Feast over Czechoslovakia
After Lithuania, Poland returned to the Czechoslovak question. Adolf Hitler almost immediately announced the program for restoring the unity of the German nation. In 1937, despite the resistance of a part of the German military, who feared war with France and England and a natural defeat (the Wehrmacht was still extremely weak), Hitler pushed through the final decision to dismember Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the Anschluss of Austria, the activity of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, who were supported from abroad, increased sharply. At the congress of the pro-German Sudeten Party in April 1938 in Karlovy Vary, a demand was made to unite a number of border regions of Czechoslovakia with Germany. Also, the Sudeten Germans demanded that Czechoslovakia terminate the agreements on mutual assistance with France and the USSR.
Initially, the Czechs were ready to fight. The Czechoslovak army was a tough nut to crack. And the German armed forces were still in their infancy. The Czechoslovak government planned to defend itself, relying on powerful border fortifications. And also to move the Škoda military factories inland, to start mobilizing industry and food resources, including the introduction of round-the-clock work at 8 aircraft factories.
This is how the Sudeten crisis arose. Its outcome is known. First, England, France and Italy seized the Sudetenland in favor of Germany (Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938), and in March 1939 Czechoslovakia was liquidated. Germany introduced its troops to Bohemia and Moravia and declared a protectorate over them (protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). Slovakia remained autonomous, but in fact became a vassal of Germany.
This is fairly well known. In the USSR, the Munich Agreement was directly called a conspiracy and well revealed the essence of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by the Western powers, which had previously guaranteed its safety. However, they preferred not to focus on the role of Poland in these events, since Poland was an ally of the USSR, was a member of the socialist bloc and the Warsaw Pact Organization.
The fact is that Warsaw had territorial claims, not only to the USSR, Germany, Lithuania and Danzig, but also to Czechoslovakia. Poles from the very creation of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth claimed the so-called. Cieszyn Silesia. Poland's policy towards Czechoslovakia was based on the words of the founding father of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Pilsudski that "the artificially and ugly created Czechoslovak Republic is not only not the basis of European equilibrium, but, on the contrary, is its weak link."
Another surge of anti-Czechoslovak sentiments in Poland occurred in 1934. The Polish press launched a campaign about the need to return the original Polish lands. And the Polish army conducted large military maneuvers near the border of Czechoslovakia, working out the scenario of the collapse of Czechoslovakia or its surrender to Germany. In 1935, relations between the two European countries were still at the Cold War level. Warsaw and Prague exchanged "pleasantries", sending ambassadors "on vacation." In January 1938, Warsaw and Berlin held consultations on the future of Czechoslovakia. The meeting between Adolf Hitler and Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck marked the beginning of fruitful cooperation between the two countries on the Czechoslovak issue. In 1938, Warsaw, copying the policy of Berlin, created in the Cieszyn region the "Union of Poles", which aimed to separate this region from Czechoslovakia.
When, after the Anschluss of Austria, Hitler made demands to Prague "to ensure the rights of the Sudeten Germans," Warsaw supported him, presenting similar demands regarding the Cieszyn Poles. When on May 12, 1938, the USSR announced its readiness to support Czechoslovakia on condition that the Red Army troops pass through Poland or Romania, Warsaw announced that the Polish state would immediately declare war on the Soviet Union if it tried to send troops across Polish territory to help Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, the Poles were nasty and their traditional allies - the French. Jozef Beck said quite clearly that in the event of a conflict between Germany and France over Czechoslovakia, Poland would remain neutral and would not comply with the Franco-Polish treaty, since it provided only defense against Germany, not an attack on it. France was also reproached for not supporting Poland in March 1938, when there was a question about the future of Lithuania. At the same time, Poland categorically refused to support Czechoslovakia, which faced the threat of a direct German invasion.
The Poles were much nicer to the Germans. Warsaw not only reiterated its promise not to let the Red Army pass through its territory, and not to allow the Soviet Air Force to pass through to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia, but proposed its own plan for dividing the Czechoslovak Republic: the Cieszyn region was to go to Poland, Transcarpathia and Slovakia - Hungary, the Czech Republic and everything else - Germany.
In September 1938, the Sudeten crisis reached its highest point. In early September, 300 thousand reservists were called up in France, and on the night of September 24, another 600 thousand people, vacations in the eastern garrisons were canceled, the Maginot Line was equipped with all technical means. Six French divisions were moved to the border with Germany, then their number was increased to 14. By the end of September, 1.5 million people were mobilized, and 35 divisions, 13 cavalry regiments and 29 tank regiments were deployed on the border with Germany. In the USSR, in the middle of the summer of 1938, they were actively preparing to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia. The command decided to form six army groups in the Belarusian and Kiev military districts. Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Odessa and cavalry army groups were formed. At the end of September, the USSR was ready to send an aviation group of more than 500 aircraft to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government, in accordance with the Soviet-French-Czechoslovak treaty, expressed its readiness to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, if Prague asks for it, and even under conditions if France remains neutral. In addition, Moscow reported that in the event of the invasion of Polish troops into Czechoslovakia, the USSR will denounce the non-aggression pact it concluded with Poland in 1932.
Poland, meanwhile, was preparing for an attack on Czechoslovakia in alliance with Germany. In September, the Tesin Liberation Volunteer Corps was formed. In September 1938, large maneuvers of the Polish army took place in Volhynia, under the cover of which Polish troops began to pull up to Tesin. On the border with Czechoslovakia, Warsaw deployed a separate task force "Shlonsk" consisting of three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. By early October, the Polish group numbered about 36 thousand people, 270 guns, more than 100 tanks and armored vehicles, over 100 aircraft.
German and Polish militants began active provocations at the border. They attacked the Czechoslovak military and police, military and government targets. With the response of the Czech military, Polish and German bandit formations were hiding in their territories. Polish aircraft regularly invaded Czechoslovak airspace. At the same time, Germany and Poland launched a campaign of political and diplomatic pressure on Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, Warsaw expressed its readiness to fight the USSR along with Germany. The Polish ambassador to France told his American colleague: “A religious war between fascism and Bolshevism is beginning, and in the event that the USSR renders assistance to Czechoslovakia, Poland is ready for a war with the USSR, shoulder to shoulder with Germany. The Polish government is confident that within three months the Russian troops will be completely defeated, and Russia will no longer represent even a semblance of a state."
It is worth noting that in 1938 the Red Army had complete superiority over the German and Polish troops and could alone defeat the combined armies of Germany and Poland. However, the Soviet government could not act alone, at the risk of facing a "crusade" by the Western powers against the USSR. Moscow's independent actions could have been declared aggression. In addition, it is worth keeping in mind that in the summer of 1938, the Red Army fought heavy battles with Japanese troops on Lake Hassan and was on the verge of a major war with the Japanese Empire. Moscow remembered the threat of a major war on two fronts and tried to avoid such a dangerous situation. At least the neutrality of France and England was needed. But the English and French elites simply surrendered Czechoslovakia. Paris initially bent its own line, but soon succumbed to the influence of London, which ultimately led to the collapse of France.
On September 20-21, the English and French envoys in Czechoslovakia announced to the Czechoslovak government that if Prague did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, Paris would "not fulfill the treaty" with Czechoslovakia. In addition, the British and French hinted that if the Czechs unite with the Russians, then “the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay on the sidelines. " At the same time, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with an ultimatum to "return" the Cieszyn region to them. On September 27, the Polish government reiterated its ultimatum. As a result, Prague capitulated. On September 30, 1938 Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. On the same day, Warsaw sent another ultimatum to Prague and, simultaneously with the German troops, introduced its army into the Cieszyn region.
Polish army captures Cieszyn Silesia in 1938
Thus, Germany and Poland, with the consent of Italy, France and England, began the partition of Czechoslovakia. As Churchill noted, Poland "with the greed of a hyena took part in the plunder and destruction of the Czechoslovak state." Teshin region was a relatively small area, but had a developed industry. At the end of 1938, the factories located in Cieszyn produced more than 40% of the pig iron smelted in Poland and almost 47% of the steel. It was a tidbit. In Warsaw, the capture of the Cieszyn region was perceived as a national victory. Jozef Beck was awarded the highest order of the White Eagle. The Polish press called for new "achievements".
In Warsaw, they did not understand that they themselves had signed their own death warrant. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia sharply increased the potential of Germany and allowed Hitler to begin solving the next problem - the Polish one. Already in November 1938, Hitler dismissed Warsaw's proposal to transfer Moravian Ostrava and Witkovic to Poland. He no longer planned to share with Poland.
Hitler initially wanted to obtain concessions from Poland over Danzig and the transport corridor to East Prussia. However, here Warsaw made a second fatal mistake - it balked, hoping for its strength and assistance from England and France. At the same time, the arrogant Poles rejected the helping hand that the USSR offered.
During the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Ciano
The death of the Second Commonwealth
Warsaw did not protest against the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, although it was offended by the fact that when the Czechoslovak Republic was partitioned, the Poles got too little piece. Even before the capture of the Czech Republic, in January 1939, a meeting between Hitler and Beck took place with Berchtesgaden. The German Fuehrer at this meeting raised the issue of reuniting Danzig with Germany, in accordance with the will of the population of the "free city", taking into account the economic interests of Poland. Danzig politically was to become German, and economically - to remain under the control of Poland. Hitler also raised the issue of the Polish corridor. The Fuehrer noted that Poland's connection with the Baltic is necessary. However, Germany also needs a connection with East Prussia. Hitler proposed to reconsider the status of the Polish corridor. The Polish minister did not give Hitler a clear answer to these proposals.
In March 1939, German troops occupied Memel. After that London announced that it was ready to support Warsaw if it was attacked and resisted. In April, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced that not only England, but also France would come to Poland's aid. Moscow offered assistance in the fight against the aggressor. In July, the Soviet government reiterated its proposal to conclude a military convention. London and Paris agreed to start negotiations on this topic, but were clearly in no hurry. Their representatives arrived in Moscow only on August 11. In addition, the British mission did not have the authority from its government to sign the relevant agreements. In general, the envoys of England and France were wasting time and wanted to shift all responsibility in the fight against Germany to the USSR.
The main problem, due to which the negotiations in Moscow finally came to a standstill, was the reluctance of Romania and Poland to let the Red Army through their territory. The Soviet Union did not have a common border with Germany and could provide assistance to France, England, Poland and Romania only if the Red Army passed through Polish and Romanian territories. At the same time, Moscow strictly limited the zone of passage of its troops: the Vilna region (Vilensky corridor) and Galicia. Warsaw, like Bucharest, constantly refused to accept any help from Moscow. However, England and France were in no hurry to put all possible pressure on Poland so that in the event of a war with Germany, she would let the Soviet troops through.
Poland's reluctance at such a dangerous moment to let the Red Army forces pass was due to several reasons:
First, it is hatred of the USSR and Russians in general. Warsaw did not want to cooperate with the hated Russians, much less let Soviet troops pass through its territory. As Polish Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly declared on August 19: "Regardless of the consequences, not a single inch of Polish territory will ever be allowed to be occupied by Russian troops." Poland categorically did not want Russian help and until the last moment pursued an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy, still hoping for the defeat of Russia and its dismemberment in favor of the Second Rzecz Pospolita.
Secondly, the Polish leadership was afraid that the West Russian population would simply rise up at the sight of Soviet tanks, which would force Moscow to reconsider its attitude towards Poland and seize the moment to annex Western Belarus and Galicia. This was possible, since the Poles treated the Russians as "slaves" (slaves), and the Russian lands as a colony.
Thirdly, Polish lords once again in history were let down by arrogance and self-confidence. For example, French Foreign Minister Bonnet, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, noted that the threat of a clash with Germany makes the USSR's assistance necessary for Poland. To this, the Polish ambassador confidently declared that "not the Germans, but the Poles will break into the depths of Germany in the very first days of the war!" When the French continued to insist on their own, the Polish minister Beck said that Poland did not want to have a military treaty with the USSR.
I must say that such ideas that "the Polish cavalry will take Berlin in a week" were very common in Poland. The idea of a victorious "march on Berlin" was based on the shortsightedness and arrogance of the Polish military-political leadership. Warsaw remembered the devastation and economic and political weakness of Germany after the defeat in the First World War. Then the really large Polish army was stronger than the German army. However, in Germany, in literally a few years, fundamental changes took place. Finance and industry, thanks to Anglo-Saxon capital, have grown stronger. A strong Wehrmacht was created. Germany achieved the Anschluss of Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland and the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, these victories inspired the army and the population. Poland, in the 1930s, did not manage to achieve visible success in consolidating the people, developing the economy and improving the armed forces. Almost all plans for the modernization of the Polish army remained on paper.
Therefore, the Wehrmacht's invasion of Poland will become a terrible revelation for the Polish military-political leadership, the public and the people, showing all the rottenness and weakness of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, it will be impossible to change something for the better.
Fourth, in Warsaw they believed that "the West will not leave them." Indeed, if the powerful French army, which in 1939 had complete superiority over the Wehrmacht (especially on the Western Front), struck, and the Anglo-French air force began to deliver powerful strikes against the main political and economic centers of Germany, this would lead to military political catastrophe of the Third Reich. The German generals knew about this, who tried to stop Hitler, warning about the impossibility of a war on two fronts. However, Hitler knew for sure that France and England would confine themselves to verbal threats, there would be no real war on the Western Front. And so it happened. When Germany smashed Poland on the Western Front, there was a "strange war" - British and French soldiers drank wine, played various sports games, and the Allied Air Force "bombarded" Germany with leaflets. Poland was simply poured, like Czechoslovakia, although they rattled their weapons. Western leaders believed that after the defeat of Poland, the Wehrmacht, possibly after a short pause, would strike at the USSR. However, Hitler did not repeat the mistakes of the Second Reich, initially he wanted to destroy the strong French army that was hanging over West Germany. Thus, the Polish leadership miscalculated, believing that France and England would come to their aid. Poland was easily sacrificed.
The Polish leadership had two chances to save the country. First, it was possible to enter into an alliance with the USSR. Joint Soviet-Polish forces, with the threat of Germany from the western direction of the French army plus the British expeditionary forces and the fleet, would have stopped the beginning of a major war in Europe. Hitler was a smart man, he knew how to count. He would not go to war with such a coalition. However, Warsaw rejected the Soviet proposal for help. Seeing the attitude of Poland, as well as the frivolous attitude of Britain and France to a potential military alliance, Moscow chose the only correct strategy - it concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany.
Secondly, P Poland could agree with Germany on the Danzig problem and the corridor to East Prussia. As a result, Poland could join the Anti-Comintern Pact, become Hitler's ally in a future war with the USSR. Warsaw itself has long dreamed of a joint "crusade" against Moscow. This scenario was destroyed by the pride and stupidity of the Polish leadership. Warsaw did not want to negotiate with Berlin, the Poles were confident in their strength, the support of England and France, they did not believe that Germany would start a war.
Therefore, already on the eve of the invasion of the Wehrmacht in Poland, Warsaw began to put pressure on Danzig. It all started with a scandal with Polish customs officers who were fond of assault, going beyond their official duties. On August 4, 1939, the Polish diplomatic representative in Danzig handed an ultimatum to the President of the Senate of the Free City. Poland has promised to cut off the import of all food products into the city if the Danzig government does not agree to never again interfere in the affairs of Polish customs. The city was dependent on outside food supplies, so this was a serious threat. Hitler at this time was not yet ready for war, so he offered Danzig to accept the ultimatum.
In addition, pressure on the Germans began in Poland itself. In Upper Silesia, there were mass arrests of Germans. Thousands of those arrested were deported inland. Masses of Germans tried to flee to Germany. German businesses, trade firms, cooperatives and various organizations were closed. The German community in Poland was gripped by fear. In fact, Poland provoked Germany to intervene. September 1, 1939 came the day of judgment for the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Thus, the military-political leadership of Poland itself buried the country. Warsaw first supported the partition of Czechoslovakia, opening the way for Berlin to resolve the Polish question. As long as there was a united and strong Czechoslovakia, Hitler could not launch an offensive to the east. However, Warsaw helped roll out a tough Czechoslovak nut.
Then Warsaw buried two possible scenarios for saving the country. The Polish lords refused to accept the help of the USSR, hoping that Germany would attack the USSR through the Baltic states or Romania. In the event of an attack by the Germans on Poland, the Poles hoped for their army (up to the "march on Berlin") and "help from the West." As history has shown, all these hopes were a soap bubble. Warsaw also buried the second possible scenario of preserving the country: as soon as the Polish leadership returned to reality at least a little, becoming a junior partner of Germany, the USSR would have had to hold back the onslaught of German-Polish troops (not counting other German satellites). A million-strong Polish army could seriously worsen the situation of the USSR at the initial stage of the war. However, the ambitious and short-sighted Polish lords buried this scenario.
Wehrmacht soldiers break the barrier at the border checkpoint in Sopot
