In the previous part, we compared the data presented in the reports of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft as of June 1 and 22, 1941, with the actual presence of German formations at the border. It was noted that the KA leadership misjudged minimal amount German troops needed to start a war with the Soviet Union (up to 180 divisions). However, due to mass misinformation, our intelligence services were unable to document the exit of German formations to the state border until June 21. In accordance with the RM, German troops as of June 21 were located at points of deployment far enough from the border and would simply not be able to advance to it through an area that did not have many roads during the day. The discovered tank units were extremely small for an attack on our country.
From the plotted situation on the PribOVO map on June 21, it can be noted that the district command did not suspect that Hitler's troops had pulled up to the border and on the night of June 22 were ready to take their starting positions for an attack. In the People's Commissariat of Defense in Moscow for similar RMs, there should have been a similar map with the situation, according to which the leadership of the spacecraft on June 21 also found it difficult to conclude that the war began at dawn on 22.6.41.
Maybe the presented map, which we examined in the previous part, is a post-war falsification of generals who sympathized with traitor generals? No, everything is much simpler. The situation was plotted on the map in accordance with the RM of the intelligence department of the PribOVO as of June 17 and at 20-00 on June 21. Both summaries are discussed in detail in the cycle. In the same place, the author Wieck gave maps with a detailed placement of German troops in accordance with the data indicated in the RM.
Area of responsibility of the intelligence department of PribOVO
The figure shows the areas of responsibility of the intelligence departments of the PribOVO (border: Suwalki - Likk - Allenstein - Konigsberg) and ZAPOVO.
The zone of responsibility of the ZapOVO intelligence goes through Suwalki and further beyond the border of the drawing (53 km west), turns to the city of Mlawa and further goes to Warsaw. From Warsaw to the city of Radom and turns to the border. The ZAPOVO intelligence considered its German troops located in the cities of Alenstein and Suwalki. The intelligence department believed that the troops in these cities belonged to the area of responsibility of the PrbOVO.
Also in the RM of the ZapOVO reconnaissance department, the troops stationed outside their area of responsibility are noted. For example, 400 km from the state border. Therefore, the data on the German troops in the RM of the ZAPOVO intelligence department are overestimated relative to similar data from the reports of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. This course of events continued for a long time and it is difficult to say why this was allowed in the Intelligence Directorate. After all, RM entered the Intelligence Directorate from the headquarters of the ZAPOVO regularly …
Dislocation of German troops on the eve of the war according to intelligence
For clarity, I will give a picture from the cycle, which correspond to the RM at 20-00 on June 21. Last year, the author double-checked the correspondence of the parts shown in the figures in the cycle with the data indicated in the intelligence reports. Almost everything coincided. It was not possible to find only 4-5 settlements from the RM. Perhaps not looking hard enough …
It can be seen from the figure that on the northern flank of the invasion group, located in East Prussia and in the territory of former Poland, directly at the border on the eve of the war to the settlement of Zadarun, only three infantry battalions and one artillery regiment are deployed. On the specified section of the border, there can be no talk of any invasion by such forces!
From the town of Zadarun to the Suvalkinsky ledge (in the PribOVO area of responsibility), a more significant grouping is deployed: the headquarters of an infantry division, 3 infantry regiments, artillery, tank, motorized and cavalry regiments, 2 artillery battalions, 4 infantry and one engineer battalions. In total, these forces can be estimated at 2 … 2, 5 divisions. Of these units, only three regiments (tank, motorized and cavalry) can form a kind of mobile grouping for rapid advance into the interior of the district. From the presented situation, one can only assume some provocative actions of the German generals against the troops of the PribOVO in the area of the Suvalka salient. This is exactly what Moscow was talking about …
The figure shows that 8 hours before the start of the war, there are only four tank battalions at a distance of up to 10 km from the border. Another part of the infantry, motorized and tank units are located 15-20 kilometers from the border. PribOVO reconnaissance did not reveal the place of concentration of enemy strike groups near the border. The grouping, concentrated near the city of Gambinnen, can be redeployed to the Suwalkinsky ledge, which corresponds to the concept of threatened directions, which were reflected in the "Cover plans …".
Part of the German troops disappeared from the area of attention of our intelligence. Intelligence was instructed to investigate this issue: [intelligence report of 06/18/41]
The information that the intelligence of the PribOVO did not reveal the movement of German troops to the border until June 21 is confirmed by the order of the Chief of Staff of the Artillery of the 11th Army:
The chief of staff of the PribOVO, Lieutenant-General Pyotr Semenovich Klenov, was arrested in early July and charged with sabotage. He was accused of this by the testimony of four witnesses, three of whom belonged to the leadership of the intelligence department of the PribOVO headquarters (later the intelligence department of the North-Western Front). The currently available RM shows the complete absence of reliable information on the eve of the war, presented to the district leadership by the intelligence department of the headquarters and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft …
Data on the German group after the start of the war
Consider the situation on the map of the North-Western Front (formerly PribOVO) as of June 22-23.
It can be seen from the map that a tank company is moving towards Liepaja. An unknown number of infantry and tanks are advancing in the direction of Prietkula. Against the three rifle regiments of the 10th rifle division, two infantry regiments are marked in defense.
Unknown enemy units and tanks are marked on a fragment of the map. The 61st Infantry Division was probably marked on 23 June. Another infantry and one motorized division are marked below.
Again an infantry division with an unknown number of tanks, two infantry regiments, an infantry division, a tank brigade, an infantry division with a tank regiment.
Up to three infantry divisions, a tank division, an infantry regiment, a motorized regiment, an unknown number of tanks.
The war has been going on for a day, but not so many German units have been found. Strike groups are not indicated on the map and, therefore, have not been identified again. Based on the inflicted situation on the northern flank of the front, the Germans attached tank units to the infantry divisions. This was exactly what was expected of their use by small groups, since reconnaissance had not yet found motorized corps and tank groups.
Below in the figure, the above divisions are shown in two sectors of the territory of the North-Western Front.
Intelligence Directorate on the situation on the North-Western Front
According to available data, as of 22-00 on June 22, Reconnaissance Report No. 01 of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was prepared. The figure below shows in blue the directions of the enemy groupings' strikes against the troops of the North-Western and Western Fronts.
Conclusions on the submitted RM
Based on the above, we can state the following:
1) the intelligence department of the headquarters of the PribOVO (NWF) in its area of responsibility on June 21, totaled up to 24-24, 5 German divisions from the 41st located in its area of responsibility. This testifies to the excellent work of the German special services and the German military command in disinformation work and in the covert redeployment of divisions to the border;
2) most of the German troops as of June 21 are concentrated far enough from the border. It takes about 1-2 day crossings for the concentration of infantry units and about one for the concentration of motorized and tank units. Considering the limited number of roads, it can be assumed that the concentration will take at least two days. Two days will allow the leadership of the spacecraft and PribOVO to bring the troops of the district to full combat readiness in a timely manner. Withdraw troops from permanent deployment points or camps, as well as disperse aviation;
3) according to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft, 29 German divisions are concentrated against the troops of the PribOVO. Since in the data of the PribOVO reconnaissance department on June 21, only 24-24.5 divisions are noted, then about five more divisions (according to the district scouts) are located west of the PribOVO reconnaissance area of responsibility, i.e. far enough from the border;
4) RM on the deployment of German troops at 20-00 on June 21 cannot testify to the expectation of the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22 against the PribOVO troops.
It is likely that on the night of June 22, the district headquarters received numerous reports of the advancement of German troops to their initial positions before attacking the border. Only this can explain the appearance in Directive No. 1, which is being transferred to the PribOVO troops, of a separate clause on the start of mining immediately. Even the fact that pits were dug on the roads for the installation of mines and the transportation of mines to the installation sites was started - they did not have time to install them …
Overestimation of the number of German divisions by Soviet intelligence
I propose to consider the topic of overstating the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border. To start the discussion, here is a drawing that was used by the author of Vic in the parts devoted to exploration. On September 1, 1940, the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border (up to Slovakia) ranged from 83 to 90. According to RM, on October 1, 1940, the number of divisions ranged from 80 to 88.
According to the RM, on the eve of the war on the border with the Soviet Union (including the border with Romania, but excluding the border with Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine), there were up to 125 German divisions. If we remove 17 German divisions from this number, which, according to the RM, were at the border in Romania, then we get the number of 108 divisions concentrated to Slovakia. By June 22, the German grouping from Konigsberg to Slovakia increased by 9.3% compared to the number of the grouping at the end of August 1940! With intensive traffic to the border for 8, 5 months, there was an increase in the German invasion group by only 10%!
Those who have read the parts of the cycle devoted to intelligence understand that RMs were double-checked by various intelligence agencies and, if necessary, requests were prepared to double-check the data by other sources. 83-90 or 80-88 German divisions are quite accurate data for reconnaissance. German troops were stationed somewhere, servicemen from these divisions were seen somewhere … It's a pity that for this period it was not possible to find the actual number of formations available in this zone.
During the period when there was a grouping of up to 80-90 enemy divisions near our border and to the west of it, an interesting conversation took place, which was described in the memoirs of General Sandalov:
“… In the beginning, perhaps, we will have to retreat,” Pavlov clarified … But when the troops of the internal districts come up from the rear, Pavlov looked at Tyulenin, “when the authorized density in your army zone is reached - 7.5 kilometers per division, then, of course, it will be possible to move forward and not doubt the success …
Then Chuikov got up:
- You are well aware, Comrade District Commander, that in the first echelon of the 4th Army in the spring of this year there were only two divisions on one hundred and fifty kilometers of the front. In the summer they gave us another one. This means that the density is now fifty kilometers per division. The second echelon is also not dense - only one division. This is not an army, but just a corps … Why not advance two or three divisions from the rear of the country into our zone in advance?
- How do you not understand that such actions can provoke a war? - Pavlov answered irritably. - Yes, and we do not have barracks for the deployment of new troops …
I hastened to help Chuikov:
- The advancement of new divisions into the army zone can be carried out in the spring under the guise of training camps. There is a way out with housing: at first we will build dugouts. After all, we settled in this way the forty-ninth division.
Zaporozhets interrupted me:
- We have a non-aggression pact with Germany, and there is no reason to doubt that it is not fulfilling its obligations … Anyway, - he turned towards Pavlov, - it seems to me that some of your commanders here are beginning to show excessive German fear.
And although Zaporozhets uttered the last words with a smile, Pavlov, who knew what neither Chuikov knew. neither I felt that this was no longer a member of the Military Council of the capital district. He also put on a smile on his face and tried to make it clear:
- Do you speak in this case as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District or already as the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda?.."
80-90 German divisions near the border in the fall of 1940 were not intimidated by the leadership of the ZAPOVO and the spacecraft. At that time, there were no tank units near the border and the formation of many new formations was expected in the Wehrmacht. Also, the war between Germany and England took place in a certain way …
In the future, the movement of German troops to Romania and the Balkans takes place. However, the number of German troops, which intelligence refers to as possible participants in the war with the USSR, is at a fairly large level - 78 … 80 formations. How during 4, 5 months the intelligence of the spacecraft and the NKVD regularly monitored these formations and also regularly continued to significantly overestimate their number?
The German command not only carried out a planting of disinformation at different levels and in different countries - at least something would reach the Soviet intelligence, but also probably organized many fictitious formations. The presence of these fictitious formations was regularly rechecked by our intelligence services and again convinced of their presence. There is practically no information about this on the Internet. Of course, someone will decide to use another version for themselves: about the general betrayal in Soviet intelligence …
In the RM in April-May, it was said about the increase in the transport of German troops, equipment and military supplies. In June, there was a significant increase in these traffic. However, from the Republic of Moldova, the number of divisions in June increased by only 7-9! And what happened to all this breakthrough of German troops, which they saw on railway lines and stations? They settled in places reliably protected from ordinary inhabitants and probably filled fictitious units with personnel and equipment.
Intelligence detected intensive military transport, but in fact could not determine where these troops were located and how many of them were concentrated at all …
From April 1941, intelligence recorded a significant increase in the number of German troops being transferred to the border. I will clarify that not to the border itself, but to settlements at some distance from it. The removal could be tens of kilometers (for units carrying out unloading, for example, in Konigsberg or Warsaw and more).
According to the maximum data from intelligence reports, on 4.4.41, 84 German divisions were recorded near the border. On April 25 - 100 divisions (an increase of 19%), and on May 15 - 119 (an increase of 41, 7%). Our intelligence found such traffic volumes. Consequently, they very carefully monitored communications and possible stations for unloading military units and equipment.
From April 4 to May 15, there actually was an increase in the number of divisions from 47 to 71 (an increase of 51%). It turns out that, in fact, the Germans transported 24 divisions, and reconnaissance counted 35 over the same period. The volume of troops transported was overestimated. by 45% … In fact, this is misinformation … I am not saying this to people from intelligence, but to writers who elevate intelligence data to the rank of absolutely correct information that does not require rechecking. Intelligence delivered the information that it managed to get and it was repeatedly rechecked.
It has long been estimated that the German command can move up to 8 divisions a day by rail to Slovakia! After all, the volume of military traffic can greatly increase! And how should the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the Soviet Union react to the increase in the transfer of German troops to the border? If we accept the version of P. A. Sudoplatov - they were supposed to build up the grouping of spacecraft forces near the border and keep the forward units in readiness. In the same period, RMs are received, in which the dates for the start of the war are indicated on May 15-20, and even the end of May is called.
M. G. Pajiev (outpost commander of the 94th border detachment):
It is possible that the advance of a rifle battalion with reinforcement units was carried out in early May and in other directions … There is practically no such information. It is easier to find information about the troops on the eve of the war … This version can be indirectly confirmed by the directive of the headquarters of the 6th Army on the installation of VNOS points (we do not confuse them with territorial VNOS points) and the organization of round-the-clock duty on them. Their readiness must be ensured by May 5th. In principle, this is a rather serious indication. More precise information could not be found …
As for the occupation of long-term structures of the URs by the garrisons in May, the information is rather contradictory. There is one recollection of the occupation of firing points in early May. However, two other memories completely refute this theory.
I. P. Krivonogov:. The personnel were in the buildings before the start of the war.
A. K. Shtankov (platoon leader, 68 UR):
In the future, I plan to work on the topic of the readiness of the spacecraft border troops in April-May 1941. In the next part, we will consider the deployment of German divisions according to intelligence data against the KOVO troops.
