Turkey's hostility to Russia has been fueled by the West for two centuries
The confrontation with Turkey began almost from the moment the Russian statehood emerged. Only the last half century has passed bloodlessly, when both sides tried to demonstrate that they can mutually cooperate. But as recent events have shown, politics and hostility accumulated over the centuries, coupled with the current situation, are stronger than the economy.
Russian-Turkish relations are old, dating back more than one century, but too often they were complicated by military conflicts. For three and a half centuries - I take time from 1568 to 1918 - Russia fought with Turkey about once every 25 years, that is, practically continuously, if we take into account the preparation time for armed clashes. According to other estimates of historians, who determined the period of the duration of the Russian-Turkish wars in 241 years, the peace intervals were even less - only 19 years.
Naturally, the question arises: what is the reason for such a long, stubborn and bloody mutual struggle? It is primarily due to the geopolitical interests of the Russian Slavs, and then of the Great Russians - the desire for the Black Sea. The desire to prevail in this strategically important region for the state manifested itself in our ancestors from very distant times. It is no accident that in ancient times the Black Sea was called Russian. In addition, historical facts are known that testify to the presence of Russian (Eastern) Slavs in the Black Sea region. We know, for example, that our First Teacher, Saint Cyril (827–869), being in the Crimea, in Chersonesos, saw the Gospel there, written by the Russians in “writing”. There is another very convincing proof - the tribes of the Old Russian Slavs, such as the Uchiha and the Tivertsy, lived in the south of Eastern Europe, between the Dnieper and Dniester, their settlements stretched to the Black Sea - "oli to the sea," as Nestor the chronicler, the creator of the wonderful Tale, put it time years. We must not forget about the route from the "Varangians to the Greeks", part of which ran through the Black Sea. Along this path, a bright East Slavic civilization (Kievan Rus) developed, in need of trade, cultural and religious communication with Byzantium.
Subsequently, the Slavs were moved from the southern borders under the onslaught of the steppe dwellers - the Pechenegs, Polovtsians, and especially the Mongols. There was an outflow of the Russian population fleeing from the fierce fury of the nomads to the north. The geopolitical situation in the abandoned lands has changed. But as the Tatar-Mongol domination weakened and as a result of the collapse of the Golden Horde, it became possible for the Russians to move back to the south, to the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. However, this was hampered by the fragments of the Horde - the Khanates of the Crimean, Kazan and Astrakhan. The Turks also arose here, defeating the Byzantine Empire and establishing their power in Constantinople. But Russia had close ties with the Roman Empire. From there, the Russians took the most valuable thing - the Christian faith and, consequently, a whole layer of culture, which to a large extent formed the Russian Orthodox people, possessing individual features that distinguish them from others, in particular, the ethnic groups of the West. That is why the victory of the Turks over the Romans (Greeks), the co-religionists of the Russians, was not at all a joy to our ancestors.
It did not take long for Russia to feel the real danger posed by the Port.
Crusades of the Ottoman Ports
In 1475, the Turks subjugated the recently emerged Crimean Khanate, which significantly affected the relations of the Russian state with it. Before that, Crimean Tatars and Russians lived relatively peacefully, one might say, in cooperation. Under the influence of Ports, the Crimean khans began to show increasing aggressiveness towards Moscow. At first, the Turks only occasionally took part in the raids of the Crimean Tatars to the Russian lands, sending small military detachments to help them, for example, in 1541, 1556, 1558. The first major anti-Russian Turkish campaign itself took place in 1568-1569. The Turks set out to retake the Astrakhan Khanate, which had just been annexed to Russia. This meant creating a staging area for further attacks on our southern borders. The matter, however, ended in complete failure and a shameful flight of the enemy. And yet, this became the prologue to the subsequent numerous wars between Turkey and Russia, which went on throughout the 17th, 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries with the frequency noted above. In most cases, the Russians were the winners. However, there were also defeats that our ancestors had to endure. However, Russia in the Black Sea region was gradually gaining strength. The change was dramatic in the end.
In the 17th century, Russia was cut off from the Black Sea. The exit to it was locked by Azov. The Russian government, geopolitically oriented towards the south, was faced with the need to end this situation. As a result of the campaigns of Peter I (1695-1696), Azov fell. True, as a result of the Prut campaign (1711), which was unsuccessful for us, the fortress had to be returned. It was possible to get Azov again only after more than half a century, following the results of the war with the Turks in 1768-1774.
The attempts of the Russians to seize Crimea also remained fruitless - let us recall the fruitless campaigns of Vasily Golitsyn (1687, 1689) and Burkhard Minich (1735-1739).
Turkey and the Crimean Khanate posed a serious threat to Russia until the reign of Catherine II. They also greatly disturbed other states of Eastern and Western Europe. That is why European politicians, including the Roman pontiff, have been seeking rapprochement with Russia in the fight against Turkish aggression since the time of Ivan the Terrible. At the same time, they behaved in a double-minded manner, setting Porto and Crimea against Russia at the first opportunity, and sometimes tried to shift the burden of fighting them onto the shoulders of our ancestors.
Only during the reign of Catherine II Russia won a complete victory over the Crimean Khanate, and therefore, to a certain extent, over Turkey. Crimea, as you know, was annexed to Russia in 1783, and without military action. However, it was possible to take possession of the peninsula earlier - as a result of the campaign of 1768-1774. Empress Catherine II directly spoke about this in her manifesto of April 19, 1783. She noted that our victories in the previous war gave full reason and opportunity to annex Crimea to Russia, but this was not done out of humane considerations, and also for the sake of "good agreement and friendship with the Ottoman Port." At the same time, the Russian government hoped that the liberation of the peninsula from Turkish dependence would bring peace, silence and tranquility here, but this, alas, did not happen. The Crimean Khan, dancing to the tune of the Turkish Sultan, took over the old. That is why, and also taking into account the fact that the reconciliation of the Crimean Tatars cost Russia great human losses and financial costs (12 million rubles - a huge amount of money at that time), she annexed Crimea. But the national customs, the culture of the indigenous peoples who inhabited the peninsula, the unhindered performance of religious cults were preserved, the mosques did not suffer. It should be noted that of the Western countries, only France came out with an open protest against the annexation of Crimea to Russia, thereby demonstrating an interest in maintaining tension in Russian-Turkish relations. Subsequent events have shown that Paris is not alone. Meanwhile, our country asserted its position in the Black Sea region. As a result of the next Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791, unleashed by Constantinople not without the influence of the Western powers, Crimea and Ochakov were assigned to Russia according to the Yassy Treaty, and the border between the two states was pushed back to the Dniester.
The 19th century was marked by new armed conflicts between Russia and Turkey. The wars of 1806-1812 and 1828-1829 brought success to Russian weapons. Another thing is the Crimean campaign (1853-1856). Here we already clearly see the vile behavior of England and France, inciting the Porto to oppose Russia. The first Russian victories in the Caucasian theater of military operations and near Sinop showed firsthand that the Turks alone cannot win the campaign. Then England and France, having thrown off their disguises, had to enter the war themselves. The Russophobic physiognomy of papism, twisted with malice, also looked out from under the veil. “The war that France entered with Russia,” said Cardinal Sibur of Paris, “is not a political war, but a sacred war. This is not a war between the state and the state, the people against the people, but only a religious war. All other grounds put forward by the cabinets are essentially no more than pretexts, and the true reason, pleasing to God, is the need to drive away heresy … tame it, crush it. This is the recognized goal of this new crusade, and such was the latent goal of all previous crusades, although those who participated in them did not admit it. Russia lost the war. We were forbidden, among other things, to have a navy in the Black Sea, thereby infringing on sovereignty and humiliating national pride. Austria played the most vile role in the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty (1856), repaying Russia with black ingratitude for saving the Habsburg monarchy during the revolution of 1848.
The Crimean War was not the last for the Ottoman Empire with Russia in the 19th century. The Balkan campaign of 1877-1878 followed, during which the Turkish troops were utterly defeated.
As expected, in the First World War, Porta found herself in the camp of opponents, entering the Quadruple Alliance. We know how this war ended - the monarchies fell in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
The rapprochement of the Bolshevik dictatorship with the regime of Kemal Ataturk is quite curious. There is some mystery here, if we take into account the affiliation of the Turkish leader with his entourage and some prominent Bolsheviks to Freemasonry. Atatürk himself, as far as is known, was initiated (1907) into the Veritas ("Truth") Masonic lodge, which was under the jurisdiction of the Grand Orient of France. From this point of view, the friendship of Lenin and his associates with Turkey is still waiting for its researchers.
In World War II, Ankara leaned towards Nazi Germany, but, having learned from experience, was cautious and waited. And soon the Turks were convinced that they would lose by getting involved in the war against the USSR. It is usually thought that this became clear after the success of the Red Army at Stalingrad. However, perhaps even earlier - after the defeat of German troops near Moscow in the fall-winter of 1941, which meant the collapse of Hitler's plan for a lightning-fast war, the failure of the strategic plans of the German command, which ultimately predetermined the victory of the USSR. The Turks understood the lesson and refrained from direct participation in hostilities against the Soviet Union.
Backstab, nothing personal
The history of the confrontation between Russia and Turkey testifies to the fact that the Russians waged mainly defensive wars, during which our territory expanded in the Black Sea region and in the Caucasus. The task was not to seize new foreign lands, as is sometimes argued about, but to create a geopolitical space that would ensure security in front of an external hostile world for the Russian and other peoples that were part of the empire.
History also testifies (and this is the most important thing) that Turkey is our centuries-old and irreconcilable enemy, both in the past and in the present, in spite of any indulgences and circumventions we have accepted until recently. After all, the fact that she helped and is helping, as before Shamil, the North Caucasian militants, is a member of NATO, an organization hostile to Russia. However, contrary to real historical reality, we imagined that Turkey is not only our closest neighbor, but also a friendly state. A strategic (!) Planning Council was even created jointly with the Turks. Where does such, as a classic would say, “extraordinary lightness of thought” come from? I find two sources here.
Since the time of Gorbachev, our foreign policy has largely begun to be based on the personal relations of Russian leaders with foreign, excuse me, “colleagues” and “partners”. We heard every now and then: "My friend Helmut", "Friend George", "Friend Bill", even "Friend Ryu". Was Recep Tayyip Erdogan also included in this group of "friends"? I do not exclude this, bearing in mind the preferences that the Russian leadership showered on Turkey up to the death of our Su-24. These are honored by old friends, not centuries-old opponents.
Our traditional gullibility, inherent in the Russian character, did us a disservice. In everyday life, it is forgivable, but in politics it is not, since it leads to mistakes that damage the country's security. We made just such a mistake, trusting Erdogan and exposing our back to him, while we should have remembered the elementary rule: they do not turn their backs on enemies. But instead of admitting this and thus excluding the repetition of such mistakes in the future, we embarked on a moral and ethical reasoning that is completely inapplicable to politics. In all international affairs, we need to follow the historical experience tested over centuries. He convincingly testifies that Turkey was and remains an adversary of Russia. In a relationship with such a neighbor, the gunpowder should be kept dry.
