This is how the cold war began

This is how the cold war began
This is how the cold war began

Video: This is how the cold war began

Video: This is how the cold war began
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This is how the cold war began
This is how the cold war began

From the morning of March 14, 1946, loudspeakers, which were then in almost all Soviet city apartments, transmitted the answers of I. V. Stalin to the questions of the Pravda correspondent regarding the recent speech of the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In his responses, Stalin called Churchill a "warmonger" and compared him to Hitler.

But less than ten months ago, Churchill's photograph was published on the front pages of the festive issues of the country's central newspapers on the occasion of Victory Day over Nazi Germany, along with photographs of US President Truman and Stalin … What was the reason for such a sharp change in relation to the former leader of the country, who was an ally of the USSR during the Second World War?

Nine days before Stalin's announcement on March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, which outlined a program of radical changes in the foreign policy of Great Britain, the United States and other "English-speaking countries" in relation to his a recent ally in the anti-Hitler coalition. Churchill announced: “Dusk has descended on the international political arena, once illuminated by the rays of a common victory … From Szczecin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic, the Iron Curtain divided the European continent. On the other side of this barrier were the ancient capitals of Central and Eastern Europe - Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia. The population of all these famous cities has passed into the Soviet camp and is not only under the strong influence of Moscow, but also under its strict control."

Subsequently, the concept of the "iron curtain", which Churchill introduced into political circulation, began to be used to describe the restrictions on citizens of the USSR and other socialist countries to travel to capitalist countries and receive information about life in the West. However, Churchill called the "iron curtain" the difficulties in obtaining information from the West from the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. By this time, the Western press constantly wrote that the restrictions imposed by the Soviet troops and their allies on the activities of Western journalists (as well as intelligence officers) hinder a sufficiently complete coverage of events in these countries, and therefore the West does not receive a complete picture of what is happening there. …

The phrase "iron curtain" was taken from an article by Goebbels published in the newspaper "Reich" on February 24, 1945.

In it, the Nazi Reich propaganda minister assured that as the Red Army moved westward, the "iron curtain" would fall on the territories occupied by Soviet troops. In fact, Churchill repeated Goebbels' assertions that the "curtain" of Soviet tanks and other "iron" weapons concealed the preparation of an attack on Western countries.

To counter the impending threat, Churchill called for the creation of a "fraternal association of English-speaking peoples." He stressed that such an association would involve the joint use of aviation, naval bases and the armed forces of the United States, Britain and other English-speaking countries. This is how Churchill announced the beginning of the "cold war" of the West against the USSR.

Churchill's political turns

Churchill made sharp political turns more than once in his long life. In April 1904 g.he left the Conservative Party and became a minister in a cabinet headed by Liberal Party leader D. Lloyd George. In 1924, Churchill broke with the Liberals and soon became Treasury Secretary in Baldwin's Conservative cabinet. Churchill was more than once the initiator of cardinal turns in the foreign policy of his country. On the evening of November 11, 1918, when the people of London were jubilant at the victorious end of the war against Germany, Churchill, by his own admission, was in a gloomy mood. Being in the company of members of the government that evening, he said that it was necessary "to help the defeated enemy." The change in attitude towards defeated Germany was explained by Churchill's desire to defeat Soviet Russia. Churchill reasoned as follows: “To conquer Russia … we can only with the help of Germany. Germany should be invited to help us liberate Russia."

Soon Churchill came up with a proposal to organize a "campaign of the 14 powers" against Soviet Russia.

At the same time, he advocated the dismemberment of Russia. In 1919 Churchill wrote that a disunited Russia "would pose less of a threat to the future peace of all countries than an extensive centralized tsarist monarchy."

However, on June 22, 1941, the British heard Churchill's speech on the radio, in which the head of the royal government announced: “Over the past twenty-five years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than me. I will not take back a single word that I have said about communism. However, all this fades into the background against the background of the current events … I see how Russian soldiers stand on the threshold of their native land, which their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial … I see how the Nazi war machine is moving on them. Churchill compared the German soldiers to the Huns and locusts. He stated that “Hitler's invasion of Russia is just a prelude to an attempt to invade the British Isles … Therefore, the danger that threatens us and the United States, just like the business of every Russian fighting for his hearth and home, is the business of free peoples in all corners of the globe”.

The agreement on cooperation between the USSR and Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Germany, signed in the Kremlin on July 12, 1941, turned on May 26, 1942 into an Anglo-Soviet agreement on alliance in the war and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war. Then the governments of Churchill and Roosevelt undertook to open a "second front" in Western Europe. However, in July, both governments refused to fulfill these obligations. Explaining his refusal during a visit to the Kremlin in August 1942, Churchill at the same time asked Stalin for forgiveness for organizing a British military intervention against the Soviet country a quarter of a century ago. (Stalin replied: "God will forgive!"). Returning to London in September, Churchill, in his speech to the House of Commons, spared no bright words to express his admiration for Stalin.

Although Churchill more than once congratulated Stalin and the Red Army on their victories, the British and Americans again violated their commitments to open a “second front” in 1943. And yet, despite this, as well as Churchill’s attempts at the Tehran conference to weaken the future “second front By the end of 1944 our troops entered Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia with operations in the Balkans, which he planned to prevent the entry of the Red Army into Western Europe.

Then Churchill in October 1944 again flew to Moscow and tried to establish "quotas" of influence of the USSR and the Western allies in the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

Churchill recalled that during negotiations with Stalin “I took half a sheet of paper and wrote: Romania. Russia - 90%; Others - 10%. Greece. Great Britain (in agreement with the USA) - 90%; Russia - 10%. Yugoslavia. 50% - 50%. Hungary. 50% - 50%. Bulgaria. Russia - 75%. Others - 25%. Although Stalin did not comment on these figures, and no agreement was reached on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, Churchill's trip to the USSR reaffirmed the strength of the Anglo-Soviet military alliance. This impression was strengthened after the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945), in which Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill took part.

However, on April 1, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: “The Russian armies will undoubtedly capture all of Austria and enter Vienna. If they also capture Berlin, will they not get too exaggerated the idea that they have made an overwhelming contribution to our common victory, and may this lead them to a frame of mind that will cause serious and very significant difficulties in the future? Therefore, I believe that from a political point of view, we should move as far east as possible in Germany and in the event that Berlin is within reach, we should certainly take it."

Churchill did not confine himself to lamenting about the successes of the Red Army. In those days, Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery, who commanded British troops in Europe, received a directive from Churchill: "Carefully collect German weapons and lay them down so that they can be easily distributed to German soldiers with whom we would have to cooperate if the Soviet offensive continued." However, the secret operation developed then by Churchill against the Soviet ally, dubbed the "Unthinkable", was not implemented due to the reluctance of the United States at that time to fight against the USSR in Europe. The Americans expected the Red Army to help them in the war against Japan.

Yet Churchill's secret directive to Montgomery regarding German soldiers and their weapons was not overturned. This was evidenced by the exchange of views between Stalin and Churchill at the Potsdam Conference. While discussing the topic of the shortage of coal and the lack of manpower for its production in Western Europe, Stalin said that the USSR now uses the labor of prisoners of war to work in the mines, and then remarked: “400 thousand German soldiers are sitting with you in Norway, they even not disarmed, and it is not known what they are waiting for. Here's your labor. " Realizing the true meaning of Stalin's statement, Churchill immediately began to justify himself: “I did not know that they were not disarmed. If anything, our intention is to disarm them. I do not know exactly what the situation is there, but this issue was settled by the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Anyway, I'll make inquiries."

However, Stalin did not confine himself to his remarks, but at the end of the meeting conveyed to Churchill a memorandum regarding the unarmed German troops present in Norway. Churchill again began to justify himself: "But I can give assurance that our intention is to disarm these troops." Stalin's answer: "I have no doubt" was clearly pronounced with an ironic intonation, and therefore caused laughter. Continuing to make excuses, Churchill said: “We do not keep them in reserve, so that later we can let them out of our sleeve. I will immediately demand a report on this matter."

Only 10 years later, when Churchill again became prime minister, he admitted that he personally ordered not to disarm some of the German troops, but to keep them ready in case of a possible armed clash with the USSR in Europe in the summer of 1945.

Washington's turn towards confrontation

Although in his political activities Churchill constantly demonstrated his loyalty to the perfidy traditional for British politicians, the turn to the Cold War was not only a consequence of the actions of the "insidious Albion." The most important factor in this was the position of Great Britain's main ally.

On April 25, 1945, two weeks after Roosevelt's death, the new US President Harry Truman was privy to the secret of the Manhattan Project by Secretary of War Stimson. On the same day, the President and the Minister prepared a memorandum, which, in particular, said: “At present, we alone control the resources with which the United States can create and use these weapons, and no other country will be able to achieve this for a number of years. … Maintaining peace on Earth at the present level of moral development of society, which is significantly below the level of technical development, will ultimately be dependent on these weapons … weapons … If the problem of the correct use of these weapons can be solved, we could ensure world peace, and our civilization would be saved."

After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, the US government decided that they no longer needed a Soviet ally. The destruction of two Japanese cities with atomic bombs showed the world that the United States possesses the most powerful weapon the world has ever had. The owner and editor of the largest American magazines, Henry Luce, declared: "The 20th century is the century of America … the first century when America is the dominant power in the world." These statements echoed with official government declarations. On October 27, 1945, Truman stated in his Fleet Day speech: "We are the greatest national power on Earth."

After the creation and use of atomic bombs, the agreements between the winners in World War II, reached in Yalta and Potsdam, no longer suited the United States.

In the military circles of the country, preparations were launched for an attack on the USSR with the use of atomic weapons. On October 9, 1945, the US Chiefs of Staff prepared secret directive No. 1518 "Strategic Concept and Plan for the Use of the US Armed Forces", which proceeded from the preparation of America's launching a preemptive atomic strike against the USSR. With the rapid accumulation of atomic weapons in the United States, on December 14, 1945, a new directive No. 432 / d of the committee of chiefs of staff was prepared, in the annex to which 20 main industrial centers of the USSR and the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway were indicated as objects of atomic bombing.

And yet, the United States did not dare to go straight to war against the USSR. Nor were the European allies ready for such a turn in politics. Therefore, to "sound" the change in relation to the USSR, they decided to use Winston Churchill, whose party was defeated in the parliamentary elections. The retired prime minister's speech was preceded by his long stay in the United States in the winter of 1945-1946, during which Churchill met in Truman and other statesmen of the country. The main points of Churchill's speech were agreed upon during his conversation with Truman on February 10, 1946. During his several weeks in Florida, Churchill worked on the text of the speech.

The final version of the speech was agreed with the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who led the Labor Party, and Foreign Minister Ernst Bevin. Truman traveled to Fulton to personally introduce Churchill to those gathered at Westminster College prior to his speech.

Under the guise of false accusations

The Western powers covered up their program of attack on our country by accusing the Soviet Union of violating the agreements reached on the post-war peace. Exposing the falsity of Churchill's speech, Stalin in his "answer to the correspondent of Pravda" pointed out: "It is absolutely absurd to talk about the exclusive control of the USSR in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils of representatives of four states and where the USSR has only of the votes. It happens that other people cannot help but slander, but you still need to know when to stop."

Stalin also drew attention to the fact that an important part of the post-war settlement in Europe was the creation of borders that ensured the security of the USSR.

He stated: “The Germans invaded the USSR through Finland, Poland, Romania, Hungary … The question is, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, wishing to secure itself for the future, is trying to ensure that governments exist in these countries, loyal to the Soviet Union?"

Before the acquisition of atomic weapons, this demand of the USSR was recognized by our Western allies. In his speech in Fulton, Churchill was silent about the fact that in the fall of 1944 he agreed to the prevailing influence of the USSR in Romania and Bulgaria (by 75 - 90%). By March 1946, the USSR had not exceeded this "quota" proposed by Churchill. In November 1945, at the elections to the People's Assembly of Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front, which, along with the Communist Party, included the Agricultural Union, received 88.2% of the votes. The rest of the votes were received by the parties of the pro-Western opposition. In Romania, which retained royal power, opposition parties existed along with the ruling People's Democratic Front.

In Hungary, which Churchill agreed to divide equally between the USSR and the West according to the degree of influence, in the elections in November 1945, the Communist Party received 17%, the Social Democratic Party - 17%, the National Peasant Party - 7%, and the small farmers' party won the elections which received 57%. The Communists were clearly in the minority.

Although Churchill wanted in 1944 to achieve equal influence of the West and the USSR on Yugoslavia, in fact, this country was not completely subject to anyone's influence. It was only under pressure from Stalin that the Yugoslav communists reluctantly agreed to include representatives of the émigré government in his government. Soon events showed that the USSR could not exert an effective influence on the government of Yugoslavia.

There was no complete USSR domination in March 1946 in Czechoslovakia either. By that time, in the government and local bodies, the communists were sharing power with representatives of other parties on an equal footing. E. Benes, who personified the pro-Western orientation in the country, remained the president of the republic, as in 1938.

Although the leading posts in Poland remained in the hands of communists and left-wing socialists, the former Prime Minister of the exile government Mikolajczyk, who joined the government as deputy chairman, and the Polske Stern Ludowe Party, led by him, played a significant role in the country's political life.

It is clear that Churchill's far-fetched accusations and frightening statements were intended to portray the USSR as a treacherous aggressor and to create an atmosphere conducive to escalating international tension.

Churchill blatantly distorted the USSR's readiness for aggressive actions against the West. By the end of the war, the USSR had lost 30% of its national wealth.

On the territory liberated from the occupiers, 1,710 cities and towns and 70 thousand villages and villages were destroyed. 182 coal mines were put out of action, the production of ferrous metallurgy and oil production fell by a third. Agriculture suffered enormous damage. The loss of life was colossal. Addressing Truman and Churchill at the Potsdam conference, Stalin said: “I am not used to complaining, but I must say that … we lost several million killed, we do not have enough people. If I began to complain, I am afraid that you would cry here, so difficult situation in Russia."

These facts were recognized by all objective observers. Analyzing American plans for an attack on the USSR, researcher M. Sherry later wrote: “The Soviet Union does not pose an immediate threat, the command of the armed forces acknowledged. Its economy and human resources are depleted by the war … Consequently, in the next few years the USSR will focus its efforts on reconstruction."

The report of the Policy Planning Council of the US Department of State of November 7, 1947 admitted: "The Soviet government does not want and does not expect a war with us in the foreseeable future."

Summing up his impressions of his stay in the USSR and meeting with Stalin in early 1947, Field Marshal Montgomery wrote: “In general, I came to the conclusion that Russia is not able to take part in a world war against any strong combination of allied countries, and she understands this. Russia needed a long period of peace, during which it would need to rebuild. I came to the conclusion that Russia will closely monitor the situation and will refrain from careless diplomatic steps, trying not to "cross the line" anywhere, so as not to provoke a new war, which it will not be able to cope with … I reported this in report to the British government and the chiefs of staff."

Cold war in action

However, having learned about the plight of our country, the leaders of Great Britain and the United States did not "cry", but went over to confrontation with the Soviet Union, moreover, taking advantage of the Americans' possession of atomic weapons. In September 1946, by order of H. Truman, Special Assistant to the President of the United States K. Clifford held a meeting with the top state leaders of the United States and, on September 24, 1946, presented the report "American Policy Towards the Soviet Union", which, in particular, said: "We must point out to the Soviet government that we have sufficient power not only to repel an attack, but also to quickly crush the USSR in a war … To keep our power at a level that is effective to contain the Soviet Union, the United States must be ready to wage atomic and bacteriological warfare." … In mid-1948, the US Chiefs of Staff prepared the Chariotir plan, which called for the use of 133 atomic bombs against 70 Soviet cities in the first 30 days of the war. 8 bombs were supposed to be dropped on Moscow, and 7 - on Leningrad. It was planned to drop another 200 atomic bombs and 250 thousand tons of conventional bombs on the USSR in the next two years of the war.

Threats of an atomic attack against the USSR, voiced in the US Congress and the British House of Commons, as well as in the press of Western countries, were reinforced by hostile actions in the international arena.

In 1947, the US government unilaterally terminated the 1945 Soviet-American agreement on the supply of American goods on credit. In March 1948, export licenses were introduced in the United States, which prohibited the import of most goods into the USSR. Soviet-American trade actually ceased. But anti-Soviet propaganda began to expand. K. Clifford's report of September 24, 1946 emphasized: "On the widest scale that the Soviet government will tolerate, we must deliver books, magazines, newspapers and films to the country, and broadcast radio broadcasts to the USSR." This is how the Cold War program outlined by Winston Churchill on March 5, 1946, began to be implemented.

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