In many publications devoted to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, reconnaissance materials (RM) are considered very superficially. With such a consideration of the RM, the wrong conclusion is made that the intelligence reported everything accurately and in great detail. The conclusions are based on the fragments torn from the RM and on the memories of war veterans. Such memories may be superimposed on post-war knowledge, or there may be other reasons why the memories were distorted. For example, to avoid responsibility for mistakes and shift the responsibility for their erroneous actions onto the shoulders of other bosses. They began to collect answers to the questions of Colonel-General Pokrovsky during Stalin's lifetime. The consequences for truthful answers were difficult to predict in advance.
If intelligence reported accurately, then, consequently, either Stalin or the traitorous generals who dreamed of helping the Nazis enslave our country were to blame for the unexpected attack of the Nazis on the troops of the border districts. You can adhere to the third version, which was expressed by the author of Vic in the materials of the series "An Unexpected War …" She used a recheck of materials based on numerous memoirs and documents. This is where statistics come into play: one memory cannot be considered true if four others say otherwise. Rather, the opposite is true … Memories can be considered reliable only if they are confirmed by documents or other memories of war veterans. There is a lot of material in the cycle of the author Vic, which will have to be referred to or briefly repeated. Hereinafter, these materials will be referred to as the "cycle" and will be accompanied by hyperlinks.
In the article devoted to the creation of the Southern Front (part 1), a small number of RM and the memories of veterans were considered that the actual location of the German group at the border was not at all what they knew about in the headquarters of the districts and armies. The same, but discussed in more detail in the cycle (part 14, part 15, part 16 and part 17).
Disinformation and disinformation intelligence materials
Let me remind you that the German government, officials of the Foreign Ministry and other departments, special services and the Wehrmacht, willingly or unwillingly, spread mass disinformation. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft received such "intelligence" information through numerous sources available in various spheres and states. Our management should have gotten the impression that RMs, which have been checked many times from various sources, are reliable! On the basis of these misleading materials, conclusions were drawn that led to tragic events in the border military districts …
No intelligence in other countries could have obtained reliable information with such a massive flow of disinformation, in which even Hitler, Goebbels, Goering and other high-ranking officials of the Reich took part! There was no betrayal of the generals, there was no braking of the initiative of the military on the part of Stalin. There was only an incorrect assessment of the expected actions of Hitler and the enemy forces concentrated on the Soviet-German border. Of course, there were also attempts not to give the Germans a reason for a full-scale war, and for this it was necessary to avoid provocations …
An attempt was made to warn Germany against attack by gradually building up its troops. First, away from the border, and then gradually increasing their number in the troops of the 1st echelon of the covering armies. The main thing is that the number of divisions on both sides is comparable. Our divisions were stationed at points of deployment or in camps as far from the border as the German troops.
P. A. Sudoplatov wrote:. This statement was tested in the loop.
It should be noted that even on the evening of June 21, the German command did not exclude the possibility of abandoning an attack on the USSR, disguising preparations for a full-scale war as separate provocations on the border.
Combat Log of the 17th Army:.
Speaking about detailed RMs, one should not think that the country's leadership and the spacecraft saw the grouping of German troops in the form shown in the figure.
Intelligence activities consist of obtaining reliable, verified information, assessing it, analyzing trends in the development of specific situations, predicting them and assessing the likely consequences. RM, which entered the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft, were processed, summarized and analyzed. Then the materials were sent to the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Since the original RM included misinformation, the analysis of the situation was not reliable either. The erroneous analysis of the materials was also superimposed on the incorrect assessment of the required number of German divisions required for a full-scale war with the USSR.
The article showed that in five documents from September 1940 to June 22, 1941, the number of troops that Germany should put up against the USSR was 173-200 divisions. There is not a single pre-war document that says that for an attack on the USSR, Germany will enough in the initial period, set 120-124 divisions! In the memoirs of veterans, only the actual number of troops participating in the attack is reflected.
Reconnaissance reports on the German group at the border
V Reconnaissance report No. 5 for the West it says: [divisions] [part of these divisions are derived from five separate tank regiments and two tank battalions]
[Total 120-122 divisions. Some of the indicated number of divisions are even 400 km from the border.]
Together with the reserve, the number of German divisions is 164-170.
On the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland, intelligence did not find no one headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps. Many tank divisions were formed from tank regiments and battalions in bulk. To eliminate this incident, the writers came up with the following explanations:
- the leaders of the spacecraft are accustomed to consider all enemy troops as divisions and therefore information about the corps and armies in the RM is not given. This is probably a hint that the former non-commissioned officers who fell into the leadership of the spacecraft were inferior;
- it doesn't matter how many battalions, regiments or divisions, and the main thing is the number of tanks that can reach, for example, Minsk. (A logical question arises: why then did our mechanized corps at the beginning of the war with many hundreds of tanks mediocrely lose their equipment, if the main thing is the number of tanks?);
- the archives contain more accurate intelligence data, which reflect the entirety of the situation. True, no one has seen them, but the authors know that they exist;
- the border guards knew everything better than the army intelligence and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft.
What the intelligence of the NKVD border troops reported in the spring of 1941 is discussed in detail in the 14th part of the cycle. I will give a brief summary of the results of the evaluation from the cycle. V Note People's Commissar of Internal Affairs I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and S. K. Tymoshenko was told that the intelligence of the border troops of the NKVD from 1 to 19 April 1941 data was obtained on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the General Government. In 19 days, intelligence of the border guards discovered the arrival of 18 German divisions.
According to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff for a slightly longer period, from April 1 to 25, there was an increase in the grouping of German troops by 12-15 divisions. The intelligence data of the NKVD for a shorter period indicate a greater number of arrived divisions in comparison with the data of the Intelligence Directorate.
Information about the actual arrival of German divisions at the border as of April 19 or 25 could not be found. It is only known that with April 4 to May 15 1941 (in 32 days) arrived 24 divisions. Therefore, we can say that the RM from the NKVD border troops also included disinformation thrown by the Germans.
Consider Reconnaissance report No. 1 of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft at 20-00 on 22.6.41: [According to RM on 1.6.41 there were up to 24 divisions, of which two, etc.]
[There were 30 divisions according to RM, 4 of them etc. The German grouping has increased by only one division!]
[There were up to 36 divisions in RM, including up to 6 tank divisions. There was an increase in the grouping by 12 divisions!]
[According to the RM against the KOVO troops, the German grouping in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary) consisted of up to 9 divisions.
There were 17 divisions against the troops of the OdVO (Moldavia and Northern Dobrudzha), of which 2 were tank divisions. In the central part of Romania and in Bulgaria there were 11 more divisions each. In the reconnaissance report dated 22.6.41, it is said about the presence of 33-35 German divisions in Romania. It turns out that intelligence revealed the "transfer" of 6-8 new German divisions to Romanian territory from Bulgaria. This information, like the presence of 33-36 German divisions in Romania, was disinformation.]
On June 22, hostilities on the border with Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine did not begin. Excluding German troops in these areas, the strength of the grouping at the border was 125 divisions. Taking into account the troops in Slovakia, the Carpathian Ukraine, front-line reserves and the reserve of the main command, the total number of German divisions was more than 167.
The actual number of the German group at the border of the Soviet Union
In fact, on 22.6.41, the following forces were located on the Soviet-German front (taking into account army reserves and reserves of army groups):
- Army Group (GRA) "North" - 20 infantry, 3 motorized, 3 tank and 3 security divisions -
Total 29 connections;
- GRA "Center" - 31 infantry, 6 motorized, 9 tank, 1 cavalry, 3 security divisions and 1 motorized regiment. Without a motorcycle shelf - only about 50 divisions … The 900th motorized brigade was not taken into account in the calculations, since at 11-00 on June 22 it was still 203 km from the border;
- GRA "Yug" (including two OKW divisions) - 18 infantry divisions, 4 light infantry divisions, 9 tank and motorized, 2 mountain rifle and 3 security divisions. In Moldova and Northern Dobrudja there are 8 infantry divisions. Total - 44 connections.
In total, the Soviet-German border had 123 divisions excluding German troops in Slovakia and Hungary. 123 and 125 divisions are very close and may testify to the successful work of Soviet intelligence … However, their distribution across the RM of reconnaissance did not correspond to the actual … And most importantly, they were not deployed on the border!
It should be noted that by July 4, 1941, it was planned to concentrate in the East an additional 13 divisions and 1 brigade from the reserve of the High Command, and after July 4, 11 more divisions.
In five parts, we will consider little-known documents on the deployment of German troops near the border, according to intelligence data, on the basis of which decisions were made about preparing for war. The title of the subsequent parts will contain the word "Exploration".
Was the German group known to the PribOVO headquarters?
The most powerful grouping of German troops as of June 22 was concentrated against the troops of the PribOVO. How did you assess the deployment and size of the German group opposing the PribOVO in the district headquarters on the eve of the war?
Fragments of the map will be presented in the figures below. The map in the archive was scanned at a fairly large scale, and when enlarged, some of the inscriptions are not very clearly visible. Therefore, the author additionally marks all inscriptions and designations on the map in blue. As illustrations, the fragments additionally contain drawings showing the actual presence of German troops on the eve of the war.
From the materials presented, it can be seen that on the northern flank of the German troops stationed in East Prussia and in the territory of former Poland, the exit of German formations to the border was not detected by reconnaissance. The actual placement of the German troops coincides little with the intelligence data.
What can be seen from the map? It turns out that the headquarters of the corps and armies, when intelligence reported on them, were still located on the maps!
A grouping is concentrated against the PribOVO troops with a total number of: one Army headquarters, up to 4 headquarters of the Army corps, up to 18 infantry divisions, 2 tank and 4 motorized divisions, up to one cavalry division (a cavalry brigade and two cavalry regiments), a tank and motorized regiment, up to 15 artillery regiments. Excluding artillery regiments, the number of the group is about 25, 5 divisions. It should be noted that one of the tank divisions was derived from separate tank units. A very significant grouping! But, something confuses …
First … Against the troops of the district (in the area of responsibility of its reconnaissance), it is concentrated in the 1st and 2nd echelons, in the reserves of armies and an army group of up to 40 divisions!
Second … There is not a single headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps - neither the district command, nor the SC command, nor the leadership of the Soviet Union know about them! But the leadership of the army and the country knows that the Nazis have about 10 motorized corps and they used from 3 to 5 tank groups in the war with Poland and France!
There are also few tank divisions - only two at a stretch. Of these, there are only four infantry divisions near the border to the Suvalka salient! Up to 4, 5 divisions, including up to 2 motorized regiments and not a single tank unit, are still on the Suvalkinsky ledge in the PribOVO zone of responsibility! In total, up to 8, 5 divisions near the border (without tanks). At the same time, the concept “near the border” is rather arbitrary - more than half of them are located at a distance of 20-30 km from the border. For infantry units, this is one or two days' march! And the information on the map refers to June 21 - less than a day before the start of the war … The deployment of German troops and the traffic capacity of the roads may indicate that it will take from 1 to 2 days to bring troops to the border …
If intelligence is so well informed about the German grouping, then in a day or two, when German formations are redeployed to the border, it will be possible to redeploy its units to field positions, withdraw construction battalions from the border, disperse aviation …
