasks of repelling threats on distant lines were worked out, taking into account the possibility of entering the naval service with ships that are not inferior in their combat capabilities to European ones.
In this regard, the naval historian captain Yan van Tol complains that if civil and military leaders, possessing the appropriate knowledge, realized in time what promising and outstanding technology was in their hands, many subsequent errors in equipping the fleet and arising from this blunder in the development of naval art could have been avoided.
LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following generalizations suggest themselves.
First, the lack of desire of the military-political leadership of the United States after the end of the Civil War to pay due attention to the armed forces, although under the objective pretext of a lack of funds, not only led to a landslide reduction in the armed forces, but also created significant obstacles to the real reconstruction of the national military machine. including the formation of command and control bodies adequate to the requirements of the time.
Secondly, the reform of the armed forces, and even more so the military reform as a whole, whatever it is called - reconstruction or transformation, requires significant financial costs, and underfunding inevitably leads to underreform.
Thirdly, the selection by the military-political leadership of the United States from the entire spectrum of supposedly promising threats as a priority internal (so-called Indian) threat to a certain extent disorientated the American officer corps. It knocked him off the path of acquiring knowledge in the framework of the advanced European military science at that time and led to the loss of the conventional armed struggle skills acquired during the Civil War.
Fourth, the underestimation of the civil and, most importantly, the military leadership of new technologies, including national ones, led to the loss of real opportunities for the development of the armed forces to the level of at least European powers.
Fifth, the partial introduction of new technologies into the troops in the form of weapons and military equipment, due to the lack of a special education base and training of officers, did not allow the military leadership to draw correct conclusions and predict the consequences of the influence of weapons and military equipment entering the troops on changing the forms and methods of armed struggle.
Sixth, the misunderstanding made by the US military leadership - due to the lack of relevant knowledge and ignorance of the world (European) experience - of the importance of large-scale and methodical exercises with troops and experimentation led to the loss of the command staff of the army and navy of the ability to think operatively in battle. Moreover, to the loss of even those limited skills that were acquired by servicemen in the course of preliminary theoretical training.
Seventh, the selfless activities of a small group of generals, admirals and officers of the US Army and Navy, aimed at introducing troops into practice, nevertheless allowed the American armed forces to finally keep up with their development. Based on the groundwork created during this period, in the end, it was possible to overcome the stagnation and advance to the number of the militarily advanced powers of the world.
