This article concludes the series about the artillery cruisers of the Soviet fleet. In previous articles, we reviewed the history of the design of ships of projects 26 and 26-bis, 68K and 68-bis, their technical characteristics and the capabilities of Soviet cruisers in comparison with their foreign "peers". It remains only to figure out the place and role of artillery cruisers in the post-war Soviet Navy: find out what tasks were assigned to these ships and understand how effectively they could solve them.
As we said earlier, in the first post-war years, the USSR launched the construction of torpedo-artillery surface ships: in the period from 1945 to 1955, 19 light cruisers of projects 68K and 68-bis, 80 destroyers 30-K and 30-bis were commissioned by the Russian Navy. - and this is not counting the cruisers and destroyers remaining in the ranks of the pre-war projects. Nevertheless, the superiority of the fleets of the NATO countries remained overwhelming, and therefore the leadership of the armed forces did not expect too much from the surface warships. In the 1950s and at the very beginning of the 60s, their main task was to defend the coast from the landing of potential enemies.
Artillery cruisers in all 4 fleets were brought together in cruiser divisions (DIKR), while destroyer brigades were included in these formations. Thus, ship strike groups (KUG) were formed to counter the surface forces of a potential enemy.
In the Baltic in 1956, the 12th DIKR was created, which included all light cruisers of projects 68K and 68-bis. Its tasks included not only the defense of the coast, but also the prevention of the enemy from the Baltic strait zone. Despite the relative weakness of the ship's composition, the Soviet fleet was supposed to dominate the Baltic and, what is most interesting, such a task did not look unrealistic at all. Let us recall the map of the ATS countries.
A significant part of the coastline belonged to the ATS, and Sweden and Finland, in addition to not being part of NATO, also did not have powerful navies and did not have bases on which they could be based in the Baltic Sea. Accordingly, to protect its own coast and its allies, the USSR had to blockade the strait zone, and this could have been done without even having aircraft carriers and battleships. Numerous minefields, land bomber and fighter aircraft, cruisers and destroyers with the support of torpedo boats and submarines deployed to positions could well have ensured the status of a "Soviet lake" to the Baltic. Not that the above forces guaranteed the inaccessibility of the "Baltic fortress", the NATO fleets of the 50s or 60s, if they so desired, could muster a shock fist capable of breaking through the defenses of the straits. But for this they would have to pay a very high price, hardly appropriate for the sake of tactical landings and / or strikes by aircraft carrier aircraft on the territory of the GDR and Poland.
A similar, but still somewhat different situation developed in the Black Sea - two DIKR were organized there - the fiftieth and forty-fourth, but still they did not really count on sea domination. Not only did a significant part of the coastline belong to Turkey, which was a NATO member, but also the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were at its disposal, through which, in the event of a threat of war, any ships of the United States and Mediterranean countries could enter the Black Sea. Soviet naval strike groups practiced combat with enemy forces that had passed into the Black Sea within the combat radius of the domestic missile-carrying aviation operating from the airfields of the Crimea, as well as from the ATS countries.
At the same time, in addition to fighting enemy ships and protecting their own coast from enemy landings, the actions of the fleet against the coast were of particular importance both on the Black and Baltic Seas. There was a strait zone in the Baltic, on the Black Sea - the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, through which NATO squadrons could pass into each of the seas, which should have been prevented: but it was much easier to "close" these "bottlenecks" if the coastline along them were under control of the Soviet troops. Accordingly, the fleet as a whole (and the artillery cruisers in particular) was entrusted with the responsibility of assisting the ground forces carrying out these operations, and such support was to be carried out, including in the form of tactical landings. The task of capturing the Black Sea Straits remained relevant almost until the very collapse of the USSR.
In the Pacific Fleet, the tasks of our artillery cruisers differed from their Baltic and Black Sea counterparts, perhaps due to the absence of straits. There, as well as in the Black Sea Fleet, two DIKR were created, No. 14 and No. 15, with one based directly in Vladivostok, and the second in Strelok Bay. Their main task was considered to cover the facilities and bases of Primorye from attacks by squadrons of surface ships, and, of course, to counter the landing of assault forces. Similarly, the cruisers of the Northern Fleet were supposed to be used - they were also assigned the task of torpedo-artillery combat with enemy surface ships, ensuring the landing of assault forces and protecting their internal convoys.
Thus, the main tasks of the Soviet artillery cruisers at the first stage of their service were:
1) Artillery battle with enemy surface ships
2) Counteraction to the landing of enemy troops
3) Providing and artillery support for the landing of their own assault forces
During this period (1955-1962), the Sverdlov-class cruisers were quite adequate to the tasks facing them. They had to operate in coastal zones, "under the umbrella" of numerous land-based naval aviation, and the task of this aviation was not so much to cover their own naval strike groups from the air, but to neutralize enemy heavy ships - battleships and aircraft carriers, which the ships of the project 68 bis were too tough. In fact, we can say that the Soviet fleet for some time "slipped" towards the theory of combined and / or concentrated strike, which dominated the minds of military men in the first half of the 30s. Indeed, everything was like this - the enemy groupings were to be destroyed by joint strikes of aviation, submarines and surface ships from torpedo boats to light cruisers, inclusive. But in comparison with pre-war times, there was one fundamental change - the basis of naval striking power was now aviation, and therefore, in essence, it would be more correct to say that the formations of our cruisers and destroyers played not the main, but rather still an auxiliary role … The basis of the naval strike power in the coastal areas was made up of Tu-16 missile-carrying bombers with anti-ship missiles, the first of which KS-1 "Kometa" was put into service in 1953 (and began mass production a year earlier). Such a missile, flying at a speed of over 1000 km / h at a range of up to 90 km, having a semi-active homing head and a combat one, often weighing up to 600 kilograms, was extremely dangerous even for a battleship, not to mention aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers. Of course, "Krasny Kavkaz" was nothing more than an old and lightly armored light cruiser (side - 75 mm, deck - 25 mm), but hitting it with a single KS-1 with a full-fledged warhead led to the fact that the ship had a standard displacement over 7,500 tons broke into two parts and sank in less than three minutes.
On the one hand, it would seem that the presence of such weapons systems nullified the value of torpedo-artillery ships, which were both the cruisers of the 68-bis project and the destroyers of the 30-bis project. But in reality, this is not so - even the deck of a supercarrier is by no means rubber, on it you can prepare only a part of the wing for takeoff, and the commander has to choose which one. If an aircraft carrier formation is threatened only by an air enemy, then for the time being it is possible to give preference to fighter squadrons. But if, in addition to an air attack, an attack by surface ships is also possible, then fighters will have to make room in order to also have strike aviation ready, but this, of course, will weaken the capabilities of air defense. At the same time, the presence of attack aircraft on the decks did not guarantee protection, there was always a danger of a night battle, so the threat of an attack by Soviet DIKR required the use of a powerful escort of its own cruisers and destroyers. And all the same, it is much more difficult to repel air attacks during an artillery battle with enemy ships than outside it. In other words, Soviet cruisers and destroyers, of course, could not independently defeat a balanced squadron of NATO ships, including heavy ships, but their role in such a defeat could be very significant.
And I must say that even the first URO cruisers and destroyers that appeared did not make the ships of the 68-bis projects useless in naval combat. Of course, the American air defense systems "Terrier" and "Talos" were not only anti-aircraft, but also a very powerful anti-ship weapon that could be used within line of sight. But it should be noted that the Terrier, due to the nuances of its radars, saw very poorly low-flying targets, and from this it did not work very well on surface ships at long ranges. Another thing is the Talos air defense missile system, which was specially modified so that the rocket first rose into the air, and then, from a height, fell on the ship, causing colossal damage to it. This weapon was extremely dangerous against any surface ship up to and including battleship, but it also had its own small complications. The air defense missile system was heavy and required many different equipment, which is why even heavy cruisers had stability problems after placing it. Therefore, the US Navy included only 7 ships with this air defense system (all - in the period from 1958 to 1964)
But the main problem was that the missiles of those years still remained a rather complex, unfinished and fastidious weapon. The same "Talos" had a large number of prelaunch operations that had to be carried out manually, and the preparation of the complex was rather slow. In the series of articles devoted to the Falklands conflict, we saw how often, for various technical reasons, the Sea Dart and Sea Wolf anti-aircraft missile systems failed and could not attack the enemy, and this is a completely different generation of missiles and a completely different technological level. At the same time, the Soviet cruisers of Project 68-bis, armed with outdated, but reliable 152-mm B-38 cannons, in the exercises usually covered the target from the third salvo, after which they switched to fire to kill, and even close explosions of 55 kg of shells both launchers and radars were capable of hitting with fragments …
In general, the strike of a pair of Talos missiles could well become fatal for the Soviet cruiser (not to mention the cases when the missile was equipped with an atomic warhead), but it still had to be delivered in time. Thus, the presence of guided missile weapons on a number of ships of foreign fleets in 1958-1965 still did not give them an overwhelming superiority over Soviet artillery cruisers - moreover, in 1958-65. there were still relatively few such ships.
And, of course, the very long-range 152-mm guns of the Soviet cruisers were perfect for supporting their own troops, or ground forces operating in the coastal zone.
Nevertheless, already at the beginning of the 60s, it became clear that artillery cruisers would soon be unable to effectively participate in solving the tasks of defeating enemy surface formations. The first nuclear submarines were commissioned, the first Soviet missile cruisers of the Grozny type were built, capable of firing a salvo of 8 anti-ship missiles flying at a distance of up to 250 km, and, of course, their strike capabilities in naval combat were fundamentally superior to those of any artillery cruiser … Therefore, in 1961-62, DIKR was disbanded, and the role of Project 68-bis cruisers in the fleet changed significantly.
The main tasks of domestic cruisers in wartime were to participate in amphibious operations and counteract enemy assault forces, while their role has changed somewhat. Now they were assigned the role of flagships of detachments of fire support ships for operational-tactical and strategic landings. In addition, the Project 68-bis ships were entrusted with the task of destroying enemy landings, but here it was no longer a naval battle with escort ships, but about finishing off convoys destroyed by aviation and other ships and destroying the landed forces. In other words, if the enemy landed troops under the cover of warships, then those had to be destroyed by aviation and / or submarines and surface ships of the URO, and then a cruiser approached the landing site, and from a dozen six-inch boats swept away everything - both transport and specialized landing ships, and landed units of the marines, and supplies unloaded ashore not far from the coastline … It is too costly to destroy all this with missiles, aviation is not always possible, but barrel artillery perfectly solved this issue. This is exactly how the Baltic cruisers were supposed to be used, and the Pacific ones were even relocated to Sovetskaya Gavan, closer to Hokkaido, where (and from where) the landings were expected - both ours and the enemy. But in the Northern Fleet, they did not see a great need for landings. For some time, they tried to use cruisers to ensure a breakthrough of Soviet submarines into the Atlantic, or to cover the areas of their deployment, but the capabilities of Sverdlov-class ships did not allow effectively solving such tasks, so the number of cruisers there was reduced to two, and in the the fleet was usually only one, and the second was either under repair or in conservation. The Black Sea cruisers were to provide a strategic landing in the Bosphorus.
Thus, around 1962-1965, plans for the use of Project 68 bis cruisers in wartime no longer envisaged their use as a strike force in naval battles and limited their use, albeit important, but secondary tasks. But the range of duties of ships in peacetime has significantly expanded.
The fact is that the USSR began to create a nuclear missile fleet, but at that time priority was given to submarines and small surface ships - at the same time, political necessity actively demanded the display of the flag in the vastness of the world's oceans, the protection of Soviet shipping and the provision of a military presence. Of all the available ship composition of the fleet, the project 68-bis cruisers were the best suited for solving this problem. As a result, the Sverdlov-class cruisers became perhaps the most recognizable ships of the USSR. They went everywhere - in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, and there is no need to even talk about the Arctic, the Norwegian and Mediterranean seas. And how they walked! For example, while serving in the Indian Ocean from January 5 to July 5, 1971, "Alexander Suvorov" covered 24,800 miles, visiting the ports of Berbera, Mogadishu, Aden and Bombay.
Significant progress in the development of aviation led to the fact that NATO aircraft carriers no longer needed to enter the Black Sea - now they could strike at the territory of the USSR from the eastern regions of the Mediterranean Sea. Previously, the Soviet Navy did not plan to operate in such remote areas for it, but now the situation has changed. Enemy groups had to be destroyed, and even a simple search and detection after the start of the war was a completely non-trivial task!
Gradually, the Soviet fleet came to the concept of combat services (BS). Its essence was that the detachments of Soviet ships in peacetime were deployed and served in the areas of concentration of the forward forces of the US Navy and NATO. Thus, the squadrons of the USSR Navy were able to control the location and movement of the ships of a potential enemy. At the same time, Soviet ships were tracking in such a way that, in the event of a war, they would be able to destroy the advanced NATO groupings, or cause serious damage, excluding the possibility of using the ships for their intended purpose. This is an important reservation: to destroy even a dozen 152-mm guns of a supercarrier weighing 100,000 tons by fire is a completely non-trivial task, but damaging it to such an extent that it was impossible to use its carrier-based aircraft was quite realistic.
The peculiarity of the combat service was that the detachments of the ships of the USSR Navy were indeed capable of delivering a disarming blow and "taking out of the game" the most dangerous enemy ships - aircraft carriers. But at the same time, the power of the Soviet detachments deployed for these purposes was not enough to ensure acceptable combat stability. In other words, they could complete the assigned task, but had practically no chance of surviving - they were expected to die either in the process of its implementation, or shortly thereafter.
For example, in the Mediterranean Sea, the famous 5th Operational Squadron (OPESK) was created, in which at the best of times there were up to 80 or more combat and auxiliary ships. With luck, these forces were indeed capable of neutralizing the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, but only at the cost of heavy losses. The surviving ships would find themselves in a ring of hostile countries - the navies of the NATO countries of the Mediterranean basin would outnumber them many times over, and of course, the remnants of the 5th OPESK could not go to the Black Sea or break through Gibraltar. As a result, regardless of whether the combat mission was completed or not, in the event of a full-scale conflict, the ships would die in battle.
Nevertheless, then this was perhaps the only way to neutralize the advanced groups before they struck - and we must respectfully remember those who were ready at any moment to carry out the order, even without the hope of surviving.
Tracking the advanced enemy forces should have been carried out not only in the Mediterranean Sea, therefore, in addition to the 5th OPESK, operational squadrons of the Northern (7th OPESK) and Pacific (10th OPESK) fleets were formed. In addition, the 8th OPESK was created to carry out combat services in the Indian Ocean. All OPESK led (or were part of) the cruiser 68 bis, and there were several reasons for this. Of course, in the second half of the 60s, the use of classic artillery cruisers in naval combat seemed an anachronism, but not because their firepower was insufficient, and then because, compared to rocket weapons, the firing range of barreled artillery was quite small. However, for BS, the range of weapon use was of much lesser importance, since tracking could be carried out within the limits of visual visibility. In addition, large and armored ships were not so easy to destroy - as a result, even if the enemy had struck the first blow, the cruisers had some chance, regardless of damage, to complete their task.
The Sverdlov-class cruisers regularly carried out combat services and were often accompanied by the aircraft carriers of our "sworn friends". This experience was first obtained on May 7, 1964, when the Dzerzhinsky, together with the large rocket ship Gnevny, entered the Mediterranean Sea, where they monitored the aircraft carrier groupings of the 6th Fleet, led by the aircraft carriers F. D. Roosevelt "and" Forrestal ". Perhaps the first pancake came out a little lumpy, because if our ships found the Roosevelt and took it for escort on the fourth day of the cruise, the Forrestal was discovered only a month later, on the way back - it was in the roadstead of Istanbul. But then, our fleet was just learning combat services, and learned very quickly … Take the same light cruiser Dzerzhinsky: another time, during combat service, which lasted from April to November 1967, he, together with two BODs, monitored the operational a compound of the US 6th Fleet, which included the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga. The capabilities of the American "floating airfields" were very interesting to the Soviet fleet, so the number of takeoffs and landings of carrier-based aircraft was scrupulously recorded on the cruiser.
In the period 1969-70, the ship took part in combat services, in 1970 it again went to the Mediterranean, although not on the BS - it took part in the exercises "South" under the flag of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko. And in 1972 "Dzerzhinsky" again watched one of the AUG of the 6th Fleet in order to prevent US intervention on the side of Israel - and this was no longer an exercise, the Soviet ships were in full readiness to destroy the American task force. In 1973, the cruiser was again in the Mediterranean, now in the area of hostilities - she provided cover for the Black Sea landing ships with a regiment of marines, heading to the conflict zone. In 1974-75, planned repairs were underway, but the ship was ahead of numerous new combat services …
Other cruisers of the Sverdlov class were not lagging behind, and here are a few examples: as mentioned above, the Dzerzhinsky performed its first combat service in May 1964, but in the same year, Mikhail Kutuzov also followed the 6th fleet. In 1972, when "Dzerzhinsky" was at the exercises, "October Revolution" and "Admiral Ushakov" were on the BS in the Mediterranean, later "Zhdanov" came there and with the same purpose.
In the Indian Ocean, at about the same time (late 1971 - early 1972), Dmitry Pozharsky was on combat service - and also in conditions close to combat. There was an Indo-Pakistani conflict, and the 10th OPESK was engaged in what the Americans called "power projection" - it was supposed to prevent the Americans and British if they tried to intervene. In 1973, the Admiral Senyavin served there, and at about the same time, the Admiral Ushakov in the Mediterranean was holding the American task force at gunpoint, led by the Iwo Jima landing helicopter carrier.
But in order to tell about all the combat services of the Soviet cruisers of the 68-bis project, neither an article nor a cycle will be enough - it's time to write a whole book. Indeed, even in 1982, in the Mediterranean Sea, "Zhdanov", which had already "knocked" 30 years old (entered service in 1952) and which served as a control ship, still "shook the old days" and about 60 hours, at a speed of 24-28 knots accompanied the nuclear aircraft carrier "Nimitz".
However, not only the battery of six-inch guns and the ability to maintain a high speed for a long time ensured the usefulness of our cruisers in combat services. The fact is that due to their size and good "infrastructural" component of the Sverdlov-class cruiser, they could not only effectively carry the BS themselves, but also helped other smaller ships do it. From the cruisers to the OPESK ships, fuel and food (including freshly baked bread) were transferred, on which the submarine crews could get a short rest, and in addition, the medical equipment of the cruisers was very perfect for their time, and the ships provided medical care for the sailors of the operational squadrons. In addition, the large size and large range of communications equipment of the project 68-bis cruisers made it possible to use them as command posts.
Of course, the ships of the 68-bis project over the years of their service were regularly upgraded, but for the most part it was of a relatively cosmetic nature - the composition of radio and radar equipment was updated, but by and large that was all. Of the more serious work, 3 main directions can be distinguished.
Since the further construction of artillery cruisers in the second half of the 50s clearly lost its meaning, and there were several unfinished ships of the 68-bis project on the stocks, the idea arose of their completion as missile carriers. In order to test the possibilities of placing missile weapons on ships of this type, two Project 68-bis ships that have already entered service were equipped with promising missile systems. Thus, the "Admiral Nakhimov" was re-equipped according to Project 67, and the Strela anti-ship missile system was installed on it. Unfortunately, the complex turned out to be relatively unsuccessful, as a result of which further work on it was stopped. The light cruiser "Dzerzhinsky" was modernized according to the project 70 - it received the M-2 air defense system, created on the basis of the land S-75 "Dvina". This experiment was also recognized as unsuccessful - the SAM ammunition was only 10 missiles, moreover, they were liquid and required charging before launch. As a result, the M-2 was put into service in a single copy, as an experimental one, but in the early 70s the complex was mothballed and until the end of the cruiser's service was not used for its intended purpose. It can be stated that the work on "rocketing" the cruisers of the 68-bis project did not become successful, but this does not mean that they were useless - their result was invaluable experience, which made it possible to create truly effective naval anti-aircraft and missile systems in the future.
The second direction was the creation of control ships on the basis of light cruisers of the Sverdlov type according to projects 68U1 and 68U2.
The emphasis here was on equipping ships with the most powerful means of communication - the number of transmitting and receiving devices was amazing. Each ship received 17 communication posts, which included 17 transmitters and 57 receivers of all ranges, 9 VHF radio stations, 3 radio relay VHF and DCV stations, long-range and space communications equipment. 65 antennas were installed on the cruiser so that they could work simultaneously. The control cruiser provided stable communications at a distance of 8,000 km without repeaters (and, of course, without taking into account space communications that would provide reception anywhere in the World Ocean). The ships lost part of their artillery, but acquired the Osa-M air defense system and rapid-fire 30-mm AK-230 mounts (and the Admiral Senyavin even a helicopter). In total, two ships were converted into control cruisers: "Zhdanov" and "Admiral Senyavin", but at the same time they slightly differed in the composition of weapons.
I would especially like to note that on these cruisers the number of the crew was reduced and the conditions for its habitation were improved. For example, living quarters were equipped with air conditioning systems.
And, finally, the third direction is the modernization according to the 68A project, designed to create a flagship for the landing forces. According to this project, 4 cruisers were re-equipped: "October Revolution", "Admiral Ushakov", "Mikhail Kutuzov" and "Alexander Suvorov". The ships received new means of radio communication, allowing them to control a group of ships, and some other equipment, including transceiver devices for transferring cargo on the move, as well as eight AK-230. Work on this project was carried out on the Murmansk cruiser, but unlike the above cruisers, it did not receive the AK-230.
On the one hand, such improvements do not seem to be fundamental and do not seem to increase the air defense capabilities of cruisers too much. But, remembering the history of the Falklands conflict of 1982, we will see how useful the cruiser would be for the British, converted according to the 68A project. Even the standard 100-mm and 37-mm installations could create a density of fire, which would have been very difficult for Argentine pilots to break through, and how the British ships lacked rapid-fire installations similar to our AK-230 and AK-630! And this is not to mention the fact that a dozen long-range 152-mm guns of the cruiser could become an extremely powerful argument in land battles at Goose Green and Port Stanley.
Of course, in the mid-80s, at the end of their service, the Sverdlov-class cruisers almost completely lost their combat significance, many of them left the ranks. But nevertheless, to the last, they retained the ability to support the landing forces with fire, so the inclusion of the ships of this type remaining in the ranks in the amphibious divisions looks both reasonable and justified.
In general, the following can be said about the service of Soviet cruisers of the Sverdlov type. Commissioned in the period 1952-55, for some time they became the strongest and most advanced surface ships of the domestic surface fleet and were in no way inferior to foreign ships of the same class. The concept of their use (close to their shores, under the umbrella of fighter, bomber and missile-carrying aviation turned out to be quite reasonable. Someone may point out the inability of domestic DIKR to defeat the AUG in some hypothetical ocean battle, but in the 50s no one was going to drive cruisers into the ocean, and on their shores they were a formidable force to be reckoned with. However, ships of the Sverdlov class surprisingly managed to take a worthy place even among nuclear submarine missile carriers and surface missile ships. Project 68 bis cruisers did not fire a single shot at the enemy, but their role in Russian history can hardly be overestimated. In the th century, the "enlightened" Western world practiced "gunboat diplomacy", and the Americans in the 20th century introduced "aircraft carrier diplomacy" then the Soviet Union in the 60s and 70s of the last century was able to respond to the naval power of NATO with the "diplomacy of cruisers" and these cruisers were ships of the "Sverdlov" type. The Project 68-bis cruisers carried out intense service, leaving at sea for many months and returning to bases only to replenish supplies, a short rest and scheduled repairs - and then went to sea again. No wonder they said in the navy:
"Although the cruisers are light, their service is difficult."
In the late 1980s, the Sverdlovs left the ranks, and this was frighteningly symbolic. The cruisers created after the war marked the revival of the Russian fleet: they were the firstborn, followed by much more powerful and sophisticated rocket ships. Now their service is over, and after them the nuclear missile, oceanic Navy of the USSR went into oblivion. Many modern ships were scrapped, cut into metal or sold abroad: it is all the more surprising that one Project 68-bis cruiser has miraculously survived to this day. We are talking, of course, about "Mikhail Kutuzov", which has been in Novorossiysk from 2002 to the present day and functions as a museum ship:
I really want to believe that the leadership of the Russian Navy will be able to preserve it in this capacity for future generations. It's not for nothing that the cruiser bears the name of one of the most cunning and patient military leaders of the Russian Empire! Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov saw the fall of Moscow, but he also saw the flight of Napoleon from Russia. "Mikhail Kutuzov" survived the death of the USSR: but maybe this beautiful ship, which faithfully served its Motherland, will someday be destined to witness how the revived Russian fleet will once again, like in the old days, go out into the ocean in all the splendor of its sovereign might?
THE END.
Previous articles in the series:
Cruisers of project 68-bis: the backbone of the post-war fleet. Part 1
Cruisers of project 68-bis: "Sverdlov" against the British tiger. Part 2
List of used literature:
1. A. V. Platonov "Cruisers of the Soviet Fleet"
2. A. V. Platonov "Encyclopedia of Soviet Surface Ships"
3. V. Arapov, N. Kazakov, V. Patosin "Artillery warhead of the cruiser" Zhdanov"
4. S. Patyanin M. Tokarev “The fastest-firing cruisers. From Pearl Harbor to the Falklands"
5. S. A. Balakin "Cruiser" Belfast"
6. A. Morin "Light cruisers of the" Chapaev "type
7. V. P. Zablotsky "Cruisers of the Cold War"
8. V. P. Zablotsky "Chapaev-class light cruisers"
9. Samoilov KI Marine dictionary. - M.-L.: State Naval Publishing House of the NKVMF of the USSR, 1941
10. A. B. Shirokorad "Sverdlov-class cruisers"
11. A. B. Shirokorad "Soviet ship artillery"
12. I. I. Buneev, E. M. Vasiliev, A. N. Egorov, Yu. P. Klautov, Yu. I. Yakushev "Marine artillery of the Russian Navy"
