The following abbreviations are used in the article: A - field army, AK - army corps, IN - military district, Gra - Army Group, CA - Red Army, mk (md) - motorized corps (division), RM - intelligence materials, RO - the intelligence department of the headquarters of the military, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, TGr - tank group, td (TP, TB) - tank division (regiment, battalion).
In the previous part, the RM was considered about the large German headquarters, which came to the leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft in 1940. The reliability of these RMs was low. The RM was considered about the presence of the GRA commands at the Soviet-German border, which, in fact, were the front headquarters for commanding troops in strategic directions. Our intelligence was unable to obtain information about the presence of such commands at the border before the start of the war. It was shown that of the large headquarters concentrated near our border, only the emerging 4th TGr (the Germans tried to create such an impression) did not have encrypted designations and the 4th A. its true name was often used.
Consider the RM on the deployment of the headquarters of the armies and the TGr near our border, which was received in the spring and in June 1941 by the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Information about the presence of such headquarters could help the command of the spacecraft to determine the main directions of tactical strikes by the enemy armies and with especially dangerous directions in which large mobile groupings should be introduced into the breakthrough.
Intelligence about the presence of large headquarters of Germany's allies
The inability to explain the lack of reliable data on the presence of the headquarters of the GRA, field armies, TGR and MK at the border forced some writers to come up with a new version. According to this version, the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR were not interested in the Republic of Moldova about the presence of large headquarters. For these leaders, it was only necessary to determine the number of divisions and the number of enemy tanks. The author, however, claims the opposite: there was little information about the presence of large headquarters in the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the German command did not seek to disclose their presence to our intelligence, in contrast to the infantry divisions. Consider a few RMs about the troops of Germany's allies.
Summary No. 4 RU (April 1941):
The existing operational formations in Hungary (three armies, nine AK and one mobile corps) on April 20 were actually mobilized and brought to wartime states … In the Carpathian Ukraine, in addition to reinforced border units, three AK are concentrated on the Hungarian-Soviet border (6, 7, 8) … It can be assumed that the Hungarian command began the transfer of two more AKs (2 and 5 AK) to the Carpathian Ukraine …
Summary RO of KOVO headquarters (May 1941):
Dislocation of the Romanian army. According to reliable data from radio intelligence and RO OdVO, the deployment of the following units and formations is confirmed: Bacau - headquarters of the 4th army … Brasov - headquarters of 6 AK, Buzau - headquarters of 5 AK, Tecuch - headquarters of 3 AK, Pyatra Neamt - headquarters of the mountain rifle corps …
Special message ("Mars" 15.6.41):
The 3rd and 4th Bulgarian armies (five infantry and one cavalry divisions) are concentrated on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The headquarters of the 3rd army - Mikhailov …, 4 armies - Simeonovgrad …
It can be seen that information about the presence and locations of the headquarters of the armies and AK of Germany's allies was in demand by intelligence and leaders of various ranks.
Several intelligence reports received before the war
Special message ("Costa", 19.5.41):
From the information collected, it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. Early july serious military actions are planned against Ukraine. In this case, one proceeds from the considerations that the war cannot be won without the resources of Ukrainebecause, the German competent persons conclude, Europe is not able to provide food for the peoples of the devastated countries and regions …
Special message ("Ramsay", 21.5.41):
The war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May … [Diplomatic couriers - author's note] also said that this year the danger may be over. They stated that Germany has nine AKs, consisting of 150 divisions, against the USSR. One AK is under the command of the famous Reichenau. The strategic scheme of the attack on the Soviet Union will be taken from the experience of the war against Poland …
There is a mark:. But this resolution is not strange if one understands that Uzbekistan has no information about the redeployment of three front headquarters to the East and the data on the presence of army headquarters are incomplete and inaccurate … The clarification comes shortly before the start of the war.
Special message (17.6.41):
Memo … reports that his report on the 9 armies on the Soviet-German border clearly says about the armies, not about the AK …
In June, the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan covered the concern related to the suspicion of the unreliability of incoming RMs. During this period, there is also a suspicion of the inaccuracy of the information obtained through visual observation of the epaulets of German servicemen and according to rumors: “[16.6.41] [in Warsaw].
The leadership of intelligence, spacecraft and the Soviet Union are interested in the locations of German large headquarters, while RU has no certainty about their presence and location. This can be seen from a letter from RU to the NKGB of the USSR (3.6.41):
We ask the means at your disposal to help the RU in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues:… 6. Dislocation of the headquarters of German armies and the headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR, in particular, check the presence of army headquarters and their numbering in Konigsberg, Allenstein, Warsaw, Lublin, in the Zamosc region - Krasnystav - Yankov, in the Tarnow - Debica - Bochnia region, in the Zakopane region - 75 km south of Krakow. German army headquarters on the territory of Romania, headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz - Spala … and Krakow …"
Referring to the torn quote from the memoirs of General Golikov, some writers confidently state that our intelligence provided the leadership with all the necessary RM about the presence and deployment of German troops near our border. Our intelligence, allegedly, had more complete information about the troops that were stationed in East Germany. had a more extensive intelligence network there.
Continuation of the Letter from 3.6.41:
7. Recheck the number of German divisions and corps east of the Oder River, ie. from the Moravska-Ostrava-Breslau-Stettin line … In this case, it is especially important to identify the composition of the troops in the most dimly lit areas: Czestochowa, Katowice, Krakow; Lodz, Poznan, Breslau; Frankfurt an der Oder, Breslau and Danzig, Stettin, Bromberg (Bydgoszcz).
9. What is known about the plans for military operations against the USSR (in any form - documentary, in statements, etc.). Golikov, head of the main command and control unit of the spacecraft.
At the beginning of June 1941, RU should be helped to double-check the number of German troops from East Germany to the Soviet-German border. Intelligence is interested in information about the presence of the GRA headquarters, armies and corps. They talk about quite extensive areas, about which there is very little information … In RU there is no complete certainty about the plans of the German command in case of war with the USSR. This is referred to in listing nine. Referring to the torn quote from the memoirs of the former head of the RU, the writers do not even bother to read the entire text of the memoirs. General F. I. Golikov, even after the war, was sure that intelligence provided reliable information …
Was not in Germany on 1.6.41.286-296 divisions, 40-47 td and md, 8-10 parachute and airborne divisions … The unreliable RM about the absence of German MK and TGr near the border did not allow the leadership of the spacecraft and military unit to put forward our troops to protect especially dangerous areas. Not knowing about the places of concentration of large mobile enemy groupings led to errors in the orders to relocate our mechanized corps from the very beginning of the war. Not knowing the locations of the enemy's existing parachute units led to the massive involvement of troops in the fight against non-existent large landings.
The fact that there are no other RMs that would warn the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union about the start of the war on June 22 is confirmed by the first military report of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was covered in detail in the cycle on exploration. Overwhelmingly, this report confirms the RMs that our intelligence services had by 1.6.41. However, these data turned out to be unreliable, which, in turn, led to mistakes by the spacecraft leadership immediately before the start of the war and on June 22.
The presence of large German headquarters at our border
Consider the actual location of the headquarters of the field armies and TGr in the territory of East Prussia and the General Government.
Headquarters 4th A in September 1940 moved to the East. From the beginning of October 1940 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Warsaw on Hitler Square (formerly Pilsudski Square), and on June 21 it is located in Miedzyrzec.
Headquarters 6th A from 10.4 to 19.6.41 deployed to Tarnobrzeg, and 21.6.41 moved to Sulov.
Headquarters 9th A from 23.4 to 27.5.41 deployed in Vidminnen (20 km northeast of the city of Aris). On June 16 and 19, it is located in Shlagakrug (10 km south of Aris), and on June 21 - in the town of Giby on the Suvalka ledge. The report for 12.6.41 says that in the evening the army headquarters (A. O. K.9) proceeded through Aris.
Headquarters 11th A until May 1941 is deployed in Germany, and on 27.5.41 is located in Romania.
Headquarters 12th A at the end of 1940 he was deployed in Zakopane. In January 1941, the headquarters of the 17th A was formed on its basis. In March, the headquarters of the 12th A moved to Bulgaria and would never return to our border.
Headquarters 17th A until 12.4.41 is deployed in Zakopane, and from 23.4 to 19.6 is located in Rzeszow. By June 21, the headquarters moved to Rudnik, and its place in Rzeszow was taken by the command of the GRA "South".
Headquarters 16th A from 23.4 to 19.6.41 is stationed in Bartenstein, and on June 21 is celebrated in Gumbinen.
Headquarters 18th A until 19.6.41 deployed in Königsberg, and on June 21 is located near the city of Heudekrug.
It can be seen that the headquarters of the 4th, 6th, 9th, 16th, 17th and 18th armies from April to June 1941 were deployed in the same settlements.
Headquarters of the 1st TGr … 23.4.41 the advance group of the headquarters is located north of Rzeszow, and on May 27 it is also celebrated in Sandomierz. During the same period, the main part of the headquarters is located in Breslau. On June 16 and 19, the TGR headquarters (in full) is celebrated in Rudka (73 km west of Zamosc), and on June 21 - in Wolka Labunsk (9 km south of Zamosc).
Headquarters of the 2nd TGr 27.5.41 is stationed in Berlin, and his advance group is located in the outskirts of Warsaw. Until June 16, the headquarters of the group will be located near Warsaw, and from June 19 to June 21 - it is celebrated in Biala Podlaska.
Headquarters of the 3rd TGr will be deployed in Jena (Germany) until at least 27.5.41, and his advance group will be in Widminen from 23 April. On June 16, the headquarters of the TGR is celebrated in the specified city in full. On June 19, the headquarters are located in Treiburg.
Headquarters of the 4th TGr from 17.2 to 16.6.41 is located in the place of the beginning of formation - in the city of Allenstein. On June 19, it is celebrated 17 km north-west of Tilsit, and on June 21 - in the suburb of Tilsit.
RM on the presence of large headquarters
On May 31, 1941, the last pre-war report of the RU was printed and sent to the addressees, which is currently published. Further, before the start of the war, there is no published information from the RC GSh KA. Why is there no such information in the public domain?
According to the author, the only reason is the absence of changes in the RM, which were available on May 31. In the last known information, the number of enemy divisions randomly coincided with their actual number. At the same time, the very distribution of enemy troops along the border does not correspond to the information from the reports.
The last known published document of the RU is Bulletin No. 5 (to the west) of 15.6.41, which repeats the information of the bulletin of the RU from 31.5.41. 41 g. There is a clarification that the information is given according to the intelligence data of the RO VO. But if this information is given in the summary of the RU, then this information does not contradict the RM that the RU has. Consider in detail the information from the summary dated 15.5.41, which concerns the headquarters of the armies and TGr.
Abbreviations will be used below: PI - verified information, Accident - the data requires verification.
In RM, the presence of the headquarters of the 9th A in Allenstein, which is PI, is noted. The headquarters of the 18th A is located in Konigsberg (PI). There is a note that the headquarters of the army group is marked in Konigsberg - in the terminology of RU - the headquarters of the front. It is indicated that there is an accident.
There is the headquarters of the 8th A (PI) in Warsaw. There is a large headquarters in Otwock not far from Warsaw. There is a mark:.
The headquarters of the Eastern Group (PI) is located in Spala. In Lublin - the headquarters of the 3rd A (PI). In Ropshitsa - the headquarters of the 6th A (road accident). In Bochnia - the headquarters of the army with an unknown number (RTA).
It is noted that, according to the testimony of the defector, there is a headquarters of the 16th A (road accident) in Ulyanov. According to unverified reports, the 14th A headquarters is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the 17th A headquarters in Zakopane, and the 11th A headquarters in Romania.
In total, it is reliably known about the presence of one front headquarters (headquarters of the eastern group) and four field armies (3rd, 8th, 9th and 18th). It is required to check the data on the presence of two GRA (in Konigsberg and Warsaw) and seven armies: the 4th in Warsaw, the 6th in Ropshits, unknown in Bochnia, the 16th in Ulyanov, the 14th in Krakow, the 17th in Zakopane and 11th in Romania. Let's check the reliability of the RMs presented in the Summary.
According to unverified reports, the 14th A headquarters is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the 17th A headquarters in Zakopane, and the 11th A headquarters in Romania.
There is no army headquarters in Krakow. The headquarters of the 14th A was reorganized into the headquarters of the 12th A in the fall of 1939. There is no headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, which has been located in Rzeszow since April 1941. The headquarters of the 11th A is indeed located in Romania, but this information (according to intelligence) is not verified …
One can “pull by the ears” of RM and say that the intelligence provided reliable information. But the author believes that the intelligence information is unreliable. Why?
The headquarters of the mobile groups were not found. The reconnaissance did not detect the crossing of the headquarters closer to the border on the eve of the war. According to intelligence data, many enemy formations on the eve of the war were located in places of deployment far enough from the border. And much more…
After the start of the war, the headquarters of the border military units prepared maps with the situation on the eve of the war to explain their actions. Probably to convey the truth hidden from us that the intelligence did not detect the presence of mobile strike groups and the exit of enemy formations to the border. It should be noted that these maps were discussed in detail in the first four parts of the article on exploration.
On the map of the KOVO headquarters, the presence of the non-existent headquarters of the 3rd A and the headquarters of an unknown army in Bochnia is again noted. There are signs of unknown army headquarters near the city of Sandomierz and Zamoć. The headquarters of the eastern army group in Spala, mistaken by intelligence for the headquarters of the GRA. On the PribOVO map in East Prussia, the only large headquarters is marked - the headquarters of the 18th A.
At the headquarters of the ZAPOVO, they also plot the situation that they knew about on June 21: the headquarters of the 18th A in Konigsberg, the headquarters of the 9th A in Allenstein, the headquarters of the 8th A in Warsaw, the headquarters of the 3rd A in Lublen. All of them, as well as a significant mass of enemy troops, are located in places of deployment far enough from the border … The information repeats unreliable RMs, which were discussed above.
The deployment of large enemy headquarters from the point of view of the command of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO does not differ much from the information presented in the Summary of 15.6.41. Three field armies against PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to four armies against KOVO. The only front headquarters in the East …
Consider the number of tank and motorized troops that were given in the intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan on May 31 and June 15, 1941. Intelligence discovered:
- against PribOVO - 5 TP, which are combined into 2 TP. The presence of 3 ppm was noted;
- against ZAPOVO - td and 6 tp, which are combined in total into 4 td. There is one MD;
- against KOVO concentrated up to 6 TD and 5 MD;
- in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja, i.e. against the troops of KOVO and ODVO - 2 TD and 4 MD.
In total, without taking into account the German troops in Romania, twelve TD and nine MD were concentrated near the border.
According to the intelligence of the districts, tank units are concentrated:
- against PribOVO - 6 TB and 5 TP;
- against ZAPOVO - 3 TB and 6 TP;
- against KOVO - up to 4 td, 6 tp and 3 tb.
It can be seen that the data of the districts are somewhat overestimated in relation to the information of the RU.
Based on the intelligence data, the enemy should deliver the main strikes where there are more tank and motorized troops. And most of them are concentrated against KOVO and ODVO.
Consider the summary of RU on May 5, 1941 in terms of the presence of tank and motorized troops:
In the very composition of the forces concentrated against the USSR, attention is drawn to the strengthening of tank forces from 9 divisions at 25.4.41 to 12 divisions by 5.5.41; motorized, including the motorized division, - from 7 divisions at 25.4.41 to 8 divisions at 5.5.41 …
According to RU, from May 5 to May 31 at the border (excluding the territory of Romania) there are twelve TD and 8 … 9 MD. In Romania, there are 2 more TD and 4 MD. Let's check this information.
In Romania, instead of 6 tank and motorized divisions, in fact, there is not a single one. The figure shows information about the deployment of tank and motorized divisions as of 27.5.41. The German map itself is not shown, since in the future, an article will be prepared on the data of our intelligence on mobile German troops, which will provide links to the documents used.
In the areas of responsibility of the VO, units of only two tank divisions (the 1st and 6th in East Prussia) are deployed and there is not a single motorized division. Even before the Stettin - Breslau - Moravska-Ostrava line, two TD and one MD are concentrated, but this territory is already outside the lines of responsibility of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO. The assumption that intelligence could receive servicemen from separate units of divisional subordination is not correct. On the maps that will be presented in the future, divisional areas of concentration of these divisions are indicated. There are no tank and motorized units near the border from the word "absolutely" … As an example, I will give information (as of 27.5.41) about the deployment of three military units, which, according to intelligence data, were located opposite KOVO.
Causes complete bewilderment: what tank and motorized divisions, regiments and battalions confidently "see", "track" and "confirm" our intelligence ?? Indeed, in places designated as verified information (!) With the deployment of tank battalions, tank regiments, tank and motorized divisions at the time of compilation of reports, they are not and were not …
The German command deliberately "lit up" a number of field army headquarters in front of our intelligence, hiding the presence of the headquarters of the TGr and MK. Perhaps it wanted to show that apart from the infantry armies with reinforcements at the border, there is nothing else. It makes no sense to tame our intelligence to the fact that it makes no sense to dig thoroughly: after all, anyway, all information is readily available. This information is confirmed by visual and repeatedly verified observation … And then suddenly the Soviet intelligence will start digging and find something that it was not supposed to know …
The figure shows the location of large German headquarters according to intelligence data. How should the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union be determined by the presented RM?
From the experience of the campaign in Poland and France, our command knew that the enemy armies consisted of AK and, in fact, were infantry armies. Armies that cannot carry out deep and lightning breakthroughs, maneuvers with numerous mobile troops. Consequently, their presence at the border is not strategically dangerous.
The presence of these armies is even less dangerous due to the concentration of their troops far enough from the border. After all, the infantry will need 1 … 2 … 4 days to approach the initial positions to attack at the border.
The presence of these armies is even less dangerous because of the presence of only one front headquarters, which must lead all the armies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Our command is well aware of this, tk. in the event of a war, it itself deploys 3 … 4 fronts in the same zone to lead the armies. But the front headquarters alone does not interfere so much with defending the Germans …
Disinformation was also well confirmed by the intensified construction of fortifications by German units, the preparation of firing positions for artillery, the installation of many anti-tank guns. In June, the reconnaissance line was followed by inquiries: "How many anti-tank guns have been installed by the Germans?" The supply of troops and equipment without increasing the number of divisions (according to RM) in June 1941 in the zones of the districts could also be taken for the accumulation of reserves of infantry armies and supplies.
What does the leadership of the spacecraft and the country know as of June 21, 1941 according to intelligence data? At the western border there is only one headquarters of the GRA, which commands 4 … 9 armies on the territory of East Prussia and the General Government. All armies are infantry armies, supported by 45 … 54 artillery regiments, with a small number of mobile troops, which are located far from the border.
Up to three armies are concentrated against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to 6 armies are concentrated against KOVO in Poland. There are no tank armies (groups) and motorized corps at a considerable distance from the border. Therefore, deep and lightning strikes should not be expected in the near future. There are no significant enemy aviation forces at the border airfields. Reconnaissance very carefully and in detail tracks all movements of German troops: down to infantry battalions, artillery batteries and tank companies … There is no reason not to trust the intelligence provided …
According to the RM data, which are confirmed by the situation on 21.6.41 on the maps of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO headquarters, a significant part of the German troops is not located near the border. The only conclusion suggests itself: nothing dangerous is expected in the near future and the situation is under control. There is no reason to withdraw the 1st echelon divisions to their positions, tk. the main forces of the German border divisions are also located at a distance from the border. There is no need to disperse aviation as large forces of German aviation as of the morning of June 21 were not near the border. The main thing, probably, was not to give the German generals a pretext for provocation.
