This material was conceived as a continuation of articles devoted to the Soviet nuclear-powered heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Ulyanovsk", links to which will be given below. The author intended to express his point of view on the issues of the place and role of aircraft-carrying ships in the Russian Navy. However, under the influence of the remarkable series of materials by the respected A. Timokhin “Building a Fleet”, published on VO, it was decided to slightly expand the scope of this work, including ships of other classes.
In this series of articles, the author will try to "design" for the Russian Federation the military fleet of the future, capable of effectively solving the tasks it faces in the coming decades. As far as possible, realistically taking into account the production and financial capabilities of our country, and, of course, comparing the results of the resulting calculations with existing plans and real projects being built or planned to be built for the Russian Navy.
And let's start with
What, in fact, types of war should we be prepared for. Conflicts, in which the RF may be involved, are divided into 3 main categories:
1) Global nuclear. This is a conflict in which the Russian Federation will have to resort to full-scale use of its strategic nuclear potential.
2) Limited nuclear. This is a conflict in which the use of nuclear weapons will be limited to tactical ammunition and, possibly, to a small part of the strategic nuclear forces. This is possible, for example, in the event of a war with a power with an insignificant nuclear potential, which, nevertheless, dares to use it for us. Or in the event that the territory of the Russian Federation is subjected to a non-nuclear attack of such power that we obviously will not be able to repel it without using the "last argument of the kings". In this case, our concept of defense allows the use of nuclear weapons first. It is understood that this application will initially be of a limited, precautionary nature. If, seeing our determination, the aggressor calms down, then this is how it is. Otherwise, see point 1.
3) Non-nuclear. A conflict in which the parties will fight exclusively with conventional weapons. Here, too, options are possible - from a clash with a first-class economic and military power, to a regional conflict like compulsion to peace in Georgia, or a military operation in a foreign country "a la Syria".
It is obvious that the Russian Navy must be ready for any of these conflicts, including the most terrible one - the global nuclear one. For this, our fleet, along with general-purpose forces, also has strategic nuclear forces. Their tasks are extremely clear and understandable. In peacetime, the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces should serve as a guarantee of the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear missile strike, but if Armageddon begins, they should strike this strike.
Everything seems to be clear, but … a seditious question still arises. Do we really need naval strategic nuclear forces? Perhaps it makes sense to invest instead in the development of the land and air components of our nuclear triad? The point is that today there are more than enough arguments against the construction and operation of strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs).
The domestic military budget does not seem to be the worst, although not too honorable, 6th place in the world. But at the same time, it is about 10, 5 times inferior to the American, and more than 4 times - to the Chinese. Compared to the total budget of NATO countries, our military spending looks altogether scanty. This is not a reason for panic, but, obviously, we must make good use of every ruble allocated for the country's defense. However, if we try to evaluate naval strategic nuclear forces from the point of view of “cost / efficiency”, then the picture will be rather bleak.
The merits of SSBNs, true and imaginary
What is the main advantage of SSBNs as a weapon system over silo intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)? In stealth and mobility. What do these qualities give to the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces? Obviously, the impossibility of hitting SSBNs with a preventive nuclear missile, or some other "disarming strike" about which the United States is so fond of talking. This, of course, is great, but …
But let's be frank - about 300 silo and mobile ballistic missiles, which the ground component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces currently has, and so cannot be destroyed by any "disarming strike." Today, our "sworn friends" do not have technologies that would guarantee the simultaneous destruction of almost 300 highly protected targets located mostly in the Russian outback, some of which, moreover, are capable of moving in space.
Today, the weapons that the United States could allocate for such a strike are either too short-range to "reach" our ICBMs, or too long a flight time, which is comparable or even exceeds that of American nuclear ballistic missiles. That is, there will not be a sudden strike - even if we assume that the United States has secretly launched the release of new modifications of Tomahawks with an increased flight range, they will fly not even an hour, but hours to the bases of our ICBMs, despite the fact that the massive use of such missiles will be recorded shortly after their launch. Such an attempt to "disarm" simply does not make sense - by the time these missiles fly up to their targets, Armageddon will have ended.
Thus, the only at least somewhat relevant option to destroy the Russian Strategic Missile Forces before they are used is a nuclear missile strike on the Russian Federation's ICBM bases. In this case, the Americans can hope that in those tens of minutes while the missiles are flying, our leadership will not have time to figure out what's what and will not be able to give the order for retaliation.
But the chances of success for such a scenario are very small. Firstly, because such a development of events has been very carefully prepared since the days of the USSR and continues to prepare now, so the United States should not "sleep through" the mass launch of ballistic missiles. Secondly … for a long time it was believed that our powers that be, with their foreign villas and billions of dollars in bank accounts, simply would not dare to push the button. Today we can already guarantee that they will make up their minds: the Americans and Europeans, using the example of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, have clearly shown how they will deal with the rulers of other countries that they dislike. That is, they perfectly explained to the Russian "powers that be" that under no circumstances would they be able to escape and live out their days in the Bahamas. And if a full-scale nuclear missile strike is inflicted on our country, or if a non-nuclear invasion of obviously superior forces occurs, then our "top" will be doomed in any case. She understands this, so that our “owners of factories, newspapers, ships” will not have any hesitations about the retaliatory strike.
But even if the nuclear attack warning system does not work as expected, or the country's leadership hesitates, there is still "Perimeter", that is, "Dead hand". If dispassionate sensors detect a nuclear flame, in which our Motherland is burning, then the automation will direct the flight of relay missiles, and they will rise above the dying country, broadcasting a permission-order to use nuclear weapons to everyone who will still be able to hear it.
And many will hear. Even the allocation of 2-3 warheads per missile silo or installation, generally speaking, does not guarantee the complete destruction of our Strategic Missile Forces. Of course, with the massive use of US ballistic missiles, there will be a certain number of technical failures, there will be some technical failures. Some of the warheads will go off course and fall at a greater distance than their creators anticipated. Some part of nuclear warheads will be able to disable air defense systems.
And what about mobile launchers? It should be understood that with the current state of the art, ballistic missiles are only capable of hitting stationary targets. Even if the Americans knew exactly the location of all our mobile launchers before they launched their ICBMs, this does not guarantee their success. During the flight of the Yarsy and Topoli missiles, it is quite possible to get rid of the impact - the flight time can be up to 40 minutes, while it will not be a mistake to assume that already at a distance of 12-15 km from the explosion point of a megaton-class ammunition, the missile and the crew will remain operational.
That is, it is almost impossible to destroy our mobile ICBM installations even if we know their exact location in advance. But how would the Americans know him? Indeed, in something, but in disguise in the Russian Federation they know a lot - the traditions of "Invincible and Legendary" are excellent in this respect. The only way to somehow scout the location of the mobile "Yars" and "Topol" are spy satellites, but you need to understand that their capabilities are very limited. It is quite easy to mislead them even with the most common mock-ups, not to mention the fact that it is easy to equip such mock-ups with devices that imitate the signature (thermal, etc.) of real launchers.
Indeed, even if out of more than one and a half hundred silo ballistic missiles, only 5 R-36s survived, which received the affectionate nickname "Satan" in the west, and out of more than a hundred mobile installations - a little less than half, that is, up to fifty "Yars", then only one this will make it possible to strike with a force of 200 nuclear warheads. This will not drive the United States into the Neolithic, but inflicting unacceptable damage is absolutely certain: American losses will amount to tens of millions. And all this - completely without taking into account the other two components of our nuclear triad: air and sea.
But there is another extremely important aspect. The above-described attempt at a "counterforce" strike, designed to destroy the Russian nuclear potential, will give a chance of survival not even to millions, but not to tens of millions of our fellow citizens. Indeed, using at least 2-3 "special warheads" to destroy each of the approximately 300 ballistic missiles we have, it is required to allocate 600-900 warheads out of 1,550 permitted by START III. Such a "disarming" strike will pull off a lot of American nuclear weapons from our cities and other infrastructure and energy facilities of our country, and thereby save many lives of our citizens.
Suppose for a moment that the country's leadership decides to eliminate the naval component of our nuclear triad. For SSBNs today there are about 150 ballistic missiles, and maybe more. And, arguing theoretically, instead of these missiles, we could well deploy another 150 silo-based or mobile-based Yars. In this case, the number of our ICBMs in the Strategic Missile Forces would have grown to about 450, and for a counterforce strike the Americans would need up to 1,350 nuclear warheads, which is deliberately irrational, since there is very little left to defeat all other Russian targets. This means that when the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces is eliminated in favor of the land one, we are completely meaningless the concept of a counterforce strike.
Why is it so important for us to make sense of it? For obvious reasons. The goal of any military aggression is a world in which the position of the aggressor would be better than it was before the war. No one in their right mind and sober memory wants to start a war in order to worsen their future. The only way that gives at least an illusory hope for a relatively successful outcome of a nuclear war for the United States is to neutralize the enemy's nuclear potential. That is, one can count on some kind of gain only if the enemy is destroyed by nuclear weapons, but at the same time he does not have time to use his own. Take away from the United States (or from any other country) the hope of neutralizing the nuclear weapons of a potential adversary, and he will never go for nuclear aggression, because it will never bring him a peace that would be better than the pre-war one.
As you can see, in the event of the elimination of the naval component of the nuclear triad with a corresponding strengthening of the Strategic Missile Forces, this task may well be solved. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the Strategic Missile Forces and strategic aviation, even in their current state, are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to the aggressor, even if the Russian Federation "sleeps" a large-scale nuclear missile attack.
But if so … Then why do we need naval strategic nuclear forces at all? What is it that SSBNs can do that the Strategic Missile Forces cannot do?
At least in theory, the submarine's stealth is better than that of the Yars or Topol mobile launcher. At the same time, the limitations of land transport are higher than those of sea transport, which means that ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying SSBNs are more powerful than their land mobile counterparts. In addition, SSBNs at sea, in principle, are not affected by a strategic nuclear warhead - unless it is in the base.
All of the above (again, in theory) provides us with the best safety of ICBMs for a retaliatory nuclear missile strike in case we still "oversleep" a nuclear counterforce attack. But, firstly, in practice, everything may not turn out so well, and secondly, is it so important if, even without SSBNs, we retain a sufficient number of warheads so that the aggressor does not seem small? It is not the more-less criterion that is important here, the sufficiency is important here.
In other words, the potential gain in SSBN stealth is not a truly critical advantage for us. It is clear that this is useful, because "the pocket does not hold the stock", but we can do without it.
About the cost of NSNF
Alas, SSBNs appear to be an extremely wasteful component of strategic nuclear forces. Let's start with the fact that such ships must be armed with specialized ICBMs; unification with land-based missiles here, if possible, is only at individual nodes. In other words, the development of sea-based ICBMs alone is already an additional cost. But they also have to be produced, losing the "economies of scale" from large series of "land" ICBMs - again costs. An atomic-powered submarine capable of firing ICBMs? is a very complex structure, no less technological than, for example, a modern spacecraft. Well, and its cost is appropriate - in 2011 figures were named indicating that the cost of one "Borey" exceeded 700 million dollars. The author does not have data on the cost of silo or mobile launchers, but it would not be a mistake to assume that they will be much cheaper for 16 missiles.
But that's not all. The fact is that there is such a concept as KOH, that is, the coefficient of operational stress or the coefficient of operational use of forces, measured in the range from 0 to 1. Its essence is that if, for example, a submarine was on combat duty for 3 months in 2018, that is, a quarter of the total calendar time, then its KOH for 2018 was 0.25.
So, it is obvious that the KOH of the same mine installation is much higher than that of the SSBN. The mine with the "Voevoda" inside is on combat duty almost constantly, at the same time, even the most intensively used American SSBNs usually do not exceed 0.5-0.6., 24. Simply put, an SSBN is a much more complex structure than a conventional missile silo, and the boat needs much more time for various kinds of preventive repairs, and so on. etc.
And so it turns out that in the days of the USSR, to ensure constant readiness for the use of, say, 16 sea-based ICBMs, it took from 4 to 7 SSBNs with 16 silos each, and in the USA - 2 SSBNs with the same number of missiles. But SSBN is not just a thing in itself, it requires an appropriate infrastructure for itself and so on. But that's not all. The fact is that SSBNs are not a self-sufficient means of nuclear war and require significant forces to cover their deployment.
A single SSBN today is hardly vulnerable except in the ocean, which is so large that looking for several such ships in it is many orders of magnitude more difficult than the notorious needle in a haystack. Despite the large number and power of the US and NATO navies, if a domestic missile submarine managed to go out into the ocean, then you can only find it there by chance. The problem is that even in the most ordinary peacetime it will be very, very difficult for a domestic SSBN to reach the "big water" without the help of numerous general-purpose forces.
Yes, in the ocean, our SSBNs can become "invisible", but the places where they are based are known in every way. Foreign atomarines can watch for our ships already at the exit from the bases, and, in the future, accompany them in immediate readiness to use weapons upon receiving the appropriate order. How real is this threat? In the article "Homeless Arctic" Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov pointed out:
"From February 11 to August 13, 2014, the New Hampshire submarine unimpeded unimpeded on all activities for the strategic containment of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea."
In the period of aggravation of the international situation, things will be even worse - the number of multipurpose nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines of NATO off our shores will be increased, near our waters will be searching for anti-aircraft submarines, etc. In other words, in order for SSBNs to do their job, their exit must be covered by solid detachments of forces. Even in peacetime, we will desperately need a naval reconnaissance and target designation system to identify enemy forces off our shores, and plan the exit time and SSBN routes so as not to come into contact with them. And in the military?
For some reason, many believe that nuclear Armageddon must necessarily strike like a bolt from the blue. But this is completely optional. In the past, the military and politicians considered other scenarios: for example, when a war between the USSR and NATO begins as a non-nuclear war, continues as a limited nuclear one, and only then develops into a full-scale nuclear conflict. This option, alas, has not been canceled even today.
Let's assume for a second that it does happen. As it will be? It is likely that the beginning of the war will be preceded by a certain period of aggravation of the international situation. Before the start of this exacerbation, obviously, only a part of the Russian SSBNs will be on alert, but with its beginning, realizing that “it seems that this is a war,” the leadership of the fleet and the country will try to send as many SSBNs into the sea as possible, which at the beginning of the diplomatic conflicts are located in bases and are not ready for immediate exit. Some of them will take several days, and some will take a month or two, some SSBNs will not be able to go to sea at all, for example, being stuck under major repairs. A period of tension can last for months, during which time it is really possible to seriously strengthen the deployed SSBN grouping with new ships. At the same time, SSBNs will try to go out to sea as soon as they are ready, until the very beginning of Armageddon, that is, as long as there is still someone (and from where) to go.
But every day it will become more and more difficult, because the enemy will concentrate its naval and air forces, trying to open our deployment, detect and escort our SSBNs. Accordingly, we need forces capable of driving away, displacing, and if the conflict at the first stage proceeds in a non-nuclear form, then destroy enemy anti-submarine weapons that pose a threat to the deployment of our SSBNs. This requires dozens of surface, submarine, air ships: nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, corvettes and minesweepers, fighters and aircrafts (helicopters) PLO and others and so on. For each fleet, which includes SSBNs.
It's not that the same silo or mobile ICBM installations don't need cover. How much they need! But still, protecting them from long-range cruise missile strikes and creating a missile defense circuit based on the same S-500 will cost much less than maintaining the SSBN cover forces described above.
“And why go out somewhere at all, if our SSBNs are capable of shooting from the pier,” someone will say. Indeed, a number of targets in the United States can be covered with "Bulava" and "Blue" directly from the pier. But in order to fire ICBMs from the coast of SSBNs, generally speaking, it is deliberately redundant - missile silos will be much cheaper.
And so it turns out that, according to the cost / efficiency criterion, naval strategic nuclear forces, consisting of SSBNs, lose to the same Strategic Missile Forces. By redirecting the resources that we are now spending on the construction and maintenance of SSBNs in favor of mine-based and mobile-based ICBMs, we will achieve the same effect, and even free up a lot of money to finance other arms and services of the Russian armed forces.
And what about our "sworn friends"?
“Well, okay,” a respected reader will say then: “But then why did other countries not put their SSBNs on hold and give priority to the ground and air components of their nuclear forces?” The answer to this question is quite simple. As for the United States, firstly, the appearance of submarine missile carriers - carriers of ballistic missiles - happened at a time when land-based ICBMs were still very imperfect. Then SSBNs were more than justified. In the future, traditions worked - the American Navy was always in competition with other branches of the US armed forces, and, of course, was not going to lose its significance, abandoning SSBNs. And besides, the US Navy dominated the ocean: no matter how strong the Soviet Navy was, it always remained in second place. Thus, the Americans have never had such problems with the deployment of SSBNs with ICBMs on board, which are before us. And another important aspect - SSBNs can approach our territory, in this case the flight time of its ICBMs can be significantly reduced in comparison with missiles launched from the territory of the United States.
As for France and England, their nuclear arsenals are comparatively small, as are, in fact, the territories of these countries. In other words, it is in the Russian Federation that ICBMs can be deployed so that the flight time of enemy cruise missiles can be several hours, but the British and French are deprived of such an opportunity. But the combination of a small number of warheads and a small size of the territory can really lead to the fact that the strategic potential of England or France will be destroyed by a preemptive strike. So for them the use of SSBNs looks quite reasonable and reasonable.
And for us? Perhaps the construction and use of SSBNs today is really a luxury that we should not allow ourselves? Should we abandon the preservation of the NSNF as part of the nuclear triad, and focus on silo and mobile ICBMs, and strategic aviation?
The answer to this question is completely unambiguous. No no and one more time no!
The first reason, more technical
In creating this or that weapon system, we should in no case limit ourselves to assessing its usefulness solely from the point of view of today. Because “not only everyone can watch tomorrow” (Klitschko), but the consequences of such decisions must be predicted for many decades to come. So today, when the flight time of US ICBMs will be no less than 40 minutes, and their subsonic cruise missiles will fly even longer to our missile silos, silo and mobile ICBMs are indeed capable of retaining the potential for a retaliatory strike.
But the situation could change dramatically with the proliferation of high-precision medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and non-ballistic hypersonic missiles deployed, for example, in China. Which, generally speaking, today is slowly preparing to declare itself not only as an economic, but also as a political superpower, and which is located much closer to us than the United States. And the flight time of Chinese missiles to our mines, if anything happens, will be much less. The President of the United States D. Trump has rejected the INF Treaty, thus it is quite possible to expect the appearance of American "first strike" missiles in Europe. Or somewhere else. As for hypersonic weapons, now only the Russian Federation announces the imminent entry into service of such missiles. But another 30-40 years will pass - and this kind of ammunition will cease to be a novelty and will become widespread. Scientific and technological progress cannot be stopped.
And then there are questions about the near space. He, unlike airspace, is nobody's, and what will happen if someone wants to deploy a squad of spacecraft in low-Earth orbits in an advanced version of the X-37?
The American spacecraft has already shown its ability to "hang out" in orbit for many months and return to earth. The combination of such a spaceplane with hypersonic weapons will be almost an ideal means of a first strike, which can be suddenly delivered during the passage of a spacecraft in orbit over enemy territory. Well, yes, there were some kind of treaties on the non-proliferation of the arms race in outer space, but who will they stop? The INF Treaty was also here …
That is, today the Strategic Missile Forces fully guarantee nuclear retaliation "to everyone who encroaches." But after 40 years, everything can change dramatically. And, having abandoned SSBNs now, we risk getting into a situation where by the time we finally lose all experience in the construction and operation of missile submarines, the creation and maintenance of sea-based ICBMs, they will be the only means of preserving our strategic nuclear potential from " disarming "strike.
Here, of course, one can recall the alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of a potential aggressor. That's right - on ballistic missiles the light did not converge like a wedge, because you can create non-ballistic hypersonic missiles, or nuclear-powered cruise missiles, or something else like that. But there are nuances here. Under no circumstances will we pull our strategic nuclear forces into orbit (unrealistic for technical and a number of other reasons), and any type of missile deployed on land can become the object of a disarming strike, no matter whether they are ballistic or not. So in a situation where any point of our vast Motherland can be targeted by hypersonic weapons (and, God forbid, placed in outer space), only SSBNs can provide any real guarantees of the safety of strategic nuclear forces.
The second reason, it is also the main
This is a human factor. The attentive reader has probably already noticed one feature of this article. The author took the liberty to assert that with the technologies existing today, SSBNs are not the optimal means of waging a nuclear war on the cost / efficiency scale. But the author did not mention a word that the main task of our strategic nuclear forces is not to wage, but to prevent a nuclear war.
The point is that there is only one reason why Armageddon can break out. This is a human error. In a nuclear war there are no and cannot be winners, but if suddenly someone mistakenly decides that it is still possible to win it …
The professional military (with the exception of some psychopathological cases) will always sensibly assess the consequences of a nuclear conflict. But it is not they who make the decision to start a war - this is the prerogative of politicians. And among them there are very different people.
Let us recall, for example, Saakashvili, who sanctioned the attack on Ossetia in 2008. He in all seriousness believed that his small but trained according to NATO standards, if something happened, would easily deal with “these rusty Russian tanks”. The reality of the "08.08.08" war turned out to be infinitely far from the ideas of the Georgian president, but will this return the dead Russian and Ossetian citizens? But in fact, their deaths were the result of Saakashvili's gross mistake in assessing the combat potentials of the Georgian and Russian armed forces.
Yes, of course, we can say that Saakashvili was an extremely odious politician, but … Alas, the capitalist world does not need thinking people, but consumers: but the decline in the quality of education, "public IQ", if you like, cannot but be reflected and on those in power. And we are no longer surprised when a threat sounds from the high tribunes of the White House to send the 6th Fleet to the shores of Belarus (for foreign readers, a landlocked country). To be honest, it is not easy for the author to imagine such a blunder performed by the administration of the same R. Reagan. And it would be fine if it was an accidental slip of the tongue, but Jen Psaki won the sincere love of our fellow citizens, amusing us with such maxims almost every week. And Donald Trump? His statement that the United States is not obliged to help the Kurds, "because the Kurds did not help the United States in the Second World War, including during the landing in Normandy" is absurd in essence, but even if we assume that it was such a joke, then her should be recognized as completely inappropriate. And we hear more and more such frankly stupid remarks from American and European politicians …
Even the smartest people make mistakes. Hitler and Napoleon should be reproached in many ways, but they were not exactly fools. Nevertheless, the former tragically underestimated the economic and military potential of the USSR and the will of the Soviet people, and the latter did not at all think that the threat of the capture of Moscow might not force Alexander to end the war … Fuhrer , nor the truly great emperor of the French could not cope with them. And if even the smartest are wrong, then what about today's American and European establishment?
And the prerequisites for an error in assessing the consequences of Armageddon already exist today.
In the United States and in the West, the basis of nuclear forces is precisely SSBN submarines, an analogue of our SSBNs. The explanation for this is very simple - invulnerability to a preemptive strike. Given NATO's dominance at sea, this is certainly correct. And this reasoning has long become a commonplace, understandable to American and European taxpayers. It has, in fact, turned into a dogma. But such reflections can push you to a simple error of perception: “We have SSBNs and our strategic nuclear forces are invulnerable. (It's right). And the Russians abandoned their SSBNs, which means that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable (and this is already a mistake!)."
On the other hand, the Americans are constantly looking for ways to neutralize our strategic nuclear forces - hence all these theories of a "disarming" strike and so on. The means for such a strike are high-tech and expensive and represent a tidbit for the military-industrial complex. So it is not surprising that the lobby, "pushing" the adoption of such systems, with its advertising will create an advertising image of super missiles capable of playfully destroying the Russian nuclear potential … And a terrible thing can happen - someone will believe in it.
So, the presence of SSBNs in the Russian triad will never allow such a mistake to happen. "We have invulnerable SSBNs, the Russians have invulnerable SSBNs, okay, let everything remain as it is."
In other words, SSBNs are certainly not the most economical means of waging a global nuclear missile war. But at the same time, the naval strategic nuclear forces are the most important tool for its prevention. This means that the Russian Navy cannot abandon the SSBN - we will proceed from this axiom in our plans to build the Russian Federation's military fleet.
