Platoon on the offensive
Organization and conduct of an offensive battle of a rifle platoon to a height
(Example 8)
In January 1944, our troops carried out an offensive operation in the Novosokolniki area. On the evening of January 15, the 1st Rifle Company of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division received the task - in the early morning of January 19, after dark, to break through the enemy's front line, capture height 241, 2 and at dawn ensure the entry of the main forces of the regiment into battle.
The company commander, senior lieutenant Urasov, decided to build a battle formation of platoons in a line to master the height: on the right flank - the 3rd rifle platoon, in the center - the 2nd rifle platoon, and on the left flank - the 1st rifle platoon under the command of the junior lieutenant Smirnov.
On the morning of January 16, after the reconnaissance, the commander of the rifle company assigned the rifle platoon of Junior Lieutenant Smirnov the task of destroying the enemy on the southwestern slopes of heights 241, 2 and, reaching its northwestern slopes, gain a foothold on them and ensure that the main forces of the left flank battalion of the regiment.
The platoon was reinforced with one heavy machine gun, a sapper squad and three reconnaissance guides.
To support the combat operations of the platoon, it was planned to conduct a 15-minute artillery fire raid. Four 45-mm guns, mounted for direct fire, a mortar platoon and two artillery batteries, [58] allocated to support the platoon's offensive, were supposed to destroy enemy firing points and accompany the advancing platoon infantry until it completely took possession of the western part of the hill …
The 2nd rifle platoon, advancing to the right, received the task of capturing the central part of the height.
The western part of height 241, 2 was defended up to a reinforced platoon of enemy infantry. The enemy's defenses were well prepared in engineering terms. It had a developed system of trenches and communication passages, firing points, engineering structures and barriers. The first trench ran along the southern slopes of the height 250 meters from our troops, the second - closer to the top, the third - behind the return slopes of the height. On the southwestern slopes of the height, the first trench turned at an angle to the north and connected with the second and third trenches, representing here a sort of cut off position.
Between the trenches there were two bunkers, two open machine-gun platforms and one 75-mm cannon, exposed for direct fire; behind the third trench were two 81-mm mortars. In front of the front line of the defense there were three rows of stakes, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. On the northern slopes of the hill, between the second and third trenches, the enemy had dugouts in which the infantrymen rested.
The terrain on the front line of the enemy's defenses and in the nearest depths was open. Height 241, 2, dominating the surrounding terrain, was very convenient for organizing and conducting a defensive battle. The open terrain and the dominant position of the height made it difficult for the rifle platoon to advance.
There was a thaw, fog was spreading on the ground. Visibility in fog at night did not exceed 10–12 meters. Dawn began only at 8 o'clock. 25 minutes
Having received the task for the offensive, the commander of the 1st rifle platoon calculated the time he had to prepare for the offensive.
It took almost three days to prepare for the offensive. The platoon commander distributed this time as follows: for [59] the day of January 16, to conduct a reconnaissance, make a decision and assign tasks to the squad leaders, organize interaction in the platoon and with the artillerymen, and prepare the personnel for night exercises; on the night of January 17 and 18, conduct night tactical training exercises for the platoon; during all three days - January 16, 17 and 18 - the platoon personnel study the enemy, their mission, the direction of the attack and target designation signals. Rest for the platoon personnel was provided in the daytime.
After conducting a reconnaissance with the squad leaders and the commander of the heavy machine gun crew, the rifle platoon commander made a decision and assigned tasks to the squad commanders and the crew of the heavy machine gun.
The 1st rifle squad was ordered to advance on the right flank of the platoon, attack and destroy the machine gun in the first trench and capture the second trench in the section between the communication passage connecting the first trench with the second, and the communication passage connecting the second trench with the dugouts. Then the 1st rifle squad was to attack the dugouts in cooperation with the 2nd rifle squad, destroy the infantry in them, capture the third trench in the area north of the dugouts, repel possible enemy counterattacks from the north and northeast and ensure the entry of the main forces into battle battalion.
The 2nd rifle squad was ordered to advance along the ravine in the center of the rifle platoon, attack and destroy the bunker between the first and second trenches and capture the second trench in the area between the communication passage connecting the second trench with the dugouts, and the communication course connecting the first trench with the second. Then the 2nd rifle squad was to attack the dugouts and, in cooperation with the 1st rifle squad, destroy the infantry in them, seize the third trench in the area to the left of the 1st rifle squad, repel enemy counterattacks from the north and north-west and ensure entry into battle of the main forces of the battalion.
The 3rd rifle squad was ordered to advance on the left open flank of the rifle platoon, along the southwestern slopes of heights 241, 2, attack and destroy the bunker between the first and second trenches to the right of their fork and seize the second trench in the section between the communication passage connecting the first trench with the second, and the fork in the trenches. After that, the squad had to attack the gun between the second and third trenches and destroy its crew, seize the cut-off trench in the area between the second and third trenches, repel enemy counterattacks from the west and secure the left flank of the rifle battalion when it was put into battle.
By 5 o'clock on January 19, the sapper squad was ordered to make three passes (at the rate of one pass to the rifle squad) in the enemy's engineering barriers in front of its front line of defense on the directions of the rifle squad's offensive, and with the beginning of their offensive, advance with the 2nd and 3rd rifle squads. [61] squads, block and blow up enemy bunkers.
The calculation of the heavy machine gun received the task of advancing on the left flank of the 3rd rifle squad, ensuring its attack from the front and from the left flank, repelling enemy counterattacks from the west and securing the left flank of the rifle battalion when it was put into battle.
The platoon commander himself decided to be in the 2nd (directing) squad.
Then the platoon leader organized interaction and control in the platoon. At the same time, he determined: the time and procedure for the infantry squads to leave their initial position to the attack line, the procedure for overcoming engineering obstacles and moving into the attack, the sequence for the destruction of enemy firing points, the procedure for firing with light and heavy machine guns, as well as their change of positions during the advance of rifle branches, the order of target designation and signals.
The rifle platoon was supposed to take its starting position at 7 o'clock on January 19. The advancement of rifle squads to the line of attack was scheduled for 7 o'clock. 30 minutes, that is, immediately after our artillery begins a fire raid.
The line of attack of rifle squads was assigned in front of the barbed wire fence, not reaching 10-15 meters from the passages made in it.
When the rifle squads moved from their initial position to the line of attack, the sappers marked the places of passage in the enemy's engineering barriers with signals from a flashlight.
The front line of the enemy's defense was to be attacked simultaneously by rifle squads. During the attack of the light machine gun and enemy bunkers by rifle squads, our light machine guns ensured the attack of the 1st and 2nd squads from the side of the heavy machine gun, and the heavy machine gun provided the attack of the 3rd rifle squad from the side of the enemy's gun.
The 1st and 2nd rifle squads, having captured the second trench, simultaneously attacked the dugouts from the east and west (from the flanks) and destroyed the enemy infantry located there. At the same time, light machine guns ensured the attack of the squads from the side of enemy mortars.
The 3rd rifle squad during the attack by the 1st and 2nd [62] rifle squads of the enemy's dugouts attacked the enemy gun, and the heavy machine gun of the 3rd squad, taking a position in the second trench, supported the attack of its squad.
During the attack of rifle squads, the crews of light machine guns move in the squad chain and fire on the move. In the event that the enemy put up strong resistance, they were ordered to move along the lines, taking up positions for firing.
The calculation of the heavy machine gun was supposed to follow the lines as the 3rd rifle squad moved 30-40 meters behind its chain. Moreover, both light and heavy machine guns moved from one line to another only after the rifle squads, supported by machine gun fire, advanced 30–40 meters ahead.
The platoon commander assigned sound and light signals to control the squads.
On the afternoon of January 18, the platoon leader organized interaction with the artillery. It consisted in coordinating the actions of the platoon and artillery during the offensive and establishing interaction signals.
With the beginning of the attack of the rifle platoon, the 1st squad gave a signal to a 45-mm gun, firing at the enemy's light machine gun, to transfer the fire to the heavy machine gun. The fire from the guns at the firing points was to be conducted until the rifle platoon took possession of the first enemy trench.
The 2nd and 3rd rifle squads, having burst into the first trench, immediately gave a signal to 45-mm guns firing at enemy bunkers to transfer fire to an enemy gun located between the second and third trenches.
At this time, two artillery batteries and a mortar platoon should fire from closed firing positions at the enemy's dugouts, guns and mortars. As soon as the rifle platoon takes possession of the second trench, the platoon leader gives the signal for artillery to transfer fire from the dugouts to mortars. The signal about the cessation of mortar fire and the fire of 45-mm guns on the heavy machine gun and the enemy's gun is given by the commanders of the first and third rifle squads.
The suppression of the newly appeared or revived enemy firing points was assigned to the artillery, which opened fire at the signals of the commanders of rifle squads.
The signal for 45-mm guns to transfer fire from a light machine gun to a heavy machine gun and from bunkers to an enemy gun was set by tracer bullets. The signal for the artillery stationed in closed firing positions to transfer fire from dugouts to mortars was a series of green rockets. Single green rockets served as a signal for mortars and 45-mm guns of a ceasefire against the heavy machine gun and the enemy's gun.
To suppress and destroy the newly appeared or revived enemy firing points, a signal was set - a red rocket towards the firing point.
In the rear of the rifle regiment's defense sector, a terrain similar to Hill 241, 2 was chosen, where for two nights on January 17 and 18 the platoon was trained to storm the strongpoint. At the same time, special attention was paid to the ability to withstand the direction of the attack and the high rate of attack; the ability to act in the chain of separation; fire at unlit targets, flashes and silhouettes, on the move and from a place; determine the distance to firing points by flashes and sounds of shots, overcome obstacles and obstacles; move in azimuth; move silently on the ground; conduct hand-to-hand combat. Great importance was attached to the organization and implementation of interaction and control during the battle.
On the night of January 19, a rifle platoon was preparing for an attack. By one o'clock in the morning, all personnel received white camouflage robes. The weapon was wrapped in a white cloth, the heavy machine gun was painted white and mounted on skis.
By 6 o'clock. 45 minutes sappers made passes through the engineering barriers. The scouts-guides arrived at the platoon. The entire platoon personnel received hot food. Artillery in closed positions and direct-fire guns were ready to open fire at firing points and enemy manpower.
By 7 o'clock, the platoon, observing camouflage measures, took up its starting position for the attack. It was dark. The enemy occasionally conducted rifle and machine-gun fire and illuminated the terrain ahead with missiles.
At 7 o'clock. 30 minutes. artillery fire began on the enemy stronghold. The raid lasted 15 minutes. Direct-fire guns opened fire on light and heavy machine guns and bunkers.
As soon as the fire raid of our artillery began, the rifle squads began to move from their initial position to the line of attack. The squads moved in a chain towards the passages in the minefield and the barbed wire. The guides in each squad were scout guides, who had a good understanding of the terrain and enemy defenses.
The sappers, having made passages in the minefield and the barbed wire, remained with them until the infantry attack began. They marked the places of passage, giving signals to the rifle squads with red flashlights.
Before reaching the minefield, the platoon turned around at the line of the attack. Light and heavy machine guns took up positions. A salvo from a rocket artillery battalion rang out. The end of the volley meant the end of the fire raid and the beginning of the platoon's attack. The commander of the 1st rifle squad gave a signal to the 45-mm gun to transfer fire from the light machine gun to the enemy's heavy machine gun.
As soon as the artillery transferred fire from the first trench to the depth of the defense, the rifle platoon swiftly attacked the first trench, in which there were a small number of enemy soldiers. Despite the fact that our artillery shifted the fire into the depths of the enemy's defenses, the enemy soldiers remained in cover, suggesting that the attack would be repeated.
Without giving the enemy time to recover, rifle squads burst into the trench and destroyed the infantry stationed there. At this time, direct-fire guns continued to fire at the heavy machine gun and enemy bunkers.
As soon as the squads took possession of the first trench, the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd rifle squads gave signals to direct-fire guns with tracer bullets to transfer fire from the bunkers to the enemy's gun.
Without stopping in the first trench, the rifle squads continued to rapidly attack the bunkers and the second trench.
The artillery, which was in closed firing positions, was at that time firing heavy fire on the dugouts between the second and third trenches and enemy mortars.
The garrison of the enemy's right bunker could not offer serious resistance to the soldiers of the 2nd rifle squad, since its machine gun was destroyed by direct hits of 45-mm shells into its embrasure.
The 1st and 2nd rifle squads quickly covered the distance between the first and second trenches and captured the second trench.
The 3rd rifle squad, when attempting to attack the enemy's left bunker, came across heavy fire from the bunker, which was not suppressed. The squad leader ordered the missile officer to send a signal to 45-mm guns firing at the enemy's guns, transfer fire to the bunker again and correct this fire with red missiles.
As soon as two 45-mm guns opened fire on the bunker, the 3rd rifle squad (without two soldiers, one of them was a rocket officer) with three sappers began to move along the first trench into the second trench and into the rear of the enemy bunker. While the squad was going to the rear of the bunker, two soldiers, left by the squad leader in place, adjusted the fire of 45-mm guns and fired at the enemy bunker, diverting his attention to themselves.
Entering the second trench (to the rear of the bunker), the commander of the 3rd rifle squad gave a signal with tracer bullets to transfer the fire of 45-mm guns from the bunker to the enemy's gun and cease fire, which was fired by two soldiers from the front.
As soon as the shelling of the bunker ceased, the 3rd rifle squad swiftly attacked the bunker from the rear, blocked it and blew it up.
After the 1st and 2nd rifle squads captured the second trench, the platoon commander gave a signal to the artillery battery to transfer fire from the dugouts to the enemy's mortars. The squads quickly rushed along the communication routes to the dugouts. On the way of the 2nd rifle squad, a destroyed section of the communication route and an anti-personnel obstacle met. By order of the platoon commander, the squad began to bypass the obstacle on the right. Unexpectedly, from the side of the summit of height 241, 2, a heavy machine gun shot down at it. The soldiers lay down, and [66] then crawled away in the course of the message. At this time, in the course of communication behind the obstacle, it appeared before the separation of the enemy infantry. The Nazis opened fire on the 2nd rifle squad with rifles and machine guns.
As soon as the artillery battery transferred the fire from the dugouts to the mortars, up to two enemy infantry squads jumped out of the dugouts and, along the lines of communication, rushed to the second trench. Here the soldiers came across the 1st and 2nd rifle squads. A fight ensued.
To break the enemy's resistance, the commander of the 1st rifle squad ordered two soldiers to remain in place and fight the enemy from the front, and he himself with five soldiers decided to bypass the Nazis on the right under cover of darkness, go to the rear and strike from the rear and defeat them from the front. their. This maneuver was successfully carried out. The attack from the rear came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Six enemy soldiers were killed and three captured. Following this, the rifle squad attacked the dugouts.
Meeting the resistance of the heavy machine gun on the right and enemy infantry from the front, the platoon commander ordered the 2nd rifle squad to call artillery fire on the heavy machine gun, and bypass the enemy infantry on the left.
The commander of the 2nd rifle squad, calling artillery fire on a heavy machine gun, ordered three soldiers to fire at the enemy infantry from the front, and he himself with three soldiers began to bypass the Germans on the left, trying to get them to the rear. On the way, he met enemy infantry, which in turn tried to bypass the 2nd rifle squad from the flank and rear. A battle broke out. Stretched out along the front and fired upon by the enemy's strong rifle and machine-gun fire, the rifle squad could not advance further.
By this time, the 1st rifle squad had taken possession of the dugouts. The squad leader gave the signal to transfer fire from machine guns to mortars and ordered three soldiers to move to the top of heights 241, 2 and destroy the enemy heavy machine gun there, and he himself, with four soldiers, began an attack from the rear of the enemy infantry, which interfered with the advance of the 2nd rifle squad.
Soon, one after the other, two hand grenades exploded, and the enemy machine gun fell silent. He was attacked and then killed by three soldiers of the 1st rifle squad. [67] The enemy infantry, located opposite the 2nd rifle squad, began to retreat towards the dugouts. But then she met with the 1st rifle squad. The infantry was almost completely destroyed by the attack from the rear and from the front.
By this time, the 3rd rifle squad completed its task and began to organize the defense. The 1st and 2nd rifle squads, having captured the third trench, also went over to the defensive.
At dawn, the main forces of the rifle battalion, brought into action in the sector of the 1st rifle platoon, began to advance in the northwest direction.
Thus, the rifle platoon of junior lieutenant Smirnov completed the task assigned to him. He acted in difficult conditions: the enemy was not inferior to him in strength, had a well-prepared defense in terms of engineering, and was located on a terrain favorable for conducting a defensive battle. The almost complete defeat of the enemy was achieved thanks to the correct organization of the night battle, good training of personnel for it and his skillful actions in battle.
The platoon leader worked out a detailed plan for the night offensive battle. This plan was based on knowledge of the enemy and the terrain, and provided in detail for the actions of rifle squads, as well as attached and supporting means, to the depth of the platoon's entire mission. This made it much easier for the platoon commander to control the platoon in a night battle.
The platoon leader has organized a clear interaction in the platoon and with the supporting means. Thanks to this, the coordination and clarity of the actions of the entire platoon personnel, attached and supporting assets to the depth of the entire combat mission, was achieved.
Thorough preparation of personnel and weapons for a night battle was extremely important for the successful operations of the platoon. Studying the enemy, the terrain and its mission, training for action at night strictly according to the plan for the upcoming battle on terrain similar to the western part of heights 241, 2, made it easier for the personnel to navigate and maneuver on the battlefield, as well as maintain continuous interaction. [68]
The presence of camouflage gowns in the platoon, painting the weapon white or wrapping it in a white cloth ensured camouflage of personnel in battle.
Making early passes in the enemy's engineering barriers and marking them with light signals, as well as the presence of reconnaissance guides in each squad allowed the platoon to move quickly and non-stop and simultaneously attack the front edge of the enemy defense.
The platoon personnel advanced quickly, skillfully combining their movement with machine gun fire, direct-fire guns and artillery from closed firing positions. This was achieved thanks to the establishment of the simplest, fast-acting signals of interaction, target designation and control, as well as through the implementation of maneuvers on the battlefield by rifle squads in order to bypass and cover individual groups and firing points of the enemy.
The actions of the platoon personnel were skillful and proactive. When the enemy tried to organize resistance in certain sectors, rifle squads, quickly maneuvering on the battlefield, boldly bypassed the enemy's firing points and manpower and destroyed them from the rear. The implementation of the maneuver by the 3rd rifle squad to destroy the bunker and the 1st rifle squad to destroy the infantry and the machine-gun point led to the rapid defeat of the enemy.
