Evaluating what the naval composition of the fleet should be, it will inevitably have to resolve a number of contradictions: forces that are optimal for some tasks turn out to be inapplicable if tasks change, universal ships are ships that solve many problems poorly, but only some are good, and the fleet, which has the optimal "tools" for any task in sufficient quantity is impossible for economic reasons, and, what is important to understand, it is impossible in principle for anyone, and not only for Russia.
Here are some examples. It is economically possible to focus on small ships, but they themselves are devoid of combat stability and are easily destroyed by a serious enemy, see article The Malicious Mosquito Fleet Myth … Many tasks that small ships solve in our country can be solved by large ships, but here economics and demography come into play: even a rich country will have difficulties in recruiting the required number of crews and financing the fleet in which the tasks of corvettes are entrusted to destroyers. In addition, the life cycle of such a ship itself is much more expensive than that of a corvette, and it can solve some problems only with the help of a helicopter.
For example, a missile boat can outrun the enemy in a maneuver, carry out a high-speed attack, and launch missiles at an enemy ship from an advantageous position due to a speed of 43-45 knots, but a frigate will not be able to either fire expensive long-range missiles for external target designation. or use a missile-armed ship helicopter or even a pair.
But target designation may not exist, and the weather may not allow helicopters to fly. On the other hand, boats with a high degree of probability can be killed by enemy aircraft. As it happened, for example, with Iraqi boats in 1980, and with them in 1991.
As you can see, there are a lot of contradictions.
The USSR solved this issue by creating specialized ships for each task and creating naval fighter and missile-carrying aircraft. Strikes against surface ships, in addition to aircraft and submarines, could be carried out by missile boats and small missile ships, in the far sea zone - by upgraded BOD (for example, Project 61PM ships equipped with anti-ship missiles), missile cruisers of various types - from Project 58 to Orlans, later aircraft-carrying cruisers. Anti-submarine defense was in charge of small anti-submarine ships in BMZ, in BMZ and DMZ - BODs of project 1135 (later reclassified in SKR), 61, purely for DMZ, whole anti-submarine cruisers-helicopter carriers of project 1123, BOD projects 1134A and 1134B, then 1155, 11551 were built …
This system had a huge disadvantage - it was simply enormous and required a lot of money. Even the USSR, with its might, could not withstand the arms race at one time, let alone today's Russia. Russia will have to "reconcile the incompatible" and build a powerful and efficient fleet - but cheap. Is it possible? Yes, it is possible. Let us examine what approaches to surface forces will have to be guided in order to do this.
Light forces and their place in the Navy system
Let's call "light" forces the surface formations of the Navy, consisting mainly of small ships from boats to corvettes, inclusive. This is an unprofessional term, but intuitive for a civilian. Why does the Navy need such a force?
There is such an eloquent example as a comparison of the intensity of operation of BOD projects 61 and 1135 on the one hand, and small MPCs of project 1124 on the other. Captain 1st Rank A. E. Soldatenkov in his memoirs "Admiral Routes":
Now about cost - efficiency. There were other excellent anti-submarine ships. For example: BOD pr.61 and pr. 1135 (1135A), which later were modestly transferred to patrol ships of the second rank. But Project 61 differed from Project 159 (159A) only by its large displacement, the number of crew, the gluttony of gas turbine engines and the high cost of maintenance. Armament and hydroacoustics were almost the same, the number of the crew was almost twice as large, the second rank. We are especially proud of the architecture and the gas turbine power plant, it is really beautiful - "Singing Frigate". But it is impossible to fight submarines with melodies alone. But the 1135M, in addition to the under-keel GAS, already had a towed hydroacoustic station (BGAS) "Vega" MG-325, which combined the advantages of the under-keel and lowered GAS, because the BGAS antenna could be towed at a given depth (within the TTD). True, the commanders of the ships did not like to use the BGAS very much because of the danger of losing the towed antenna. So, it is no coincidence that they were reclassified as watchdogs. They were practically not allowed to engage in anti-submarine training, but were kept in bases due to the high cost of operation. On fuel, which one ship with two gas turbine power plants consumed for a daily exit to the sea, the KPUG, consisting of three ships of pr. 1124, could search for submarines for three days!
For reference. KPUG - ship search and strike group, the so-called small (3-4 units) detachments of anti-submarine ships, performing tasks of group search and, in case of war, the destruction of enemy submarines.
What is important to us here? The financial issue is important - small ships, firstly, cost less, require smaller crews, and, which is very important, require less fuel. For a period of 25-30 years, the savings are enormous. In addition, by focusing on "light forces" you can have more fleet for the same money - literally.
The disadvantages are mentioned above, in addition, such ships cannot conduct high-intensity military operations in the far sea zone. Drive one submarine or sink a couple of transports - please.
To become a tool for breaking into the defense of a large naval strike group or even an aircraft carrier group, to fight with heavy ships, to “work” as part of a naval strike group (KUG) in the open ocean is not. Low autonomy, few weapons on board, strong restrictions on the use of weapons while rolling, a strong drop in maximum speed while rolling, inability to repulse massive air and missile strikes, inability to work together with aviation outside the combat radius of the base (ground) aviation.
The conclusion is simple - those tasks that "light forces" perform better than "heavy" ones need to be solved by light forces, while on the one hand, their number should not be too large, otherwise they will "eat up" the resources that are needed for others forces, and on the other hand, they must act in conjunction with the "heavy forces", which will have to provide them with combat stability and protect against attacks from a potential enemy. The question, therefore, is finding the optimal balance between light and cheap ships on the one hand, and large and expensive ones on the other. And also in their optimal shape.
Taking into account the fact that the conduct of offensive hostilities by Russia against some third world countries is much more likely than the defense of its territory in the course of a global war, our "light forces" should not be a strictly defensive instrument in order to fight only on their own coast. They should be able to be used for offensive purposes, at least for secondary tasks.
Taking into account the fact that Russia is not the USSR, and, firstly, does not have so much funds, and secondly, has already seen the collapse of the country, these ships cannot, with rare exceptions, repeat the Soviet concept, when most of the tasks were specialized ships … In most cases, ships should be multipurpose.
Next, we start from the tasks.
Let's list the tasks that can effectively solve small ships and the main threats to them. Based on the list of these tasks, it will already be possible to "make an approach" to determine the optimal appearance of the "light forces".
Anti-submarine defense. No matter how far progress goes, quantity matters here. A large number of ships using combined means of searching for submarines, for example, low-frequency lowered hydroacoustic stations when working from a stop and towed hydroacoustic stations when working on the move, as well as various sources of external low-frequency "illumination" (from GAS emitters on some ships that give "illumination "For others, up to special ammunition for bomb launchers, the practical feasibility of which has already been proven), allows you to create very effective mobile anti-submarine lines, which the submarine is simply not able to overcome. This is especially important when the task is to prevent a foreign submarine from breaking through into one or another water area. For the formation of such lines, the number of ships is still important, they need a lot, and since we traditionally have little money, these should be cheap ships, both in themselves and in operation (for example, "for fuel"). Such qualities are no less important in the anti-submarine guarding of convoys and landing detachments on the transition.
Protection of the water area (separately from PLO tasks). Small ships can carry out tasks of protecting a designated area near the coastline or a man-made object in the sea from penetration there by "light" enemy forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups on high-speed boats and other floating craft, speed boats and boats trying to carry out mine laying, in some cases - by helicopters. Also, light forces can effectively blockade any designated areas, provided that air and sea supremacy is achieved.
Strikes with cruise missiles on the coast from a large number of scattered platforms, an example of which was the combat use of the Caspian Flotilla's RTOs against terrorists in Syria. MRK as an example of a ship is unsuccessful, it itself is conceptually unsuitable for the fleet of the future and this issue will be considered separately, while we only take the principle - small ships can do this, and the enemy cannot (under a number of conditions) destroy them all at the same time.
Weapon tracking. During a threatened period, a small ship can monitor enemy ship groupings in the near sea zone if a number of conditions are met (for example, it must be used in appropriate weather conditions so that a priori less seaworthiness compared to a large ship does not prevent it from performing its mission in waves).
Destruction of enemy surface ships.
Support for landing operations - protection from submarines, surface ships and single aircraft on the transition, fire support by conducting artillery fire along the coast. Here we again come to the fact that more ships - more artillery barrels, and the example of the same corvettes suggests that it could be a 100-mm cannon.
At the same time, the actions of the light forces cannot be reduced to the defense of their territory or work in their BMZ - this is not true. The light forces are quite "tough" for offensive actions, and not only in the near sea zone, but also near the enemy's coast.
An example of such places is the Norwegian fjords, the straits between the Kuril Islands, the straits between the Aleutian Islands, some parts of the Baltic Sea, the South China Sea, the Philippines, the Aegean Sea, the Caribbean Sea. Small ships are capable of carrying out effective attacks on the naval forces of the enemy, his detachments of warships, transport ships, individual ships and vessels, provided they achieve air supremacy, or at least ensure the enemy cannot use aviation in the absence of their own aviation, and more before the seizure of dominance at sea. And the need to use them far from their shores (and close to strangers) requires taking seaworthiness seriously - even a small ship should be able to storm and move in strong seas. And this is quite realizable.
What's in the red? Air defense is in the red. And that's the problem. When providing any KPUG or KUG ship from the light forces with reconnaissance information, an attempt to withdraw a group from under an airstrike can be undertaken with the same or greater success as for large ships. But if the exit did not work out and the enemy strikes, then the result is a repetition of the Iranian Operation Pearl for the Iraqis or the shooting at Bubiyan for them - the aviation will simply devour small ships and not choke. It has always been that way.
For small ships, it is technically impossible to ensure the power of naval air defense sufficient to independently repel massive air strikes.
Another problem is the battle with large surface ships of the enemy - the latter can simply repulse a relatively small salvo of small ships with their air defense systems, but the opposite is not a fact that will turn out to be true - vertical launch installations, which are today the de facto standard for warships, make it possible to form a large salvo of anti-ship missiles. At the same time, a large ship can survive the hit of one anti-ship missile and even retain limited combat effectiveness, but with small ones this will not work, there is one rocket and the end, at best, the charred skeleton of the ship can be towed for repair. This limitation dictates the requirements for the number of attacking units, the number of missiles on them, their speed both in the attack and at the exit and withdrawal, for stealth in the radar and infrared range. We'll come back to this too.
So, the tasks are clear, let's consider what tools they can be solved with. And also how the composition of light forces, their interaction with other forces, is affected by the restrictions on combat use that they have.
Variants of the composition of light forces, their disadvantages and advantages
As already mentioned, it is necessary to immediately dismiss the idea that a separate ship is needed for each task - simply because it will be overwhelming for the budget. Accordingly, ships should be multipurpose, with the exception of those tasks that a normal ship, made at a realistic level of technology, cannot be solved. Then a specialized ship will be used.
Let's make an assumption and assume that we want to solve all the tasks listed above with one ship. Let's check if this is possible, and what such a ship should be, what features should it have.
Let's look at weapons and weapons first.
So, to perform PLO missions, we need: a sonar complex (GAK), a launcher for anti-submarine missiles (PLUR), preferably at least a small bomb launcher, for example RBU-1000, the “Packet-NK” complex, preferably redesigned for the use of torpedo tubes instead of launcher with TPK. At the same time, the SAC can include towed, and under the keel or bulb and lowered hydroacoustic stations (GAS).
We need a radar complex. Since a small ship cannot resist massive air strikes or powerful rocket salvos, it makes no sense to put a powerful and expensive radar with fixed large-sized canvases - there will not be enough missiles on board anyway, and it is better to save money. This means that it can be a relatively simple complex.
Additionally, when solving OVR tasks, a gun is required, some kind of missiles to destroy surface targets, preferably simpler and cheaper.
To conduct offensive operations, you need the same gun, the same missiles, but now not simpler and cheaper, but more effective. And they are also needed for tracking with weapons.
What is needed for such a ship to be able to deliver cruise missile strikes over long distances? We need a universal launcher 3C-14 for "Caliber". But, in fact, for anti-ship missiles needed in a serious war, it is needed the same as for the anti-submarine PLUR.
We solve the tasks of supporting the landing in the same way, with the proviso that the gun is needed from 100 mm.
What else do we need? We need a helicopter. To perform PLO tasks. But here we need to make a reservation - we need a helicopter IN PRINCIPLE, where it will be based - this is another question. It just has to be on its own, it is not necessary to have all the infrastructure on the ship for it.
But if it does, it’s also not bad.
Now let's imagine our ship.
So, option 1 is our good old 20385. But - an important caveat, the multifunctional radar system has been removed from it from the "Barrier", as a totally redundant system for a mass ship of this type, a simplified radar system has been applied (on this model - similar to the first 20380, there is a tower with "Furke", "Puma" and "Monument", in reality it is not at all necessary to do exactly that, there are options both cheaper, and simpler and better - at the same time), launchers of the RK Uranus were delivered to the vacated volumes. Experts say that if a radar system similar to that used on the Karakurt MRK is used on such a ship, and a simplified steel superstructure is used instead of a composite superstructure, then the cost of the ship can be reduced to 17-18 billion rubles at current prices.
This is less than a couple of RTOs. Our ship satisfies the list of tasks that were listed above almost completely. He has a GAK, he has a cannon, he has missiles, and different ones, both expensive ("Onyx", "Caliber", in the future "Zircon") and cheaper "Uranus". It carries an anti-submarine helicopter on board, and if you design such a ship again (the simplified version is in any case a new project), then the attack Ka-52K can also be envisaged. It is possible to envisage a lowered GAS that is absent on this project, and a bomb launcher on a newly designed ship can also be "registered", at least a small one.
Such a ship can also deliver cruise missile strikes. Can it be considered cheap and massive? Quite. For 1, 8 prices, the Navy's MRK will receive a replacement for the MRK, and also a replacement for the MPK, and also a replacement for the TFR. In terms of anti-submarine capabilities, such a ship is many times superior to both the old SKR project 1135 and the frigates of the project 11356, coming close to the ships one class higher.
Such a ship can carry out an inter-base transition even to another ocean - the Baltic corvettes went to the Red Sea, which proves their ability to carry out transitions to the Indian Ocean, which means that in an offensive war somewhere far from our shores, such ships would find themselves.
What are the disadvantages of such a ship? There are downsides.
For fighting in some difficult coastal areas (skerries, fjords, archipelagos), among the channels and shallow waters, it is too big. It has a large draft - 7.5 meters along the bulb, this is due to the large bulbous GAS "Zarya". For the same reason, such ships cannot be built at factories located on inland waterways, except for the Amur - it will not pass along most rivers.
What else? It also lacks speed. The best representatives of the project 20380 reached the speed of 26 knots with the design 27. The value of the speed will be considered a little later, for now we just remember this. Of course, if you design the ship again, then "playing" with contours and propellers, you can increase the speed, but how much is an open question.
Nevertheless, even taking into account all of the above, such a ship could well become the basis of the "light forces".
Option 2. If we talk about mass, then the version of the simplified 20385 with enhanced, oddly enough, weapons, can be beaten by the creation of the Zelenodolsk PKB. The model in the picture is assigned the index 11664, but there are other options on the same case.
A corvette based on the Project 1166 hull can also serve as a base for the "light forces". What are its advantages compared to the reference 2038X shown above?
First, it is cheaper. Generally speaking, it is rather difficult to calculate the price of a ship that does not exist yet, but most likely its price will be somewhere in the range of 13-15 billion. It has a smaller draft and smaller dimensions, which means that it can be built at a larger number of factories (including Zelenodolsk) and has fewer restrictions on the conduct of hostilities in shallow water areas. For the cost of ten 2038X, you could most likely get 12-13 1166X. Even with the same power plant of two DDA-12000 units, the ship with the Zelenodolsk corps is likely to be slightly faster. It can provide a permanent base for the helicopter, but the conditions for its storage will be worse, there will be less fuel on board. At one time, the fleet rejected such a ship, wishing to get a more "cool" 20380. In the end, however, it was left almost without ships.
Other disadvantages of the project are also obvious - a simpler hydroacoustic station "Platina-M", "Zarya" will not fit there, all missile weapons are placed in the 3C-14 installation, there is simply nowhere to add missiles there. In general, the ship is a little faster, a little cheaper, a little more massive, worse as an anti-submarine vessel and with weaker missile weapons. Also, like the previous version, it replaces the MRK when striking the coast with cruise missiles. The most important difference is that if the 2038X has a Redoubt air defense system with 16 missiles, which, with a sane radar system, will also hit where it should be, then the Zelenodolsk project does not have any air defense system, it has an air defense system, and it is extremely poorly located. It would be much more logical to place it at the stern, and assign an artillery gun to the air defense missions from the bow course angles. By the way, in this case it will have to be made 76 mm, since such a gun is better than 100 mm as an anti-aircraft gun. But she's worse in all other respects. The differences between 100 and 76 mm guns are especially critical when firing along the coast - the consumption of shells for the same typical target for a 76 mm gun is 1.5 times higher. But there will be no choice - the ship's weak air defense does not leave him.
However, you can go even further and simplify the ship even more, losing in the combat power of each individual ship, while winning in their number.
Option 3. So, the already well-known Chinese project 056. One of the most massive warships in the world. Two diesel engines, two valolines, a 76-mm cannon, small-sized cheap anti-ship missiles, self-defense air defense systems at the stern. There is no hangar for the helicopter at all, there is only a landing pad and a supply of fuel.
There is a towed GAS, there is a subtle one, the latter, sort of like a subspecies of the Russian Platinum. Simplicity and cheapness as it is. There is a truth and a nuance - inclined launchers for the Chinese YJ-83 anti-ship missiles allow launching new Chinese PLURs with a range of up to 50 kilometers - here the Chinese technologically beat us "like young" - in Russia such a project was killed during various near-naval intrigues many years ago, but the Chinese have brought everything to metal. Such an option would not hurt us for real and serial 20380s, such missiles are very asking for there, but what is not, that is not. There are also normal torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber - we just have to finish up before that, apparently for this we will have to lose some kind of war with heavy losses.
Russia is quite capable of producing such ships. Our engines are somewhat weaker than those used by the Chinese, the maximum power of the SEMT Pielstick diesel engine used on the Chinese corvette is higher than that of our Kolomna 16D49 by 1400 hp. We also do not have a compact rotary launcher for self-defense air defense systems, similar to the American RAM, which the Chinese install on their corvettes.
But, to tell the truth, this cannot stop us if we have to build "light forces" around such ships - as a power plant, the same is suitable as that on patrol ships of Project 22160, that is, two diesel units DRRA6000, each of which includes itself, the 16D49 engine of the Kolomna plant with a maximum power of 6,000 hp. and reduction gear RRP6000. With all the disadvantages of such a power plant (low power and too cumbersome and heavy gear), it is quite possible to create a similar warship around it, but you will have to win back the lack of power by hull contours. In principle, this cannot be considered impossible.
The place of the Chinese self-defense air defense system will be completely taken by the Pantsir-M, instead of the Chinese anti-ship missiles, the vertical 3S-14 will completely “stand up”, which again will provide launches of the missile defense system against ground targets, and the PLUR, and even more ammunition than the Chinese and more powerful missiles … The radar will also be serial, from the "Karakurt". The productivity of the Kolomensky Zavod and OOO Zvezda-Reducer will allow building a couple of such ships per year, if necessary, and without any additional investment in infrastructure. True, having invested a penny in a couple of stands for assembling and testing gearboxes and units, you can order large corvettes in the same quantity, but they are more expensive.
What are the benefits of "Russian 056"? Price and production time. Such a ship will cost 11-12 billion rubles and can be laid down at literally any shipyard in the country. About two units a year right now. The disadvantages are also clear - compared to the 1166X, it will not have conditions for basing a helicopter, the latter will only be able to make a short landing on it for refueling and replenishment of ammunition.
Speed is critical - the Chinese ship is unacceptably slow, we, with the mass of our units and less diesel power, will have to try very seriously so as not only to keep up with them, but to get a normal speed.
Another critical point is that such a small ship, already in a rather acute form, begins to have restrictions on the use of weapons due to excitement and a drop in speed with great excitement. It is impossible to do something here without high costs and expensive technical solutions, and even these expensive solutions will not solve all problems - some types of rolling can be eliminated only and exclusively due to the size of the ship and nothing else. This shortcoming of the hypothetical "Russian 056" must be clearly borne in mind. However, something here can be “played back” at the expense of contours.
With the fire support of the airborne assault, everything will also be "not very", like in the 1166X - a 76 mm cannon for shooting along the coast is far from the best option, but, again, with such an air defense there is no choice.
However, such a ship can also serve as a base for light forces. But this option is not the last one either.
Option 4. As mentioned earlier in the article “A step in the right direction. Project of the multipurpose "Karakurt" (PLO) " the ship, which we know as MRK "Karakurt", could initially be multipurpose. And even should have been. However, this is still quite real.
The internal volumes of the "Karakurt" quite allow this ship to be rearranged, and to create a small corvette on its basis, which would be capable of performing both the tasks that are entrusted to the RTOs today, and those that were and are being performed by the old IPCs. At the same time, its composition of weapons on board will be as follows - a 76-mm gun, a 3S-14 launcher, Pantsir-M ZRAK, Packet-NK launchers, apparently installed across the ship, above the hull frames (to compensate for recoil), naturally, without the possibility of recharging. Although the correct version would be still develop a light torpedo tube - then the "Karakurt PLO" would have an increased ammunition load, and the requirements for the installation site of the TA would be much softer.
GAS on such a ship, most likely, will be towed and lowered, which, in principle, with the massive use of such ships will be enough, although a subtle one would not be superfluous. The disadvantages of such a ship are clear - everything is the same as that of the "Russian 056", and also the complete lack of the ability to land a helicopter - at best, you can attach a compact platform onto which you can lower some kind of load on a cable or lift a wounded from it, no more …Speed will be a plus - such a ship will clearly be faster than all the options listed above.
And of course, these options are not the only ones possible. The ship subsystems produced in Russia make it possible to come up with many other options, quite "working" ones.
Interaction with BNK
It is easy to see that whichever of these ships becomes the base for future "light forces", but they all have one thing in common - insufficient air defense, which, in principle, has already been said. And, as soon as we plan to use such forces, we must immediately resolve the issue of air defense. Let us immediately clarify why aviation from the coast cannot completely solve the problem with air defense.
The article “We are building a fleet. Wrong Ideas, Wrong Concepts an example was analyzed with the repulsion of an enemy air strike on a naval strike group, moreover, in some ideal, almost unattainable conditions, when there is a reliable radar field for many hundreds of kilometers. And even in this case, the chances of aviation being on alert at the airfield are minimal or even zero.
In principle, combat experience confirms this: the Iranian operation "Pearl" in 1980 ended just like that - the Iraqi boats were simply killed in about a four-minute attack. The only thing that matters is the presence of fighter aircraft on combat alert in the air. But it is impossible to keep large forces in the air, and small air forces will only soften the enemy's blow, but they will not be able to repulse it.
These examples are quite sufficient to substantiate a huge problem that the light forces themselves will not solve - air defense.
And here we need a means of giving the light forces the very same combat stability they lack - large surface ships.
Of all the above options for the base ship of the "light" forces, the corvette based on the project 20385 is most capable of air defense, least of all is the hypothetical "Russian 056".
Accordingly, to protect the hypothetical 2038X, we need an air defense ship of the same strength, to protect everything else, a little less. In the future, when the process of forming the appearance of warships will be returned back to a scientific basis, this will be an important point - saving on a corvette, we are spending additional money on an air defense ship and this must be taken into account.
What kind of ship should it be? It could be something similar to the Project 22350 frigate. Perhaps it was just himself. Acting together with a couple of three fighter units on duty in the air, and, in fact, protected by corvettes, such a ship, by the fact of its presence in the KPUG or KUG (naval strike group) of small ships, will make an attack on them a rather expensive event. At the same time, nothing will prevent you from reinforcing the ship group with a couple of frigates if the danger of an air attack grows.
In the future, however, it will be necessary to move away from such use of frigates of Project 22350. These ships will be needed for more serious offensive missions. Currently, Russia is developing a "large" frigate of project 22350M, a completely gas turbine ship, with a significantly enhanced rocket weaponry, and, hopefully, a couple of helicopters.
It should be expected that as soon as the lead ship of this type completes state tests and enters the combat composition of the Navy, the construction of the 22350 we are accustomed to will apparently be stopped, and instead of them the 22350M will take the place of the most powerful domestic URO ship. This is, in general, good and correct, if everything works out as it should.
However, the 22350M is a strike ship, the tasks of which will not be to graze corvettes, but in high-intensity offensive operations in the DMZ, otherwise there is no need to create it.
And in this case, it turns out to be beneficial for Russia to develop a light and relatively simple air defense frigate, possibly completely diesel, which would have both anti-submarine and offensive capabilities at the level of a corvette, and only in terms of air defense and seaworthiness, it would have a significant superiority over light ships. Such a ship would be significantly cheaper than 22350, and, in general, versatile enough to be used not only for air defense of "light" forces. It is especially important that it can carry two helicopters on board, and it is desirable that these could be AWACS helicopters if necessary (the width of its hangars should allow them to be based on board).
Thus, the scheme emerges - small ships, be it a corvette of the 2038X level or the conditional "multipurpose" Karakurt ", perform all the above combat missions, and so that they are not interrupted by air strikes, a couple of interceptor units are on duty over the area in which they operate, and one or two light air defense frigates on the water. Which, in other conditions, can perform tasks on their own.
At the same time, both corvettes and a light frigate should be created in a complex - for example, if helicopters (2038X and 1166X) can be based on corvettes, then the presence of a pair of helicopters on each frigate is not so critical and one hangar can be sacrificed to save money (although this is strong not desirable). And if “Russian 056” or “multipurpose“Karakurt”are at war, then it is categorically impossible to sacrifice the hangar and each ship must carry a couple of helicopters. So it will be possible to give the KPUG at least a few anti-submarine helicopters "here and now", and not on the shore. At a great distance from the coast, this can be important.
You also need to understand that all possible light corvettes except 2038X will have 76-mm guns that are of little use for firing along the coast, which means that this task will largely fall on frigates, which dictates only a 100-mm or larger gun on it, and increased barrel life and ammunition.
Theoretically, a brigade of surface ships (brnk), which we call "light" forces in the article, could have two divisions of four ships each, which, in wartime, would form the required ship groups, for example, two, and the frigates would be given command fleet, from one to two per brnc. In exceptional cases - up to three.
We are, however, missing something in this scheme. None of the above types of ships have one important property that is often necessary for strikes against enemy surface ships - speed.
The importance of speed and how to attack surface ships?
In the article “Building the Fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong”one of the universal rules was formulated - for the weaker side in a naval war to have a chance of winning over the strongest side, it must have superiority in speed.
Alas, but with the above options for warships, this is not even a dream. The same corvette 20380 in its ideal condition is much slower than the destroyer "Arleigh Burke" and this difference grows with increasing excitement.
Can this be neglected? In the case of light forces, partly yes. Almost all of the above tasks may well be solved at 25-26 nodes. This is for forces fighting in the DMZ, where one cannot count on the rapid appearance of their aircraft from the shore, where it is easy to bump into totally superior enemy forces and find themselves in a situation of “breaking contact by moving or perishing”, the superiority in speed is simply critical. For light forces, which either operate in their BMZ, under the cover of "heavy" and aviation from the shore, or operate on foreign shores, but when the "heavy" forces have thoroughly undermined the enemy's ability to resist and you just need to finish it off, the speed is not so critical. It is necessary and important, for example, when quickly changing the search area for submarines, but its lack is not fatal, although harmful.
Except for one task for which speed is critical. We are talking about one of the tasks from the list above - about hitting surface ships
What is essential for attacking enemy surface ships? You need to get ahead of them in the transition to the designated area, you need to preempt them in maneuver, in reaching the line of launching their missiles, and in retreat. Small ships cannot fight with an exchange of blows until the enemy is completely destroyed, they carry out attacks and retreat, then, if necessary, carry out attacks again. Combat with ships performed by light forces is “salvo” in nature and consists of alternating attacks and waste. And in order to minimize the time during which the enemy himself can attack during this battle, and also to prevent him from breaking contact and leaving the battle, you need speed superiority. Or, at least, so that the enemy does not have one.
In the modern world, it is accepted that the main means of destruction of surface ships are combat aircraft and submarines. However, these forces have a drawback - they are not able to hold the water area behind them. This can only be done by surface ships. Also, only surface ships can ensure the guaranteed impossibility of using sea communications by the enemy. It is very difficult for submarines to suppress the movement of warships at high speeds (29-30 knots or more), and aircraft in numbers sufficient to suppress any naval air defense cannot "hang in the air" forever. The example of the Great Patriotic War, when high-speed ships went to the blockaded Sevastopol without air cover and in the conditions of enemy air domination, is very indicative and it is still relevant.
This means that in some cases the enemy will have to use his own NKs to act against our forces. But which ones? Destroyers at $ 1.5 billion per unit? No. There are other ships for such purposes.
For example - Japanese "patrol ships" of the "Hayabusa" type, with a displacement of 240 tons, they are armed with four Japanese anti-ship missiles "Type 90" (analogue of "Harpoon" or our "Uranus"), a 76-mm cannon, two machine guns of 12, 7 mm … GEM - three turbines and three water cannons. Speed - 46 knots.
But the Norwegian Skjold. Displacement 274 tons. Thanks to the aerostatic air discharge of the hull, its speed at zero waves exceeds 60 knots. With three points - 45. Armament - eight inconspicuous anti-ship missiles NSM, which today are, perhaps, the best small anti-ship missiles in the world. In any case, neither our "Uranus" nor the American "Harpoon" stood next to them. And traditionally - 76 graph paper. At the same time "Skjold" is also inconspicuous - its missiles are retracted into the hull, and the hull shapes are specially made so that the ship would be difficult to detect. Like Hayabusa, the Norwegian ship uses turbines as engines.
That is, they do not save on the power plant for such ships, they save on everything else. Because the speed.
In fact, there are a lot of examples - almost all our neighbors have similar high-speed units in one form or another.
Recently, a high-speed combat ship, which not only formally exists and is in combat composition, but also really something can, appeared in the Americans. It is, oddly enough, about LCS - this sample drank public money, fortunately not our sample and not our money.
Something, however, is changing - today the US Navy is undergoing a program to install Koensberg NSM anti-ship missiles on these ships. And that changes everything. A suitcase without a handle suddenly turns into a ship with a guided missile weapon capable of sustaining 44 or 47 knots for a long time. Add to this the ability to carry a helicopter armed with anti-ship missiles, and we have to admit that now the combat value of these ships is very far from zero. Of course, the problem of air defense remains, but the Americans rarely go on the attack without securing air superiority.
So, if some enemy climbs to our shore to fight with surface ships, then they will have a common and key property - high speed. No one will ever send an expensive and slow missile destroyer to the meat grinder.
Similarly, start a blockade of some coast by Russia, and such high-speed units, armed with massive and cheap missiles, will fight with its fleet. And this is exactly what you need to prepare for.
Of course, a helicopter is the ideal weapon against such ships. But, as already mentioned, aviation cannot always fly, and it cannot hold the water area, cannot continuously be in the designated area or be based for weeks on a piece of rock with a floating berth and a barrel for fuel. And sometimes this will be necessary.
What means does Russia have to conduct such fast battles? Firstly, these are missile boats, and secondly, IRAs of project 1239. At the same time, IRAs are, first of all, huge as a corvette and roads, like a frigate, its missiles are also expensive Mosquitoes, and there are only two of them, both in the Black Sea Fleet. By and large, they can be regarded as a statistical error, they will no longer be built.
But the missile boats of Project 1241 are a completely different matter, if only because there are a lot of them.
Like their Western classmates, they have a speed of over 40 knots and a 76mm cannon. Like foreign boats, they use afterburner gas turbine engines. At the same time, the boats are larger than their classmates, heavier and more noticeable in the radar range. In terms of speed, they are inferior to their competitors, but not by much, not by a critical value.
At the same time, there is the possibility of a significant strengthening of the missile weapons of the existing boats - their modernization with the installation of a missile weapon system similar to Project 12418 would allow these boats to carry up to 16 Uranium anti-ship missiles, which would make the boats the most armed boats in the world.
It is worth saying that the boat, in principle, should be different - even more high-speed, unobtrusive, with a reduced crew and preferably cheaper. At the same time, you can come to terms with the reduction in the number of missiles on board for the sake of speed and stealth. But while there is no such boat, "Lightning" re-armed with "Uranus" are quite suitable for the tasks of attacking surface ships.
Alas, few people today demonstrate a complete understanding of the role of the missile boat. Even among military professionals, boats are regarded as less important combat weapons than MRKs (meaning "normal" MRKs capable of catching up and attacking a surface ship, and not "Buyany-M" missile barges, which cannot do anything like that). The motivation for this is usually as follows - the MRK is better armed, has more advanced electronic weapons and self-defense air defense systems, from which it is possible to organize aviation control by placing KPUNIA / KPUNSHA there.
That is how it is, but for some reason no one undertakes to explain how to impose a battle on an enemy with a speed superiority of 10-13 knots (18, 5-24 km / h)? How to maneuver it? And if the battle was not in our favor, then how to break the contact and leave?
And why is it so important to have powerful electronic weapons on the attacking "unit" if its task is simply to carry the missiles to the launch line, launch them and leave at the maximum speed? All this can be done by external target designation from other ships or even aircraft. REV MRK runs the risk of being a thing in itself.
In fact, belief in RTOs stems from the belief that the enemy will be forced to expose their expensive large surface ships, which are inferior to RTOs in speed, under their attack. But it is not a biased analysis of the situation that tells us that if this happens, it will probably only happen in the Sea of Japan and only in the course of the conflict in which Japan is involved. In all other cases, the enemy is more likely to withdraw its URO ships, pushing forward light forces and submarines supported by aviation. Yes, and they are inferior to BNK in speed only on calm water, and at four points, the MRK may not catch up with a large destroyer.
In fact, the only real advantage of a "classic" MRK over a missile boat is the presence of a self-defense air defense system. But they cannot win the war, in order to win the war, it is necessary to destroy the enemy's ships, and the boat, subject to the issuance of a reliable control center, surpasses the MRK in solving such a task - if only because the MRK will not be able to catch up with most of its targets. At least the important ones.
Who will issue the control center for missile boats? For example, helicopters from corvettes (if corvettes capable of carrying them on board are taken as the basis) or from frigates that provide light air defense forces. Or basic aviation from the coast will give it. And the absence of an air defense system must be compensated for by jamming complexes, speed and maneuverability, and stealth in the radar and infrared ranges.
Let's summarize the intermediate result. "Light" surface forces should consist of:
- main ships - multipurpose corvettes. It is they who must hunt submarines, carry out attacks by surface ships in simple conditions (the target cannot evade a strike due to speed or does not try to do so), attack the enemy coast with cruise missiles, and guard convoys and landing troops. If a decision is made that these should be large corvettes (2038X or 1166X), then helicopters should be based on corvettes. If any other variant of the corvette is chosen, except for the 2038X, then the cannons on the frigates should be capable of carrying out fire support missions for the landing force. In general, this ship can be small - up to the "Karakurt" with anti-submarine capabilities:
- missile boats for anti-ship defense missions. Ont should be very fast, stealthy in radar and thermal ranges, small and inexpensive, armed with 76-mm cannons and anti-ship missiles and minimal self-defense weapons, not to the detriment of the above qualities. These boats will have to cover the corvettes from attacks by small enemy ships, attack the enemy from ambushes.
These ships are supported by URO frigates, which provide air defense for them. At the same time, in principle, frigates, as multipurpose ships, are capable of acting independently.
Also, surface forces interact with aviation, both base and ship. These are the forces that will fight "near the coast" - it does not matter whether ours or the enemy's.
And, of course, assessing the appearance of the "light forces", one cannot fail to give several examples of how to provide the KUGs and KPUGs of the Navy with the required number of helicopters.
Helicopters
As previously stated in the article “Air Fighters Over Ocean Waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea , helicopters are capable of performing a wide range of tasks, up to the destruction of air targets.
Moreover, their defeat by enemy fighters is very difficult. However, they need to be based somewhere.
If the base ships of the "light forces" are corvettes with a hangar, the problem disappears. Assuming that our hypothetical air defense frigate has two hangars, we get that the KPUG has four corvettes, and one such frigate has 6 helicopters.
However, everything changes if we have a small corvette as a base ship, for example, an analogue of 056, or the "multipurpose Karakurt". Then we have only two places at the KPUG where helicopters can be stored. And, if we assume that in a pair of "neighboring" KPUG helicopters AWACS from frigates interact not only with their frigate, but also with the "neighboring", then this is even more or less acceptable. But there is no place for anti-submarine helicopters.
Is this a problem? On its own shore - no. At a distance of 100-150 kilometers from the coastline, it is even better to base helicopters on the ground - they do not depend on pitching. But as the area of operation of the KPUG moves away from its territory, the problem grows more and more. It can be solved without involving other ships only by seizing the ground and equipping takeoff and landing areas there.
This, in principle, is possible, but in the event of an offensive war against some distant country, the situation becomes unsolvable for a while.
This factor has been well known for a long time, but many of the military do not really care, since for them the ship is, first of all, an anti-aircraft missile system, and in its BMZ and not very far from the coast, and not just an anti-aircraft defense, performing anti-aircraft defense missions during the deployment cover RPLSN. And here they are somewhat right, a small corvette will be cheaper than a large one, which means that more of them will be built for the same money, which will give more search capabilities, and aviation is in the course of tasks to support the deployment of NSNF and flies from the shore, this is just not fundamental …
And you can think about the fact that later you may need to fight in completely different places and in completely different conditions.
The question, however, remains.
But there are solutions.
The first thing that suggests itself is the use of integrated supply ships as a carrier for helicopters. Currently, there is not a single full-fledged such ship in the Navy, although there is a positive experience of using them. The Navy previously had such a ship - "Berezina" of project 1833.
Currently, small auxiliary vessels are being built for the auxiliary fleet, and the KKS is not designed or laid down.
However, the need to conduct some kind of operations far from the coast will inevitably force them to build, simply because without such ships it is impossible to organize a full-fledged warring fleet. And here their large sizes can come to our aid.
KKS usually has a hangar and a landing area. The reason is that, firstly, sometimes there is a need to make up for losses in helicopters. And, secondly, because sometimes it is possible to transfer cargo only (or is it just more convenient) by helicopter.
The same "Berezina" had a hangar. But we are not interested in Berezina.
Fort Victoria is a British ship of this class. Among other things, it has a hangar for three Augusta Westland AW101 helicopters - rather big machines. And a flight deck for two helicopters at the same time. That is, in this case, we are talking not only about simply carrying helicopters on board and sometimes lifting one of them into the air, but about ensuring the possibility of regular group flights. And this is so, the British constantly use this ship both as a supply transport and as an aircraft carrier, which "closes" the lack of helicopters for ship groups operating at sea.
Actually, this is the solution. A certain Russian ship of this class, which does not exist and is not being designed now, but is needed sometime in the future, in the same size, will be able to provide the basing of about four Ka-27 or Ka-31 helicopters. Thus, the problem of basing helicopters becomes partly removed.
In general, there is a need to discuss a frigate carrying not two, but three helicopters. From 1977 to 2017, the Shirane-class destroyers were in service in the Japanese naval self-defense forces. These, of course, are not frigates, their total displacement exceeded 7500 tons. But they also had a lot of weapons - two 127-mm gun mounts, a massive ASROC anti-submarine missile launcher. There was also a developed superstructure. If we talk about our needs, then when using hangars for our compact helicopters, one art installation and a shorter flight deck, three helicopters can be "fit" into a much smaller ship.
Theoretically, the very compact Ka-27 and their derivatives can be stored in very small hangars, as evidenced by the hangar on the same corvettes 20380. At the same time, even the width of the corvette 20380 (or 20385) is sufficient to accommodate a pair of hangars. Its width is less than that of the American Perry-class frigate by only 70 centimeters. This is roughly what the result of "measuring" the corvette 20385 in width looks like.
And below - a section of the corvette to estimate the required size of the hangar for one helicopter along the length of the ship. And silhouettes to scale.
You should not consider these pictures as a kind of call to make a corvette with two helicopters - this is nothing more than a demonstration of what dimensions are actually required on a ship for several helicopters (namely, a corvette cannot be done this way, but this is not about that).
But at the same time, it is not difficult to make sure that the ability to create a ship with a displacement of 3900-4000 tons, armed at the level of project 20385 (100-mm cannon, "Packet-NK", one PU 3S-14, a pair of ZAK AK-630M or one or two ZRAK) but with an increased ammunition load of the air defense missile system and a powerful radar (the same "Polyment-redoubt") and three helicopters is not deliberately unrealistic
Although it will require designers to strain.
One way or another, while creating a new generation of "light forces", it is worth investigating the possibility of providing them with helicopters in the required quantity - naturally, in the event that a ship without a helicopter becomes the base "small corvette".
At worst, there is an opportunity to follow the path of very poor countries and retrofit a former civilian ship into a warship - for example, the Malaysians did, creating on the basis of a small container ship their own floating base to fight pirates "Bunga Mas Lima" and its sister ship. Such a solution has a lot of disadvantages, but they are overridden by one of its advantages - the price. And as a last resort, if there are no sane and quickly implemented options, you can go for it - but with the understanding that the presence in the naval grouping of a military ship that is essentially not a combat ship, which does not have, for example, design features aimed at increasing the combat survivability can have extremely negative consequences.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary to sweep aside such methods, even the British resorted to them during the war in the Falklands, using mobilized transport ships, and during operations in Lebanon, an improvised helicopter carrier converted from a merchant ship according to the ARAPAKO project is extremely unfortunate, by the way. But it is not necessary to blindly repeat after them, the principle is important.
One way or another, this question can be solved - if it is solved.
Conclusion
"Light forces" supported by large ships and aircraft are an effective means of waging war at sea. They are capable of providing anti-submarine defense, which is critical for us, and solve a host of other tasks. The ideal option would be to line them up around large corvettes as a versatile unit and missile boats as an anti-ship unit. With corvettes the size of 2038X, there will be fewer questions about seaworthiness and the use of these forces in the DMZ, for example, when protecting some convoys to Venezuela or somewhere else as far away. Corvettes have a minimum cannon for more or less effective fire along the coast, and they themselves carry a helicopter. It is only necessary to simplify and reduce the cost, while at the same time strengthening the composition of the weapons on board - and this is possible.
But in other cases as well - if it is mistaken for a base corvette on the 1166 hull with 76-millimeter paper or with a ship similar to the Chinese project 056, or with something multipurpose in size and displacement of the Karakurt, the scheme will also work. Moreover, each option will have its own strengths and weaknesses. For example, a small multipurpose version of the Karakurt will allow you to customize one and a half times more ships than a certain version of the 2038X. But it will be necessary to separately resolve the issue of fire support for the landing force and helicopters.
The general points for any base ship will be, firstly, the need for air defense frigates capable, together with aviation and the corvettes themselves, to repel an air strike, and secondly, the need for very high-speed missile boats, with a minimum level of radar signature and 76- mm cannon plus missiles. Before the creation of such ships, it is quite possible to get by with the existing project 12418 and the modernization of the existing missile boats of the 1241 project.
I would also like that the final formation of the appearance and the determination of the required number of "light forces" would be preceded by research, covering all aspects of the problem - operational-tactical, economic and the issue of the possibility of attracting the required number of personnel. And so that when developing modifications of corvettes for the forces of the new structure, the mass of their subsystems and hull contours are subjected to the most serious verification to ensure the required speed.
In practice, however, there is nothing of the kind, but there are only 12 already built and under construction corvettes, capable of somehow fighting submarines (not to say that very well), useless patrol ships and "eternal" long-term construction 20386, and a rather large brood of new RTOs, of which 30 units will be in service sometime in 2027. The concept of "building whatever" is available, and the results will also be "on the face". But that's the way it is with us.
Nevertheless, it is worth at least voicing the right ideas. It is possible that someday they will begin to be realized.
