Expert on Korea Konstantin Asmolov: "In the minds of several generations who survived the war, there is a psychological attitude to confrontation."
The largest military incident in the last half century between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, recalled that the war on the Korean Peninsula is still not over. The ceasefire signed in 1953 stopped the armed struggle only in fact. Without a peace treaty, the two Koreas are still at war. MK asked one of the largest Russian experts on Korea to tell about the causes and consequences of the Korean War.
“The main reason for the Korean War is the internal situation on the peninsula,” says Konstantin ASMOLOV, a leading researcher at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences. - The Soviet-American contradiction only aggravated the conflict that already existed, but did not initiate it. The fact is that Korea, one might say, was cut in a living way - it's like drawing a line in Russia at the latitude of Bologoye and saying that now there is Northern Russia with its capital in St. Petersburg and South Russia with its capital in Moscow. It is clear that this unnatural state of affairs caused both Pyongyang and Seoul an acute desire to unite Korea under their own leadership.
What were the two Koreas before the start of the war?
Modern audiences often envision the outbreak of conflict as a sudden and unprovoked attack from the North to the South. This is not true. South Korean President Lee Seung Man, despite the fact that he lived in America for a long time, which made him speak English better than his native Korean, was by no means an American puppet. Aged Lee in all seriousness considered himself the new messiah of the Korean people, and was so actively eager to fight that the United States was afraid to supply him with offensive weapons, fearing that he would drag the American army into a conflict that it did not need.
Li's regime did not enjoy popular support. The leftist, anti-Lisinman movement was very strong. In 1948, an entire infantry regiment rebelled, the rebellion was suppressed with difficulty, and the island of Jeju for a long time was engulfed in a communist uprising, during the suppression of which almost every fourth inhabitant of the island died. However, the left movement in the South was very little connected even with Pyongyang, and even more so with Moscow and the Comintern, although the Americans were firmly convinced that any manifestation of the left, where communist or similar slogans were put forward, would be conducted by Moscow.
Because of this, throughout the 49th year and the first half of the 50s, the situation on the border resembled the trench wars of the First World War, where almost every day there were incidents with the use of aircraft, artillery and military units up to a battalion, and the southerners more often performed in the role of the attacker. Therefore, some historians in the West even single out this period as a preliminary or partisan stage of the war, noting that on June 25, 1950, the conflict simply changed in scale.
There is something important to note about the North. The fact is that when we talk about the leadership of the DPRK at that time, we project onto it the clichés of late North Korea, when there was no one else but the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung. But then everything was different, there were different factions in the ruling party, and if the DPRK and resembled the Soviet Union, then rather the USSR of the 20s, when Stalin was not yet a leader, but was only the first among equals, and Trotsky, Bukharin or Kamenev remained significant and authoritative figures. This is, of course, a very rough comparison, but it is important for understanding that Comrade Kim Il Sung was not then the Kim Il Sung we are used to knowing, and besides him, there were also influential people in the country's leadership, whose role in preparing the war was no less if not more.
The main "lobbyist" of the war on the part of the DPRK was the head of the "local communist faction" Park Hong Yong, who was the second person in the country - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, First Deputy Prime Minister and the first head of the Communist Party, which was formed on the territory of Korea immediately after the liberation. from the Japanese while Kim Il Sung was still in the USSR. However, before 1945 Pak also managed to work in the Comintern structures, in the 20-30s he lived in the Soviet Union and had influential friends there.
Pak insisted that as soon as the DPRK army crossed the border, 200,000 South Korean communists would immediately join the fight, and the American puppet regime would fall. At the same time, it is worth remembering that the Soviet bloc did not have an independent agency that could verify this information, so all decisions were made on the basis of the information provided by the Pak.
Until a certain time, both Moscow and Washington did not give the Korean leadership carte blanche for the "unification war," although Kim Il Sung desperately bombarded Moscow and Beijing with requests for permission to invade the South. Moreover, on September 24, 1949, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) assessed the plan for a preemptive strike and liberation of the South as inexpedient. It was stated in plain text that "an unprepared offensive could turn into protracted military operations, which not only will not lead to the defeat of the enemy, but also create significant political and economic difficulties." However, in the spring of 1950, permission was still received.
Why did Moscow change its mind?
- It is believed that the matter was in the appearance in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China as an independent state entity, but the PRC had just emerged from a protracted civil war, and its problems were up to its throat. Rather, at some stage, Moscow was nevertheless convinced that there was a revolutionary situation in South Korea, the war would pass like a blitzkrieg, and the Americans would not intervene.
We now know that the United States took more than an active part in this conflict, but then such a development of events was by no means obvious. Everyone more or less knew that the American administration did not like Rhee Seung Man. He had good connections with some military and Republican leaders, but the Democrats did not like him very much, and in the CIA reports, Lee Seung Man was openly called an old senile. It was a suitcase without a handle, which is very heavy and inconvenient to carry, but which cannot be thrown. The defeat of the Kuomintang in China also played a role - the Americans did nothing to protect their ally Chiang Kai-shek, and the United States needed him much more than some kind of Lee Seung Man. The conclusion was that if the Americans did not support Taiwan and only announced their passive support, then they certainly would not defend South Korea.
The fact that Korea was officially removed from the defense perimeter of those countries that America promised to protect was also easy to interpret as a sign of America's future non-interference in Korean affairs due to its insufficient importance.
In addition, the situation by the beginning of the war was already tense, and on the world map one could find many places where the "communist threat" could develop into a serious military invasion. West Berlin, where in 1949 there was a very serious crisis, Greece, where a three-year civil war between communists and royalists just ended, confrontation in Turkey or Iran - all this was seen as much hotter spots than any kind of Korea.
It is another matter that after the invasion began, the State Department and the administration of President Truman found themselves in a situation where this time it was no longer possible to retreat, if you like it or not, you will have to get in. Truman believed in the doctrine of the containment of communism, paid very serious attention to the UN and thought that if there was a slack here again, the communists would believe in their impunity and immediately begin to put pressure on all fronts, and this must be toughly nailed down. In addition, McCarthyism was already rearing its head in the United States, which meant that officials should not be labeled as "rosy".
Of course, one can wonder whether Moscow would support Pyongyang's decision if the Kremlin knew for certain that the populace of the South would not support the invasion, and the US administration would perceive it as an open challenge that must be confronted. Perhaps events would have developed differently, although the tension did not go away and Rhee Seung Man would also actively try to get US approval for aggression. But history, as you know, does not know the subjunctive mood.
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- On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the border, and the first phase of the war began, in which the North Koreans butchered the corrupt and ill-trained South Korean army like God the tortoise. Seoul was taken almost immediately, on June 28, and when the DPRK troops were already approaching the city, the South Korean radio still broadcast reports that the Korean army had repelled the attack of the communists and was triumphantly moving to Pyongyang.
Having captured the capital, the northerners waited a week for the uprising to begin. But it did not happen, and the war had to continue against the background of the ever-increasing involvement of the United States and its allies in the conflict. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the United States initiated the convening of the UN Security Council, which mandated the use of international forces to "drive out the aggressor" and entrusted the leadership of the "police action" to the United States, led by General D. MacArthur. The USSR, whose representative boycotted the Security Council meeting because of the participation of the representative of Taiwan, had no opportunity to veto. So the civil war turned into an international conflict.
As for Park Hong Young, when it became clear that there would be no uprising, he began to lose influence and status, and towards the end of the war, Park and his group were eliminated. Formally, he was declared a conspiracy and espionage in favor of the United States, but the main accusation was that he “set up” Kim Il Sung and dragged the country's leadership into the war.
At first, success was still favorable to the DPRK, and at the end of July 1950, the Americans and South Koreans retreated to the southeast of the Korean Peninsula, organizing the defense of the so-called. Busan perimeter. The training of the North Korean soldiers was high, and even the Americans could not resist the T-34s - their first clash ended with the tanks simply driving through the fortified line, which they had to hold.
But the North Korean army was not prepared for a long war, and the commander of the American forces, General Walker, with the help of rather tough measures, managed to stop the North Korean advance. The offensive was exhausted, the lines of communication were stretched, the reserves were depleted, most of the tanks were still disabled, and in the end there were fewer attackers than those who were defending within the perimeter. Add to this that the Americans almost always had complete air supremacy.
In order to achieve a turning point in the course of hostilities, General D. MacArthur, commander of the "UN forces," developed a very risky and dangerous plan for an amphibious operation in Incheon, on the western coast of the Korean Peninsula. His colleagues believed that such a landing was a task close to impossible, but MacArthur broke through this matter on his charisma, and not on intellectual arguments. He had a kind of flair that sometimes worked.
In the early morning of September 15, the Americans landed near Incheon and, after fierce fighting on September 28, captured Seoul. So the second stage of the war began. By the beginning of October, the northerners had left the territory of South Korea. Here the United States and its South Korean allies decided not to miss the chance.
On October 1, UN troops crossed the demarcation line, and by October 24 they occupied most of North Korean territory, reaching the Yalu River (Amnokkan) bordering China. What happened in the summer months with the South has now happened with the North.
But then China, which had warned more than once that it would intervene if UN forces cut the 38th parallel, decided to act. To give the United States or the pro-American regime access to the Chinese border in the northeastern region was unacceptable. Beijing sent troops to Korea, formally called the Army of the Chinese People's Volunteers (AKNV), under the leadership of one of the best Chinese commanders, General Peng Dehuai.
There were many warnings, but General MacArthur ignored them. In general, by this time he considered himself a kind of appanage prince who knew better than Washington what to do in the Far East. In Taiwan, he was met according to the protocol of the meeting of the head of state, and he openly ignored a number of Truman's instructions. Moreover, during a meeting with the president, he openly stated that the PRC would not dare to get involved in the conflict, and if it did, the US army would arrange a "great massacre" for them.
On October 19, 1950, the AKND crossed the Sino-Korean border. Taking advantage of the surprise effect, on October 25, the army crushed the defenses of the UN forces, and by the end of the year, the northerners regained control over the entire territory of the DPRK.
The offensive of the Chinese volunteers marked the third stage of the war. Somewhere the Americans just fled, somewhere they retreated with dignity, breaking through Chinese ambushes, so that by the beginning of winter the position of the South and the UN troops was very unenviable. On January 4, 1951, North Korean troops and Chinese volunteers again occupied Seoul.
By January 24, the advance of the Chinese and North Korean forces had slowed down. General M. Ridgway, who replaced the deceased Walker, managed to stop the Chinese offensive with a "meat grinder" strategy: the Americans gain a foothold in the dominant heights, wait for the Chinese to seize everything else and use aircraft and artillery, opposing their advantage in firepower to the Chinese number.
From the end of January 1951, the American command undertook a series of successful operations, and thanks to a counteroffensive, in March Seoul again passed into the hands of the southerners. Even before the end of the counteroffensive, on April 11, due to disagreements with Truman (including over the idea of using nuclear weapons), D. MacArthur was removed from the post of commander of the UN forces and replaced by M. Ridgway.
In April - July 1951, the belligerents made a number of attempts to break through the front line and change the situation in their favor, but none of the sides achieved a strategic advantage, and the military operations acquired a positional character.
By this time, it became clear to the parties to the conflict that it was impossible to achieve a military victory at a reasonable cost and that negotiations on the conclusion of an armistice were necessary. On June 23, the Soviet representative to the UN called for a ceasefire in Korea. On November 27, 1951, the parties agreed to establish a demarcation line on the basis of the existing front line and to create a demilitarized zone, but then negotiations reached an impasse, mainly due to the position of Rhee Seung Man, who categorically supported the continuation of the war, as well as disagreements over the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war.
The problem with the prisoners was as follows. Usually, after the war, prisoners are changed according to the principle of "all for all."But during the war, in the absence of human resources, the North Koreans actively mobilized the residents of the Republic of Korea into the army, who did not particularly want to fight for the North and surrendered at the first opportunity. A similar situation was in China, there were quite a lot of former Kuomintang soldiers captured during the civil war. As a result, about half of the captive Koreans and Chinese refused to repatriate. It took the longest to resolve this issue, and Lee Seung Man almost thwarted the sentences by simply ordering the camp guards to release those who did not want to return. In general, by this time, the South Korean president had become so annoying that the CIA even developed a plan to remove Rhee Seung Man from power.
On July 27, 1953, representatives of the DPRK, AKND and UN troops (the representatives of South Korea refused to sign the document) signed a ceasefire agreement, according to which the demarcation line between North and South Korea was established approximately along the 38th parallel, and on both sides around it a demilitarized zone 4 km wide was formed.
You talked about American air superiority, the Soviet veterans are unlikely to agree with this
- I think they will agree, because our pilots had a very limited set of tasks related to the fact that the Americans used strategic bombing of, in principle, peaceful objects, for example, dams and hydroelectric power stations, as an additional lever of influence on the North. Including those who were in the border areas. For example, the Suphun hydroelectric power station, depicted on the coat of arms of the DPRK and being the largest power plant in the region, supplied electricity not only to Korea, but also to northeastern China.
So, the main job of our fighters was precisely to protect industrial facilities on the border of Korea and China from American air raids. They did not fight on the front line and did not take part in offensive operations.
As for the question "who will win", each side is confident that it has won a victory in the air. The Americans naturally count all the MiGs that they shot down, but not only ours, but also Chinese and Korean pilots flew in MiGs, whose flying skills left much to be desired. In addition, the main target of our MIGs were the B-29 "flying fortresses", while the Americans hunted our pilots, trying to protect their bombers.
What is the outcome of the war?
- The war left a very painful scar on the body of the peninsula. Can imagine the scale of destruction in Korea when the front line swung like a pendulum. By the way, more napalm was dropped on Korea than on Vietnam, and this despite the fact that the Vietnam War lasted almost three times longer. The bottom line of losses is that the losses of troops on both sides amounted to approximately 2.4 million people. Together with civilians, although it is very difficult to count the total number of killed and wounded civilians, it turns out about 3 million people (1.3 million southerners and 1.5-2.0 million northerners), which amounted to 10% of the population of both Koreas during this period. Another 5 million people became refugees, although the period of active hostilities took just over a year.
From the point of view of achieving their goals, no one won the war. Unification was not achieved, the created Demarcation Line, which quickly turned into the "Great Korean Wall," only emphasized the split of the peninsula, and the psychological attitude to confrontation remained in the minds of several generations who survived the war - a wall of enmity and mistrust grew between the two parts of the same nation. The political and ideological confrontation was only reinforced.
