The battles on the Vistula
From 2 to 6 October, the Austro-German armies approached the Middle Vistula and the mouth of the San. The Russian cover units withdrew to the Vistula, and then across the river. Novikov's cavalry withstood a number of enemy attacks, General Delsal's group (three brigades) fought a stubborn battle with three times the enemy's forces at Opatov, the 80th division held out at Sandomir. The Russian vanguards completed their task and retreated beyond the Vistula.
The retreat of Russian troops from the left bank of the Vistula worried the high command. Petrograd ordered Warsaw and Ivangorod not to surrender in any case and go on the offensive. However, the front commander Ivanov realized that the armies had not yet completed the process of regrouping, and decided to limit themselves to defensive actions until October 9.
By October 9, the German corps reached the Vistula, and the Austro-Hungarian troops - to San. The initial plan of the German command to inflict a flank attack on the 9th Russian army collapsed. The German commander Hindenburg decided to organize an offensive against Warsaw. He divided the German-Austrian troops into three groups. Hindenburg decided to turn the main forces of the 9th German army north and make an attempt to seize Warsaw on the move. This task was to be solved by a specially formed shock group consisting of three corps (17th, 20th army corps and Frommel's consolidated corps) under the command of General von Mackensen. On the left flank, Mackensen's group was supported by the 8th Cavalry Division and two brigades from the Thorn fortress. On October 9, General Mackensen's group set off on a forced march through the Radom towards Warsaw.
Part of the troops of the 9th Army (Guards Reserve Corps, 1 Division of Voyrsha's Corps and 1 brigade of the 20th Corps) were to tie up the enemy in battle, attacking him on the line from Ivangorod to Sandomir. This group was led by General Galvitz. The 1st Austrian army, supported by the 11th German corps and the 2nd division of the Voyrsh corps, was to bind the 9th Russian army in battle.
General August von Mackensen
Meanwhile, the 4th and 9th Russian armies completed the transfer from Galicia and concentrated between the mouth of the river. Pilitsa and the mouth of the river. Sana. The 5th Army was late, only the forward echelons of the 17th Corps were deployed to the north. The 2nd Army transferred the 27th Army Corps, the 2nd Siberian Army Corps and part of the 1st Army Corps to the Warsaw area.
On October 9, Ivanov gave the order to go over to the offensive. The troops of the 4th and 5th armies were to attack the enemy to the front, the 2nd army to the flank. The 9th Army was supposed to shackle the forces of the 1st Austrian Army with its actions. However, this order could not be carried out for a number of reasons: 1) the troops did not complete the transfer; 2) there were not enough ferry facilities to transfer troops to the other bank of the Vistula; 3) he was late, Hindenburg had already launched an offensive against Warsaw.
From the morning of October 10, on the approaches to Ivangorod and Warsaw, fierce oncoming battles began. The advance units of the 2nd Siberian Corps from the Mshhonov-Groitsy front were forced to retreat under pressure from the superior forces of the Mackensen group. On October 11, stubborn battles were already fought in one passage from Warsaw, near the settlements of Blonie, Brvinov, Nadarzhin and Piaseczno. A fierce battle went on for almost two days. The commander of the 2nd Army, General Sergei Scheideman, reported to the headquarters of the South-Western Front: "The German is rushing, there is not enough strength to attack everything creeping forward." On October 12, German troops fought their way for another 6 km, pushing the Russians back the line of Ozharov, Falenta and Dombrovka, and then to the fort line of the former Warsaw fortress. This was a critical moment for the Russian troops in the Warsaw area. However, Mackensen's group had already suffered heavy losses and began to fizzle out, and new units arrived to the Russians.
Stubborn battles went on in the Ivangorod direction. The formations of the 4th and 5th armies began to cross the Vistula. They managed to transfer significant forces to the other side. However, due to poor control from the front, army and corps command, most of the troops retreated across the river. So, on the night of October 10, Evert sent part of the 3rd Caucasian, Grenadier and 16th corps across the Vistula. On October 10, in a meeting engagement, the Germans pushed the Russian troops back. On the morning of October 11, Evert was forced to withdraw the Grenadier and 16th corps to the eastern bank of the Vistula again.
Only part of the forces of the two Russian armies was able to catch on to the other side. On the left wing of the 5th Army of Plehve, first the brigade, and then the entire 17th Army Corps, fortified on the western bank of the Vistula. On the right wing of the 4th Army, units of the 3rd Caucasian Corps (it was composed mainly of Cossacks) held out in the Kozienice area. The terrain here was convenient for defensive actions - forests and swamps. This allowed the Russian troops to hold the bridgehead and repel German attacks. Russian troops repulsed the attacks of the guards reserve corps for 10-12 days. This success created the preconditions for the second decisive offensive of the Russian armies.
The German command attached great importance to the Kozenitsky bridgehead, and the Germans made desperate attempts to throw Russian troops into the Vistula. However, the Russian troops stood firm and launched counterattacks. It soon became clear that Hindenburg had no fresh forces that could turn the tide of the battle for Warsaw and Ivangorod. The German 9th Army brought all its forces into battle. Meanwhile, the Russian command was pulling up new formations to Warsaw and Ivangorod. By October 15, the Russians had the advantage in strength.
Russian infantry repels a German night attack in the battle on the Vistula
Preparation of the Russian command for a new offensive and the transition of the German-Austrian armies to the defense
The Russian high command, having learned about the withdrawal of the 2nd army to Warsaw and the unsuccessful offensive of the 4th and 5th armies on the left bank of the Vistula, on October 12 decided to divide the control of the troops fighting on the Middle Vistula between Ivanov and Ruzsky. This was due to the fact that in a difficult situation Ivanov was confused. The temporary failure to move the Russian armies beyond the Vistula haunted the general. Ivanov was an impressionable man and was afraid to repeat the fate of General Samsonov, whose troops Hindenburg defeated in East Prussia. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Nikolaevich had to personally come to the front headquarters to calm down the front commander.
If Ivanov showed indecision and lost control of the armies, then Ruzskoy removed himself from any responsibility for the operation. He continued the policy of "pulling the blanket" over himself, without taking measures to accelerate the transfer of the 2nd Army's formations to Warsaw and to provide assistance to the armies of the Southwestern Front.
On October 13, the Stavka ordered to defeat the enemy, inflicting a strong blow on the left flank of Hindenburg. Responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the operation was assigned to the commander of the North-Western Front, General Ruzsky. The 2nd and 5th armies, the 1st cavalry corps of Novikov and the troops of the Warsaw fortified area (18 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions) were transferred under his command. The Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Ivanov, was to deliver an auxiliary strike. The 4th and 9th armies (23 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions) were to cross the Vistula and develop an offensive to the west and southwest.
It was planned to strike the German-Austrian troops on October 18. However, Ivanov, when the leadership of the main actions passed into the hands of Ruzsky, began to play for time and demanded a delay for additional regrouping of troops and their preparation for the offensive. As a result of this inconsistency, the Russian armies did not launch their offensive at the same time. First, Scheidemann's 2nd Army went over to the counteroffensive, followed by Plehve's 5th Army and Evert's 4th Army. The last to go on the offensive was Lechitsky's 9th Army. Thus, the 2nd and 5th armies began their offensive on October 18-20, and the 4th and 9th armies on October 21-23. In the period from 14 to 19 October, while the Russian armies were preparing for the offensive and completing the regrouping, fierce battles continued near Warsaw and Ivangorod.
Commander of the Southwestern Front Nikolai Ivanov
The German command, although every day it became clearer that the losses of the 9th Army were growing and becoming irreparable, and the Russian forces were increasing day by day, persisted and did not intend to retreat. Hindenburg still hoped to defeat the Russian armies, and in extreme cases, by stubborn defense, retain the Vistula line, preventing the Russians from crossing the river.
On October 14, the 2nd Siberian and 4th Army Corps pushed the enemy away from Warsaw with a strong counterattack. German troops withdrew to the previously prepared fortified line Blone - Piaseczno - Gura Kalwaria. Fierce fighting in this sector of the front continued until October 19.
By the evening of October 20, the entire 17th and 3rd Caucasian corps of Evert's army were transferred to the left bank of the Vistula. They launched a counteroffensive and forced Hindenburg to abandon further attempts to take the Kosenicki positions.
Source: A. Kolenkovsky. The maneuverable period of the First World Imperialist War of 1914.
The defeat of the German-Austrian troops
The strategic initiative began to pass to the Russian army. It became obvious to the German command that further struggle in the previous positions was aimless and dangerous. It was not possible to defeat the Russian troops and take Warsaw and Ivangorod. It was necessary to withdraw the forces, regroup them and try to inflict a counterattack. From the evening of October 19, Hindenburg began to withdraw troops. Mackensen's group was given the task of breaking away from the Russians, ruining all roads when retreating, gaining a foothold on the Skierniewitsa-Rava-Nove-Miasto line and repelling the enemy's offensive. The left flank of Mackensen's group was supported by two separate brigades and the 8th Cavalry Division.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff hoped that Mackensen would hold the new frontier for at least a week. At this time, the German command was supposed to form a shock group from the Voyrsh corps, the guards and the 11th corps. She was supposed to retreat to the Byalobrzegi area, Radom and deliver a counterattack to the advancing Russian troops on the left flank. At this time, the 1st Austrian Army was to move north with its left flank and cover the line on the Vistula River. Dunkl's army was ordered to take Ivangorod. With a successful combination of circumstances, there was a chance to cut off the connections of the 2nd and 5th Russian armies from the Vistula and destroy them.
However, this bold plan of the German command was not implemented. The onslaught of Russian troops near Warsaw intensified sharply and after October 25 Mackensen could only think about how to get away with his feet in time. A strong Russian offensive began near Ivangorod. The left wing of the Austro-Hungarian army (1st, 5th and 10th corps) was late and did not manage to cover the regrouping of the 9th German army. Quite unexpectedly for the Austrians, the main forces of the 4th and 9th Russian armies crossed the river. In a fierce oncoming battle from October 21 to October 26, the Austro-Hungarian troops were utterly defeated and thrown back to the southwest. The 1st Army lost more than 50% of its personnel in killed, wounded and captured. Austro-Hungarian troops retreated to Kielce, Opatov and further to Krakow.
The German command abandoned all resistance and began to withdraw troops towards Silesia. On October 27, a general retreat of the German-Austrian troops began. True, it took place under different conditions. The German army broke away from the Russian troops for a whole transition, restraining the Russians with strong rearguards and by completely destroying communications. The remnants of the Austrian army withdrew in disarray and under direct pressure from the Russian troops.
The position of the German-Austrian troops was difficult. General Ludendorff noted the potentially dangerous strategic consequences of the defeat of the 9th Army: “The situation was extremely critical … Now it seemed that something was about to happen that was prevented by our deployment in Upper Silesia and the offensive that followed: the invasion of excellent Russian forces in Poznan, Silesia and Moravia . Russian armies from October 27 developed an offensive to the west and southwest. They had the task of preparing for a deep invasion of Germany through Upper Silesia. On November 2, Russian troops reached the Kutnov - Tomashov - Sandomir line, by November 8 - on the Lask - Kosice - Dunajec river line. German troops were on the Kalisz - Czestochow line, Austro-Hungarian troops retreated to Krakow.
However, Russian troops did not enter Germany. The Austro-German command organized a demonstrative offensive of the 3rd Austrian army on the San River. Ivanov demanded that the center of gravity of the struggle against the Austrians be shifted. The high command, after some doubts, agreed with the opinion of the commander of the Southwestern Front. The 9th and 4th armies were again sent to Galicia. The front of the 2nd and 5th armies was greatly stretched, they lost their striking power. This led to the abandonment of the pursuit of the defeated enemy troops. The 9th German army was saved from complete defeat, and Germany from the invasion of Russian troops.
It should also be noted that there were objective reasons why it was not possible to encircle and destroy the 9th German army. We must pay tribute to the German command. The possibility of withdrawal was foreseen, and large reserves of explosives were prepared. Retreating to the west, the German troops completely destroyed not only railways, but also highways, and not only bridges and road junctions, but the road itself. It happened that for several miles the road was dug by explosions. This greatly influenced the mobility of the Russian troops.
Do not forget that the Russian formations were 150 km away from their rear bases, and the lack of food, fodder and ammunition began to be felt strongly. Russian soldiers could live without field kitchens, but even they could not fight without shells, cartridges and rusks. This factor also indicated poor organization on the part of the command, the inability to organize large forces in pursuit of the defeated enemy.
Thus, the German troops were able to get out of the critical situation. Hindenburg transferred troops to the Thorn area and began to plan an attack on the right flank of the 2nd Army (future Lodz operation). The German command dumped all the blame for the defeat on the Austrians. In Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian troops retreated again. The remnants of the 1st army withdrew to Krakow, as a result of its defeat, the 4th Austrian army withdrew from the line of the San River, followed by the 3rd and 2nd armies. Austro-Hungarian troops withdrew to the Carpathian line for the second time.
Outcomes
The Warsaw-Ivangorod operation became one of the largest operations of the First World War (it involved 6 armies and several separate large formations, about 900 thousand people). As a strategic operation of two fronts (Southwestern and Northwestern), it became a new phenomenon in the art of war, the highest achievement of Russian military strategy.
Russian troops carried out a bold transfer of large forces from Galicia to the Middle Vistula and from the Narew River to Warsaw, repelled the blow of the German-Austrian troops and defeated the enemy in a stubborn battle. The plans of the German command for a flank attack on the troops of the South-Western Front and the capture of Ivangorod and Warsaw were destroyed. The 9th German and 1st Austrian armies suffered a heavy defeat. Russian soldiers in this operation showed their high fighting qualities and morale, defeating not only the Austro-Hungarian, but also the German troops, dispelling the myth of their exceptional fighting qualities.
However, serious shortcomings in the organization of command and control at the level of the Supreme Command - the front, the mistakes of the front commanders Ivanov and Ruzsky, the poor organization of the supply of the Russian troops (the mistakes of the pre-war period affected) did not allow them to achieve more decisive successes and begin the invasion of Germany. It is also worth noting the carelessness of the work of the Russian headquarters: the Germans intercepted all Russian radio messages, which gave the German command an understanding of the situation.
We must not forget about the shortcomings in the control of the enemy. The plans of the German command were distinguished by adventurism, overestimation of their own and underestimation of other people's capabilities. There were serious disagreements between the German and Austrian command. There was no coordination between the allies during the operation, there were sharp conflicts and disputes. When the German troops fought heavy battles near Warsaw and Ivangorod, the Austro-Hungarian troops did not show any activity at the mouth of the San and on the Upper Vistula. When the Germans were defeated and began to withdraw, Hindenburg actually exposed the 1st Austrian army under attack, throwing it on Ivangorod. In vain did the Austrians expect help from the Germans, Hindenburg at that time tried to break away from the Russian troops as far as possible, leaving the Austro-Hungarian corps alone. The German command was also mistaken in the timing of the transfer of Russian troops and their combat capabilities. The fighting resilience of the Russian troops near Warsaw and Ivangorod shocked German soldiers and commanders.
It must be said that thanks to this operation, when, for almost two months of preparation and the course of the battle, all the attention of both the Austro-German and the Russian command was attracted to it, the situation on the Western Front became even more favorable for the Allies. The German command could not transfer a single soldier from the Eastern Front to the Western.
In the battle of Ivangorod alone, the 1st Austrian army lost more than 50% of its personnel - up to 80 thousand people. The Germans estimated their losses at 20 thousand people. Obviously, this is a reduced figure. The allies lost about 120-150 thousand people in the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. Losses of Russian troops - about 65 thousand people.
Russian soldiers in Warsaw in 1914
