There is a historical tale about how the Athenians in Ancient Greece, wishing to bargain more benefits for themselves, and less obligations, sent an ambassador to Sparta who was extremely sophisticated in rhetoric. He spoke to the Spartan ruler with a magnificent speech and spoke for an hour, inclining him to the Athenian proposals. But the warrior king's answer was short:
“We forgot the beginning of your speech, because it was a long time ago, and we did not understand the end because we forgot the beginning.”
So, in order not to erect a respected reader on the Spartan throne, I will allow myself to briefly list the conclusions of the previous articles, which will form the basis of the proposed material.
1. SSBNs as a means of waging a global nuclear war are significantly inferior to the Strategic Missile Forces in terms of cost-effectiveness. However, SSBNs are an indispensable political means of preventing such a war, since in the mass consciousness of Europe and the United States, it is submarines with ICBMs on board that are a guarantee of the inevitability of nuclear retaliation.
2. SSBNs can serve as a means of nuclear deterrence only if their secrecy in combat services is ensured. Alas, according to open publications and the opinions of a number of naval officers, the secrecy of our strategic missile submarines is not ensured at all, or, at least, is completely insufficient. This applies to all types of SSBNs currently in service with the fleet, that is, projects 667BDR Kalmar, 667BDRM Dolphin and 955 Borey.
3. Unfortunately, there is no certainty that the situation with the secrecy of our SSBNs will dramatically improve after the commissioning of the most modern nuclear submarine missile carriers of the Borei-A type.
If you try to translate all of the above into at least some numbers, you get something like the following.
SSBNs of the Pacific Fleet entering combat service were identified and accompanied by anti-submarine forces of our "sworn friends" in about 80% of cases. Moreover, this happened regardless of the route of travel: whether the boats went to the "bastion" of the Sea of Okhotsk, or tried to move into the ocean.
The author does not have any reliable figures about such statistics of the Northern Fleet. But it can be assumed that the “disclosure” of strategic nuclear-powered ships in this theater was still lower. Here, factors such as the presence of ice, under which one could hide, the difficulty of acoustic detection of submarines in the northern seas, as well as more modern types of SSBNs than those in service with the Pacific Ocean, worked in favor of our submariners. All this improved the secrecy of our "strategists", but still did not save these ships from regular "flashes" by American anti-submarine weapons.
Let's try to figure out why this happened before, and is happening now. And also with what we should do with all this.
About American PLO
I must say that in the interval between the two world wars, the United States preferred to plan grandiose naval battles of battleships and aircraft carriers, but they did not seriously think about the threat from under the water. This led to colossal losses of the merchant fleet when the Americans entered the war - German submariners staged a real massacre off the coast of the United States.
The lesson taught by the dashing guys to the Kriegsmarine went to the American Navy for the future, and more sailors under the Stars and Stripes flag never made such a mistake. The attitude towards Soviet submarines in the United States was the most serious, as evidenced by the scale of the anti-submarine defense deployed by the Americans. In fact, you can safely write a long series of articles about American PLO weapons, but here we will limit ourselves to the most concise listing of them.
SOSUS system
It was a "network" of underwater hydrophones, the data of which were processed by special and computer centers. The most famous part of SOSUS is the anti-submarine line, designed to detect Soviet submarines of the Northern Fleet during their breakthrough into the Atlantic Ocean. Here hydrophones were deployed between Greenland and Iceland, as well as Iceland and the United Kingdom (Danish Strait and Farrero-Icelandic border).
But, besides this, SOSUS was also deployed in other areas of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, including along the US coast.
In general, this system has demonstrated high efficiency against 2nd generation nuclear submarines, and limited against 3rd generation nuclear submarines. Apparently, a somewhat reliable identification of 4th generation ships is beyond the capabilities of SOSUS, so most of this system is mothballed today. SOSUS was a global submarine tracking system, but today it is outdated: as far as the author knows, the Americans do not plan to create a similar system at a new technical level.
SURTASS system
It has two fundamental differences from the previous one. The first is that SOSUS is stationary, while SURTASS is mobile, since it is based on hydroacoustic reconnaissance ships (KGAR). The second difference from SOSUS is that SURTASS uses an active search mode. That is, at the very beginning of its development, the KGAR was equipped with a long (up to 2 km) antenna, consisting of hydrophones, and operating in a passive mode. But in the future, the KGAR equipment was supplemented with an active, emitting antenna. As a result, SURTASS ships were able to operate on the principle of "underwater radar", when an active antenna emits low-frequency pulses, and a giant passive antenna picks up echo pulses reflected from underwater objects.
The KGAR themselves were relatively small (from 1, 6 to 5, 4 thousand tons) and low-speed (11-16 knots) ships that did not have weapons, except for hydroacoustic ones. The form of their combat use was combat services, lasting up to 60-90 days.
To date, the SURTASS system, one might say, has been phased out by the Americans. So, in the period 1984-90. was built 18 KGAR type "Stalworth", in 1991-93. - 4 more types of "Victories", and then, in 2000, the most modern "Impeckble" was put into operation. But since then, not a single KGAR has been laid down in the United States, and most of the existing ones have been withdrawn from the fleet. Only 4 ships of this class remained in service, three Victories and Impeckble. All of them are concentrated in the Pacific Ocean and appear on our shores only sporadically. But this does not mean that the idea of a sonar reconnaissance ship using sonar is outdated or flawed.
The fact is that the main reason for the reduction of KGAR in the American Navy was the total reduction of the submarine fleet of the Russian Navy in comparison with the times of the USSR and an even greater decrease in the activity of our submarines in the late XX - early XXI century. That is, even those submarines that still remained in the fleet in the ocean began to go out much less often. This, plus the improvement of other methods of detecting and tracking our submarines, and led to the fact that further construction of ships of the "Impeckble" type was abandoned.
However, today in the United States, an unmanned sonar reconnaissance ship is being developed, and the Americans consider this an important direction in the development of their Navy.
Underwater and surface hunters
American multipurpose nuclear submarines pose a huge threat to our submarine forces, both strategic and general purpose. For almost the entire 20th century, US submariners had a significant advantage both in the quality of their sonar systems and in the quietness of their submarines. Accordingly, other things being equal, the Americans outperformed us in the detection range of Soviet nuclear submarines, both SSBNs and multipurpose submarines.
In the 80s of the last century, the development of Soviet science and technology (as well as a successful operation to acquire Japanese high-precision machine tools) allowed us to significantly reduce the gap with the Americans. In fact, the third generation of Russian submarines (project 971 "Shchuka-B", project 941 "Akula") were comparable in their capabilities with the American ones. In other words, if the Americans were still better, then this difference was not a death sentence for our submariners.
But then the USA created the 4th generation of atomarin, which began with the famous "Seawulf", and the USSR collapsed.
For obvious reasons, work on improving submarines in the Russian Federation has stalled. For the period 1997-2019, that is, for 22 years, the Americans commissioned 20 multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 4th generation: 3 Seawulf and 17 Virginia. At the same time, the Russian Navy has not been replenished with a single ship of this generation: Project 885 Severodvinsk and three strategic Boreas of Project 955 are, so to speak, submarines of the 3+ generation, since hulls were used in their creation. backlog and equipment of ships of previous series.
Apparently, nuclear submarines of projects 885M (Yasen-M) and 955A (Borey-A) will become full-fledged Russian submarines of the 4th generation. It is hoped that they will be quite competitive with the American ones - at least in terms of noise and other physical fields, and perhaps in the capabilities of the hydroacoustic complex. However, the problem of confronting the American multipurpose nuclear submarines remains: even if we manage to reach a qualitative parity with the Americans (which is not a fact), we are corny under pressure. Currently, it is planned to hand over to the fleet 8 MAPLs of project 885M in the period up to 2027 inclusive. Seeing the current pace of nuclear submarine construction, it can be argued that this is still a very optimistic scenario, the terms can easily go "to the right". And even if a decision is made to lay down some more Yasenei-M, they will be commissioned after 2027.
At the same time, keeping up with the current pace of construction, the US Navy by 2027 will have at least 30-32 "Virginias". Taking into account the three Seawulfs, the advantage of the US Navy in the 4th generation multipurpose nuclear submarines will exceed the ratio of 4: 1. Not in our favor, of course.
The situation could be corrected to some extent by non-nuclear submarines, but, unfortunately, we did not start the large-scale construction of the Lada diesel-electric submarines, and the improved Varshavyanka of Project 636.3, although improved, are just ships of the previous generation.
In general, we can say that this component of the US Navy's PLO (although, of course, multipurpose nuclear submarines are capable of performing many other functions) is actively developing and improving. There is no need to think that the Americans are "stuck" on one type of nuclear submarine - their Virginias are built in separate sub-series (Вloc I-V), each of which has very significant changes in comparison with the ships of the previous "blocks".
As for surface warships, today the US and NATO navies have masses of corvettes, frigates and destroyers that perform two important functions. First of all, this is the provision of anti-aircraft missiles for aircraft carrier, amphibious ship groups and transport convoys. In addition, surface ships can be used to maintain contact and destroy enemy submarines detected by other ASW components. However, in this capacity, they have significant limitations, since they can effectively operate either where enemy aircraft (and other air attack weapons, including ground-based anti-ship missiles) are completely absent, or in the zone of dominance of their own aircraft.
Air and space facilities
It is well known that the main trump card of any submarine warship is stealth, and for many readers it is associated with low noise. But this, alas, is not the case, because in addition to noise, the submarine also “leaves” other “traces” that can be detected and deciphered with the help of appropriate equipment.
Like any other ship, the submarine leaves a wake trail. When it moves, waves are formed, the so-called Kelvin wedge, which under certain conditions can be detected on the surface of the sea, even when the submarine itself is underwater. Any submarine is a large metal object that forms anomalies in the magnetic field of our planet. Atomic submarines use water as a coolant, which is then forced to dump overboard, thereby leaving thermal traces visible in the infrared spectrum. In addition, as far as the author knows, in the USSR they learned to detect traces of cesium radionuclides in seawater, arising where atomarina passed. Finally, a submarine cannot exist in an information vacuum; it periodically receives (in some cases - and transmits) radio messages, so that in certain situations it can be detected by electronic intelligence.
According to the generally accepted opinion, today none of these methods guarantees the detection of a submarine and maintaining contact with it. But their complex application, with automatic data processing and bringing them into a single picture, makes it possible to identify nuclear and non-nuclear submarines with a high degree of probability. This is how the aerospace component of the US PLO is built: reconnaissance satellites monitor the vastness of the world's oceans, revealing what can be seen in optical and thermal imaging cameras. The data obtained can be refined with the latest Poseidon R-8A aircraft equipped with powerful radars, apparently capable of finding "wave trails" of submarines, optoelectronic cameras for detecting heat traces, RTR systems, etc. Of course, the Poseidons also have sonar equipment, including dropped buoys, but, most likely, today all this is not so much a search tool as a means of additional reconnaissance of underwater targets and maintaining contact with them.
There are suggestions that the United States was able to develop and launch into industrial production some new equipment, possibly using other physical principles to search for an underwater enemy than what was listed above. These assumptions are based on cases when US Navy aircraft "saw" submarines of the USSR and the Russian Federation, even in those cases when the "classical non-acoustic" methods of detecting such did not seem to have worked.
Of course, the satellites and aircraft used for the US ASW are supplemented by helicopters: the latter, of course, do not have such capabilities as the P-8 Poseidons, but are cheaper and can be based on warships. In general, the effectiveness of the aerospace component of the US Navy's PLO should be assessed as extremely high.
And what should we do with all this?
First of all, we should understand and accept the real balance of forces in the underwater confrontation between Russia and the United States. In other words, we need a detailed understanding of whether Russian 4th generation nuclear submarines can perform their inherent tasks in the face of countering US Navy ASW or its individual components.
The exact answer to such a question cannot be obtained through reflection or mathematical modeling. Practice alone will become the criterion of truth.
How can this be done? In theory, this is not difficult. As you know, the Americans are trying to escort our SSBNs on alert, "attaching" a multipurpose nuclear submarine to them. The latter follows the domestic missile carrier, ready to destroy it if SSBNs begin preparations for a nuclear missile strike. It is also obvious that the "hunter boat" following our strategic missile carrier is not so difficult to find. To do this, it is enough to set a reliable "trap" at one or several points on the SSBN route - after all, we know it in advance. The role of a "trap" may well be performed by surface or submarine ships of the Russian Navy, as well as naval anti-submarine aircraft. The enemy atomarina cannot know in advance that, following the SSBN, it will find itself in some place … well, for example, in the "field of miracles" previously "seeded" with hydroacoustic buoys. As a matter of fact, this is how Soviet and Russian sailors revealed the facts of regular surveillance of our submarines.
It is very important that already the first ships of the 4th generation, SSBNs of project 955A "Knyaz Vladimir", SSGNs of project 885M "Kazan", and subsequent submarine cruisers are 120% used as such "guinea pigs", leaving as often as possible and longer for military service. Both in the north and in the Far East. It is necessary to try all the options: try to slip unnoticed into the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, go under the pack ice of the Arctic, into the "bastions" of the Barents and Okhotsk seas. And to look for "spies" - American MPSS, following our SSBNs and PLO aircraft "accidentally" found themselves nearby. Then, in all cases of detection of American "escort" - to understand in detail, calculate, determine at what point the Americans managed to "sit on the tail" of our ships, and why. And the most important thing! Understanding exactly where we are "piercing", develop and take response measures, even the most radical ones.
Today, in the open press, there are a lot of statements about the secrecy of our submarines, both strategic and multipurpose. Extreme, polar points of view can be formulated as follows.
1. The newest SSBN "Borey-A" and SSGN "Yasen-M" are at least equal and even superior to the best foreign counterparts, and are capable of solving all tasks assigned to them (nuclear missile deterrence for the former, the destruction of AUG and enemy submarine forces for the latter) even in the zones of dominance of the US Navy and NATO.
2. Modern methods of detecting submarines have reached such heights that the location of even the quietest ships of the Russian Navy, such as 636.3 Varshavyanka, Borey-A, Yasen-M, is no longer a secret for the US Navy and NATO. The movement of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines is constantly monitored both in the near and in the far sea zone, including under the ice.
According to the author of this article, the truth, as usual, is somewhere in between, but we need to know exactly where exactly. Because knowledge of the real capabilities of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines will not only allow us to choose the optimal tactics for their use, but will tell us the correct strategy for the construction and development of the fleet as a whole. The most important task of the Russian Navy is to ensure nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, deliver a full-scale nuclear missile retaliation strike. Accordingly, having determined the areas and the procedure for carrying out combat services of SSBNs, at which their maximum secrecy is achieved, we will understand where and how exactly the general-purpose forces of the fleet should help them.
Let's analyze this with a very simplified and hypothetical example. Suppose, according to the statistics existing at the Pacific Fleet, our SSBNs were found in combat services and were taken for escort in 8-9 cases out of 10. It would seem that this is a sentence to our nuclear submarine shield, but … maybe not. Perhaps such statistics arose because before that the Pacific had served on outdated ships of the 2nd generation and it is possible that with the entry into service of the newest SSBNs, the result will significantly improve.
Let us assume that the statistics of entering combat services showed that in 10 attempts to enter the ocean, an SSBN of the Borei-A type was found in 6 cases. And four times "Borey" "sat on the tail" of nuclear submarines, guarding the exit of SSBNs in neutral waters in the immediate vicinity of the military base, and in two more cases our missile carriers were discovered and "taken on the fly" after they managed to go out into the ocean unnoticed.
Obviously, in this case, we should focus on the means to detect enemy submarines operating in our near sea zone, areas adjacent to the SSBN bases. We are talking about stationary hydrophones, hydroacoustic reconnaissance ships and light forces of the fleet, coupled with anti-submarine aviation. After all, if we know the location of foreign hunting boats, then it will be much easier to bring SSBNs into the ocean past them, and the frequency of SSBN detection by the enemy will be significantly reduced.
But, perhaps, the practice of combat services will demonstrate that the Borei-A is quite capable of going out into the open ocean unnoticed, having successfully missed the US nuclear submarine “sentinel”. But already there, in the ocean, they are regularly detected by satellite and aerial reconnaissance forces. Well, then it is worth recognizing that the oceans are not for us yet (at least for some time), and focus on strengthening the "bastion" in the Sea of Okhotsk, considering it as the main area of combat services for the Pacific SSBNs.
In theory, everything is simple. But in practice?
“Author, why are you banging on the open door? - another reader will ask. - After all, it is obvious that the methods of detecting American nuclear submarines described by you were used in the USSR and continue to be used in the Russian Federation. What else do you want?"
Actually, not much. So that all the statistics obtained are thoroughly analyzed at the highest level, and fears for the "honor of the uniform", without fear of drawing a "politically incorrect conclusion", without fear of stamping out someone's high-ranking corn. So that according to the results of the analysis, the optimal forms and areas of combat services (ocean, coastal "bastions", areas under the ice, etc.) were found. So that on the basis of all of the above, specific goals and tasks were determined that will have to be solved by the general-purpose forces of the fleet to cover the deployment of SSBNs. For experienced naval analytical officers to transform these tasks into performance characteristics and the number of ships, aircraft, helicopters and other means necessary to ensure the combat stability of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces.
And so that on the basis of all this, the directions of priority R&D were finally determined and the shipbuilding program of the Russian Navy was formed.
But maybe all this is already being done, and right now? Alas, looking at how our state armament programs are being formed, every year you doubt this more and more.
We are building a series of newest SSBNs with fanfare, but we are frankly "slipping" on the minesweepers needed to take submarine cruisers out to sea. We plan to build dozens of frigates and corvettes - and “forget” about their power plants, planning to buy them in Ukraine or Germany, without localizing production in Russia. We desperately need ships of the near sea zone, but instead of creating a light and cheap corvette based on project 20380, we begin to sculpt a missile cruiser of project 20385 from it without five minutes. And then we refuse the ships of project 20385, because they, you see, are too roads. The author fully agrees that they are too expensive, but, attention, the question is - why did the responsible persons find out this only after the laying of two ships under the project 20385? After all, the high cost of their construction was evident even at the design stage. Okay, let's assume it's better late than never. But if we have already figured out for ourselves that 20385 is too expensive for a corvette, why then began the construction of an even more expensive ship of project 20386?
And there are many more such questions to be asked. And the only answer to them will be only the growing conviction that the term "consistency", without which a somewhat combat-ready military fleet today is impossible, is inapplicable to the construction of the Russian Navy today.
In other words, the author has no doubts that the fleet will necessarily "test" the newest Borei-A and Yaseni-M, check their capabilities in practice, as they say, in conditions close to combat. But the fact that this precious experience will be used correctly, that on its basis the plans for R&D and construction of the Russian Navy will be adjusted, there are doubts, and very big.
