The Project 941 heavy strategic missile submarine (tpk SN) has become the largest submarine in history. The assessments of this project are opposite: from pride in what has been created to "the victory of technology over common sense." At the same time, there were no attempts to objectively analyze the project, taking into account all the conditions for its creation and application, despite the fact that unreasonable and unfair assessments of this project are widely circulated in publications and literature on our shipbuilding and the development of naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF).
Trpk SN project 941. Photo:
Claims to the project
1. "Large weight and dimension" of ballistic missiles "TRPK SN project 941.
Yes, it was the significant weight and size characteristics of the ballistic missiles of the submarine (SLBM) of the missile weapons complex (KRO) that determined the appearance of the entire project 941. However, at the time of the start of work on the Typhoon system with the SN project 941 and the R-39 SLBM of the D-19 complex (index 3M65, START code "RSM-52", according to NATO classification - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) the possibility of creating a liquid-fuel SLBM with the characteristics of RSM-54 (with the highest energy and mass perfection) was not clear, it happened much later, when the creation of the Typhoon system was already in full swing. Before my eyes was the "American example" with its solid-propellant SLBM SSBNs, which provided serious operational and combat advantages. The choice in favor of solid fuel for the D-19 was reinforced in 1973. the accident of the KRO in the combat service of the RPK SN K-219 (which died due to a new KRO accident in 1986).
In addition, the issue of using solid fuel for SLBMs of the Typhoon system was posed at the highest level by directive, was
"Great confidence in the leadership of the military-industrial complex, primarily in the person of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for defense issues D. F. Ustinov and chairman of the commission on military-industrial issues (MIC) L. V. Smirnov, that we can create solid-fuel missiles no worse than the American ones", - wrote the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for shipbuilding and weapons, Admiral Novoselov.
As it turned out during the development, these hopes were "overly optimistic", and the problem of our solid fuel lagging behind the American one (primarily in terms of the most important characteristic - specific impulse) was never resolved until the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, a large mass of all our solid-propellant rockets (significantly more than that of their Western counterparts).
2. "Huge displacement" and a large buoyancy reserve of the project 941 TPK.
RPK SN project 941 and 667B. Photo:
Taking into account the initial data and high requirements for the project (primarily in terms of noise and the number of SLBMs and warheads), a unique design solution for Project 941 was made - a "catamaran" made of robust hulls, with separate compartments for the torpedo complex, controls and rudder drives, and placement SLBMs in 20 mines between strong hulls turned out to be the only possible and correct one.
Construction of the CH project 941. Photo:
Moreover, the volume of strong hulls (surface displacement) was not much higher than that of the American competitor (SSBN "Ohio"). Widespread "information" about allegedly 48,000 tons of total underwater displacement of Project 941 is false, and the real total underwater displacement of "Sharks" is much less than these 48,000 tons. At the same time, a significant buoyancy margin provided the possibility of breaking thick ice.
In addition, when comparing the displacement per one medium-power warhead, the 941st project, which had 20 SLBMs with 10 warheads (of course, taking into account the actual total displacement, and not the "mythical" 48,000 tons) turns out to be even more economical than the 667BDRM project (which had 16 SLBMs with 4 warheads).
Subsequently, on the initial studies of the SN project 955 missile launcher with the Bark missile launcher (with a similar dimension and mass to the SLBM of the D-19 complex), they returned to the "classic scheme" of SSBNs, with the placement of mines in one solid hull, however, taking into account the construction constraints (including the depth of the channel in Severodvinsk), this turned out to be possible only when the number of SLBMs was reduced to 12.
RPK SN project 955 with 12 SLBM "Bark" KRO D-19UTTH. Photo:
Taking into account the available objective initial data and conditions facing the developers (first of all, SN Kovalev, the general designer of the RPK SN), the adopted design decisions for 941 projects were the only possible ones.
Kovalev Sergey Nikitich, General Designer of Strategic Submarines, Chief Designer of Project 941 CHP
At the same time, the Rubin Central Marine Design Bureau was able to ensure good controllability of the new submarine of a very large displacement.
3. Allegedly "poor control" of the project 941.
A number of statements about the alleged "poor controllability" of the 941 project have nothing to do with reality. Interestingly, at the initial stage of development, there really were serious doubts and concerns in this regard. However, all of them were successfully and beautifully solved, incl. due to the proactive development of the ship to work out the issues of its controllability on the large-scale model "Pilot" (practically an ultra-small submarine - a heavy autonomous UUV with a digital control system). This development for those years was simply unique, and only specialists and teachers of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute could successfully implement it.
4. Allegedly "extremely high cost" of the project.
Of course, the cost of Project 941 CH trpk was significant. However, it was quite consistent with analogues, and there was nothing "exclusive" or "very expensive" for 941 projects in this regard. A very high standardization of equipment with other submarines of the 3rd generation also worked to severely limit the cost of the SN submarines, and the KRO - significant unification of the first stage with ICBMs for the Strategic Missile Forces (BZHRK) railway complexes.
At the same time, having received a more effective solution (according to the criterion "efficiency - cost") in the form of modernized missile defense systems CH project 667BDRM with SLBM RSM-54, the 941 series was limited to 6 ships
“At the urgent request of the leadership of the Ministry of Justice in the early 1980s. Defense Minister DF Ustinov decided to build the seventh ship, although the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the General Staff did not consider it necessary to increase the series, at the beginning of 1985 the construction of this seventh ship was discontinued.
5. Allegedly "high noise" of the project.
The real noise level of the 941 was much lower, not only of all our SN missiles (up to the 955 project), the last hulls of the 941 project actually became the 3rd generation low-noise nuclear-powered ships themselves (when driving at low-noise moves). Here it is appropriate to quote (from the RPF forum) the hydroacoustic officers of 941 projects:
“The low noise of the Sharks is not a legend. And this is not an attempt to defend the "honor of the uniform," but work experience. "Shark" to "SeaWolf" or "Ohio", of course, does not hold out. Until "Los Angeles" reaches, almost, if not for some discrete components. When measuring the noise in the spectrum, 1-2 samples were observed in some buildings. On my last "steamer" the discretes were observed once. Due to the torn off the hatch of the light body. Eliminated. Spectrum without discrete leaving behind. The quoted noise level is higher than that of Ohio, lower than that of Los Angeles.
In the mid-90s, in the White Sea, RTM Alikova clung to us. In the process of tracking him, they began to find out: how does he manage to follow us ?! It turned out that the electricians forgot to replace the brushes of the potential removal system from the shaft line. The brush holder clicked along the shaft line. After installing the brushes, RTM lost contact with us."
What do we end up with? Most of the claims on this project are simply untenable. Yes, from the "point of view of the military economy" it would be better if instead of 941 projects "immediately began to do" 667BDRM with SLBM "Sineva". With one, but fundamental clarification: at the time of the start of work on the 941 project, both the general designer of the KRO V. P. Makeev, and the general designer of the missile defense complex SN Kovalev S. N. they themselves did not know that a significant increase in the performance characteristics of the 667 project is possible, and in the 80s it will be possible to create such a complex as "Sineva".
Those. some "modern statements" that "it is better than BDRM instead of 941" are based on "afterthought." Alas, "the time machine does not exist", and the responsible officials (both in the country's leadership and the organization of the defense industry and the navy), who stood at the origins of the 941 project, made well-grounded decisions taking into account the information they had at that time:
• the extremely acute problem of low noise;
• example of the US Navy with solid-propellant SLBMs with high performance characteristics;
• the need to ensure the under-ice use of the rocket launcher SN;
The fact that as a result of tremendous work it would be possible to significantly reduce the noise level of the CH project 667, no one had yet assumed, and the data that the managers had at their disposal was unambiguously demanded for the implementation of new (modern) requirements for the quietness of the new project.
In addition, even in a deeply modernized form, the 667BDRM project was significantly inferior in stealth to the submarine of the "potential enemy". The collision on 1993-20-03 of the SN K-407 RPK and the Grayling submarine that followed it: the newest SN Navy RPK was tracked by the US Navy PLA built in 1968 (taking into account subsequent upgrades, with a significant reduction in noise, new acoustics and weapons, in the Navy In the USSR, this type had a "semi-official" name "Sturgeon-M").
Scheme of the collision of the K-407 and the US Navy submarine "Grayling". Source:
Conclusion: taking into account all the initial difficult conditions, the 941 project turned out, and it is, of course, the pride of the domestic shipbuilding
Here, one should not forget about the "status factor" - the rivalry between the two superpowers, and this rivalry was extremely sharp not only on the scale of states, but also officials in the USA and the USSR of different scales.
On the active PR of the new SSBN "Ohio" there was a public and appropriate response from the rostrum of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU from the General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev:
“The Americans have created a new submarine, Ohio, with Trident missiles. We have a similar system, Typhoon."
The excitement of tough competition was not only among the leaders, but also among the direct performers, to the extent that young people at the construction of the head Akula in Severodvinsk "on the sly" listened to "Voice of America" (not in terms of "dissidence", but the fact that the competition almost parallel to the "teams" of the creators of the head corps "Sharks" and "Ohio" was actively discussed there).
Problematic issues were resolved by the management quickly and decisively:
“The scandal was huge. R. P. Tikhomirov as a plenipotentiary representative of the management of Gidropribor. Leaving his office after a meeting chaired by the Minister of the Sudprom, he called the general director of the NGO in Leningrad:
- Radiy Vasilievich! They demand you personally, but don't come. Here you can enter the director's office, and leave as the youngest researcher.
- Maybe we should demand that …? I gave the command …
- None of this is needed anymore. We were given one month, … ordered to finalize. I said it was unrealistic. Well, they made it clear to me that if this is unrealistic under the current leadership, they will have to change it.
So, on June 26, 1981, Isakov gathered in his office specialists who, in his opinion, are capable of solving the task set by the minister …
And they did [a new system for entering data into torpedoes]! Not in a month, of course, in two. Maybe a little more."
(RA Gusev "Such is torpedo life".)
Yes, not everything turned out as they wanted …
The most serious "failure" occurred in torpedoes and countermeasures (anti-torpedo protection). Our 3rd generation did not receive the torpedoes “Tapir” for the nuclear-powered ships, and the UST-A (USET-80) torpedoes had a number of critical problems, were not only limited in combat capability, and the torpedoes themselves were practically not available until the second half of the 80s. It was.
"Sharks" went to the fleet with outdated and extremely ineffective means of hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD) such as MG-34M and GIP-1 …
However, this was not the fault of the developer, the Rubin Central Design Bureau. Moreover, they put into projects the use of the most promising protection complexes, which have not lost their relevance today.
To some "forgotten in the 80s" developments, it makes a lot of sense to return today - to equip the SSBN "Borey" (and other submarines of the Navy).
Admission to the Navy and Service 941
The head TRPK CH K-208 joined the Navy on December 29, 1981, and immediately began to be intensively operated, according to the actual research program (including the implementation of combat services), studying the capabilities of the new project and developing ways of its effective use …
The second building, K-202, entered service on 1983-28-12, the third, TK-12, on 1984-26-12, the fourth, TK-13, on 1985-26-12. The fifth and sixth orders of project 941 were built according to the modernized project, incl. with the installation of a new digital SJC "Skat-3" and TK-17 entered service on December 15, 1987, and the last building of TK-20, on December 19, 1989.
TRPK SN project 941 in the base (Nerpichya Bay). Photo:
During the construction of the entire series, noise reduction measures were introduced.
A special direction of the use of the Project 941 SN tpk was to carry out combat services under the ice of the Arctic and the White Sea. In 1986, TK-12 carried such a long combat service (moreover, with a mid-term change of icebreaker crews). At the same time, the almost absolute invulnerability of our missile launcher was ensured ("from above" it was covered with an ice cover, and the breakthrough of the US Navy's submarine into the White Sea is extremely difficult due to the shallow depths of the throat of the White Sea).
The specificity of the use of KRO from under the ice in the Arctic is well described in the memoirs of the commander of the CH K-465 (project 667B) RPK Captain 1st Rank V. M. Batayeva:
“By definition, launching rockets from under the ice is impossible. When sailing under ice, the order for launching on time cannot be fulfilled, because there is not always an objective possibility for launching missiles - there may not be a hole or weak ice over an SSBN. The launch can be made only from the surface position into the ice hole or by breaking the ice with the ship's hull, having previously cleared the rocket deck of it before launching. … Multiply the length of the rocket deck by its width, take the ice thickness in 1.5 - 2.0 m, multiply by the ice density at least 0.8 - 0.9 and get the weight of the ice debris on the rocket deck. … pulls by 1000-1200 tons … The force of the hydraulic drives for opening the mine covers will not move the ice, you will break off the drive rods. You will not envy any crew if ice fragments fall into an open shaft."
In the process of mastering the Arctic theater, methods were developed that ensured a sharp decrease in the residual amount of ice on the rocket deck, but this problem was not completely solved.
TC-202 in the Arctic, photo:
In May 1998, an experimental cruise of the CH K-202 trpc took place to study the possibilities of using Project 941 in severe ice conditions. One of the crew members recalls:
“… We will press the Arctic ice to the maximum possible thickness for this ship project. They began to break through the ice from 1 meter and so moved closer and closer to the pole. They found suitable ice, took measurements and floated up, breaking through the ice with their hull. They surfaced, replenished the air force stock and moved on. Easily broke ice 2 meters, swam in ice 2, 5. The thicker the ice, the more the VVD reserve was spent, the more time it took to replenish it. Ice in the Arctic is very durable. Once they surfaced for a long time, when the CGB (tanks of the main ballast) were blown through, the boat shook like in a fever, the strong hull creaked and cracked. But they surfaced. Some retractable devices did not move out due to the fact that they led the structure of the cabin. There are many dents on the hull of the boat, the covers of the missile silos have jammed. All plastic fairings were broken. After this trip, TK-202 did not go to sea anymore."
Damage to the TK-202 hull, photo:
At the turn
(Vice Admiral Motsak, 1997)
[media = https://www.youtube.com/watch? v = J9Ho7P_C9bY || Admiral Motsak speaking after the destruction of R-39 missiles by shooting, 1997]
With the adoption of the KRO D-19, work was immediately started on its further improvement, the KRO D-19UTTH.
Admiral Novoselov:
“In the process of shaping the appearance of this complex, the further prospects for the development of marine ballistic missiles were determined. The lead developer, the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau and the Institute of Armaments of the Navy, proposed the creation by the end of the twentieth century. two solid-propellant missiles, one of which was equipped with RGCHIN (code "Ost"), the second - with a monoblock warhead controlled in flight (code "West"). These intentions were reflected in the draft Armament Program (AR) of the Navy for 1991-2000, which also provided for the design and construction of new Project 955 missile carriers … in the second half of the 1980s. production of the RSM-52 was discontinued, since the missile carriers were subject to re-equipment."
In view of the ensuing shocks and the collapse of the country, the cessation of production of SLBMs had fatal consequences for 941 projects. They hoped for a new KRO D-19UTTH and rearmament of ships on it …
Captain 1st rank V. V. Zaborsky:
“… The task was set to surpass the US Trident-2 missile in combat properties. If it was necessary to preserve the dimensions of the rocket and the missile silo, as well as the level of the launch weight, a multiple increase in combat effectiveness was ensured by switching to medium-power warheads, increasing the firing accuracy by four times, increasing the unit's resistance to damaging factors by 3-4 times, as well as equipping missile defense countermeasures and firing along maneuvering trajectories (flat, mounted, with random deviations in an arbitrary plane, etc.) with warheads deploying in an arbitrary and enlarged zone … In 1992, the development of cruise and auxiliary rocket engines was completed. Ground experimental testing of the control system was carried out. Prior to the start of flight tests from the ground stand, the following were carried out: flight design tests of "throw" rockets from the floating stand, 7 launches; testing the separation system of the depreciation rocket system in 4 launches on full-scale mock-ups; working out the processes of separation of steps; development of medium-class warheads with 19 launches of the K65M-R launch vehicle. Joint flight tests with missile launches from a ground stand were started in 1993, in November 1993, December 1994 and in November 1997. three launches were carried out, which became unsuccessful … The technical readiness of the complex at the end of 1997 was 73%, the readiness of re-equipment of the missile carrier under the project 941U - 83.7%. However, in September 1998, at the state level, the proposal of the Ministries of Economy and Defense was accepted to stop the development of the D-19UTTKh complex with the R-39UTTKh missile."
Now it is obvious that this decision was a mistake, the formal "grounds" for which were:
• "fatal dimension problem";
• "unification of sea missiles with land complexes" ("interspecies intercontinental ballistic missile).
The thesis of the "unification" of the new Bulava SLBM with the "Topol" is still encountered in our media, although it not only has no technical grounds, but simply did not make sense then (under the existing START treaty, we could have new missiles with multiple warheads only on marine carriers).
The problem of "dimension" also did not exist: the launch of the R-39 was provided even with the modernized diesel-electric submarine of project 629 (on which the throw tests were carried out), the first version of the project 955 provided the deployment of 12 new SLBMs of the D-19UTTKh complex. At the same time, in order to evaluate various options, it was correct and objective to compare not the number of missiles, but warheads (total throw weight).
As a result of the decision of 1998, the development of the almost finished KRO D-19UTTH was discontinued, and the development of a new one - "Bulava" began, which was extremely delayed.
In this situation, the 941 ships were left without ammunition, the service life of which was coming to an end. In addition, the possibilities of extending the terms of the existing R-39 missiles were not fully used, which became the subject of an unprecedented conflict in 2004:
Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Suchkov G. A.:
"Russia may lose an entire class of strategic missile submarines - Project 941."
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy V. I. Kuroedov:
“… The admiral's statements about the combat readiness and prospects of the Shark-class special forces of the Northern Fleet are a complete fiction.
In recent years (until the complete elimination in 2012) of the R-39 missiles, the last Project 941 CH missiles were carried with far from complete missile ammunition of the last remaining missiles.
And here the question arises: what have we lost as a result of this mistake?
The first is a lot of money and time to create a new KRO.
Obviously, if the work on the R-19UTTKh complex continued, it would have been in service by the end of the 2000s and put into service (on the upgraded CH project 941 and further on the Borei).
Second, the modernization of the 941 project automatically entailed the modernization of only 3 generations of nuclear-powered ships (due to the very high standardization of equipment), and the savings on Bulava ensured the start of such modernization back in the mid-late 2000s. Obviously, in this case, now we would have in the ranks of the Navy at least a dozen nuclear-powered ships of the 3rd generation that have undergone medium repair and deep modernization (projects 949A, 971, 945 (A)). It is especially necessary to emphasize that "some statements" at the enormous cost of such modernization are baseless. In terms of the power plant and general ship systems, the 941 project is close to the 949A project (having a more powerful missile system and a weaker torpedo one).
The large displacement and reserves for the modernization of the 941 project made it very effective options for various special-purpose submarines based on it.
Alas, today the Project 941 CH grouping is lost. The last ship in service (aka the first one to be built), TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy", today has no combat significance and is used only to ensure the tests of new submarines. In 2017, Dmitry Donskoy took part in the Main Naval Parade.
Summarizing
The creation of the ships of Project 941 was by no means a "mistake" (as stated in a number of works), it was a worthy project created within the strict framework of the objective conditions and possibilities of its time (and timing!). The life of the ships of this project was short, not because of imaginary "shortcomings", but of the upheavals that the country suffered during those years.
The heavy cruisers Peter the Great and Dmitry Donskoy are on their way to the GVMP-2017. Photo:
And the last thing. Now the last ship, the TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy, remains in service, and it would be fair and correct to tow it to Kronstadt to be placed in the Patriot fleet after its withdrawal from the Navy. At the same time, taking into account the normal radiation situation on the ship, there is no need to cut out the reactor compartments; it will be quite enough to remove the reactor cores. "Dmitry Donskoy" can and should become a worthy monument to the great country and its creators, and project 941 is rightfully the pride of the domestic shipbuilding industry.
