In the previous article, the consideration of intelligence materials (RM) on the concentration of German troops at the Soviet-German border in 1940. It was shown that the data on the enemy troops in the Republic of Moldova are very different from the real information. The presence in the Republic of Moldova of exact designations of German armies, army corps, divisions and regiments could only be due to the fact that the German command used servicemen with false insignia on their shoulder straps. These soldiers at the Soviet-German border depicted the formations, formations and units of the Wehrmacht that did not exist at that time or were located in Germany or in the West.
In this part, let's go back a little. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defense declassified several documents that were developed in 1938. An examination of the RM for the period from 1938 to 22.6.41 will allow us to get an idea of the reliability of the materials that our intelligence mined in different periods before the start of the war. Will we be able to discover the connection between the information supplied by our intelligence, between the documents developed by the General Staff of the spacecraft, between the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Red Army?
In several subsequent parts, the author decided to take a closer look at the events of 1940 and early 1941. Information about these events will be supplemented by material from additional literary sources. This is due to minor inaccuracies that took place in the previous two parts. The author decided to somewhat expand the scope of the article, having considered not only the RM, but also to offer a version of the appearance of some documents in the headquarters of the spacecraft, which allow explaining the actions of the leaders of the USSR and the spacecraft on the eve of the war. The materials prepared by the author will be supplemented by materials from the book by B. Müller-Hillebrand "The Land Army of Germany 1933-1945." and from the diary of the former chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces F. Halder.
The following abbreviations will be used in the article: A - field army, AK - army corps, IN - military district, DL - Landwehr division, cd (kp) - cavalry division (regiment), ld - light division, md - motorized division, pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), td (TP) - tank division (regiment).
Number of German tanks in documents
Recently, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published Note Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov to the People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov from 24.3.38, "On the most likely opponents of the USSR." The text of the Note was previously available in the database of the A. N. Yakovleva. The Note provides an estimate of the number of divisions in the German armed forces:.
The document clearly refers to 30 tank battalions, since on the next page it is said about the direction of about 2/3 of the German troops against our country. Among the list of these troops, 20 tank battalions are mentioned.
In the Note, the number of German tanks and tankettes is estimated by the number 5800 … Such a number of tanks and tankettes in the German troops was not even by 22.6.41, and this is taking into account the presence of Czechoslovak and French captured tanks in the German tank forces, as well as the work of the industry in Germany and occupied European countries over the next three years. Therefore, the information about the tanks, which is given in the Note, is very overstated. The overly overestimated intelligence about the production and availability of tanks in the German armed forces continued until the outbreak of the war in 1941.
Special message Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft 11.3.41: The average production capacity of the main tank factories in Germany ranges from 70-80 tanks per month. The total production capacity of 18 currently known German factories … is determined at 950-1000 tanks per month.
Bearing in mind the possibility of the rapid deployment of tank production on the basis of existing automobile and tractor plants (up to 15-20 factories), as well as an increase in the production of tanks at factories with an established production of them, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks per year … Subject to the use of French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10,000 tanks per year …
In fact, in Germany until 1937, 1,876 tanks and tankettes were produced. From 1938 to 1940, another 3,006 tanks were produced. Throughout 1941, another 3153 tanks were produced. Analyzing RM, the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union also sought to produce as many modern tanks as possible. It is possible that the number of tanks was preferred to their quality …
Based on the RM, the General Staff of the spacecraft also overestimated the number of tanks in the German army. Plan of the General Staff of the spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.3.41):
Germany currently has 225 infantry deployed, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, and up to 260 divisions, 20,000 field guns of all calibers, 10,000 tanks and up to 15,000 aircraft …
On 22.6.41, there were a little more than 3 thousand tanks in the German army.
Intelligence summary No. 5 (West) of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft: The total number of the German army as of June 1, 1941 is determined in 286-296 divisions, including: motorized - 20-25, tank - 22 …
RM on the total number of divisions were overestimated: 11.3.41 by 26%, 15.5.41 by 36% and 1.6.41 by 37-41%. There were 209.5 divisions in total. On 22.6.41, the total number of motorized divisions and individual regiments was actually 15.2.
At the same time, the information about the tank divisions turned out to be quite accurate: as of June 22, there were actually 21 TDs. However, the number of tanks in twenty-one divisions and in a small number of separate tank regiments and battalions overstated three times! Since reconnaissance did not find most of the tank divisions, then the number of tanks near the border had to correspond to significantly less than 10 thousand …
Since in the RM the data on the German tank forces are greatly distorted, it is proposed that when considering the number of German divisions of the 30 tank battalions that existed in 1938, not take into account. In principle, 30 tank battalions is not that much: only about 7.5 td. At that time, the German TD consisted of a tank brigade, which included two TPs, two battalions each.
Number of German divisions in 1938
Below is the data on the increase in the number of divisions of the German army.
In addition to the field troops indicated in the figure, there were 21 DLs, which were intended for the defense of cities, border and fortified areas. These divisions had limited mobility and were recruited for military service from 35 to 45 years of age. The conscripts of these divisions underwent military training in 1918 and earlier. The DL was supplied with obsolete weapons that were being withdrawn from the army's armament. According to some reports, these divisions (except for the 14th DL) never fully deployed. In the spring of 1940, on the basis of these divisions, the formation of several infantry divisions (with three hundredth numbers) began.
In case of mobilization, 4 reserve divisions were to be formed. These divisions in their structure corresponded to infantry divisions, but had fewer weapons and vehicles. The bulk of the personnel of the reserve divisions were recruited at the expense of reservists of the 1st and 2nd categories, and if there were a shortage of them, from the Landwehr.
According to B. Müller-Hillebrand, in the fall of 1938, the Wehrmacht had up to 69.5 divisions. The German troops are described quite well in the article "The German Army in September 1938 …". The material of the article is rechecked and presented below in the form of tables.
Failed to find the 61st, 69th and 70th DL. At the same time, in the 1st VO (East Prussia) there existed the 3rd, 22nd and 67th DLs not mentioned in the article. It is possible that there is an inaccuracy in the article.
The 9th MD was absent from the Wehrmacht. It should be about the 9th Infantry Division, formed in 1934 in the city of Hesse.
Couldn't find five reserve divisions - perhaps the author of the article was looking for them better. According to B. Müller-Hillebrand, we can talk about eight reserve divisions.
The tables do not show: the 5th TD, formed on 10/18/38 in the city of Oppeln and the 46th subdivision, formed on 11/24/38 in the city of Carlsbad. The author of the article also wrote about these divisions.
Thus, by 24.3.38, the Wehrmacht had only 66 divisions that could theoretically be deployed at the front. Excluding etc. - 63 divisions. In the Note of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army it is said about 106 divisions that also do not take into account td.
What conclusions should be drawn?
1) Intelligence significantly overestimates the number of divisions - by 68% (according to Müller-Hillebrand - by 61%).
2) The intelligence information does not say about larger formations of tank forces - about tank divisions.
3) Intelligence counted five ppm, although there were four of them.
4) Reconnaissance counted five cd. In Germany there is only one cavalry brigade during this period. At the same time, there are four ld. Three of these divisions each have two CPs and one motorized reconnaissance and artillery regiment. The 1st LD has a tp, kp, a motorized reconnaissance regiment and an artillery regiment.
We can assume that the intelligence correctly estimated the number of MD and CD (inaccuracy of information is about 25%).
It can be assumed that intelligence was unable to track changes in the structure of the German troops. Infantry divisions and landwehr divisions cannot be equated. Failed to track the creation of TD and LD.
Group of Forces "East" in May - June 1940
Back in 1936-37. border guard "Vostok" was replaced by border guards, capable only of garrison service and not having artillery. The border guard regiments had three battalions of riflemen and one machine-gun company. The regiment was armed with three field guns and two mortars. Along the Eastern border, there were about 25 border guard regiments, which were part of the nine Border Guard commands.
On 6.10.39, on the basis of the above commands, the following supercommands were created: z.b. V. XXXI (from 3.40 to Denmark), z.b. V. XXXII (until 14.5.40 in Poland), z.b. V. XXXIII (since 12.39 - in the Netherlands), z.b. V. XXXIV (before the start of the war in Poland), z.b. V. XXXV (before the start of the war in Poland), z.b. V. XXXVI (11.5.40 in France). On the basis of three commands (8 regiments), three infantry divisions (521st, 526th and 537th) were formed. 521st front 18.3.40 began reorganization in the 395th pd. 526th frontline On 28.5.40 it was redeployed to the 6th Military District and on 15.12.41 it was disbanded. 537th frontline - was disbanded on 9.12.40.
By early June 1940 of the year in two supercommands there were about seven former border regiments and two infantry divisions (395th and 537th infantry divisions), formed on the basis of border regiments.
In addition, in the territory of East Prussia and Poland, by the beginning of June, there were newly formed infantry divisions: 311th, 351st, 358th, 365th, 379th, 386th, 393rd and 399th. It is possible that the 206th and 213rd Infantry Divisions were located on the indicated territory before June. The 209th Infantry Division was located until July 1940. A total of up to 13 divisions in total, excluding z.b. V. units. XXXIV and z.b. V. XXXV. The data given does not differ much from the data of Müller-Hillebrand about ten divisions in the East.
It should be noted that Note 1 applies only to the period May - Summer 1940. In 22.6.41, part of the security divisions were located at the border and participated in the invasion of our territory in the first echelon.
In June 1940, five PDs decrease from East Prussia and Poland (206 (6.40), 213 (6.40), 311 (9.6.40), 351 (1.6.40).) and 358th (1.6.40 g.)). According to the author's estimate, 8 divisions remain in the East. According to Müller-Hillebrand, on 9.6.41 in the East there were 7 pd.
In the figure, the only division of the 3rd wave is the 209th Infantry Division, which departed at the end of June - July 1940. The difference in the total number of divisions may be due to not taking into account the 311th Infantry Division, which began redeployment on June 9. With the redeployment of the 311th Infantry Division in the East, only six divisions!
Halder noted in his diary on 28.5.40: The number of divisions indicated in the diary coincides with the data given by the author.
In the spring of 1940, two artillery battalions (out of 3 available) were sent to the West from the rear guard divisions. Six divisions for the protection of the rear had limited mobility due to the lack of automobile and animal-drawn transport.
Two questions for which there are no documented answers. Did the German command really trust the government of the USSR so much and was not afraid of a stab in the back, starting the rout of the Anglo-French troops? Was the Red Army really so weak that the German command was not afraid of it?
According to the author, Hitler was not afraid of being stabbed in the back by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the German command was very successful in misinforming our intelligence. According to the 5th Directorate of the Red Army, as of 15.6.40, there were up to 27 pd. The error in RM is 78%!
Memoirs of General G. Blumentritt:
Before that, there were only a few divisions along our eastern border … They were stationed in large cities, as in peacetime, and the usual security measures were taken along the border. The Red Army, located on the other side of the demarcation line that divided Poland, behaved as quietly as our army. It was clear that neither the one nor the other side was thinking about war. But as soon as all actions in France ceased, the German divisions began to gradually but steadily move to the East …
In Hölder's diary on October 15, 1940, it is written:
Duce at a meeting with the Fuhrer: We have to put up with the onset of a new military winter. Italy is not worried. There is no danger from Russia.
The Soviet Union did not want to start a war with Germany. The war between Germany and the USSR was a consequence of Germany's positional impasse in the war with England and Hitler's confidence in his army. Some German generals wrote in their memoirs that they should have attacked the British in the Mediterranean Sea, on the North coast of Africa and continued the subsequent offensive on other colonies of England …
According to Müller-Hillebrand, as of May 1940 there were 4 headquarters of army groups ("A", "B", "C" and the headquarters of the commander of the troops in the East), 9 army headquarters (1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th (from 15.5.40), 12th, 16th and 18th) and 28 corps headquarters with headquarters units. Before the redeployment of the command of Army Group B to the East, the German command considered the headquarters of the Eastern Group to be the command of the Army Group. There was not a single army headquarters under the control of the headquarters of the Eastern Group, which made this command of the army group purely nominal. But intelligence could rightly mistake him for the headquarters of an army group. Cavalry General von Ginant became the commander of the troops in the East from 15.5.40.
According to the author's estimates, there were 32 AKs in the West and in Germany: from 1st to 19th, from 22nd to 27th, 30th, from 38th to 42nd and 44th. In May, the formation of the 29th AK began. It was not possible to find a single AK headquarters (existing or emerging) on the territory of East Prussia and Poland.
Point of no return
In June 1940, after the defeat of the Anglo-French army, German troops stopped in front of the largest "channel" - the English Channel. Almost the entire German army is concentrated in the West and in Germany. Through its intelligence, the British government had to freeze in horror and begin to probe the situation with a view to concluding peace. But this is not happening.
1.7.40 Halder writes in his diary:
Leeb reported that, as he knew, landing in England is not expected … I answered him that, Despite this, it is necessary to analyze the possibilities of carrying out such an operation, because if the political leadership sets this task, the greatest speed will be required.
It turns out that by July 1, Hitler did not give instructions on the preparation of an amphibious operation on the territory of England. Perhaps there was an attempt at peace talks on the part of Germany … Since July 1, the troops and headquarters begin to work out plans and measures for the implementation of the landing operation.
On 3.7.40, the following entry appears regarding plans for a war with the USSR:
At the present time, the English problem is in the foreground, which should be worked out separately, and eastern problem. The main content of the latter: the way to deliver a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize the dominant role of Germany in Europe.
The positional impasse and the lack of inclination on the part of the British to conclude peace leads to the fact that on July 4 the question of redeploying the 18th Army to the East is being considered at the headquarters of the German ground forces. On the same day, the head of the "Foreign armies - East" department made a report, which served as the basis for preparing a plan for a war with the Soviet Union. The report made a mistake on underestimating the number of spacecraft troops and on the ongoing rearmament.
13.7.40 Halder writes in his diary:
The Fuehrer is most concerned with the question of why England is still not looking for peace.… He, like us, sees the reason for this in the fact that England still relies on Russia.
On 16.7.40, Hitler issued Directive No. 16 "On the preparation of an amphibious operation against England." In a week, the Fuehrer will be reported on the big problems associated with the landing operation …
On 22.7.40 Halder writes:
Carrying out the landing seems to the Fuehrer to be very risky. An invasion only if no other way is found to end England …
Reaction to the peace proposal: the press at first took a sharply negative position, then somewhat softened its tone …
News from England. The situation is assessed as hopeless. The British ambassador to Washington said: England lost the war, she must pay, but not do anything that belittles her honor and dignity …
The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive … You should think over the plan for the upcoming operation. To smash the Russian ground army, or at least to occupy such territory that it would be possible to secure Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from Russian air raids …
Political goals: Ukrainian state, federation of the Baltic states, Belarus, Finland …
On July 22, 1940, Brauchitsch was instructed to begin preliminary development of a campaign plan against the USSR. The High Command, with their Memo signed by Keitel, convinced Hitler that, for some reason, it was impossible to launch an operation against Russia in the fall of 1940.
31.7.40 Halder:
We will not attack England, but we will break those illusions that give England the will to resist … The hope of England is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia …
Output. According to this reasoning Russia must be liquidated … The deadline is the spring of 1941 … The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start already this year, but this is not suitable, since the operation must be carried out with one blow. The goal is the destruction of the life force of Russia …
The leadership of the Third Reich made a disastrous decision for themselves and the entire German people. Soviet intelligence did not find out about this decision …
Preparations began for a war with the Soviet Union. The order to reinforce the troops in the East was issued by the OKH on 6 September. The transfer of the command of Army Group B, the headquarters of the 4th and 12th armies, the headquarters of the AK and up to 17 divisions began from the West to the East.
