The auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy needs urgent replenishment
The first phase of the Russian operation in Syria, the beginning of which should be considered September 30, 2015, and the end - March 14, 2016, in addition to many positive moments for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - a radical change in the situation on the fronts in Syria, testing of the latest weapons systems, the acquisition of priceless military experience - and identified problems. The most obvious of these is the organization of logistics support for both our air group and the Syrian government army. It was carried out by air bridge and sea.
Little is known about the first. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the first phase of the operation, the military transport aviation performed a total of about 640 sorties. They were loaded at the Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow and the airbase in Mozdok. The route passed over the Caspian Sea, the territory of Iran and Iraq with the final destination "Khmeimim" in the Syrian province of Latakia.
Syrian road of life
More information about the sea route. Russian ships and support vessels participating in the operation, dubbed the "Syrian Express" in the Western press, had to travel from Novorossiysk or Sevastopol to Tartus, where the Russian Navy's logistics center is located, through the Black Sea straits under the watchful eye of the Turkish media. printed and electronic.
According to publications, it can be argued that the "express" started about a year after the start of the internal Syrian confrontation. Its organization was the result of the decision of the military-political leadership of Russia to do everything possible to prevent a repetition of the Libyan tragedy, the main events of which took place in 2011. Then, the absence of a similar decision or a delay in its adoption eventually led to the death of the leader of the Jamahiriya Muammar Gaddafi. Libya plunged into chaos, from which it still cannot.
Initially, in the absence of ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy, which had been destroyed in the previous two decades, the role of workhorses in the "Syrian Express" was assigned to large landing ships (BDK) of three fleets - the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern. They began to ply between Tartus and mainly Novorossiysk, carrying out the delivery of ammunition for the Syrian army, which fought fierce battles with the formations of the Islamic State banned in Russia, the Al-Qaeda affiliate of the Jabhat al-Nusra group, and other jihadist and oppositional sense.
The supply of weapons and military equipment, either purchased through military-technical cooperation or transferred to the Syrian government, was also carried out by sea: it is clear that Assad has few funds to pay for such imports.
It can be safely asserted that Damascus, whose armed forces were split along religious lines (the most capable were formations and units, the recruitment of which came mainly from the Alawites), withstood the jihadist international largely thanks to ammunition and weapons and military equipment from Russia.
Stages of a long journey
The initial legend and cover for Operation Syrian Express was provided by the permanent operational formation of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean, deployed there in early 2013. It consisted of one or two, or even more ships of the first rank, one reconnaissance ship, several large landing ships, and support vessels.
There are three stages in the Syrian Express. At the first stage (from about December 2012 to the end of 2014), the BDK was entrusted with the task of providing the Syrian army and its allies with everything they need. There were 30–45 exits to the Mediterranean Sea every year, calling at Tartus.
2014, which preceded the introduction of the Russian air group into Syria, was indicative. According to available records, during the year 10 large landing ships from three Russian fleets performed at least 45 movements along the Novorossiysk - Tartus route. Kaliningrad (BF) became some kind of record holders - at least 10 flights, Novocherkassk (Black Sea Fleet) - 9, Yamal (Black Sea Fleet) - 8. everything was determined primarily by the state of their nodes and mechanisms.
The second stage of the "express" began somewhere in August 2015, immediately after the decision was made in principle to enter a Russian air group into Syria. The task was to provide it and the attached units with everything necessary, taking into account further combat use. Statistics tell about the approximate start time of the stage. If from January 1 to September 1, 2015, 9 BDKs of three Russian fleets completed about 38 cruises to the Mediterranean Sea, then over the next four months - at least 42. The intensity has more than doubled. In addition, in September - December last year, at least four vessels of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy joined the Syrian Express due to the increased traffic volumes. The newcomers have attracted attention.
There were no special questions about the large sea dry cargo transport (BMST) "Yauza" of the project 550 - it was previously part of the auxiliary fleet of the Northern Fleet. But his sending to the Mediterranean caused bewilderment: what, there is nothing more? Indeed, before the "Syrian Express" BMST was solving the most important task of providing everything necessary for a nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya.
The old Yauza (built in 1974) did not disappoint after a major overhaul and returned to service at the beginning of 2015. In September - December, she made at least four flights to Tartus.
But a lot of questions arose in connection with other newcomers to the "Syrian Express". At the end of 2015, these were vessels of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy "Vologda-50", "Dvinitsa-50" and "Kyzyl-60".
The Interfax-AVN news agency provided some clarity in connection with their sudden appearance under the flag of the Russian Navy. On October 15, 2015, it reported that in connection with the increase in the intensity of military traffic from Russia to Syria, up to 10 civilian dry cargo vessels were mobilized into the auxiliary fleet, including several vessels that previously flew under foreign flags.
Already in 2016, Alexander Tkachenko and Kazan-60 were added to the aforementioned new participants in the express. The concept of "mobilization" is fully applicable to the first of them - earlier it was a ferry on the Crimean ferry. The rest of the ships with numbers “50” or “60” in their names is not very good.
According to one version, all of them previously belonged to Turkish shipowners and were acquired by the Russian Navy on an emergency basis even before the incident with the destruction of the Russian Su-24 bomber. It is clear that they were not bought from a good life - it was necessary by any means to ensure the combat work of the Russian air group in the absence of ships of this class in the auxiliary fleet.
For its part, the RF Ministry of Defense considered it beneath its dignity to clarify the history of the appearance of Russian flags on Vologda, Dvinitsa and Kyzyl. The questions remained unanswered: on what conditions were the transactions with the Turkish side, in what state were the courts accepted?
As one of the sailors noted in social networks, each sailing to them, taking into account the deplorable technical condition, is a game of Russian roulette, especially taking into account their cargo.
Without worn-out horses
It can be considered that the second stage of the "Syrian Express" ended on March 14, when the decision to reduce the Russian air group in Syria was announced. By that day, the operation had completed at least 24 flights since the beginning of the year. 17 of them are on the BDK, the rest - on the newcomers.
According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, from September 30, 2015 to March 14, 2016, 80 flights were carried out to deliver goods by sea to Tartus. This roughly corresponds to the unofficial data provided in this article.
On March 14, the countdown of the third stage of the "Syrian Express" began, during which it will be necessary to solve the tasks of supporting the Russian air group, which has been reduced by about half, as well as the military operations of the Syrian army. Nevertheless, it is already possible to summarize some interim results of the operation and make separate forecasts.
Firstly, the Russian Navy in the near future risks being left without a large landing craft, which took over the transportation of most of the military cargo to Syria. They have largely exhausted their service life and are in urgent need of repair.
Secondly, it can be expected that in the near future the ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Navy, in connection with the described situation, will take on more and more traffic volumes, freeing the BDK from these functions.
Thirdly, it seems that due to, to put it mildly, the critical situation with regard to the presence of dry cargo ships in the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy, it would be logical to assume that the main command will take care of their acquisition, and not from Turkish "sources". And here the most surprising thing: it was not there! As explained to the "Military-Industrial Courier" in the United Shipbuilding Corporation, so far no inquiries have been received from the Main Command of the Navy in connection with possible orders for the construction of new transports … And if tomorrow is a war?
For information: "Vologda-50" in the past, Turkish life was called Dadali, "Kyzyl-60" - Smyrna, "Dvinitsa-50" - Alican Deval.
