As you know, the Russian squadron entered the battle on May 14, 1905, which became fatal for him, without completing the rebuilding. Its main strength - four squadron battleships of the "Borodino" type, brought together in the 1st armored detachment, entered the head of the wake column of the remaining armored ships of the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons, but did not manage to complete their maneuver. As a result, at the moment of opening fire, the battleship Oryol was abeam the flagship of the 2nd detachment, Oslyabi. The latter had to urgently brake in order to let the Eagle pass ahead, which disrupted the formation of the ships following it.
This, of course, raises questions. Didn't the Oslyaby interfere with the shooting of the Eagle, and if so, when, in fact, the Oryol opened fire on Mikasa? And what Russian ships, in general, fired at the Japanese flagship in the outset of the battle?
When the Eagle opened fire
There is an opinion that the "Eagle" opened fire only after the "Oslyabya" entered its wake, that is, for a very long time (up to 10 minutes, or even more) the fourth battleship of the "Borodino" class did not participate in the battle. This seems to be indicated by the testimony of Lieutenant Slavinsky, which says about the outbreak of the battle:
"Oslyabya" answered the enemy, "Suvorov" also, we were silent for the distance. I noticed that the Oslyabya and the vessels following it reduced their speed to low speed in order to let us pass and leaned slightly to the right in order to enter our wake as soon as possible. When we entered service, that is, we took a place in front of the Oslyab, it already had holes in the bow and a knocked down gaff. At 1 hour 40 minutes. half., according to the order received from the conning tower on the battle index, I opened the sighting with cast-iron shells at the head flagship battleship "Mikaza" from a distance of 57 cables.
Reading this text, one really gets the feeling that "Eagle" first waited until "Oslyabya" took its place in the ranks, and only then began zeroing in. But is it?
About geometry
Information about the mutual position of the Russian squadron and the Japanese flagship in the outset of the Tsushima battle differ, but agree on one thing - "Mikasa" was on the left in front of "Suvorov". If we draw a right angle in which the Suvorov's course is 0 degrees, and the perpendicular to its left side (traverse) is 90 degrees, then the barrels of his guns for shooting at Mikasa should have been turned 80 degrees. (heading angle) or less - depending on the real heading angle to the head Japanese battleship, which, alas, is unknown to us. The 80 degrees indicated by me. come from the testimony of Z. P. Rozhestvensky, who informed the Investigative Commission that:
from "Suvorov" the first shot was fired at the battleship "Mikaza", from a distance of 32 cables, then, the "Mikaza" was less than one rumba ahead of the traverse "Suvorov".
This is the largest heading angle that is only indicated in the reports.
"Eagle" was the fourth in the ranks, respectively, its course angle to "Mikasa" was sharper than that of "Suvorov", which means - less than 80 degrees. And it is quite obvious that "Oslyabya" could prevent "Eagle" from firing at "Mikasa" only in one case - if he was between our battleship and the flagship of H. Togo. However, for this "Oslyaba" had to be significantly ahead of the "Eagle" and at least be on the traverse "Borodino". And the sharper the heading angle from "Eagle" to "Mikasa" was, the closer to "Suvorov" the "Oslyabya" had to be in order to cover this heading angle. However, there is no evidence of this. For example, the senior officer of the "Eagle" Shwede showed:
"Oslyabya" was then to the left and almost abeam of the "Eagle".
The term "almost", of course, can be interpreted that "Oslyabya" was slightly ahead or slightly behind the traverse of the "Eagle". But in any of these positions, the Oslyabya could hardly interfere with the Eagle's sighting at Mikasa. In addition, giving way to the latter, "Oslyabya" braked sharply, which, again, is confirmed by the mass of eyewitnesses. Consequently, the presence of "Oslyabi" in the line of fire of the "Eagle" at the beginning of the battle, if geometrically possible, is extremely unlikely, and its position there for any length of time is impossible at all.
Since we do not have an exact picture of the maneuvering of the Russian squadron (the existing ones contradict each other and suffer from a mass of inaccuracies), purely theoretically, it could be assumed that if the Mikasa was at a too sharp bow angle, then it was not the Oslyabya that interfered with the sighting, but the walking ahead of "Eagle" "Borodino". But the whole question is that not a single officer of the "Eagle" in his reports and testimonies mentions that in the outset of the battle the firing of the "Eagle", in general, interfered with at least some of the Russian ships. Although, it is obvious that the same Slavinsky, who was in charge of the Eagle's sighting tower, should have mentioned this. And if not he, then at least one of his colleagues who survived the Tsushima battle.
So, we have reliable data that the "Eagle" was detained with zeroing in. This is told by none other than Lieutenant Slavinsky, under whose direct supervision this adjustment was carried out. Who else would know this if not him? But there are no complaints that Mikasa was closed by Oslyabey or Borodino, or someone else.
So what prevented the "Eagle" from entering the battle on time?
On the reason for the delay in opening fire
In fact, both Lieutenant Slavinsky and the Eagle's senior artillery officer, Lieutenant Shamshev, speak quite directly about it. Let's read again the first sentence of the fragment of Slavinsky's report I quoted above:
"Oslyabya" answered the enemy, "Suvorov" also, we were silent beyond the distance ».
Now let's take Shamshev's testimony:
With the battle flag raised on the Suvorov, we could open fire on the enemy, but the distance was so great that we had to wait and, in a gradual manner with the other battleships, the Eagle entered the battle, after the Borodin.
The reason is nowhere clearer. The Eagle believed that Mikasa was too far away to shoot at him. Today, when we know that "Suvorov" started a battle either with 32 or 37 cables and that the Orel was separated from Suvorov by no more than 8-9 cables, taking into account the length of Alexander III and Borodino, and two-cable gaps between them. Thus, we know that the distance between "Eagle" and "Mikasa" was in no way more than 40-46 cables. Well, maybe two or three cables more, assuming that Oryol pulled it back, which is why it ended up at the moment of the start of the battle on the traverse of Oslyabi - and this is the maximum. But on the "Eagle" they incorrectly determined the distance to the Japanese flagship, and therefore in Shamshev's testimony we read:
"They started shooting with 57 cables."
And Slavinsky reports the same distance in his testimony!
The maximum firing range of 152-mm guns of the battleships of the "Borodino" type is indicated in different ways in different sources, but, for example, the respected S. Vinogradov, in his wonderful monograph dedicated to the battleship "Slava", indicates 62 cables. However, it is impossible to aim at the maximum firing distance, for this the distance must be at least 5–10% less than the maximum passport firing range. It was from this distance (as it was believed on the battleship) that the Eagle entered the battle.
The conclusion is obvious and simple. The "Eagle" really delayed with zeroing, but the fault was the error of the rangefinders, and not at all the overcrowding of the ships, which arose due to the error in the maneuver of ZP Rozhdestvensky.
How late was the Eagle with the shooting?
Unfortunately, this cannot be said exactly.
But, judging by the general description, "Eagle" opened fire with a minimum delay, which hardly exceeded two or three minutes, and perhaps even less. Lieutenant Slavinsky shows:
“After three shots had been fired, we had to abandon zeroing, in view of the complete impossibility of observing the fall of our shells in the mass of bursts, which at times completely covered Mikaza from our eyes. According to the admiral's order, which was confirmed by the number (1) one at the meeting with the enemy, our detachment fired entirely at Mikaza only. Rapid fire was opened at the same Mikaza with high-explosive shells, taking advantage of the distance received from the rangefinder station. At the same time, the Japanese fire became valid for the battleship: about 2 hours. was killed on the spot by a shell that exploded in the casemate, the commander of the bow casemate, midshipman Shupinsky, who was part of my group."
Again, it is not said directly, but it turns out that before "about 14:00" the battleship managed to try to shoot at Mikasa, despite the fact that it was hardly possible to make more than one sighting shot per minute, but rather, even less often, then go to rapid fire …
There is one more piece of evidence.
Lieutenant Shcherbachev 4th, who commanded the aft 12-inch tower of the "Eagle", in the description of the outbreak of the Tsushima battle indicates that first our head battleships opened fire, then shots were heard from the left bow six-inch tower (sighting tower, which was led by Slavinsky), however his 305-mm tower did not participate in the battle, since the Japanese battleships were outside the corners of its shelling. That is why, by the way, Shcherbachev 4th had the opportunity to consider the damage and condition of "Oslyabi", about which he wrote a lot in his report.
Then the senior artilleryman of the "Eagle" decided to disperse the fire. The group under the control of Lieutenant Slavinsky (the bow 12-inch, as well as the left bow and left middle 6-inch towers, as well as the bow casemate and the entire 75-mm battery on the left side) continued to fire at Mikas, and the so-called 4th the group, commanded by Lieutenant Ryumin from the 6-inch left stern turret and 12-inch stern turret of Shcherbachev 4th, was to fire at the Japanese armored cruiser, which was closest to the Eagle, at its abeam.
This decision was quite correct, since it made it possible to put into operation the second half of the Eagle's heavy artillery, which had previously been inactive, at the nearest target, which, obviously, would have been much easier to shoot at than at Mikasa. For us, it is of interest that this decision was made "at about 2:00 am", and by that moment "Eagle" had been conducting a fire fight for some time.
Thus, according to the descriptions of eyewitnesses, we can assume that the battle at 13:49 or 13:50 started a shot from "Suvorov", after him opened fire "Alexander III", having a delay no more than required by the need not to confuse sighting volleys, the falls of which, by the way, were tracked by a stopwatch (at least on the Eagle). The next to enter the battle was "Borodino", but the "Eagle" delayed a little, but, probably, he opened fire no later than 13: 53–13: 54, and maybe even earlier.
Who shot at Mikasa?
Obviously, the main fire on the Japanese flagship came from the ships of the 1st Armored Detachment, that is, from four battleships of the Borodino class. We know for sure that the aft 12-inch tower of the Eagle could not act on the Mikasa, but whether other Russian battleships had similar problems is unknown. And it is also not known who the gunmen of "Oslyabi" were shooting at, there are no direct indications of this. Nevertheless, it should be assumed that "Oslyabya" fired precisely at "Mikasa", and the point is this.
As you know, the Oslyabi artillerymen were almost the best in the squadron; this battleship fired quite well during the exercises. At 13:49, its position and distance allowed even part of the artillery to fire at Mikasa. In the first 10 minutes of the battle, Mikasa received a number of hits, while other ships of the Japanese squadron were not hit at that time. A roll and a strong trim, preventing some well-aimed shooting from the Oslyabi, appeared on the flagship of the Russian 2nd armored detachment only after 14:12.
Thus, if Oslyabya had fired not at Mikasa, but at another Japanese ship, one would have expected hits in one, but there were none. In view of the above, the assumption that Oslyabya fired mainly at Mikasa looks quite reasonable.
But Sisoy the Great, following the Oslyabey, did not shoot at Mikasa - this is known for certain. The commander of this battleship, Ozerov, reported in his report:
“At 1:45 pm, the battleship Sisoy the Great, entrusted to me, could open fire, but not at the enemy's lead ship, but first at the 5th in their order, (“Nissin”), then at the 6th ("Kasuga"), and then on the cruisers."
Noteworthy is the confusion with the time, which Ozerov indicates incorrectly. But still, from the context of the report, one can understand that Sisoy the Great opened fire with a delay of several minutes, since, in his opinion, Oslyabya opened fire at 13:42 (in fact, this could not have happened earlier than 13:49 –13: 50), and his battleship, it turns out, began the battle three minutes later.
Unfortunately, I do not know anything about who the "Navarin" was shooting at, but the next "Nakhimov" still managed to shoot a little at the "Mikasa".
From the report of the senior artillery officer Lieutenant Gertner 1st:
“The distance was 55 cables to Mikaza, the heading angle was 30 degrees. Oslyabya was already firing. The Japanese began to respond. As soon as the distance became 42 cables, "Nakhimov" began firing, first at the "Mikaza", and when it came out of the firing angle, then at the ship, which was abeam. Installation of the sight was given on the basis of the readings of both rangefinders, it was not possible to shoot by sighting because of the invisibility of the falling shells."
Judging by the description, the effectiveness of Nakhimov's firing at Mikasa was near-zero. At the moment when "Suvorov", and after him and "Oslyabya" opened fire, "Mikasa" could and should have been from "Nakhimov" at a distance of 55 cables or so, but the subsequent rapprochement with "Nakhimov" to 42 cable looks extremely dubious, if not impossible. At what distance then should the Suvorov be from the Mikasa if the Nakhimov, which was about 2 miles away from it, approached the Japanese flagship by 4, 2 miles?
But even if this happened, it should be understood that Mikasa was at a very sharp heading angle to both Navarin and Nakhimov, despite the fact that both of these ships had old and short-range artillery. Accordingly, it should be assumed that if these ships had the ability to shoot at Mikasa, it would be extremely short-lived and hardly effective. "Nakhimov", having failed to confirm the determined distance to the Japanese flagship by sighting, in general, most likely, fired at the Japanese flagship with large undershoots.
I have no information on whom the flagship of Vice-Admiral Nebogatov was firing at, the senior officer of the "Emperor Nicholas I", unfortunately, described the firing of the squadron ships, and not his battleship, but, obviously, to conduct effective fire on the "Mikasa" at the ninth on account of the ship in the Russian ranks there was no possibility. As for the coastal defense battleships in the 3rd Pacific Squadron, they were armed with 254-mm and 120-mm guns, and not a single shell of the indicated calibers in the outset of the battle hit Mikasa.
Thus, it should be assumed that in the first 15–20 minutes of the battle, only 5 Russian ships fired effectively at Mikasa - 4 squadron battleships of the Borodino class, of which the Eagle entered the battle with a slight delay, and “Oslyabya.
The material presented to your attention appeared as a chapter to an article devoted to the comparative accuracy of Russian and Japanese fire in Tsushima, but, as it often happens to me, it quickly grew to the size of an independent article. Therefore, I am posting it as a prequel to the main work.
