In this article, we return to the description of the operations of the Pearl-class cruisers in the Battle of Tsushima. It might seem that, arguing about the intentions and decisions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky, the author went too far from the topic, but all this was absolutely necessary to understand why our high-speed reconnaissance cruisers were not used for their intended purpose, that is, to detect the main forces of the enemy.
And yet: why?
In a classic naval battle, when both squadrons are looking for a decisive battle, reconnaissance is necessary, since it allows the admiral producing it to detect the enemy main forces in advance, which makes it possible for him to position and line up his squadron so as to introduce it into fight in the most rational and profitable way.
In the previous articles of this cycle, the author showed that the Russian commander, fully aware of the advantages that the high squadron speed of his ships gives H. Togo, did not have the slightest hope for this. The problem was that the main forces, even in poor visibility conditions, could see each other from seven miles, and the distance of a decisive artillery battle, at which it would actually be possible to inflict significant damage to the enemy ships, was less than 4 miles, that is, 40 cables. In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky would never have been able to "trap" the Japanese fleet, lining up in one order or another: having discovered that the situation was not in his favor, H. Togo would always have the opportunity to evade, retreat and start rapprochement on a new one. At the same time, the superiority of the Japanese fleet in speed provided it with an unconditional tactical advantage, allowing, with correct maneuvering, to expose the Russians "crossing T" and defeat the Russian squadron.
According to the author, which he substantiated in detail in previous materials, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, realizing the advantages of the Japanese, found a very original way out of a seemingly insoluble situation. He planned to follow in a marching formation, consisting of two columns, and deploy in a battle formation only when the main enemy forces were within his sight, and their intentions became clear. In other words, since the Japanese could defeat any Russian squadron in any battle formation that the Russian squadron could accept, Zinovy Petrovich decided not to accept any formation, and reorganize into battle formation only at the very last moment.
Oddly enough, this tactic worked in Tsushima - H. Togo went to the left shell of the Russian squadron to attack the relatively weak left column led by the battleship Oslyabya, which consisted of old ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments. According to the author, the fact that Z. P. Rozhestvensky nevertheless managed to bring his newest battleships of the Borodino type to the head of the left column, it became a most unpleasant surprise for H. Togo, so instead of defeating the weakest part of Russian ships or exhibiting the "Crossing T" he was forced to perform a maneuver, later called "Loop Togo". Its essence consisted in a turn consistently under enemy fire, and it is difficult to assume that this maneuver was planned in advance by the Japanese admiral: not only did he put the Japanese in a vulnerable position at the stage of its implementation, it also did not give great tactical advantages. If H. That just needed to bring the columns of his battleships and armored cruisers to the head of the Russian squadron, he could do it in a much less extreme way.
However, to understand the role that Zhemchug and Izumrud played by Z. P. Rozhestvensky, the consequences of the maneuvering of the Japanese and Russian squadrons are not so important. The key is the plan of the Russian commander, which was not to make any reorganization until the main forces of the Japanese appeared on the horizon and showed their intentions. In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky was not going to rebuild before the main forces of the Japanese appeared.
But if so, then why would he have to conduct reconnaissance?
Of course, from the point of view of classical tactics of naval combat, reconnaissance was extremely important, but the point is that the Russian commander was going to act in a completely unclassical manner. His non-standard plan for starting the battle made reconnaissance by cruisers unnecessary, so there was no point in sending Pearls and Emerald into it.
Of course, for the cruisers intended for service with the squadron, there was another task: to prevent the enemy from conducting reconnaissance. But, firstly, this was never the duty of domestic "second-rank" ships of this class - after all, they were too weak for this. Secondly, it was necessary to drive off the enemy's cruiser in order not to let the enemy know about his intentions, in order to hide his position, formation, course and speed, but Z. P. Rozhestvensky, who decided to deploy in battle formation in view of the enemy, did not need all this.
And, finally, the third obvious reason for refusing to interfere with the enemy's reconnaissance was the frank weakness of the cruisers of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons. The Japanese had an overwhelming numerical superiority in armored cruisers over the forces of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. In addition, as it was known from the experience of the battles at Port Arthur, they often supported the latter with the armored cruisers of Kh. Kamimura: at the same time, the Russian commander did not have ships capable of providing such support to our armored cruisers.
As you know, the Russian commander expected the main Japanese forces to appear from the north. It was from there that the 5th combat detachment appeared, consisting of the old battleship Chin-Yen and the armored cruisers Itsukushima, Hasidate, and Matsushima, and the Russian squadron believed that they were also accompanied by Akitsushima and Suma. … In fact, in addition to these two cruisers, the 5th Detachment also accompanied the Chiyoda. There was no point in sending Russian cruisers against such forces: it is possible that they could drive off the Japanese ships, but at what cost? And if another cruising detachment had come to the aid of the Japanese, the battle would have become completely unequal.
In other words, the cruisers of Z. P. There were not many Rozhdestvensky, and they were not too strong (excluding "Oleg"). The Russian admiral decided to use them to protect transports, as well as cover the main forces from attacks by destroyers and play the role of rehearsal ships. Accordingly, any other use of them was possible only to achieve some important, significant goals: the attack of the Japanese intelligence officers, obviously, was not such a goal. Z. P. Rozhestvensky won absolutely nothing from the fact that the Japanese scouts would not have seen his squadron - on the contrary! Let us recall that the decision to attack the left column of the Russian squadron was made by H. Togo long before entering the line of sight, guided by information received from his cruisers who were carrying out reconnaissance.
Strictly speaking, to implement the plan Z. P. Rozhestvensky should just not hide the Russian squadron, but proudly demonstrate its marching formation to the Japanese scouts. Only in this way it would be possible to "convince" H. Togo to abandon the "crossing T" and attack one of the columns of Russian ships. Perhaps this is the reason for the strange reluctance of the Russian commander to interfere with the Japanese intelligence officers: here is the prohibition to interrupt Japanese radio messages, the refusal of the Izumi attack, and so on.
Thus, the Russian commander did not have a single reason to send the Emerald and Zhemchug into reconnaissance, but there were many reasons not to do so. In any case, reconnaissance itself is not an end in itself, but a means to put the enemy at a disadvantage: and since it was the Japanese who got into it in the outset of the battle, there is no reason to consider this decision of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky erroneous.
The consequence of this decision of the Russian commander was the completely unheroic presence of the Zhemchug and Izumrud with the main forces of the squadron. And although the "Pearl" before the start of the battle of the main forces managed to "clarify" the Japanese steamer, which was trying to pass under the nose of the squadron, and the "Emerald" even fought a little with Japanese cruisers, when an accidental shot from the "Eagle" at 11.15 put an end to the short ten-minute skirmish of the Russians battleships with the ships of admirals Kataoka and Deva, but, by and large, nothing interesting happened with these cruisers.
The beginning of the battle
After a small skirmish with the Japanese cruisers, during which the Emerald, firing back, moved to the right flank of the Russian squadron, in battle it was ordered to be from a non-firing side. At this time, both Russian cruisers, together with the 1st destroyer detachment, were abeam of the "Prince Suvorov", while the "Izumrud" was sailing into the wake of the "Pearl". But, at about 12.00 Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to retreat a little, shifting to the traverse of the "Eagle", which was done by the cruisers.
The main forces of the Japanese were found on the "Pearl" at about the same time as they were spotted on the "Prince Suvorov", that is, around 13.20, when they were still on the right shell of the Russian squadron. From the cruiser, just in case, they fired a shot from the bow 120-mm gun, so that the Japanese battleships would not be overlooked on the flagship. Then, after the ships H. Togo and H. Kamimura crossed to the left side, they were lost on the Pearl, and they were seen again only after the Japanese, performing the Togo loop, opened fire on the Oslyaba. But on the "Pearl" the battleships of H. Togo, nevertheless, were poorly seen. However, the Japanese shells that made the flight landed near the Pearl and even hit it. The commander of the cruiser P. P. Levitsky ordered to open return fire - not so much to damage the enemy, who was almost invisible, but to raise the morale of the team.
For some time nothing happened for Zhemchug, and then the real adventures began. As you know, at 14.26 on the "Prince Suvorov" the rudder was disabled, and it turned 180 degrees. (16 points), rolled to the right. Initially, "Alexander III" turned after him, and only after it was realized that this was not a maneuver, but an uncontrolled movement of the ship knocked out of action, "Alexander III" led the squadron further.
However, on the "Pearl" these events were seen so that the main forces of the squadron were deployed. And at the same time, the Japanese flagship Mikasa was discovered, which seemed to be running across the Russian course. This was incorrect, since at that moment the squadron courses were closer to parallel ones, but the Zhemchug commander suggested that the Japanese were going over to the right side of the Russian system. Accordingly, remaining in the same place, "Pearl" risked ending up between the main forces of the Russians and the Japanese, which was unacceptable: the order of Z. P. Rozhestvensky determined the place of the 2nd rank cruisers behind the formation of the Russian battleships, and nothing else.
Accordingly, P. P. Levitsky led his ship to the left side of the Russian squadron, directing the Zhemchug into the gap that had formed between the Eagle and Sisoy the Great after the Oslyabi went out of action. However, this seemingly correct decision led to the fact that the "Pearl" was no more than 25 cables from the terminal armored cruisers of the 1st Japanese combat detachment - "Nissina" and "Kasugi", which immediately fired at the small Russian cruiser. However, it is possible, of course, that some other ships fired at the Zhemchug, it is only reliable that shells fell around it.
P. P. Levitsky quickly realized that he was mistaken in his assumption, and made an attempt to return to the right side of the squadron. For some reason, he could not return the same way he came - that is, through the gap between the "Eagle" and "Sisoi the Great", and therefore went along the Russian squadron.
"On the Internet" the author has repeatedly come across the opinion about the good preparation of the 3rd Pacific Squadron in terms of maneuvering. However, on the "Pearl" they saw something completely different, P. P. Levitsky, in his testimony to the Investigative Commission, indicated: "Seeing that the ships of Admiral Nebogatov were stretched so much that the intervals between them reach 5 cables and more …". In other words, with the intervals set by the commander of 2 cables, the length of the formation of the entire squadron should have been about 3 miles, but only 4 Nebogatov's ships managed to stretch at least 1, 7-1, 8 miles!
Taking advantage of long intervals, the "Pearl" passed under the stern of the coastal defense battleship "General-Admiral Apraksin" following the "Emperor Nicholas I", in the gap between it and the "Senyavin", and returned to the right side of the squadron.
Collision with "Ural"
P. P. Levitsky saw that the Russian cruisers, located to the right of the transports going a little further away, were fighting with their Japanese classmates, and that Apraksin was trying to help them - apparently, the ships of the main Japanese forces were too far for him, or on the battleship they were not seen at the coastal defense. The Zhemchug commander later reported that both Apraksin towers were aimed at Japanese cruisers trying to break through to the transports. Not wanting to shoot them down, P. P. Levitsky reduced the speed of his ship to small - and it was here that the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", trying to stay closer to the battleships, and made a bulk on the "Pearl".
P. P. Levitsky ordered to increase the speed immediately after the Apraksin's main battery was fired, but this was not enough, since the Ural came into contact with the bow of the Pearl's stern. The damage was not fatal, but unpleasant:
1. The edges of the blades of the right propeller are bent;
2. The square, fastening the shirstrekovy belt of the side planking with the deck stringer in the stern, turned out to be dented;
3. The scoop of the aft mine apparatus broke, the mine itself, loaded into it, broke, and its charging compartment fell into the water and drowned.
It must be said that the aft mine apparatus on the cruiser was the only one manufactured for battle: the onboard ones, given the excitement and draft of the cruiser, could not be used. Thus, the bulk of the "Ural" deprived the cruiser of its torpedo armament: however, given the meager firing range, it was still completely useless. There was one more thing - from the impact of the "Ural" on the hull of the "Pearl" the right car of the latter stopped, and steam was immediately blocked for it: but then it was gradually added, and the car operated completely freely, obviously without receiving any damage.
But why did they not do anything in the Urals to avoid a collision with the cruiser that had reduced its speed? The fact is that by this time the "Ural" had received quite serious damage.
Approximately half an hour after the start of the battle, according to the cruiser commander, a "at least ten-inch" shell hit it, as a result of which the Ural received an underwater hole on its port side, in the nose. The water instantly flooded the front "bomb cellar", as well as the coal pit, which turned out to be empty, which caused the "Ural" to receive a strong trim on the bow and roll to the left side. As a result, the auxiliary cruiser, built as a passenger liner rather than a battleship, became difficult to obey the helm. But, as if that were not enough, enemy shells damaged the telemotor and broke the steam pipe of the steering engine. As a result, the ship completely lost its rudder and could only be controlled by machines.
All this, of course, in itself made it extremely difficult to control the cruiser, but, as if all of the above was not enough, almost immediately interrupted the machine telegraph. This has not yet completely disrupted communication with the engine room, since, in addition to the telegraph, there was also a telephone, on which the commander of the "Ural" Istomin began to give commands. But then Ivanitsky, the engineer on duty, came to him and reported on behalf of the chief engineer that due to the roar of shells explosions and the fire of their own artillery in the engine room they could not hear the telephone at all …
In light of the above, by the time Zhemchug dropped the move, so as not to interfere with Apraksin's shot, Ural was almost uncontrollable, which led to the bulk. It is interesting, by the way, that the commander of the Ural believed that he had collided not with the Pearl, but with the Izumrud.
After completing his "run" between the fighting main forces of the squadrons and returning to the right side of the Russian column, P. P. Levitsky, as it seemed to him then, finally considered the plight of the flagship battleship "Prince Suvorov" and went to him. Later on "Zhemchug" they learned that in fact it was not "Suvorov", but the battleship "Alexander III". On the way, the "Pearl" had to dodge the "Sisoy the Great", which, according to the commander of the "Pearl", cut him across. What it was, the author of this article was unable to find out, because there is no evidence that "Sisoy the Great" left the column at that time (closer to four in the afternoon). At about 16.00, the Zhemchug went out under the stern of the Alexander III and partially stalled the course: the cruiser watched two destroyers departing from the battered flagship, and one of them began to turn around, as if having a desire to approach the starboard side of the Pearl. The cruiser noticed that the flag-captain Clapier-de-Colong was on board the destroyer, and decided that the rest of the headquarters and the admiral were there, and that they all probably wanted to go to the cruiser. Accordingly, "Zhemchug" prepared to receive people on board: the entrance to the right ladder was opened, the ends, stretchers for the wounded were prepared and the whaleboat was launched.
However, when the whaleboat was already being lowered, P. P. Levitsky discovered that the destroyer was not going to approach the Zhemchug at all, but went somewhere further, to the right of the cruiser, and the second destroyer followed him. And on the left, Japanese battleships appeared, and the rangefinder showed that there were no more than 20 cables before them. The enemy immediately opened fire, so that shells immediately began to burst around the "Alexander III" and "Pearl". Having lost his only mine apparatus capable of using torpedoes, P. P. Levitsky lost even the theoretical chances of harming such a powerful enemy, and was forced to retreat, especially since his battleships were not visible. From the "Pearl" we saw only "Borodino" and "Eagle", which passed under the stern of the cruiser and disappeared from sight. The cruiser gave full speed and, turning to the right, followed the destroyers leaving the Alexander III.
Perhaps someone will be able to see in this the lack of fighting spirit of P. P. Levitsky, who left "Alexander" alone in the face of a detachment of Japanese battleships. Perhaps someone will remember the actions of N. O. von Essen, fearlessly leading his Novik to the Japanese armored ships. But let's not forget that Nikolai Ottovich nevertheless "jumped" on the Japanese flagship in view of the entire Port Arthur squadron, to which the Japanese fire was diverted, and here the "Pearl", if he ventured to do something like that, did not have such cover. The decision of P. P. Levitsky, of course, was not heroic, but he could not be considered cowardly in any way.
Why couldn't they distinguish Alexander III from Suvorov on the Zhemchug? The flagship battleship Z. P. Rozhestvensky was further away, already without pipes and masts, and was not seen from the cruiser. At the same time, "Alexander III" by that time had already been badly burned and was so smoky that the inscription on the stern of the battleship became completely indistinguishable. Although P. P. Levitsky and admitted later that someone from his team could still read it when "Pearl", turning to the right, briefly approached the battleship.
At the departure, the "Pearl" was damaged: it was at this time that a hit occurred, the consequences of which P. P. Levitsky described in detail in his testimony. An enemy shell hit the middle pipe and severely damaged it, fragments flew into the stoker, and the flame was blown out of the furnaces by gases from the explosion. But the bulk of the fragments fell on the place where the right waist 120-mm gun was located, and the gunners serving it were killed or wounded, and the deck was pierced in many places. In addition, shrapnel hit the bow bridge, wounding three sailors and killing Midshipman Tavashern. There were also fires - the fire engulfed four 120-mm "cartridges" lying at the gun, the command compartment filled with coal and the cover on the whaleboat caught fire. The gunpowder in the casings began to explode, and midshipman Ratkov was wounded by one of the casings.
Here I would like to note a small discrepancy: V. V. Khromov, in his monograph devoted to the Zhemchug-class cruisers, indicates that not four 120-mm rounds, but only three, caught fire, but the Zhemchug commander P. P. Levitsky still points out that there were four of them. Be that as it may, the "Pearl" left after the destroyers. P. P. Levitsky assumed that the headquarters of Z. P. Rozhestvensky and the admiral himself did not switch to his cruiser only due to the proximity of enemy battleships, but when he went beyond their fire and, at about 16.00, approached the destroyers up to 1 cable, they still did not express such a desire.
But what was “Emerald” doing at this time? To be continued…
