The article offered to your attention was conceived as a continuation of the material "The answer of the supporters of the aircraft carrier lobby to the" inconvenient "questions" and was supposed to tell why, in fact, we need aircraft carriers and where we are going to use them. Unfortunately, it quickly became clear that it is completely unrealistic to give a well-founded answer to this question within the framework of one article. Why?
On the criteria for the usefulness of Russian naval weapons
It seems that there is nothing complicated here. Any state has goals to achieve which it seeks. The armed forces are one of the tools to achieve these goals. The navy is part of the armed forces, and its tasks directly follow from the tasks of the country's armed forces as a whole.
Consequently, if we have specific and clearly formulated tasks of the fleet, integrated into a system of equally understandable goals of the armed forces and the state, then the assessment of any naval weapons system can be reduced to an analysis according to the criterion "cost / effectiveness" in relation to solving the tasks assigned to the Navy. Of course, the "cost" column takes into account not only the economy - throwing hand grenades at the bunker may be cheaper, but the losses among the Marines in this case will be immeasurably higher than when using a tank.
Of course, with such an analysis, it is necessary to simulate as realistically as possible all forms of naval combat with the participation of "tested" weapons systems, and this is the lot of professionals. But, if the necessary mathematical models are developed, then it is relatively easy to determine which of the "competing" weapons (and their combinations) solves the assigned tasks with the best efficiency at the lowest cost.
Alas. In the Russian Federation, nothing is ever easy.
Tasks of the Russian Navy
Let's start with the fact that we do not have clearly defined goals of the state. And the tasks of the armed forces are formulated in such a way that it is often completely unrealistic to understand what exactly is being discussed. Here we go to the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The goals and objectives are "cut" according to the types and types of troops, this is normal. Open the tab dedicated to the Navy and read:
"The Navy is designed to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, maintain military-political stability at the global and regional levels, and repel aggression from sea and ocean directions."
In total - three global goals. But - without any detail and specifics. True, it is additionally indicated:
"The foundations, main goals, strategic priorities and tasks of state policy in the field of naval activities of the Russian Federation, as well as measures for its implementation, are determined by the President of the Russian Federation."
Well, we have the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 20, 2017 No. 327 "On the approval of the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030", which I will refer to as "Decree" and which I will further reference. All quoted text, which you, dear reader, will read in the following three sections, is a citation of this "Decree".
Goal # 1: Protecting National Interests in the World Ocean
It sounds impressive, but who else would explain exactly what interests we have in this very ocean.
Unfortunately, the “Decree” does not give at least any intelligible answer to this question. The Decree clearly states that Russia needs a powerful ocean-going fleet to protect its national interests. But why Russia needs it, and how it is going to use it in the ocean - almost nothing is said. In short, the main threats are “the desire of a number of states, primarily the United States of America (USA) and their allies, to dominate the World Ocean” and “the desire of a number of states to restrict the access of the Russian Federation to the resources of the World Ocean and its access to vital important maritime transport communications”. But what these resources and communications are and where they lie is not said. And the adversaries who prevent us from using them have not been identified. On the other hand, the "Decree" informs that "The need for the naval presence of the Russian Federation … is also determined on the basis of the following dangers," and even lists them:
“A) the growing desire of a number of states to possess sources of hydrocarbon resources in the Middle East, the Arctic and the Caspian Sea basin;
b) the negative impact on the international situation of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in a number of countries in South Asia and Africa;
c) the possibility of exacerbation of existing and emergence of new interstate conflicts in any area of the World Ocean;
d) an increase in pirate activity in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as in the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
e) the possibility of foreign states countering the economic activity of the Russian Federation and the conduct of scientific research in the World Ocean”.
Just what does the term “presence” mean? The ability to enforce peace in the pattern and likeness of British action in the Falklands in 1982? Or is it just about showing the flag?
The "Decree" contains an indication of "the participation of forces (troops) of the Navy in operations to maintain (restore) international peace and security, take measures to prevent (eliminate) threats to peace, suppress acts of aggression (break the peace)." But there we are talking about operations sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and this is completely different.
The Decree clearly states that the Russian Federation needs an ocean-going fleet. Ready for "long-term autonomous activity, including the independent replenishment of supplies of material and technical means and weapons in remote areas of the oceans." Able to win in a battle with "an adversary with high-tech naval capabilities … in distant sea and ocean areas." Having sufficient strength and strength to provide, no less, "control over the functioning of sea transport communications in the oceans." Ranked "second in the world in combat capabilities", finally!
But, when it comes to at least some specifics in terms of probable opponents and areas of the World Ocean in which our ocean fleet should be used, everything is limited to an indistinct "presence".
Again, for the purposes of our maritime policy, it is indicated "maintaining … international law and order, through the effective use of the Navy as one of the main instruments of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation." Taking into account the required power of our fleet, it turns out that our president sets before the Russian Navy the task of implementing the gunboat policy on the American model. It can be assumed that this policy should be carried out in the regions of "presence". But this will remain just a guess - the “Decree” does not speak about it directly.
Goal number 2. Maintaining military-political stability at the global and regional levels
Unlike the previous task, which was completely incomprehensible, this one is at least half clear - in terms of maintaining stability at the global level. The Decree contains an entire section on strategic deterrence, which, among other things, states:
“The Navy is one of the most effective instruments of strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence, including preventing a“global strike”.
Therefore, it is required of him
"Maintaining the naval potential at a level that ensures guaranteed deterrence of aggression against the Russian Federation from ocean and sea directions and the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage to any potential adversary."
That is why a "strategic requirement" is imposed on the Russian Navy:
"In peacetime and in a period of imminent threat of aggression: preventing force pressure and aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from ocean and sea directions."
Everything is clear here: the Russian Navy, in the event of an attack on our country, must be able to use nuclear and non-nuclear precision weapons so that any of our "sworn friends" will die in the bud. This, in fact, is the provision of military-political stability at the global level.
But how the fleet should maintain regional stability is anyone's guess.
Goal number 3: Reflecting aggression from sea and ocean directions
Unlike the previous two, here, perhaps, there are no ambiguities. The "decree" directly says that in wartime the Russian Navy must have:
“The ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the enemy in order to force him to end hostilities on the basis of guaranteed protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation;
the ability to successfully confront an enemy with a high-tech naval potential (including those armed with high-precision weapons), with groups of its naval forces in near and distant sea zones and oceanic regions;
the presence of high-level defensive capabilities in the field of anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and mine defense”.
That is, the Russian Navy must not only inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy, but also destroy the naval forces attacking us and protect the country as much as possible from the effects of all types of enemy naval weapons.
On discussions about the ocean fleet
One of the main reasons why discussions about the creation of an ocean-going fleet are reaching a dead end is that the leadership of our country, declaring the need to build such a fleet, is in no hurry to explain what it is for. Unfortunately, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin for more than 20 years of his tenure in power has not formulated the goals to which our country should strive in foreign policy. If we, for example, read any "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", we will see there that the Russian Federation, in general, stands for all good against all bad. We are for equality, individual rights, the rule of law, the supremacy of the UN. We are against terrorism, harm to the environment, and so on and so forth. A minimum of specifics is present only in regional priorities - it is stated that for us this priority is to build relations with the CIS countries.
Obviously, any reasonable discussion about the need for an ocean-going fleet begins with the tasks that this fleet must solve. But, since the government of the Russian Federation has not announced these tasks, the opponents have to formulate them themselves. Accordingly, the dispute boils down to what role the Russian Federation should play in international politics.
And here, of course, the discussion very quickly reaches a dead end. Yes, even today the Russian Federation is indeed taking a considerable part in world political and economic life, let us at least recall the map of our economic interests in Africa, provided by the respected A. Timokhin.
But nevertheless, many people believe that today we should not promote any political and economic interests in distant countries. That we should focus on putting things in order in our country, limiting external influences to our neighboring states. I disagree with this point of view. But she, no doubt, has the right to life.
Therefore, in my next materials on this topic, I will consider the necessity and usefulness of aircraft carriers for the Russian Navy in relation to only two tasks: strategic deterrence and repulsing aggression from sea and ocean directions. And regarding "ensuring the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods" I will express my private, and, of course, not claiming to be absolute truth.
Protection of Russian interests in the World Ocean
The modern world is a rather dangerous place, where hostilities with the participation of the US and NATO armed forces regularly break out. Thus, in the last decade of the twentieth century, two serious wars thundered - "Desert Storm" in Iraq, and "Allied Force" in Yugoslavia.
The twenty-first century "worthily" took over this sad baton. In 2001, another round of the war in Afghanistan began, which continues to this day. In 2003, US and British forces again invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein. In 2011, Americans and Europeans “noted” in the civil war in Libya, which ended with the death of Muammar Gaddafi and, in fact, the collapse of the country. In 2014, US military forces entered Syria …
The Russian Federation should be able to resist such "incursions" not only politically, but also by military force. Of course, as much as possible while avoiding direct confrontation with the armed forces of the United States and NATO, so as not to unleash a global nuclear conflict.
How can I do that?
To date, the Americans have mastered very well the strategy of indirect actions, perfectly demonstrated in the same Libya. Muammar Gaddafi's regime was not pleasing to the United States and Europe. But, in addition, part of the population of Libya itself was dissatisfied with their leader enough to take up arms.
A small remark - you should not look for the cause of the civil war in Libya solely in the personality of M. Gaddafi. He has been gone for a long time, and military actions continue to this day. The peculiarities of many African and Asian countries, and not only them, if we recall the same Yugoslavia, are that large societies are forced to coexist within the same country, initially hostile to each other on territorial, national, religious or some other basis. … Moreover, enmity can be rooted so deeply in history that no reconciliation between them is possible. Unless there is such a force that will ensure the peaceful coexistence of such societies for centuries so that old grievances are still forgotten.
But back to the Libyan civil war. In short, the local protest against the detention of the human rights defender turned into mass demonstrations with victims among the participants of the demonstrations. And this, in turn, led to an armed mutiny, the transfer of part of the regular army to the side of the rebels and the beginning of full-scale hostilities. In which, however, the troops, who remained loyal to M. Gaddafi, quickly began to gain the upper hand. After initial setbacks, government forces regained control over the cities of Bin Javad, Ras Lanuf, Bregu and successfully advanced to the "heart" of the rebellion - Benghazi.
Alas, the restoration of Gaddafi's control over Libya was not included in the plans of the United States and European countries, and therefore they threw the strength of their air force and navy on the scales. The pro-government armed forces of Libya were not ready to confront such an enemy. During Operation Odyssey Dawn, Gaddafi's supporters lost their air force and air defense, and the potential of the ground forces was seriously undermined.
It was the aircraft and navy of the United States and its allies that ensured the victory of the rebels in Libya. Of course, the forces of special operations also played a significant role, but far from the main one. In fact, the British SAS appeared in Libya extremely quickly, they helped the rebels organize the "March on Tripoli". But this did not help the rebels either defeat the pro-government forces, or even stabilize the front. Despite all the skill of the British special forces (and these are very serious guys, whose professionalism I am not at all inclined to underestimate), the rebels clearly suffered a military defeat. Of course, until the US Air Force and Navy and NATO intervened.
All this was in reality, and now let's look now at some hypothetical conflict. Suppose that due to certain political and economic reasons (the latter, by the way, we certainly had), the Russian Federation would be extremely interested in preserving the regime of M. Gaddafi. What could we do in this case?
In theory, it was possible to act in the same way as in Syria. Agree with M. Gaddafi and deploy parts of our aerospace forces at one or two Libyan air bases, from where our aircraft would strike at the rebel forces. But the difficulty is that this is … politics.
To begin with, it is fundamentally wrong to extinguish any fire with our aircrafts. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, excuse me, are not a world gendarme and not "a plug in every barrel." They are an extreme measure that should be used only when the country's interests are truly commensurate with the threat to the lives of our servicemen. And considerable financial expenses for the military operation. Therefore, while the pro-government forces of Libya kept the situation under control, our intervention was completely unnecessary. First of all, we ourselves.
And if you think about it, so will the Libyans. Let's not forget that a military contingent in Syria was deployed when Bashar al-Assad was on the verge of death. Would he have accepted our help earlier, when the conflict was just beginning and there were good chances to end it with the forces of the regular Syrian army? Great question. Generally speaking, the military bases of another, even an allied, power on your territory is an extreme measure. It is worth going to only when your country is threatened by an enemy that you are obviously unable to resist.
In other words, if the Russian Federation suddenly considered the preservation of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi an overriding and essential matter, then even in this case it would be clearly premature to flee to Libya with the Su-34 at the ready as soon as local unrest began.
But after the start of "Odyssey Dawn" - it's too late. How to transfer military contingents to Libya and deploy them at local airbases when these airbases are under attack from NATO aviation?
Demand the Americans to temporarily cease fire? And why should they listen to us if they have a UN Security Council resolution, and they are absolutely not obliged to show us such courtesies? And then what is left for us to do? Still trying to carry out the transfer of the Aerospace Forces, under the threat that they will fall under American missiles and bombs? Then we will have to either keep silent, which will be a huge loss of face and prestige on the world stage, or respond proportionately and … Hello, World War III.
This is not to mention the fact that, unlike Syria, where the United States used its aviation on a very modest scale, in Libya they could simply bomb local air bases into a state in which it is not that the Russian air regiment cannot base a couple of corn workers on them. work out. So we would not have been able to deploy any significant air force there either during Odyssey Dawn or after it ended. And if they had a suspicion that we want to intervene, would they, in general, stop this operation or would they continue it until the very victory of the rebels?
When we are told that the same Su-34s operating from the Khmeimim land airfield will cope with the task of countering the "barmaley" in Syria much better than any carrier-based aircraft - this is true, and I agree with that. But it is also true that not in every conflict, other "interested parties" will give us the opportunity to deploy the forces of our aerospace forces on land air bases. There is no doubt that the determination of the Russian Federation in Syria has been noticed and scrutinized. And our "sworn friends" in the future will plan their military operations in such a way as to make interventions of the Syrian type as difficult or impossible as possible.
In the same Libya, for example, they could well have succeeded - if we had a desire to intervene with "heavy forces", of course. And not only in Libya.
The strategy of indirect actions, when a rebellion or an “orange revolution” is arranged to overthrow an unwanted regime, and then, if the existing power is not immediately thrown off, the country's military potential is “multiplied by zero” through the operation of the Air Force and the Navy, is extremely effective. And it can be carried out in such a way that the allies of this very regime will simply not be given the opportunity to deploy their (that is, ours) aerospace forces at pro-government air bases.
What could we oppose to such a strategy?
An effective multipurpose aircraft carrier group (AMG) - of course, if we had it, of course. In this case, with the beginning of an armed rebellion in Benghazi, we could send her to the Libyan shores. As long as the forces of M. Gaddafi remained victorious, she would have been there, but did not interfere in the confrontation. But in the case of the beginning of "Odyssey Dawn", she could give a "mirror" answer. Are the US and NATO planes successfully "zeroing" the military potential of M. Gaddafi? Well, our carrier-based aircraft could significantly reduce the potential of the Libyan rebels. At the same time, the risks of accidentally getting hit by NATO planes (and they - under our blow) in this case will be minimized.
One large aircraft carrier will have enough forces for this. The Americans and their allies used about 200 aircraft in their air operations, of which 109 were tactical aircraft combat aircraft, and 3 were strategic bombers. The rest are AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, tankers, etc. A nuclear aircraft carrier of 70–75 thousand tons would have three times fewer aircraft than the Europeans and Americans would use. But after all, the military potential of the rebels was much more modest than that of the troops that remained loyal to M. Gaddafi?
Such use of a multipurpose aircraft carrier group led the situation in Libya to a strategic impasse, when neither M. Gaddafi nor the rebels would have sufficient forces to decisively defeat the enemy. But then an interesting question arises - would the Americans have decided on their "Odyssey Dawn" if our AMG with a modern aircraft carrier was located off the coast of Libya? The United States and Europe sought to overthrow the regime of M. Gaddafi, yes. And, of course, they could well achieve this, even taking into account the impact of our AMG. But for this they would have to get their hands dirty themselves - to transfer their own large military contingents to Libya to conduct a large-scale ground operation.
Technically, of course, the United States is capable of doing other things. But it is very possible that such measures would be considered an excessive price to pay for the dubious pleasure of seeing the death throes of Muammar Gaddafi.
I will reduce all of the above to three short theses:
1. The cheapest and most effective way to infringe on Russia's interests in any country loyal to the Russian Federation is to arrange a regime change there by means of a military coup, reinforcing the latter, if necessary, with the influence of the NATO Navy and Air Force.
2. The most effective counter-insurgency measure in such a country would be the deployment of a limited VKS contingent on land-based airfields, following the pattern and likeness of how it was done in Syria. But, unfortunately, if our opponents strongly want to make such a scenario impossible, then they may well succeed.
3. The presence of a combat-ready and effective AMG as part of the Russian Navy in the event of events under item 1 will allow us to effectively counter the strategy of "indirect actions". In this case, our geopolitical opponents will have a choice of either an almost bloodless “orange revolution” or a full-scale war on the edge of geography with the involvement of their own large ground forces. Thus, the possibilities of opposing our political and economic interests will be significantly limited.
Peace enforcement
Very interesting is Operation Praying Mantis, which the US Navy conducted against Iran. During the infamous "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf, the Americans sent warships there to protect shipping. And it so happened that the frigate "Samuel B. Roberts" was blown up by a mine, which the Iranians had placed in neutral waters - in violation of all the rules of naval warfare.
The Americans decided to "strike back" and attacked two Iranian oil platforms, which, according to them, were used to coordinate sea attacks (an attack on the third platform was also planned, but it was canceled). Whether it really was, it doesn't matter to us. Subsequent events are interesting.
The Americans conducted a limited military operation, pushing two naval strike groups (KUG) to the platforms. Group "Bravo" - landing ship dock and two destroyers, group "Charlie" - missile cruiser and two frigates. The aircraft carrier Enterprise provided support from a sufficient distance from the scene.
The Iranians, on the other hand, did not pretend to be a submissive victim and counterattacked with planes and surface ships. At the same time, high-precision weapons were used: the Iranian corvette Joshan launched a Harpoon. But, besides this, the Iranians tried to give an "asymmetric" response, attacking several civilian ships in neutral waters with boats, and of the three ships that were damaged, one turned out to be American.
And here the US carrier-based aircraft turned out to be very useful. It was she who attacked the light boats of the Iranians, destroyed one of them and forced the rest to flee - the American surface ships were too far away to intervene. Also, carrier-based aircraft discovered and played a key role in repelling the attack of the largest Iranian ships, the frigates Sahand and Sabalan. Moreover, the first was sunk, and the second was heavily damaged and lost its combat effectiveness.
Let's imagine that the Americans conducted this operation without an aircraft carrier. Without a doubt, they had superior forces, and their ships were superior to the Iranian, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Both oil platforms targeted by the American attack were destroyed. But it is worth noting the danger faced by the American battle groups. Both groups, naturally, "showed up" at the oil platforms, and even had contacts with Iranian aviation, as a result of which their location was known to the enemy. And if the Iranian frigates had not been detected in time and at the same time carried modern missile weapons, then their attack could well have been crowned with success. In addition, the American ships, concentrated for a specific task, could do nothing to help the neutral ships that were attacked, including one American.
In other words, even with a clear quantitative and qualitative superiority, the American KUGs could not solve all the problems that faced them, while the Iranians, having noticeably smaller forces, had a chance to seriously whack the Americans.
conclusions
They are obvious. The presence of aircraft carriers in the Russian Navy will have significant political significance and will limit the ability of the United States and NATO to "carry democracy" to other countries. At the same time, the absence of aircraft carriers will threaten our fleet with disproportionate losses, even when participating in limited conflicts against less developed countries.
But, I repeat, all of the above is not a justification for the need for aircraft carriers as part of the Russian Navy. This is just my point of view on world politics and the participation of the Russian Navy in it. And nothing more.
In my opinion, the need for the presence of aircraft carriers in the Russian Navy stems from the need to address completely different tasks: maintaining military-political stability at the global level and repelling aggression from oceanic areas. But in order to understand how true this is my assumption, it is necessary to concretize the threats that our Navy must fend off.
More about this in the next article.
