Monument "Sons of the Fatherland - Grieving Russia. 1939-1940". Sculptor Oleg Komov
In the autumn and winter of 1939-1940, the dramatic events of the Soviet-Finnish war unfolded. I want to tell you about one white spot in its history - the deaths of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers in the forests of circumpolar Finland.
For a long time, not a paragraph, not a line, not a word was written about the events in the area of the village of Suomussalmi … The tragedy remained only in the memory of the battle participants who miraculously escaped from this snowy hell, a narrow circle of military specialists. It is easy and pleasant to talk about victories. But you also need to know about defeats in order to be able to avoid them in the future. Especially if these defeats were predetermined by military and political miscalculations.
A blow that the Finns did not expect
The symbol of the winter war was the "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus, which Red Army units tried to storm head-on, suffering heavy losses. But further north, along the state border from Ladoga to the Barents Sea, the Finnish defense was much more "transparent" - it was held not by a regular army, but by reservists. Here the Finns did not expect a powerful blow, relying on almost complete off-road.
However, the blow was nevertheless delivered. The Red Army intended to march from the eastern border of Finland to its western coast, cutting the country in two, with a swift thrust in the direction from the village of Suomussalmi to Oulu (Uleaborg).
This task was assigned to the 9th Army. The 163rd rifle division of brigade commander A. I. Zelentsov. She was supposed to strike from Ukhta (now Kalevala) to Suomussalmi, and later in the direction of Oulu.
On November 30, 1939, the division launched an offensive. And for the first time, the days of the operation, it was she, and not other formations of the 9th Army, that was accompanied by the greatest success. Despite the difficult terrain, in the first four days, the 163rd division advanced 50 kilometers deep into Finnish territory, as it was opposed only by the Finnish battalion and small units of border guards. But even this success did not suit the High Command, which expected a higher rate of advancement. On December 2, it demanded "to speed up the advance of our troops in every possible way."
And the 163rd division continued to develop the offensive. On December 6, one of the regiments reached the close approaches to Suomussalmi, an important transport hub, which was defended by two infantry battalions. On December 8, the 81st and 759th regiments, advancing from two directions, captured Suomussalmi.
Mannerheim's last reserve
The Finnish command was aware of all the danger that the loss of Suomussalmi posed in itself. Therefore, it hastily transferred its reserve to this area - an infantry regiment, which it had previously planned to send to defend the Mannerheim Line. The regiment, along with the battalions defending at Suomussalmi, joined the formed brigade under the command of Colonel Hjalmar. Siilasvuo, who received an order from the Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim himself to destroy the Russians. He undertook a simple tactic: to cut the enemy forces into pieces and gradually destroy them.
The Finns had five battalions, and the Red Army men had two regiments of Zelentsov's division. Having occupied the junction points of the Raate road and cutting off practically all directions for further advancement of the 163rd Division, Colonel Siilasvuo began an assault on Suomussalmi. After a week of fierce fighting, reinforcements approached the Finns. Even artillery and anti-tank guns appeared.
The headquarters of the Soviet High Command, worried about the unfavorable development of events, demanded to urgently restore the situation and transfer new forces to the aid of the 163rd division.
From a telegram dated December 19, 1939 to the commander of the 9th Army:
IMMEDIATELY over a straight wire.
The case in Suomussalmi is getting worse. I order to take all measures and urgently, without delay, throw all the forces of the 44th rifle division in order to prevent the enemy from encircling and capturing two regiments of the 163rd rifle division. To abandon all aviation to help the 163rd rifle division … Direct leadership and responsibility for the conduct of hostilities to provide assistance to the 163rd division rests with you personally. I warn you that you will personally be responsible for a possible catastrophe of the 163rd division. Immediately report your actions and orders.
CEO - K. VOROSHILOV
MEMBER OF THE MAIN MILITARY COUNCIL - I. STALIN
HEAD OF THE GENERAL STAFF - B. SHAPOSHNIKOV
The Finnish command understood that the delay in death was similar and continued to build up its forces, sending practically its last reserves to the Suomussalmi area. And on December 22, all the units and subunits operating in this area, the Finnish command united into the 9th Infantry Division, which was headed by the same Colonel Siilasvuo.
Deprived of supply routes for materiel, the 81st and 759th Rifle Regiments of the 163rd Rifle Division, after fierce battles on December 28, left Suomussalmi and began to retreat to the northeast.
In the meantime, the 44th division was already moving to the rescue, which was tasked with striking Suomussalmi, unblocking the road to Raate and linking up with parts of the 163rd Infantry Division. However, the deployment of the division, transferred to Karelia from Zhitomir, proceeded slowly. Some subdivisions and units by this time had not yet managed to unload from the railway trains. Due to the lack of vehicles, the fighters moved on a marching march. Moreover, the division was not prepared to conduct hostilities in a harsh winter. The personnel had neither warm sheepskin coats, nor felt boots, nor mittens. The soldiers were dressed in thin greatcoats and canvas boots. And the frosts have already reached 40 degrees.
At this time, the Finnish radio intelligence had already intercepted data on the 44th division, which was in a hurry to help the encircled people. And then Colonel Siilasvuo took a big risk. On a narrow bridge between lakes Kuivajärvi and Kuomanjärvi on the way of the division moving along the Raate road, he set up a barrier, and from the nearest forests began to deliver preemptive strikes with the forces of flying detachments of skiers. In that war, skis generally turned out to be almost an ideal means of transportation. In addition, the Finns had excellent ski training: they also knew how to crawl on their bellies, without taking off their skis, and even climb trees in them if necessary. In addition, the Soviet fighters experienced the effectiveness of the action of Finnish snipers ("cuckoos").
The Cuckoo Myth
Finnish intelligence, with the aim of demoralizing Soviet soldiers, created a myth about snipers - "cuckoos", allegedly sitting on branches. In fact, the Finnish soldier could have been in the tree only for the purpose of observation, but not in order to be in ambush. Indeed, it is generally difficult to think of a more unsuccessful place for this - in such a situation, the sniper unmasks the first shot, and it is simply impossible to quickly change position, not to mention the likelihood of falling from a height even in the event of the slightest injury. That is why the Finnish snipers preferred to "pretend to be" a snowdrift or, in the most extreme case, to hide behind a tree, but certainly not to climb on it. But the myth worked, the Soviet soldiers, moving through the forest, constantly looked around at all the trees, and their attention was weakened.
Due to the fact that almost the entire 44th division was on foot, the convoy stretched out for 30 kilometers. As a result, units of the division, tired of the miles-long journey, entered the battle from the march. Snow and difficult terrain prevented Divisional Commander Vinogradov from using his military equipment properly. Therefore, the blow of the 44th division turned out to be weak, and the position of the 163rd division remained the same difficult: its strength was running out.
But the 44th Infantry Division itself was in a difficult position. After the liberation of Suomussalmi, Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo regrouped his units: now he redirected the main forces against the 44th division. With flank strikes on the divisional units stretching along the road, he cut off its communications in several places, depriving the supply of ammunition, fuel and food, the ability to evacuate the wounded. By this time, the 44th Infantry Division was only 10 kilometers away from the 163rd Division.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the maps at the disposal of the Soviet units were so inaccurate that they had to use Finnish tourist maps. And the divisions had to move almost blindly.
Due to the lack of interaction and lack of communication, the Divisional Commander of the 163rd Division Zelentsov, without waiting for the approach of the units of the 44th Infantry Division, and without coordinating his actions with Divisional Commander Vinogradov, decided to leave the encirclement on his own. The division overcame Lake Kianta-Järvi on the ice, and reached the Soviet-Finnish border, losing about 30 percent of its personnel, as well as a large number of weapons and military equipment. The command could not organize a competent retreat, and if it were not for the heroism of the soldiers and commanders of the 81st Mountain Rifle Regiment, which covered the retreat of the main forces, the losses could have been even greater.
The headquarters of the Soviet High Command blamed the 9th Army Commander Dukhanov and the Army Chief of Staff Sokolovsky to blame for the failure and the failed offensive. They were removed from their posts. The commander of the most affected 662 Rifle Regiment Sharov and Commissar Podkhomutov were arrested and put on trial. They "frankly" confessed to sabotage and were shot.
Defeat of the 44th division
… And the position of the 44th Infantry Division was getting worse every hour. As a result of the strikes undertaken by Finnish troops from December 30, 1939 to January 4, 1940, the division was dismembered into six pockets of resistance. Unfortunately, the brigade commander Vinogradov was unable to unravel the maneuver of the Finnish troops and organize a rebuff. In addition, the Finns knew about the plans of the Soviet command, since on December 27 they captured a number of orders for the 44th division and managed to prepare to repel attacks in the right places. A few days later, they themselves launched a counterattack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at the most crucial moment one of the battalions of the division, whose fighters had not received hot food for several days, left the front without permission. As a result, the left flank of the division was exposed, which the Finns took advantage of.
On January 2, the Finnish ski squads cut the only road along which the divisional column was moving. People and equipment crowded in a small area became an excellent target for Finnish artillery. The attempts to break through on January 2-4 failed. Division commander Vinogradov and division chief of staff Volkov lost control of the troops. On January 4, they asked the command of the 9th Army for permission to leave the encirclement without heavy weapons and equipment, since there was no fuel or horses. Some of the horses died of hunger, the rest were eaten by the surrounded soldiers. In addition, the Finns organized the so-called "carousel" - small Finnish ski flying squads constantly inflicted harassing blows. Suddenly appearing on the flanks and in the rear of the Soviet units, they opened heavy fire, and then suddenly disappeared. Not only subunits were subjected to blows, but also headquarters. This brought confusion, disrupted communications, disorganized management. In addition, there were severe frosts, and the soldiers, if they did not die from a bullet, then froze to death in their thin overcoats. But the army commander, due to the lack of reserves, could not provide significant assistance to the surrounded units. At his disposal were only a battalion and a howitzer artillery regiment that had escaped encirclement, and 5 companies formed from the newly arrived reinforcements. But, such forces only managed to squeeze the Finns by only half a kilometer. All attempts to break through the ring around parts of the 44th division were unsuccessful.
Late in the evening of January 6, the Stavka received permission to withdraw units of the division from the encirclement, but with the indispensable preservation of heavy weapons and equipment. Then communication with the headquarters of the army was interrupted.
Having received at 10 o'clock in the evening the permission of the command of the 9th Army: "To act on his own initiative", Vinogradov on January 7, at his own risk and peril, ordered "to destroy the materiel and retreat in scattered groups through the forests to the east to the Vazhenvaar region." By this time, an indiscriminate retreat had already begun, which turned into flight.
Colonel Siilasvuo described this retreat in the following way: “The panic of those surrounded was growing, the enemy no longer had joint and organized actions, each tried to act independently to save his own life. The forest was full of people running. The soldiers threw not only cannons and machine guns, but also rifles. Many Red Army soldiers were killed in the blizzard. Their bodies were found and buried in the spring, after the snow melted. At noon on the 7th, the enemy began to surrender, mostly wounded. Hungry and frozen people came out of the dugouts. A single nest continued to resist, for a while it was left alone … We captured an incredibly large amount of military materials, which our units could not even dream of even in a dream. We got everything quite serviceable, the guns were new, they still shone … Trophies were 40 field and 29 anti-tank guns, 27 tanks, 6 armored vehicles, 20 tractors, 160 trucks, 32 field kitchens, 600 horses."
By the evening of January 7, the first groups of division fighters, led by its commander and headquarters, arrived in Vazhenvaara. People left the encirclement for several days. According to Finnish data, about 1,300 people were taken prisoner. The 44th division lost almost all of its weapons and military equipment. 40 percent of the fighters who left the encirclement were even without rifles.
The division commander was shot in front of the line
Thus, the plans of the Soviet command to combine the two divisions and their rapid throw along the shortest path to the western border of Finland were thwarted. The remnants of the 163rd division went back to the north and until the end of the war settled in the town of Yuntusranta, and the 44th (numbering about 17 and a half thousand people) was defeated. (Division personnel losses exceeded 70 percent). Only a few groups and individuals managed to get out of the encirclement, who immediately fell into the hands of the NKVD.
On January 19, 1940, an order was issued by the Main Military Council: “In the battles on January 6-7 on the front of the 9th Army in the area east of Suomusalmi, the 44th Infantry Division, despite its technical and numerical superiority, did not offer adequate resistance to the enemy, shamefully left on the battlefield most of the hand weapons, hand and easel machine guns, artillery, tanks and retreated in disarray to the border. The main reasons for such a shameful defeat for the 44th Infantry Division were:
1. Cowardice and shameful and treacherous behavior of the division command in the person of the division commander, brigade commander Vinogradov, the chief of the political department of the division, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the division chief of staff, Colonel Volkov, who, instead of showing commander's will and energy in leading units and perseverance in defense, instead of taking action to the withdrawal of units, weapons and materiel, they despisedly abandoned the division in the most crucial period of the battle and were the first to go to the rear, saving their own skin.
2. The confusion of the senior and middle command personnel of the division's units, who, forgetting about the commander's duty to the Motherland and the Army, gave up control of their units and subunits and did not organize the correct withdrawal of units, did not try to save weapons, artillery, tanks.
3. Lack of military discipline, poor military training and low education of fighters, thanks to which the division in its mass, forgetting its duty to the Motherland, violated the military oath, even abandoned its personal weapons on the battlefield - rifles, light machine guns - and retreated in panic, completely defenseless.
The main culprits of this shame have suffered the well-deserved punishment of the Soviet law. On January 11 and 12, the military tribunal considered the case of Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov, who pleaded guilty to mean selfishness, and sentenced them to be shot."
TOP SECRET
TO THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
T. SHAPOSHNIKOV. (for bet)
We report: the trial of the former commander of the 44th rifle division VINOGRADOV, the chief of staff VOLKOV and the chief of political department PAKHOMENKO took place on January 11 in VAZHENVARA in the open air in the presence of the personnel of the division. The defendants pleaded guilty to the crimes they had committed. The speeches of the prosecutor and public prosecutor were approved by all those present. The trial lasted fifty minutes. The execution sentence was carried out immediately in public by a platoon of Red Army soldiers. After the execution of the sentence, a meeting of the command personnel was held, at which further explanatory work was planned. The identification of all traitors and cowards continues. At the 44th Rifle Division, the Military Council commission is working, which is responsible for a detailed investigation of all the reasons and circumstances of the defeat of the 44th Rifle Division.
January 11 CHUIKOV, MECHLIS
Reference: In total, the Finnish troops lost about 800 people near Suomussalmi, ours - about 23 thousand (killed, wounded, missing, frostbitten). Finnish experts, considering the reasons for the defeat of the 44th division, pay special attention to psychological factors: on the Raate road, two military models of thinking collided, one of which recklessly believed in technology, the other in a lightly armed soldier who was more effective in the local conditions.
Epilogue
This material was not written by a professional historian and does not claim scientific and historical significance. But I want to say that any war is a tragedy of peoples. And it seems that the peoples of Russia and Finland have learned from that war and realized its disastrous consequences. They had the courage not only to reconcile, but also to establish good-neighborly relations, which allowed, over time, to ease the pain of past grievances and perpetuate the memory of those who fell in hostilities. In the area of the village of Suomussalmi, there are more than a hundred unnamed burials of Soviet soldiers. At first, the very idea of the installation, here at least a commemorative sign was met with hostility by the Finns. But times have changed, in 1994, in Finland, a monument to the dead soldiers of the 163rd and 44th divisions was erected. It is called "Sons of the Fatherland - Grieving Russia"
Photo:
Battles map.
The brigade commander of the 44th division Alexei Vinogradov
Soldiers of the 44th division
Chief of Staff Captain Alpo Kullervo Marttinen (one of the leaders of the defeat of the 44th and 163rd divisions). Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
The famous Finnish sniper, the symbol of the Finnish "cuckoos" Simo "Valkoinen Kuolema" ("White Death") Häyhä, killed more than 500 Soviet soldiers. Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
The Finnish funeral team poses against the background of the soldiers of the 3rd company of the 81st state rifle regiment who died on December 9. Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
Finnish officers inspect trophies from Suomussalmi (ski guide). Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
A defeated column of vehicles from the 44th division. Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
The defeated tank column of the 44th division. Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
Broken Soviet train. From the archives of American photojournalist Karl Meadans
Frozen bread captured by the Finns. From the archives of American photojournalist Karl Meadans
Prisoners of the Red Army of the 44th division. December 1939. From the archives of American photojournalist Karl Meadans
Frozen under Suomussalmi. From the archives of American photojournalist Karl Meadans
Red Army soldiers of the 44th division frozen in a trench. From the archives of American photojournalist Karl Meadans
Suomussalmi. The harsh truth of the war … Finnish soldiers pose next to the body of a frozen Red Army soldier.
For a long time in the spring of 1940, when the snow began to melt, local residents found the decomposing bodies of the Red Army soldiers.
War correspondent. Suomussalmi, December 1939. Photo from the Finnish Winter War archive
