Offensive plan
The general idea of the offensive was to break through the center of the front of the Turkish army in the direction of the village of Kepri-kei. In order to rivet the enemy's attention, his reserves, as well as secretly concentrate the troops of the army group to break through the enemy front, the 2nd Turkestan and 1st Caucasian corps had to launch an offensive somewhat earlier and in directions dangerous for the Turks.
The 2nd Turkestan corps under the command of Przhevalsky was supposed to go on the offensive in the area from the area of the village of Khartkha (east of Lake Tortum-gel, 30 km north-west of Olta) to the village. Veran-tap. At the first stage of the offensive, our troops were to occupy the Gay Dagh mountainous area. A special column of Voloshin-Petrichenko (Don foot brigade - 12 battalions, 18 guns) was supposed to seize Mount Kuzu-chan with blows from the south and north and advance over the mountains to Sherbagan, providing the army's strike group from the right flank.
At the same time, the shock column under the command of Vorobyov, as part of the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division and the Siberian Cossack Brigade and artillery (12 battalions, 13 hundreds, 50 guns, including 8 howitzers), was to move from the area of the villages of Sonamer and Geryak in the direction of Maslagat, Karabyikh, Gechik, Kepri-kei. Vorobyov's troops were supposed to knock the Turks out of their positions and attack the flank and rear of the Turkish troops operating in the Passin Valley in order to cut off their communication with Erzurum. The 1st Caucasian Corps, commanded by Kalitin, was assigned the task of attacking the Ilimi - Endek sector.
Offensive
2nd Turkestan corps. The 2nd Turkestan corps launched an offensive on December 28, 1915. The commander of the 2nd corps decided to carry out the task of capturing, first of all, the mountainous Gay Dagh, not by maneuver, but by a frontal strike. The terrain was extremely difficult to attack. The Gay Dag mountain massif (up to 3 thousand meters high) allowed an offensive only in the zone of its two peaks. The strongholds of the Russian and Turkish troops were located one against the other on two peaks of the Gay Dag mountain, connected by a narrow isthmus, along which more than 12-15 people could not walk side by side. The sides of the isthmus, as well as the peaks, abruptly ended in gorges up to 1 km deep. Due to the terrain conditions, it was only possible to destroy the enemy's fortifications with howitzers, and they could not be brought down due to off-road conditions.
As a result, the offensive of 5 Russian battalions in the area of the river. Sivri Chai, the Gay Dag Mountain, did not lead to success, despite repeated frontal attacks on the enemy strongholds in this area, and especially on the top of the Gay Dag Mountain. Only a successful offensive on the left flank of the corps of the 5th rifle division and the beginning of the breakthrough of the Turkish front in the Sarykamysh direction led to the fact that on January 4, 1916, the troops of the 10th Turkish corps began to withdraw and on January 5, our troops occupied Gay Dag without a fight. …
In the sector of the 5th rifle division, which received the task of capturing the heights near the village of Norshin, the offensive of the Russian troops, which began on December 28, ended successfully on January 3. Success was achieved due to the choice of a more favorable mountainous area for the offensive, on which there were paths, as well as due to the offensive of the neighbors - the Voloshin-Petrichenko column. Having occupied the area of Mount Karaman, the left flank of the Przhevalsky corps, in connection with the exit of the 1st Caucasian corps and the shock group of the army to the area with. Kepri-kei, and parts of the Voloshin-Petrichenko column to the Karachly pass, turned to the west. While advancing on Bar, the troops of the 2nd Turkestan corps threatened the flank and rear of the units of the 10th Turkish corps, which systematically retreated to a position at Kizil-kilis, which closed the way to the Gurdzhi-bogaz passage leading to the Erzurum plain.
The offensive proceeded slowly due to the inaccessible mountainous and roadless terrain, and the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 10th Turkish Corps. On January 7, our troops captured the passes on the Sivri-dag ridge near the village of N. Leski. This was the most serious obstacle in the advance towards Erzurum. On January 9, corps units captured the position of the Turks at Kizil-Kilis, and on January 12 they reached the Kara-gyubek fortification located in the Gurdzhi-bogaz pass.
Commander of the 2nd Turkestan Army Corps Mikhail Alekseevich Przhevalsky
Sarikamysh direction
In the early morning of December 30, 1915, an offensive began in the Sarykamysh direction. Kalitin's 1st Caucasian Corps launched an offensive in the Ali-Kilisa-Endek sector. The army reserve was concentrated in the area of the villages of Karaurgan, Kechasor and Zivin. The offensive developed in a difficult manner and with heavy losses. The Turks relied on strong border fortifications and fought back stubbornly. They shot the area well and even launched counterattacks. A particularly fierce battle went for the Azap-Key position, where the best and shortest path to Erzurum passed.
In addition, fearing for this sector of the front, which was swiftly attacked by the reinforced 39th Infantry Division, the Turkish command concentrated its reserves on this sector. Our troops suffered huge losses in frontal attacks. However, Yudenich demanded that Kalitin continue to attack. On December 31, Turkish troops, pushing back the right flank of the 39th division, which was advancing on the position of Mount Gilli-gel, themselves launched a counterblow. The Turks struck at the junction of the 39th division and the 4th rifle division (the shock group of the army), trying to reach our flanks. However, this dangerous blow of the Turkish army was parried by our reserves.
Column Voloshin-Petrichenko with great difficulty overcame, with the resistance of small parts of the Turks, snow-covered spurs of the Chahir-Baba mountain range. The leaders of the strike groups repeatedly asked Yudenich for reinforcements in order to break the resistance of the Turks. However, the army commander, in response to all reports about the severity of the situation and about the reinforcement of the exhausted units, invariably continued to demand an increase in the offensive, regardless of losses. As a result, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Army quickly melted away, but all the reserves of the Turkish army also quickly ended.
Thus, the offensive of our army developed slowly due to the fierce resistance of the enemy, who occupied well-fortified positions and the complexity of the terrain. Russian troops, especially parts of the 39th division (lost up to half of their strength), suffered heavy losses. However, the Turks had exhausted their reserves and decided that it was in the sector of the 39th division that Yudenich's army was delivering the main blow.
By the evening of December 31, Russian intelligence discovered that almost all the Turkish units, which were Russian in the reserve of the 3rd Turkish Army, had been brought into the first line by the Turks. Then Yudenich reinforced the 4th rifle division of the 263rd from the army reserve. infantry Gunibsky regiment, and the 1st Caucasian corps - 262th infantry Grozny regiment, ordered on the night of January 1, 1916 to go over to all units in a decisive offensive.
The offensive of the Caucasian army took place slowly due to the outbreak of a blizzard, the complexity of mountain conditions and enemy resistance. However, on New Year's Eve, in a blizzard and a blizzard, the 4th Caucasian Division broke through the enemy's front. The Turkish command, distracted by the desperate attacks of the 39th division, left the Sonamer, Ilimi, Maslagat and Kojut mountains without due attention without due attention. In addition, there was a highly rugged, wilderness covered with deep snow, which was considered almost impassable. The 4th Caucasian Rifle Division occupied this area and in the evening reached the area of the village of Karabyikh. On January 2, the division completed the breakthrough of the Turkish front. And the Voloshin-Petrichenko column, capturing the commanding height - the city of Kuzu-chan, developed an offensive along the ridge in the direction of the Karachly pass.
As soon as a breakthrough of the enemy front was indicated, the army headquarters sent a Siberian Cossack brigade to it on the night of January 3, which received a special task - to blow up the bridge on the river. Araks at Kepri-Kei. The elimination of this crossing led to the division of the Turkish troops, which were located on both sides of the Araks, and the Turkish grouping, located south of the river, was cut off from the best and shortest routes to Erzurum. However, the Cossacks got lost in the mountains at night in a blizzard and were forced to return without solving the problem. Later it turned out that the Cossack brigade was almost at the target, but lost its way and turned back.
On January 3, the 4th Caucasian Division, deepening the breakthrough, advanced from the village. Karabykh to the flank and rear of the Turkish group of forces that fought against the 1st Caucasian corps. Meanwhile, the troops of Kalitin's corps, pushing the enemy, occupied the area of the village of Kalender. The Turkish command, using all its reserves to contain Kalitin's corps, could no longer stop the offensive of the army strike group and on the night of January 4 began a quick withdrawal of troops. Our troops did not notice the enemy's retreat in time, and the Turks were able to break away for a while and avoided encirclement.
On January 4, units of the 4th Caucasian Division occupied Kepri-Kei, the Voloshin-Petrichenko detachment approached the Karachly pass on the road to Khasan-Kala. The troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps, pursuing the fleeing Turks, also reached Kepri-Kei. On the southern bank of the river. The Araks Turks also retreated, abandoning their artillery depots and supplies. Thus, our troops broke through the center of the Turkish front, defeated the Sarykamysh grouping of the enemy. However, we did not succeed in destroying the main forces of the Turkish army located in the Passinskaya Valley due to the skillful separation of the Turks from the 1st Caucasian corps at night and a quick flight from the possible "cauldron" that created the maneuver of the 4th Caucasian division.
On January 5, the Siberian Cossack brigade with the 3rd Black Sea Cossack regiment was already conducting reconnaissance near Khasan-Kala. On January 6, our cavalry attacked the Turkish rearguard near this city, and then pursued the Turks in almost darkness to the advanced fortifications of Erzurum, built on the Deveboinu ridge. On the same day, the advance units of the 1st Caucasian Corps occupied the area of the town of Khasan-Kala. On January 7, the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division and the 263rd Gunib Regiment moved to the position on Deveboyna.
Commander of the 1st Caucasian Army Corps Pyotr Petrovich Kalitin
Results of the first stage of the operation
Thus, on January 7, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps, with their vanguards, had already approached the belt of forts of the Erzurum fortress. At this time, the 2nd Turkestan corps lagged significantly behind, lingering in front of strong mountain positions in the Kizil-kilis region, occupied by the less disordered 10th Turkish corps.
Our losses in the 8-day battle amounted to about 20 thousand people. The 39th Infantry Division lost up to half of its strength. The 154th Derbent regiment during the assault on Azap-Key lost all its staff officers and was led by the regimental priest, Archpriest Smirnov, who lost his leg during the assault. The Turkish army lost up to 25 thousand people and 7 thousand people were taken prisoner.
The main goal set by the commander of the army Yudenich is to deliver a short powerful blow in the direction of the village. Kepri-kei have been reached. The 3rd Turkish army suffered a heavy defeat, losing its powerful border positions. The main forces of the Turkish army were defeated in the Sarykamysh-Erzurum direction - the 9th and 11th corps. The mixed Turkish units rolled back to Erzurum, not trying to gain a foothold in intermediate positions. The unexpected defeat caused extremely serious consequences: large losses in personnel and materiel (loss of warehouses with ammunition and food), which could not be replenished in the near future; the loss of the fortified positions adapted for the winter time, on which the Turks worked for a considerable time; moral disorder of the Turkish troops. However, the Russian troops failed to encircle the Sarykamysh group of the enemy and completely destroy it, the Turks settled in Erzurum and waited for reinforcements. The stoppage of the offensive could lead to the restoration of the 3rd Turkish army.
Yudenich reported to the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian: “I am sure that the Turkish army is in complete disorder, demoralized, has lost the ability to fight in the field, is running under the protection of the fortress. Warehouses are on fire. Such a strong, fortified position as Kepri-Keiskaya was abandoned without a fight. I am fully convinced that an immediate assault on Erzurum may be successful, but the small number of rifle cartridges in the depots does not allow me to decide on an assault."
Our troops rushed forward. General Yudenich, seeing this and knowing that there was an offensive impulse, decided to start storming the Erzurum fortified area at once. However, this operation - the storming of the strongest fortress, which the Ottomans considered impregnable, in a harsh winter, without siege artillery and lack of ammunition, required extraordinary fortitude from the commander and the sacrificial heroism of the troops. Yudenich was ready to attack, as were the troops. Yudenich asked the commander-in-chief for permission to take from the stocks of the Kars fortress located far in the rear, 8 million rifle cartridges needed for the upcoming assault. Thus, the assault on the Erzurum fortress was made dependent on the possibility of replenishing the expended ammunition from the inviolable artillery depots of the Kars fortress.
But Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and his entourage did not believe in the success of the assault. As the military historian A. A. Kersnovsky noted: "Placing, like their ideal Moltke, the materialistic principle at the head of strategy and completely neglecting the spiritual side, they resolutely opposed the Erzerum operation." The commander-in-chief gave instructions to withdraw the troops from Erzurum and Hasan-Kala and to occupy the line of the Karachly pass, with. Kepri-kei, Mount Ax-baba (south of the village of Kepri-kei), creating a strong defense there.
Nikolai Nikolaevich wrote to Yudenich that “the general situation does not allow us to decide to attack Erzurum without careful preparation and fully armed with the means necessary for this. Apart from the small number of rifle cartridges, we do not have the appropriate artillery for a successful fight against heavy Turkish artillery, forts and permanent fortifications; our general reserve is comparatively weak, our base is remote, and transportation, as you yourself informed me, further to Keprikei is very difficult. Judging by your reports, the Turks are still putting up serious resistance in front of the Turkestan corps. … Maybe the Turkish army is not in a position at this time to resist us in the field, but we do not know what it is capable of on the verge of the fortress, with the support of hundreds of guns. In view of the above, I do not consider myself entitled to authorize the production of this operation. Use the cavalry as widely as possible, if there is food, for reconnaissance. Thus, the troops were going to be pulled back and set up for winter quarters.
Yudenich insisted, but the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, being far from the troops, in Tiflis, categorically forbade the commander of the army to prepare for the assault on Erzurum. At the same time, it was repeatedly ordered to immediately stop further pursuit of the enemy, to stop the main forces of the army operating in the Sarykamysh direction, on the mountain borders of Kepr-Kei, where they would spend the winter.
Yudenich, having received new information about the situation at the front, about the disorder of the Turkish army, for the last time resolutely asked the Grand Duke by telephone for permission to continue the offensive, stating that he was ready to take full responsibility. As a result, Nikolai Nikolayevich conceded, saying that he was relinquishing responsibility for everything that might happen.
In the meantime, the command of the 3rd Turkish army appealed to Constantinople with a request to send reinforcements, which should have arrived in 20 days, otherwise there is no way to hold Erzurum with forces. This message came as a complete surprise to the Turkish high command. In Constantinople, it was decided to strengthen the 3rd Army with 50,000 troops. soldiers who began to be transferred from other theaters of military operations.
