The article is a continuation of the cycle on informing the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union by intelligence about the presence of German troops at the Soviet-German border. Earlier in the reconnaissance cycle, information was provided about what the headquarters of the four border districts knew about the enemy troops as of 21.6.41. Intelligence data on the Wehrmacht's infantry divisions and regiments were examined in detail. At the request of readers, I provide a link to a site with data on German troops. Materials of the specified site can be used only as reference data. Some information from the site should be double-checked with other sources.
The materials of the cycle can be found on the website "Military Review" (part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6, part 7, part 8, part 9, part 10, part 11).
The following abbreviations will be used in the article: A - field army, AK - army corps, IN - military district, Gra - Army Group, mk - motorized body, RM - intelligence materials; RO - the intelligence department of the headquarters of the military district, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, SHVG - the headquarters of the Eastern Group.
Intelligence reports on the headquarters of army groups and armies in 1940
The RS Summary stated that at 15.6.40 on the territory of East Prussia and Poland the following were installed: SHVG in Lodz; the headquarters of the 1st and 4th A in Warsaw and in Krakow; AK headquarters in Poznan (21st), Lodz (3rd), Lublin (32nd), Krakow (7th). The headquarters of the corps of unspecified numbering are available: in Warsaw, in Konigsberg and in Insterburg.
On 16.7.40, reconnaissance confirmed the presence of these headquarters and noted the appearance of the headquarters of the 20th AK in the city of Danzig. The 20th AK will be recorded by our intelligence in the city of Danzig before the start of the war. It was possible to establish that the indicated corps was never stationed in Danzig. Since November 1940, the corps was in the city of Schneidemuhl (now the city of Pila, 182 km from Danzig), on 12.12.40 - in the city of Stettin (Szczecin, 288 km from Danzig), and from the beginning of 1941 to June - in town of Thorn (149 km from Danzig). For the headquarters of the 20th AK, the headquarters of the 20th Military District, which was stationed in Danzig, was taken, which is a reconnaissance mistake.
The Certificate of RU as of 8.8.40 again confirms the presence of these headquarters and notes an increase in the number of corps headquarters by one unit.
At that time it was considered natural that intelligence is able to determine the exact designations of headquarters, formations, formations and regiments. In the certificate, as a lack of intelligence work, it is noted that "". Everything would be fine if RM were true …
The only accurate information is the presence of the SHVG, the designation of which the German command did not hide. The SHVG was identified by our intelligence as the headquarters of the army group (GRA) and in this the intelligence data turned out to be correct. Until 20.9.40, the ShVG performed the role of command of all the armed forces in the East, and from September 20, this role was assumed by the command of the GRA "B".
From September 1940, the SHVG served as the headquarters for the commander of the military forces of the General Government and was subordinate to the high command of the Wehrmacht. The commandant's offices and security units were subordinate to the SHVG, which were stationed on the territory of the General Government.
It should be noted that the General Government was only part of the territory that used to belong to Poland. Therefore, when the Republic of Moldova speaks of "the former Poland", it refers to the entire territory of Poland, and when it refers to the "General Governorship", it refers only to a part of the former state.
German name for SHG: Der Millitarbefehlshaber im Generalgouvernement. Correspondence designation - M. I. G. Before the start of the war, our intelligence tracked this headquarters and mistakenly believed that it was in charge of all the armed forces located in the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.
The published RM contains incomplete data on the presence of large headquarters from September 1940 to May 1941 in the above territories. Some writers believe that it was easier for the semi-literate leadership of the spacecraft to count enemy troops in divisions, and not in corps, in armies or army groups (in fact, these were fronts). Only these persons cannot explain why the RM for Romania and Hungary consistently include information about corps and about armies.
The graph below shows information about the concentration of the headquarters of armies and tank groups on the territory of East Prussia and Poland.
It can be seen that the actual data differ significantly from verified and confirmed by RM … In the period from May 15 to July 20, 1940, there were no army headquarters in the indicated territories, and intelligence "sees", rechecks and confirms the information about the presence of two headquarters of the 1st and 4th armies.
In fact, the 1st and 4th A have been in the West since the fall of 1939. After 20.7.40 the redeployment to the East of the first army headquarters - the headquarters of the 18th A. In September 1940, the headquarters of the 4th and 12th Army will leave for the East. On the basis of the headquarters of the 12th Army, in January 1941, the formation of the headquarters of the 17th Army will begin, and the headquarters of the 12th Army will leave for Romania to lead the troops. in the Balkans.
Since the summer of 1939, the German command has been disguising its headquarters under code designations so that they are not tracked by enemy intelligence. After the end of the war in Poland, the designations of two commands of the GRA and four (out of five) armies that participated in the war against Poland were changed. Subsequently, before the start of World War II, many German armies, tank groups, corps repeatedly changed their code designations. It was possible to find a document according to which in the spring of 1940 the German divisions in the West were also assigned code designations.
A large number of readers consider themselves well versed in the events on the eve of the war, but hardly any of them will answer the question: which headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups did the German command seek to hide from our intelligence, and which of them did not hide?
What was the German command hiding?
To answer this question, you do not need to look at the numerous materials on the website of the "Russian-German project for the digitization of German documents in the archives of the Russian Federation", although there you can find the correct answer based on numerous documents. It is enough to look at the well-known document on the treatment of commissioners: "". Let's see: where this document was sent from OKH.
Our intelligence was allowed to learn about the presence in the East of Army Group "B", headquarters of the 2nd, 4th, 11th, 18th field armies and 4th TGr. Of the four headquarters of the armies, two were not deployed on the territory of Poland and in East Prussia: the 2nd A was in the Balkans, and the 11th A, although it had the name "", was stationed on the territory of Germany until 21.6.41.
In the German headquarters, the same mess reigned as in the headquarters of the spacecraft. It is possible that not all officers participating in the correspondence knew about the impending war and about the meaning of the code designations. In the documents, there are many times addressing and mailing by code designations, and in the text of the documents itself, the closed names of field armies and, for example, the 2nd TGr, are indicated. The same thing happens on maps. Some of them indicate the location of the TGr or MK using a code designation, but on a map prepared after a short period of time, the code and true designations are present at the same time. The same applies to the advance groups of the GRA command …
Our intelligence could "learn" about the presence of the headquarters of the GrA "B" with the subordinate headquarters of the 4th and 18th A, as well as the headquarters of the 4th TGr. To complicate the task of our intelligence, the address for postal correspondence of the command of the GRA "B" was disguised under the code name "" ("Peter"). However, when transmitting telegraph messages, the true name "" is often used, indicating the location of "".
Why was intelligence allowed to detect the 4th TGr?
Why was it possible to detect the 4th TGr? Perhaps because if there is a fourth group, then there must be three other groups. And the presence of three other TGrs near the border, the German command tried to hide, which they did.
The 4th TGr began its formation on 17.2.41 on the basis of the headquarters of the 16th MK, which was stationed in East Prussia. The indicated TGr was the smallest in terms of the number of tanks and our reconnaissance should have got the impression that the formation of the group had not yet been completed. However, our intelligence did not find out about the formation of the 4th TGr before the start of the war. Perhaps the misinformation simply did not reach our intelligence sources …
It seems that the German command was confident in the significantly greater capabilities of Soviet intelligence … But our intelligence did not find either the headquarters of the GRA "B", or the emerging 4th TGr, or the other three TGRs and not a single headquarters of the MK. In May 1941, a special message was passed about the arrival of the commander of a German tank corps, but for a whole month, none of the intelligence services was able to find this corps …
Field Army Headquarters Intelligence
In the Summary of RU from 11.9.40 it is said about the presence at the border five armies: one in East Prussia (army headquarters in Königsberg, commanded by General Kühler), two armies in northern and middle Poland (army headquarters in Warsaw (1st A) and, presumably, in Radom and two armies in middle and southern Poland (the headquarters of the 4th A in Krakow and the 3rd A, presumably in Lublin.) The commander of all German troops in the East, presumably, is Field Marshal Rundstedt, with headquarters in Lodz.
In fact, only the headquarters of the 18th A and the command of the GRA "B" were located at the border during the indicated period. It is possible that there were also groups of lodgers, but these groups are not a fact of having a full-fledged headquarters.
Reconnaissance data on the 18th A and its commander are reliable. The information on the location of the headquarters is not correct, because the headquarters at this time is located in the city of Bromberg (Bydgoszcz, 240 km from Königsberg). In this city, the headquarters of the 18th A will be located at least until the beginning of October 1940. The command of the GRA "B", which in early October 1940 will be marked in the city of Posen (Poznan), will also go to the same city on 16.9.40. The GRA command will be in the indicated city until 19.6.41. 22.6.41 the headquarters of the GRA "Center" will be marked in the suburbs of Warsaw.
The headquarters of the 4th A in October 1940 is celebrated in Warsaw and will be there at least until 11.6.41. Interestingly, it will be deployed in the city center on Hitler's Square in the Europe Hotel. Perhaps this location of the headquarters is due to the fact that our intelligence finds it faster. After all, the army headquarters is not located at the border, but rather far from it. And this is evidence of the imminent start of the war …
The headquarters of the 12th A on October 4, 1940 is located in the city of Krakow.
The headquarters of the 3rd A during this period does not exist, since in the fall of 1939 it was renamed the headquarters of the 16th A.
Rundstedt at that time was the commander of the occupation forces in France and responsible for coastal defense in the Netherlands and Belgium.
It seems that our intelligence did not track the change in the names of the headquarters of the armies and the GRA after the end of the company in Poland. During that period, Rundstedt held command of the armed forces in the East for a short period of time. What intelligence took for the headquarters of the commander of the armed forces in the East in the city of Lodz is the SHVG. It turns out that the reliability of the RM regarding the location of large headquarters in 1940 was extremely low.
In the special message of the head of the Regional Office of ZapOVO dated 19.9.40 it says:
After the defeat of Poland, the 8th A was renamed into the 2nd A. The location of the 8th A headquarters in Warsaw, as well as the non-existent headquarters of the 3rd A in the city of Lublin, will be regularly confirmed by our intelligence until the start of the war. The constant confirmation by intelligence of two non-existent headquarters of field armies from the fall of 1940 to 21.6.41, according to the author, can only be the purposeful work of the German command to misinform our intelligence.
Bulletin # 6 (Westward) (September 1940):.
German corps at the border in 1940
Before the arrival of the corps from the West in the summer of 1940, Poland had only two the headquarters of the reserve corps: z.b. V. XXXIV and z.b. V. XXXV. In July, the headquarters of five AKs arrive (3rd, 17th, 26th, 30th and 44th). In September, the headquarters of five more AKs (1st, 9th, 12th, 16th and 40th) will arrive, and the 14th AK will arrive in October.
In RM, five AKs are mentioned with known numbers: 3rd (Lodz), 7th (Krakow), 20th (Danzig), 21st (Poznan) and 32nd (Lublin). Let's check the reliability of these RMs.
3rd AK - since autumn 1939 has been in the West and returns to Poland on 5.7.40. RM are confirmed.
7th AK - is in the West until January 1941. RMs are not confirmed.
20th AK - was discussed above. RMs are not confirmed.
21st AK - from autumn 1939 to January 1940 is in Germany. In March 1940 he was reorganized into the "Group 21" and sent to Norway. RMs are not confirmed.
32nd AK - will be formed only in April 1945. However, the headquarters of the reserve 32nd corps (z.b. V. XXXII) was stationed in Poland, which departed for the West on 14.5.40 and never appeared in the East. It seems that it was him that our intelligence took for the headquarters of the 32nd AK and did not track his disappearance. The location of the mythical headquarters of the 32nd AK in Lublin will be regularly observed and confirmed by our intelligence until 21.6.41. PM are false.
Below is a graph of the concentration of motorized and army corps in the territory of East Prussia and Poland. Again, there is no coincidence between the actual data and the intelligence data, except for an accidental coincidence at one point.
In the report No. 1 (in the West) RU says about the change in the grouping of German troops from 15.11.40 to 1.2.41:. Departure of the headquarters of the 4th Army from Krakow was established. But in Krakow, the headquarters of the 4th A has never been …
Information on strategic directions
Our intelligence reports repeatedly contained information about strategic directions for strikes against our country.
For example, the report of the head of the RU GSh KA (20.3.41):.
Special message (Sophocles, 4.4.41):.
Similar information came from the military attaché in Germany, General V. I. Tupikova. However, this information was discussed tens of thousands of times in various sources, which set the teeth on edge. However, a new book about the beginning of the war is being advertised for the 70th anniversary of the Victory. Transfusion of well-known information and "revelations" from empty to empty, which, as the author of the book thinks, few people will double-check.
Neither A. Martirosyan nor O. Kozinkin (who wrote the review) even began to double-check what they wrote … Although there is a lot of information on this topic on the Internet.
Nobody shuffled anyone. It's just that our intelligence only had information at the time of the end of the war in Poland. The change in the designations of the large headquarters of the associations, their movement from the territory of Poland to Germany, to France, back to Germany and the appearance at our borders, intelligence simply could not track. There were no sources of information in the large German headquarters. The officers of the overwhelming majority of large headquarters did not wear the insignia of belonging to specific headquarters on their shoulder straps, unlike infantry divisions and regiments …
We must understand that if the Nazis decided to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev with three army groups, then the corresponding headquarters of the GRA should appear at the border. And before the start of the war, intelligence did not find a single GRA command! In addition to the fictitious headquarters of the SHVG. How can we advance without front headquarters?
Just imagine the picture: there are 7-9 Soviet armies on the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and all of them are led by the entire front headquarters, which is deployed, for example, in Vitebsk. All armies are infantry and there is not a single mechanized corps and not a single mechanized brigade … Maybe such a grouping successfully, quickly and to great depths advance in three directions at once: in East Prussia,in Poland and Romania? The command of the spacecraft should have come to the same conclusion - no …
Command of the GRA "S" from 2.11.40 to 12.4.41 is celebrated in the city of Dresden. Around April 20, it moves to East Prussia in the city of Elbing, where it is until 19.6.41 (possibly later, but the next mark is only on June 22). In the RM, no German headquarters is noted in this area.
Command of GRA "B" located in the city of Poznan until 19.6.41 (possibly later). Our intelligence did not find it either. In RM on 1.6.41 and a more updated summary on 15.6.41 it is said only about the headquarters of the 21st AK. And again confusion: the headquarters of the 21st Military District was adopted for the AK headquarters.
In April 1941, the advance group of the command of the GRA "A" is celebrated in the town of Okozim, while the main headquarters still remains in the town of Breslau. In the town of Okozim, the command of the GRA "South" will be located until 19.6.41. In RM RU on June 1 and 15, this headquarters is absent. Only in the city of Bochnia, located near Okozim, is an unknown army headquarters noted, which will be observed there by June 21. Even if intelligence found the headquarters of an army group, but tying it to another headquarters of the field army (in fact, an infantry army) made a big mistake …
Wikipedia and many other documents indicate that GrA "A", "B" and "C" changed their designations to GrA "North", GrA "Center" and GrA "Yug" on June 21 or 22, 1941. However, on the maps of the deployment of German troops, that already on 27.5.41, these groups changed their names.
Something similar to the events in the PribOVO on the eve of the war, when the North-Western Front was mentioned in the correspondence.
In June 1941, something was suspected in RU. German troops are moving in a stream, but something is wrong …
On 3.6.41, a special message is sent from the RU to the NKGB of the USSR:
“… We ask the means at your disposal to help the RC GSh SC in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues:
… 6. Dislocations … of headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR … Headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz - Spala (the former residence of Moscicki) and Krakow …"
Not far from Krakow, the concentration of the GRA "South" began, but in Krakow itself there were no headquarters higher than the AK headquarters. RU is trying to clarify the existence of the GRA command, but does not link it with the unknown army headquarters.
In the next part, we will look at intelligence data on army headquarters.
