The story about submarines will not be complete without mentioning the special-purpose boats that are part of the Russian Navy. The purpose of these boats is mostly secret and not disclosed to the general public. Currently, the Russian Navy has seven deep-sea nuclear power stations, including:
Station of project 10831: AS-12, in service since 2004;
Project 1910 stations: AS-13 (1986), AS-15 (1991) AS-33 (1994);
Stations of the project AS-21 (1991), AS-23 (1986), AS-35 (1995).
Little is known about them. These are small submarines with surface displacement from 550 to 1600 tons with a crew of 25 to 35 people, all of them are part of the Northern Fleet and are used in the interests of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research of the RF Ministry of Defense (GUGI).
What is GUGI? This is one of the most secret organizations of our armed forces - according to some sources, the percentage of Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation among the personnel of the GUGI is comparable to that in the cosmonaut corps. The GUGI is engaged in hydrology and hydrography - there is no need to explain how important the maps of the underwater situation are for the crews of our submarines, including strategic missile submarine cruisers. Of course, a detailed knowledge of the hydrology of the northern seas will give our ships very great advantages in confrontation with any foreign submarine fleet - in fact, this can be compared with the confrontation of two armies, one of which has a complete set of military maps, and the other - an atlas for elementary school. However, in addition to science, even in its most applied variety in the interests of our fleet, GUGI is also engaged in other activities, including:
1) Gathering intelligence information about enemy equipment;
2) Protection and maintenance of deep-sea communication lines;
3) Rise from the bottom of the remnants of secret equipment left after tests or accidents.
There are some suspicions that the term "maintenance of deep-sea communication lines" refers not only to Russian, but, first of all, to foreign fiber-optic lines laid along the ocean floor. But here one can only guess about the possibilities of the GUGI and envy the descendants: there is no doubt that in the distant future, when the activities of the GUGI are declassified, they will learn a lot of interesting and unusual things.
According to the speculations of the open press, our nuclear deep-sea stations are capable of diving to a depth of six kilometers (at least some of them), but they cannot independently go far into the ocean on their own. Accordingly, the Russian Navy has two nuclear-powered submarines that carry deep-sea stations and underwater vehicles. This is about:
1) BS-136 "Orenburg" of project 09786. The boat was re-equipped from K-129 - SSBN of project 667BDR, entered service in 2002
2) BS-64 "Moscow region" project 0978. Converted from K-64 project 667BDRM in 2015
There is no data on the performance characteristics of these ships, but they are used, of course, in the interests of the same GUGI. For example, the bmpd blog in 2012 reported:
"On September 27, 2012, during the Sevmorgeo expedition, the nuclear-powered carrier BS-136 of project 09786 with a nuclear deep-water station of rank AC-12 of project 10831 reached the North Pole. The Sevmorgeo expedition was carried out to clarify the high-latitude boundary of the continental shelf in the Arctic. Rock samples were taken to collect evidence that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges belonged to the Russian continental shelf. The results are planned to be submitted to the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea in 2014."
The representative of "Sevmorgeo" additionally said:
"During the expedition, we drilled three wells at a depth of 2-2.5 kilometers and took three cores (" pillars "of rock, which are removed by a drill - ed.). One core is 60 centimeters long, the second - 30, and the third - 20 centimeters A layer of silt at the bottom, reaching a thickness of five meters, prevented unhindered access to solid rocks."
Well, we wish our submariners from the GUGI further success, and in no case be satisfied with what has already been achieved. Since they were able to substantiate the belonging of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges to the Russian continental shelf, it would be quite nice to present irrefutable evidence that Alaska is nothing more than one of the peaks of the aforementioned ridges … ()
In addition to the above ships, which are part of the Russian Navy, two more nuclear submarines for special purposes are being built today, namely:
1) K-329 "Belgorod", which began to be built as the SSGN of project 949A "Antey", but on December 20, 2012 was re-laid under the project 09852. Commissioning is expected before the end of this year.
2) Project 09851 nuclear submarine "Khabarovsk". This nuclear submarine was laid down on July 27, 2014 in an atmosphere of the highest secrecy in workshop No. 50 of PO "Sevmash". According to some reports, the entry into the fleet should be expected in 2020.
The purpose of these boats is secret. It was suggested that Belgorod would become the carrier of the once sensational Status-6 system - a gigantic deep-water high-speed torpedo with a nuclear warhead designed to destroy coastal cities. Foreign sources see "Belgorod" as a kind of versatile person, capable not only of threatening to be hit by the "Status", but also of transporting the latest deep-sea underwater vehicles "Klavesin-2R-PM", as well as nuclear power plants "Shelf" for powering the network of underwater sensors.
The latter are worth dwelling on in more detail. "Harpsichord-2R-PM" is a deep-sea unmanned vehicle. According to Igor Vilnit, the developer, general director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, "Klavesin-2R-PM" is capable of performing work at a depth of 6,000 m.
But almost nothing is known about the purpose of this device, except for the fact that to the correspondent's question: “We also wrote about robotic systems for the protection of sea areas and the continental shelf in the Arctic. Is this also a “Harpsichord”?”, I. Vilnit replied:
It's still a slightly different family.
As for the Shelf, this is a very interesting and extremely necessary undertaking for the Russian fleet. According to American experts "H I Sutton", Russia is preparing to deploy a network of naval installations designed to detect and identify foreign submarines in the Arctic Ocean. In their opinion, the goal of Russia is to build a system similar to NATO's SOSUS, but more modern and at the best technological level, such that it will control the movement of the latest submarines in real time. The architecture of the system includes underwater hydrophone sensors, the power supply of which will be performed by special underwater nuclear power plants of low power.
Nuclear reactors for such stations have already been developed and received the name "Shelf".
But we will return to the systems for lighting the underwater environment, but for now let's return to the Belgorod nuclear submarine. Another prospective application is the use of geophysical towed antennas designed for exploration of minerals that lie under the seas and oceans.
According to the author of this article, Belgorod is being created to replace the BS-136 Orenburg. The fact is that the K-129, which was converted into "Orenburg", entered service with the USSR Navy in 1981, respectively, in 2021 it will celebrate its fortieth anniversary. This is a lot for a Soviet submarine, since it was assumed that their service life should not exceed 30 years. Of course, in the course of large-scale re-equipment and modernization, the boat will be able to serve more, but nevertheless, it is obviously time for it to "retire" in the very near future. Therefore, the most likely purpose of "Belgorod" will be the transportation and control of unmanned and robotic deep-sea vehicles of the new generation, possibly also - laying cables for various purposes under the ice.
As for the "Status-6" super torpedo, its existence or development raises great doubts. Of course, the task for which "Status-6" is supposedly created is extremely important - in the event of a full-scale nuclear conflict, the destruction of large US port cities will be a terrible blow for the Americans, since it paralyzes external sea traffic, which will interrupt foreign trade and prevent the transfer of troops to Europe … But nevertheless, this task can well be solved by conventional means, such as land-based or sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the creation for this of a separate, rather complex and expensive weapon system that requires special carriers does not seem reasonable. In addition, there are big questions for the carrier. No matter how you upgrade the Belgorod, it will still remain a third generation boat, and far from being the quietest among its peers. "Belgorod" should not be called a "roaring cow", but it repeatedly loses in secrecy to modern nuclear submarines and SSBNs, and is there any point in installing strategic weapons on it? The author is inclined to assume that the Status-6 project is, rather, a means of information warfare, and is intended to force the Americans to spend money on protection against a non-existent threat.
… although, of course, it cannot be ruled out that the author of this article is following the instructions of the RF Ministry of Defense and convincing the Americans that Status-6 is a fake. And then, when Armageddon breaks out, "Belgorod" and "Khabarovsk", will go to the line of attack and kaaaak ….
As for the nuclear submarine of project 09851 "Khabarovsk", absolutely nothing is known about this submarine.
Various opinions were expressed about its purpose, including that the boat would become:
1) Carrier of deep-sea vehicles
2) Multipurpose atomic, less expensive than "Ash"
3) By the ship of the long-range hydroacoustic patrol
4) An experimental platform for testing the SAC and weapons for submarines of the 5th generation
5) And, finally, that this is not a submarine at all, but a large nuclear deep-sea station.
The first option raises certain doubts, because it is unlikely that the Russian Federation feels the need to have in service as many as three large nuclear submarines - carriers of deep-sea vehicles. It is expected that "Khabarovsk" will go into operation in 2020, and one can hardly assume that it is needed to replace the "Podmoskovya", which returned to service after refurbishment in 2015.
The second option - a cheap multipurpose nuclear submarine - is also highly unlikely, for two reasons. First, the design of the "cheap Ash" would most likely be entrusted to the developer, i.e. KB "Malachite". As it became known, Khabarovsk was developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau. Secondly, it is known that the development of a submarine of the 5th generation has begun in the Russian Federation, and the lead submarine is planned to be laid closer to 2025, against this background, financing the development and construction of the second type of submarine of the 4th generation looks like a senseless waste of money. The version of the deep-sea station is also somewhat doubtful, because the Russian Federation has recently clearly favored relatively medium-sized uninhabited deep-sea vehicles. According to the author, versions of a long-range hydroacoustic patrol ship, or an experimental boat for testing MAPL technologies of the 5th generation, look the most likely, but by and large all this is fortune-telling on coffee grounds.
In addition to numerous nuclear submarines and stations, the Russian Navy also includes a special-purpose diesel submarine: B-90 "Sarov" project 20120, which entered service in 2008.
This boat is also at the disposal of the GUGI, but, probably, its main profile is testing various weapons and equipment for non-nuclear and nuclear submarines.
In general, we can say that the Russian Navy is doing quite well with special purpose submarines. What, alas, can not be said about the system of illumination of the underwater situation, the deployment and operation of which could well be provided by our underwater special forces.
A long time ago, on March 4, 2000, the document "Fundamentals of the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities until 2010" was signed and adopted. In accordance with it, it was planned to build the "Unified State System for Lighting the Surface and Underwater Situation" (EGSONPO). The significance of this task for the country is difficult to overestimate, especially in the context of the continuing reduction in the composition of the fleet.
Even the ancient Romans said "Praemonitus praemunitus", which translated from Latin means "He who is forewarned is armed." There is no doubt that in modern naval warfare, knowledge of where the enemy's ships are located would be the most important advantage for our small fleet, capable of at least to a significant extent compensating for the numerical superiority of the enemy. Including because in the seas washing our shores, the enemy cannot have such information about our fleet. Moreover, operational knowledge of the location of enemy nuclear submarines would practically guarantee the invulnerability of our strategic missile carriers.
Unfortunately, the construction of the UNDGPS in the Arctic until 2010 was completely ruined.
Then, at the end of 2010, the creation of the UNUSPO was included in the "Strategy for the development of maritime activities of the Russian Federation until 2030". According to this strategy, by 2012 the UNEGS was supposed to cover the Arctic by 30%, and by 2020 - by 50%. As far as can be judged today, these indicators are not being met at all. Moreover, judging by the publications in the open press, today there is not even an understanding of what the UNDISP should be.
For example, Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov, in his article "Homeless Arctic", published in 2015, indicates that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, instead of deploying existing developments, for many years continues to invest heavily in all kinds of development work on this topic. Moreover, according to the rear admiral, for the most part these ROCs are of a very dubious nature:
“Each State Armament Program (GPV-2015, 2020, in the draft - and 2025) begins with large-scale billion-dollar R&D to highlight the situation in the Arctic regional direction. Under the federal target program "Development of the OPK-2020" from 2011 to 2014, 3.2 billion rubles were spent to organize the groundwork for the creation of an "Integrated network-centric system of underwater surveillance". But not a single square kilometer under water in the Arctic, in the exclusive economic zone, has been illuminated as a result of these works."
At the same time, the Rear Admiral declares that (at the time of this writing, i.e. February 11, 2015), only one sonar complex has been adopted, but it is not deployed in positions either.
As far as one can assume, we are talking about the MGK-608M system, which provides for the placement of bottom passive sensors connected into a single network and fed with energy from underwater reactors. According to Rosoboronexport's advertising brochure, such a system (MKG-608E Sever-E) can include from 8 to 60 sensors and detect objects with a noise level from 0.05 to 0.1 Pa over an area of 1000 to 9000 square kilometers, and, say, objects with a noise level of 5 Pa - up to 300,000 square kilometers.
On the other hand, even the 3rd generation MAPLs (if the data on "Shchuk-B" are correct) had about 60 dB of noise, which is only 0.02 Pa. Will Sever-E be able to catch the 4th generation nuclear submarine? This is unknown, but one should not forget that the “E” in the name of the system most likely means “Export”, and sometimes the potential of export products is reduced in our country.
But in general, it can be assumed that Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov proposes to rely on stationary hydroacoustic systems. S. Zhandarov obviously knows firsthand about their capabilities, since he himself was a military sailor in the past, and later - the director of defense topics at the Atoll Research Institute, which was engaged in the development of MGK-608M. By the way, because of this, “on the Internet” he is reproached for not caring about the benefits of the cause, but defending the interests of his institution, but is this reproach deserved?
Other well-known experts in hydroacoustics are Valentin and Viktor Leksin, in their series of articles "Does Russia have modern hydroacoustic weapons?" it is believed that such a system should be not so much stationary as mobile and include not only stationary (bottom) hydroacoustic complexes similar to MGK-608M but also a large number of their mobile analogs, i.e. a network of remote receiving devices that can be quickly deployed in the desired areas when the need arises. At the same time, Valentin and Viktor Leksin consider stealth an extremely important factor for the survival of such systems and suggest focusing on passive sonar.
But M. Klimov, in his article "Hydroacoustic sadness", on the contrary, believes that passive sonar will not be able to provide an opening of the underwater situation, and that it must be supplemented with an active one.
There are other authors who propose other ways to solve the lighting of the underwater environment, and they also contradict each other and the above points of view. In addition, the author of this article is forced to state that very often publications on hydroacoustic topics are designed in the style of “only I know how to do the right thing, and the rest are deeply mistaken,” or even worse - there are open accusations of forgery and corruption. I must say that the topic of hydroacoustics is extremely difficult for a layman, and it is absolutely impossible to understand it without being a professional hydroacoustics with experience of real work at sea. Probably, some of the authors are really right (all of them cannot be right, as they express opposite points of view), but in general there is still a feeling of a corporate struggle between the developers.
However, almost all publicists agree on one thing - we do not have any UNDISP, any system of illumination of the underwater situation, and it is unclear when it will appear. What does this mean in practice? As Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov writes:
"From February 11 to August 13, 2014, the New Hampshire submarine unimpeded unimpeded on all strategic containment activities for the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea."
In other words, in the event of aggravation of international relations and the outbreak of an armed conflict between the Russian Federation and the United States in 2014, Russian SSBNs would be destroyed before they used ballistic missiles. It is clear that the one and only New Hampshire is not capable of this, but the Americans had nine nuclear submarines of this type in 2014, and at the end of the year one more was added to them.
Of course, the SSN-778 New Hampshire is an extremely formidable enemy - this is the fifth Virginia-class boat, and the first Block-II modification boat, but you need to understand that today and in the future we will face an even more formidable enemy. And we must be ready for this yesterday, but alas, we are not ready today and it is not a fact that we will be ready tomorrow.
There is one more important aspect in the UNDISP problem. Although the open press does not focus on this, the EGSONPO should apply not only to the Arctic, but also to the waters of the Far East, where strategic missile submarines are also based in our country.
Will we be able to cope with all this by 2025? Is the government fully aware of the importance of the UNEGS? It is known that V. V. Putin personally took part in meetings on the non-working Polyment-Reduta, an anti-aircraft missile system whose problems prevented the delivery of the lead frigate of Project 22350 Gorshkov. But the solution to our problems in hydroacoustics is much more important than even the entire series of these frigates.
The conclusion from the above is very simple. Today we are experiencing a total shortage of modern multipurpose nuclear and non-nuclear submarines. Added to this is the lack of systems for monitoring the underwater situation, which further complicates the deployment of our SSBNs in a threatened period. It is sad to admit this, but today, in the event of aggravation of relations with NATO, we will send our strategic submarine cruisers into the unknown, in the hope that their low noise, hydroacoustics and crew experience will allow them to slip past the American cordons, and yet, when the red button will be pressed, fulfill its purpose. In essence, today the fate of a third of Russia's strategic nuclear forces rests with the Russian "maybe". And, what is even sadder, there are no guarantees that in the course of 2018-2025. our situation will change for the better.
Previous articles in the series:
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future (part 2)
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future. Part 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
Russian military fleet. A sad look into the future. Part 4. "Halibut" and "Lada"
