The world today, after a fairly long period of nuclear disarmament, is again, step by step, returning to Cold War-style rhetoric and nuclear intimidation.
In addition to the well-known nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it looks like the same tensions are returning to Europe. In the context of an international political crisis, in other words, a crisis of confidence, many politicians are not averse to taking up again the usual means of intimidating opponents with all kinds of nuclear war plans.
However, the question arises: is it worth to be led by fear? A careful study of the history of the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States provides very interesting answers to these questions.
At the time when Washington had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, there were many plans for a nuclear war against the USSR. In the 1980s, they were partially declassified and even published, and quickly became known to the Soviet reader, since the party press quickly picked up these plans for a nuclear war as an argument proving the incurable aggressiveness of American imperialism. Yes, indeed, the first plan for an American nuclear attack on the USSR was developed in September 1945, about two months after the signing of the Potsdam agreements. The countries were still formally, and in fact, were allies - the war with Japan had just ended - and suddenly such a turn …
The Americans were not forced to publish such documents, and this allows one to think that the reason for the disclosure of old and unfulfilled plans for a nuclear war was something else. Such documents served the purpose of "psychological warfare" and intimidation of a potential enemy, that is, the USSR, and, to a certain extent, Russia as well. The message here is quite transparent: here, look, we have always kept you on the spot! It also follows from this that they are still holding them, developing even more sinister plans. Approximately in this style, those first American plans for a nuclear war against the USSR were commented on, already in Russian political journalism, almost always with more or less fear.
At the same time, they write very little about the fact that it was very difficult to fulfill these wonderful plans for a nuclear war, and the Americans, even during the Berlin crisis of 1948, themselves renounced the use of nuclear weapons, as well as weapons in general.
At the time of the Berlin Crisis of 1948 (known in Western literature as the "Blockade of West Berlin"), the United States had a ready-made plan for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This was the Broiler plan, which called for the bombing of 24 Soviet cities with 35 nuclear bombs. The plans were quickly revised. The Broiler, approved on March 10, 1948, became the Frolic plan on March 19. Apparently, the revision of these plans was associated with changes in the list of goals.
It was a very tense moment. In March 1948, the United States, Britain and France approved the use of the Marshall Plan for Germany. The USSR categorically refused to implement the Marshall Plan in the Soviet occupation zone. And after heated debates, due to the impossibility of reaching an agreement, the Allied Control Council - the supreme body of allied power in occupied Germany (this was even before the formation of the FRG and the GDR) - collapsed. The western zones sharply reduced the supply of coal and steel to the Soviet zone, and in response, strict searches of allied trains and cars were introduced. When the Western countries introduced a new German mark in their zones and in West Berlin on June 21, 1948, the SVAG introduced its German mark on June 22, and on June 24-25, 1948 all communication with West Berlin was terminated. Trains and barges were not allowed through the canal, the movement of cars was allowed only for a detour. The power supply was cut off.
In Western literature, all this is called the "blockade of Berlin", although in reality these measures were introduced in response to the splitting policy of the American military administration in Germany. The Berlin crisis also occurred due to the refusal of the Western Allies to confiscate the property of the German concerns that participated in the preparation of the war. This was their commitment to the Potsdam Accords. In the Soviet sector of Berlin, in which the largest industrial concerns ended up, 310 enterprises were confiscated, and all former Nazis were expelled from there. The Americans returned to the factories the directors and managers who had held their posts under Hitler. In February 1947, the Berlin City Council passed a law to confiscate the property of concerns throughout Berlin. The American commander, General Lucius Clay, refused to approve it.
In fact, the Marshall plan in Germany was to keep the German concerns almost inviolable, with only a superficial reorganization. These concerns were of interest for American investment and profit making. The Americans were not embarrassed by the fact that most of the factories and factories were headed by the same people as under Hitler.
So, a very conflict situation arose. The supply of food and coal to West Berlin stopped. Due to the fact that the United States has nuclear weapons, while the USSR does not, the Americans are beginning to consider the use of force.
This was a situation when the American leadership and personally US President Harry Truman seriously discussed the possibility of starting a nuclear war and bombing the Soviet Union.
But there was no nuclear war. Why? Let's consider that situation in more detail.
Then in Berlin the superiority of forces was on the side of the Soviet army. The Americans had a group of only 31 thousand people in their zone. West Berlin had 8,973 American, 7,606 British and 6,100 French soldiers. The Americans estimated the number of troops in the Soviet occupation zone at 1.5 million people, but in reality there were about 450 thousand of them at that time. Subsequently, in 1949, the size of the Soviet group increased significantly. The West Berlin garrison was surrounded and had no chance of resistance, General Clay even gave the order not to build fortifications due to their complete meaninglessness, and rejected the proposal of the US Air Force Commander, General Curtis Lemey, to strike at Soviet air bases.
The beginning of the war would mean the inevitable defeat of the West Berlin garrison and the possibility of a quick transition of the Soviet group to a decisive offensive, with the capture of West Germany, and, possibly, other countries of Western Europe.
In addition, even the presence of nuclear bombs and strategic bombers in the United States did not guarantee anything. Specially modified carriers of Mark III B-29 nuclear bombs had a combat radius sufficient only to defeat targets in the European part of the USSR, approximately to the Urals. It was already very difficult to hit targets in the Eastern Urals, Siberia and Central Asia - there was not enough radius.
In addition, 35 atomic bombs were too few to destroy even the main military, transport and military-industrial facilities of the Soviet Union. The power of plutonium bombs was far from unlimited, and Soviet factories, as a rule, were located over a huge area.
Finally, the USSR was not at all defenseless against the American air raid. We already had 607 stationary and mobile radars in 1945. There were fighters capable of intercepting B-29s. Among them are 35 high-altitude propeller-driven fighters Yak-9PD, as well as jet fighters: Yak-15 - 280, Yak-17 - 430, La-15 –235 and Yak-23 - 310 units. This is the total production data, in 1948 there were fewer combat-ready vehicles. But even in this case, the Soviet Air Force could use about 500 - 600 high-altitude jet fighters. In 1947, production began on the MiG-15, a jet fighter specially designed to intercept the B-29.
The American strategist with nuclear weapons B-29B was distinguished by the fact that all defensive weapons were removed from him in order to increase the range and carrying capacity. The best fighter pilots would have been sent to intercept the "nuclear" raid, among them the recognized aces A. I. Pokryshkin and I. N. Kozhedub. It is possible that Pokryshkin himself would have taken off in order to knock down a bomber with a nuclear bomb, since during the war he was a great expert on German bombers.
So, the American B-29B, which were supposed to take off for an atomic bombing from air bases in Great Britain, had an extremely difficult task. First, they and the fighter cover were to engage in the air with the fighters of the 16th Air Army stationed in Germany. Then the planes of the Leningrad Guards Fighter Air Defense Corps awaited him, followed by the Moscow Air Defense District, the most powerful and well-equipped formation of the Air Defense Forces. After the first bashing over Germany and the Baltic, American bombers would have to overcome hundreds of kilometers of Soviet airspace, without fighter cover, without airborne weapons, and, in general, without the slightest chance of success and return. It would not have been a raid, but a beating of American planes. Moreover, there were not so many of them.
Moreover, in 1948, US Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, at the most decisive moment in the development of plans for a nuclear war, found out that there was not a single bomber capable of carrying a nuclear bomb in Europe. All 32 units from the 509th Bomb Group were stationed at their Roswell AFB in New Mexico. Anyway, it turned out that the condition of a significant part of the US Air Force fleet leaves much to be desired.
The question is, was this plan for a nuclear war realistic? Of course no. 32 B-29B bombers with nuclear bombs would have been detected and shot down long before they approached their targets.
A little later, the Americans admitted that the factor of the Soviet Air Force must be taken into account and even put forward an estimate that up to 90% of the bombers could be destroyed during the raid. But even this can be considered unjustified optimism.
In general, the situation quickly cleared up, and it became obvious that there could be no question of any military solution to the Berlin crisis. Aviation came in handy, but for a different purpose: the organization of the famous "air bridge". The Americans and British assembled every transport aircraft they had. For example, 96 American and 150 British C-47s and 447 American C-54s were working on transportation. This fleet per day, at the peak of traffic, made 1500 sorties and delivered 4500-5000 tons of cargo. Mainly, it was coal, the minimum amount required for heating and power supply of the city. From June 28, 1948 to September 30, 1949, 2.2 million tons of cargo were transported by aircraft to West Berlin. A peaceful solution to the crisis was chosen and implemented.
So neither the nuclear weapons themselves, nor the monopoly on possession of them, even in the situation that required and assumed their use, helped the Americans. This episode shows that the early plans for nuclear war, which were plentifully drawn up in the United States, were largely built on sand, on a gross underestimation of what the Soviet Union could counter the air raid.
So, insoluble problems were already in 1948, when the Soviet air defense system was far from ideal and was only being rearmed with new equipment. Subsequently, when a large fleet of jet fighters appeared, more advanced radars and anti-aircraft missile systems appeared, the atomic bombing of the Soviet Union could only be spoken of as a hypothesis. This circumstance requires a revision of some generally accepted ideas.
The USSR was not at all defenseless, the situation with the possession of nuclear weapons was still not as dramatic as it is usually presented (the "atomic race").
This example very clearly shows that not every nuclear war plan, even in spite of its frightening appearance, can be implemented in practice, and is generally intended for this. Many plans, especially those that were published, served more intimidation than actual guidance documents. If the enemy was frightened and made concessions, then the goals were achieved without the use of nuclear weapons.
