The following abbreviations are used in the article: AK - army corps, GSh - General base, INO - the foreign department of the Cheka, CA - Red Army, mk (md, mp) - motorized corps (division, regiment), NGOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), RM - intelligence materials, RO - intelligence department, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft (or the 5th Directorate of the Red Army), TGr - tank group, td (tbr, TP, TB) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).
80 years ago, Hitler's Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Millions of our people died at the hands of the Nazis, their allies and fellow citizens-traitors. Therefore, the topic of the events that took place in our country on the eve of the war remains relevant for many decades. After all, these events are directly related to the losses of our troops in the first days of the war.
There are many versions of the pre-war events. Most of these versions are based on reliable RM, with which the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR was familiar. The author will present his version of the events that took place on the eve of the war, based on the fact that the RM did not correspond to reality.
In a series of articles on intelligence, it was shown that the RM were unreliable (the last parts of the articles, which contain links to the previous parts: Intelligence about German divisions, Radio intelligence about enemy headquarters, German mobile troops in the general government).
The author analyzed all published RM on the deployment and transportation of enemy troops, maps and diagrams of the headquarters of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and ODVO, German maps of the operational department of the Wehrmacht ground forces, the RU summaries of 06.22.41 and operational reports of the General Staff for 22-23 June. The analysis showed that the leadership of the border districts, the spacecraft and the USSR could make their decisions only based on the erroneous picture of the concentration of German troops at the border. Which, in turn, should have led to their erroneous decisions …
Inaccurate data from our intelligence
In the first part, I will remind you of the main provisions of a series of articles on intelligence.
Under the term or the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (later RU), in the summer of 1940, it considered German troops concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland (Warsaw direction, Lublin-Krakow region and Danzig region, Poznan, Thorn).
4.04.41 in RU, the grouping of German troops concentrated on our border was supplemented with divisions located in Romania (in Moldova and in Northern Dobrudja), and from April 26 - with divisions located in the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary).
In May 1941, a grouping of German troops was determined, concentrated against the USSR, which was stationed in the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (Moldova and North Dobrudzha), Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.
The figure shows the actual data on the presence of German divisions near our border and RM, received from intelligence.
It can be seen that the data presented differ significantly from each other. The different slopes of the dependences indicate that the coincidence of the data by the beginning of the war is a random factor.
The similar data on the number of German motorized and tank divisions differ even more significantly. In accordance with RM RU, as of May 31, 1941, there were 120-122 divisions near the border, including 13 MD and 14 TD. In fact, there were 83 divisions near the border, including 3 tank divisions.
From the number of mobile troops from the fall of 1940 to mid-April, two TDs (1st and 6th) were stationed near the border of the USSR, and at the end of April 1941 the third arrived (4th TD). There was not a single MD near the border until June 1941. The only exception is the 60th MD, which departed from the territory of Poland by 23.11.40. It turns out that RU, when assessing mobile troops on the eve of the war, was mistaken nine times!
Everything that related to the Republic of Moldova about the enemy troops, intelligence of the NKGB and the border troops of the NKVD were sent to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Do not think that the data of these two intelligence services were more accurate. The article showed that in April 1941, the intelligence of the NKVD border troops overestimated the number of German troops redeployed to the border in relation to the given RU.
The NKVD certificate (issued after 05.24.41) says
on the concentration: “on the territory of East Prussia and the Polish general government … 68-70 pd, 6-8 md, 10 cd and 5 td … In April-May of this year. in Romania, up to 12-18 divisions of German troops were concentrated, of which: 7 md and up to 2 td”.
Reconnaissance of the border troops discovered up to 101-111 divisions on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian borders. This number does not include the troops on the territory of Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, as well as the grouping in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area. According to RU, there were up to 14 divisions in these territories.
Due to different terms in the preparation of documents between the RM RU (1941-31-05) and the border troops (after 1941-24-05), there may be a difference in a small number of divisions. Therefore, we can say that the data of both intelligence services on the total number of divisions are comparable to each other.
Reconnaissance of the NKVD border troops found 13-15 md and 7 td. It can be seen that the number of ppm found by reconnaissance is practically the same. The data differs in the number of etc. Let me remind you that many TD in the RM RU are formed from separate TP, which the border guards could simply not combine into a TD or combine according to a different principle.
It should be noted that all the detected deployment locations of regiments and divisions of motorized and tank forces did not coincide with the divisional areas of concentration of the 1st, 4th and 6th etc.
The reconnaissance authorities mistook for tank and motorized regiments and divisions anything, but not specified units. For example, in RU, large headquarters, the 615th automobile regiment, a light infantry division and ordinary infantry divisions were taken as the places of deployment of mobile troops. It turns out that the intelligence services provided false information. Based on unreliable RM, the KA leadership made the wrong decisions and confidently defended them with Stalin.
Why did the RMs turn out to be unreliable?
This can only be explained by the absence of our intelligence officers and sources of information in large German headquarters (with the exception of the Air Force headquarters).
And why did our intelligence not bring up sources in large German headquarters?
Intelligence repression
The repressions of 1937–1938, taking place in our country, also affected intelligence. In a series of essays by M. Ktorov "100 years in the service of foreign intelligence" (magazine "National Defense" No. 9, 10), the history of INO is considered. M. Ktorov:
On 2.06.37, at a meeting of the Military Council of the NCO, Stalin said: “In all areas we defeated the bourgeoisie, only in the area of intelligence were we beaten … Our intelligence along the military line is bad, weak, clogged with spies. Inside the KGB intelligence there was a whole group working for Germany, Japan, Poland …"
[A few months later - approx. ed.] 01.24.38, Yezhov stated:
“In some places they cleared themselves, were arrested and calmed down … Comrades, understand, with the relations that existed with us before, it was difficult for foreign intelligence to rush to us? Of course, it's easier than easy … We must take a closer look at each specific …
They took a closer look, arrested and shot a lot. In 1937-1938, a series of arrests of intelligence officers swept through. Residents in Germany, England and France were arrested and shot.
In place of qualified specialists dealing with intelligence issues for many years, people who did not have the necessary training often came. They had to perform better than their repressed colleagues. Therefore, in order not to follow the arrested, new employees were required to provide more accurate and comprehensive RM. But how can this be done if there are no sources of information in the German headquarters? If there is no one to recruit new sources? If any recruitment by the authorities could subsequently be turned against an intelligence officer?
It is likely that the new intelligence officers took the easier route. For example, to determine the exact numbers of regiments and divisions by rumors or by signs placed on the shoulder straps of German servicemen. Of course, this data was cross-checked with the help of other sources and other departments.
By the signs on the shoulder straps of servicemen, it was possible to determine the number of the regiment, division, corps and even the army. By the military colors () on uniforms and shoulder straps, it was possible to determine the type of troops. It turned out that it was quite easy to get “reliable” RMs …
The head of the 5th Directorate of the General Staff, II Proskurov, spoke about the lack of people in military intelligence and the difficulties with sending employees on business trips in 1940 when discussing the experience of military operations against Finland (April 14-17, 1940).
Correctly the employees were afraid. Some of them remembered that they often arrested colleagues years after foreign business trips, accusing them of collaborating with foreign intelligence services. At the same time, they often simply knocked out the testimony necessary for the investigation …
For a long time, the materials received by the RU were not even sorted out. Probably due to the lack of employees, some of whom were repressed. At a meeting on April 14-17, 1940, I. I. Proskurov noted:
“The archive contains a lot of undeveloped valuable materials. Now we are developing, but there is a whole basement, a colossal amount of literature, on which a whole team of 15 people should work for a couple of years."
Also, the intelligence chief said that many materials were not even viewed by high-ranking military leaders. The military leaders immediately "turned the arrows", noting that the literature is secret and difficult to work with …
Information from intelligence in 1940
Studying the RM, one gets the impression that the intelligence is well aware of the German troops concentrated at the border. As an example, the figure shows the data of the 5th control of the General Staff. Comparing the actual data on the presence of German troops at the border and the Republic of Moldova, it is clear that the established numbers of German units, formations and formations do not correspond to reality.
In the fall of 1940, the General Directorate of State Security of the NKVD provides information about the German grouping near our border, which does not differ significantly from the information of military intelligence.
The main problem of the RM was that a significant part of the German troops were not at the border …
But RM was considered proven! In other words, information about the German troops was confirmed by several sources and often by different intelligence services, but still it turned out to be unreliable.
How could this happen?
This could only happen because of the mass misinformation of our intelligence services with the help of the measures of the German command.
Disinformation of the German command
After the capture of Poland, the German command changed the name of two army groups (out of two that fought in Poland) and four armies (out of five) to hide the headquarters of large formations being transferred to the West. Consequently, the German command understood that it was necessary to hide the names of the troops in order to counteract the enemy's reconnaissance.
The German command was obliged to know about the need to conceal signs that would reveal the redeployment or the appearance of mobile troops (motorized and tank) at the front. Indeed, in the places of their concentration, one can determine the directions of the main blows. Therefore, they were obliged to give instructions on the concealment of the belonging of the military personnel to the mobile forces. In this case, insignia on shoulder straps and military colors should have been hidden or distorted. For example, the insignia on the shoulder straps were allowed to be hidden with muffs made of uniform cloth.
The Allies on the Western Front were unable to locate the concentration of German mobile troops, which invaded France in May 1940. It is possible that the German command already at that time was taking measures to conceal the military color and the specific uniform of the tank forces.
In the summer of 1940, according to our intelligence, there were many units and formations of mobile troops near the border. Most likely, they were portrayed as fake units or units with the aim of overstating the number of these troops so that the group would not seem too weak to the Russians.
Since our intelligence services had no other, more reliable, method of obtaining RM, apart from observing the uniform of German servicemen and collecting rumors, we had to be content with the available information.
In May - early June 1941, the "cunning Germans" removed the insignia (numbers) from the shoulder straps or cut them off, but traces of the insignia remained on the faded shoulder straps. Our scouts probably laughed at the "stupid" Germans …
Just before the war, the suspicion arose that the Nazis were using false signs for misinformation. There are two requests to clarify the RM, received from the insignia on the shoulder straps, but it was already impossible to fix something …
Access to the places of deployment of arriving MD, etc. was strictly limited and prohibited on pain of shooting. Probably, similar measures were practiced at railway unloading stations. Therefore, our scouts did not manage to find the places of concentration of MD, etc. before the start of the war.
Scout Sedov's report
Consider the message received from the NKGB officer Sedov on 20.06.41:
Personnel intelligence officer Sedov arrived in Zamoć and followed through many settlements. He spoke with his sources of information. The RM refers to the deployment of infantry units with anti-tank artillery and a cavalry regiment in different places. The report also mentions numerous warehouses, airfields and a long-range artillery battalion and several artillery batteries. The report does not contain a single word about the presence of motorized and tank units.
The article contains fragments of German maps of the operational department of the Wehrmacht ground forces as of the evening of June 16 and 19, 1941. When comparing these maps, we can conclude that the grouping of mobile troops in the Zamosc-Tomashev area has practically not changed.
The figure below shows a map with the situation as of the evening of June 19. Some of the settlements mentioned in the report are marked on the map. The route of Sedov's movement passed near or through the places of concentration of the mobile group, but neither the scout nor his sources obtained information about its presence …
Misinformation by the German special services
Could the German special services use the fake uniform of their servicemen to misinform our intelligence services?
During the war, our special services often used this technique themselves. For example, the offensive of our troops near Moscow, unexpected for the Nazis, the encirclement of their troops near Stalingrad and in Belarus, as well as hundreds of other large and smaller operations. Therefore, the Germans were obliged to use similar techniques, which they had already tried! They showed fake subunits (units) to simulate the presence of mobile troops far from the direction of the strikes of all four TGRs.
If we consider that the Germans did not use fake units, then it is impossible to find answers to the following questions:
1) Why did about 70% of German submarines and submarines with known and rechecked numbers not exist in the Wehrmacht at the time of their discovery by our intelligence services or were they far from the places of their discovery?
2) Why did not 100% of the MP and MD with known numbers exist in the German armed forces at the time in question?
3) Why were regiments and divisions with known numbers for a long time tracked by our reconnaissance when they either did not exist or were far enough away? For example, in France.
4) Why did our intelligence services know for sure about the presence of ten md, etc. in Romania, if there were none of them there? Why were our intelligence services confident that 18 infantry divisions were on the territory of Romania, although by the beginning of the war there were only six of them?
5) Why did our intelligence services know exactly about the presence of nine German divisions in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine by June 1, 1941, and by June 22 - 13–15, if there was not a single division there?
6) Why were all TP and so on discovered by our reconnaissance forces located far from the places of strikes of all four TGRs?
Consider an example of the misinformation of our command using fake subunits or units.
By June 1, 1941, intelligence knows exactly the numbers of the seven md (6th, 8th, 17th, 37th, 58th, 175th and 215th) and seventeen md. RM about the 161st MD demanded verification, but on June 22, its number was already attributed to verified data.
In the report of RO PribOVO dated 06/18/41, the information about the presence of the 161st MD is beyond doubt. At the headquarters of the ZapOVO, by June 21, it is also known about the presence of the 34th MD. It should be noted that not a single number of md or mn, which was mentioned above, existed in the German armed forces at the indicated time.
06/23/41, the Handbook on the insignia of the German army was signed for printing. There are no motorized infantry colors in the guide. The intelligence officers know about the MP and MD, but they don't know about the color of the motorized infantry. How can this be? This can only be the case when our intelligence officers or sources have not seen the servicemen of the MP and MD, whose numbers the intelligence knows for sure. Unless, of course, these were not fake units …
At the end of August 1941, a short guide to the German armed forces was published and it indicated that the motorized parts were pink. There is not a word about motorized infantry units again …
Why was the German command not afraid to show our intelligence services fake MPs or MDs?
In the fall of 1940, all the Wehrmacht MDs were reorganized - instead of three MPs, only two remained in them. A light howitzer battalion was removed from the artillery regiment. There were 24 105-mm and 12 150-mm howitzers left in the regiment. In MD there were up to 37 armored vehicles and there was not a single tank or assault gun. In fact, MD was a third weakened PD on cars, which could only be quickly transferred to the places of possible strikes by spacecraft troops.
The mistake of the German special services was that our intelligence services could not find out about the reorganization of the motorized troops. If they suspected this, they would try to throw in the necessary information about the changed structure of the MD …
According to our intelligence, the German MD had significant forces: three MPs, an artillery regiment consisting of four divisions (48 guns), 68 armored vehicles, 60-72 light tanks and 24 assault guns with a caliber of 75 … 105 mm.
If the Germans tried to show the presence of fake MD, it becomes clear why the data of the RU and the intelligence of the NKVD border troops on motorized divisions coincide. After all, they could see fake connections …
A somewhat similar situation was with the tank forces. The intelligence did not manage to find out about the reorganization of the td, from which one tp was withdrawn, and the headquarters of the tbr were withdrawn from many divisions. The scouts were confident in the presence of two TP in the composition of all the TD of the Wehrmacht.
In the already mentioned short guide, published after the start of the war, the structure of MD and heavy etc. was given. The table of contents mentions these divisions.
The author reviewed four reference books posted on the Internet. And in all copies there are no inserts with the structure of these divisions. Probably, they were removed after the printing of the circulation, since the Germans did not have heavy etc.
The structure of the MD, etc. did not correspond to the data that our command staff possessed before the start of the war. For example, a text about the length of a column of tp, tbr, etc. remained in the reference book, from which it follows that the division had a tbr, consisting of two tp.
Unlike MD, the German command was not going to show our intelligence services the presence of TD, MK and TGr at the border. After all, these formations are the main means of blitzkrieg.
By 1.06.41 g.intelligence knew only one number of TD (8th), allegedly concentrated in Lancut (KOVO). At the same time, in accordance with the RM RO of the headquarters of the ZapOVO, the 8th TD was stationed in Warsaw until June 22. At the same time, information about the presence of this division with a number in different places is reflected in the RU document. In fact, the 8th TD in June arrived at the 4th TGr, which was located in East Prussia.
Our scouts knew the exact numbers of nine tp. It is possible that the German special services could show the presence of individual TPs that could be attached to the AK, but they were forbidden to show the presence of TD, MK and TGr.
In 1940, a "Brief Guide to the German Army" was published under the editorship of Major General IM Tokarev. The handbook was intended for the commanding staff of the spacecraft and was available in stores. Naturally, German intelligence knew what it contained.
The handbook said that this is probably why the German command did not show the presence of full-fledged TD near our border, which could solve independent tasks after breaking through our defense line.
The tasks that the German command set for the MK and the TGr were an order of magnitude more significant and therefore showing their presence contradicted the plan to conceal the concentration of shock groups. In turn, tp and tb could be attached to AK and, less often, pd.
Thus, the tp and tb, discovered by our intelligence, could well have been attached to the AK and had to solve the tasks assigned to these corps. The movement speed of the AK was equal to the movement speed of the infantry. Therefore, the AK could not make rapid deep marches after the breakthrough of the defense line of the spacecraft forces. Perhaps that is why the speed of advance of German troops was considered at the war games of about 12 km / day.
conclusions
Based on the presented material, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1) Our intelligence provided inaccurate information about the places of concentration of German troops near our border.
2) Our intelligence was unable to obtain information about the concentration at the border of TD, MK and TGR. Therefore, the leadership of the spacecraft and border districts had no idea about the possible places of strikes by mobile groups and did not know about their concentration.
3) The German command widely used disinformation measures to mask the movement of tank and motorized troops to the border, to create a picture of the concentration of false large groups on the southern flank of the Soviet-German border.
These measures were consistent with the task of the 11th Army headquarters assigned to it in the Barbarossa plan:
“To ensure the success of the offensive of Army Group South, the army must, demonstrating the deployment of large forces, shackle the opposing enemy."
The High Command of the Wehrmacht gave appropriate instructions to the Abwehr:
"To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria."
The disinformation measures carried out within the framework of the above orders led to the fact that our intelligence found by June 22 in the southern part of the General Government, in Slovakia, in the Carpathian Ukraine and on the territory of Romania, up to 94-98 German divisions, of which up to 26 were motorized and tank. According to reconnaissance data, up to 35–37% of mobile units were located against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO (in the secondary direction), which were dispersed along the entire border.
Of the 16 TDs, 11 were full-fledged (according to the intelligence of RU on June 1, 1941). The remaining five TDs were conditionally combined from the TP (rifle and artillery regiments, as well as separate battalions of these divisions, were not detected by intelligence). Of these 11 full-fledged divisions on the territory of the southern part of the General Government and Romania, there were 10. The picture emerged that the main mobile groupings of the German invasion troops were stationed in Romania (against the ODVO and the southern flank of the Lvov salient), as well as against the summit of the Lvov salient …
The real picture turned out to be more ominous …
