New bomber for long-range aviation: pros and cons

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New bomber for long-range aviation: pros and cons
New bomber for long-range aviation: pros and cons

Video: New bomber for long-range aviation: pros and cons

Video: New bomber for long-range aviation: pros and cons
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This year, when the Russian Air Force celebrates its centenary, military aviation unwittingly becomes one of the main newsmakers in the field of military construction. However, in fairness, it should be noted that the lack of attention of the Russian Air Force has never been complained about, and the leadership of military aviation has always demonstrated a relatively high level of openness and transparency compared to other types of troops. An indirect confirmation of this thesis is the fact that Air Force purchases under the State Armament Program until 2020 are decomposed almost completely, in contrast to, say, the programs of the Ground Forces or Aerospace Defense.

Among the voiced plans of the Air Force, the program for creating a new strategic bomber, which received the name "Advanced Aviation Complex for Long-Range Aviation" (PAK DA), stands apart. The level of attention to the program is so high that in the summer of 2012 it was mentioned by President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

Concept development

However, the PAK DA program itself is not something fundamentally new, which appeared in 2010. Its roots in its current form go back at least 2007, when the Russian Air Force issued Tupolev JSC a technical assignment for the development of a new aviation complex for Long-Range Aviation. Note that R&D funding on this topic was included in the state defense order and, accordingly, in the State Armament Program (GPV-2015). Funding for R&D on PAK DA was supposed to open in 2008. However, the Air Force signed a three-year R&D contract in 2009.

Special breakthroughs and Stakhanov's successes in design were not planned then - until 2015, the creation program was mainly supposed to be conceptual and research in nature, associated with the definition of the technical "face" of this aircraft. At the end of 2009, the management of the Tupolev Design Bureau announced that research on the PAK DA project is planned to be completed in 2012, and development work - in 2017. That is, there was already a delay in the timing of the aircraft's readiness, because, according to the original plans, in 2017, serial production was to begin.

Probably, the adoption of the new State Armament Program until 2020 had a certain impact on the fate of the PAK DA. Apparently, in comparison with GPV-2015, the priority of the PAK DA program has been reduced, since in the four years that have passed since the launch of the program, it is still at the stage of exploratory research.

According to official data, by mid-2012, it was possible to form the appearance of a promising bomber ("avanproekt") and begin improvements "in terms of tactical and technical tasks." It may well be that all the developments available today are the result of the groundwork from the previous GPV. It is known that GPV-2020 has funds only for R&D and the formation of the PAK DA image by 2015 and, apparently, the creation of prototypes, but it is planned to go to the stage of mass production after 2020, possibly already within the framework of the new GPV-2025 being developed. …

This is confirmed by leaks from the circles involved in the creation of the plane. The timing of the creation of the aircraft is already shifting "to the right" in comparison with the original ideas. Last year, unnamed sources in the aviation industry reported that the new bomber would not be built until 2025 at the earliest, and the new aircraft would take at least 15-20 years to build.

Airplane appearance

Today, little is known about the concept of the aircraft itself, and even more so about its performance characteristics. In part, this may be due to the fact that the Air Force themselves have not fully decided on the approaches to the new aircraft. Nevertheless, it is believed that the PAK DA will not only be able to perform tasks in conventional and nuclear wars, use a wide range of high-precision strike weapons, but also have a certain set of "qualitatively new combat capabilities that allow implementing completely new ways of solving deterrent problems."

It is understood that a promising bomber will be created using composite materials and using stealth technologies. A new complex of airborne electronic equipment (avionics) will be created for it and new weapons will be developed.

It is still unclear what engine the new aircraft will be equipped with. It is no secret that at present, engines for strategic aviation are not mass-produced; the Samara OJSC Kuznetsov is only faced with the task of restoring production of the NK-32M engine for Tu-160 strategic bombers, and the first engines will be ready no earlier than 2016.

However, Samara engine engineers, based on the projects of the NK-93 and the modernized NK-32M engines, are developing a project for the NK-65 geared turbojet engine, which is proposed to be installed both on the modernized An-124 Ruslan transport aircraft and on a promising strategic bomber. This may indirectly indicate that the PAK DA may be a subsonic aircraft, possibly close in concept to the American B-2A "penetrator". Be that as it may, it is obvious that the engine is one of the weak elements of this project, and to a large extent, it will be the success in its creation that will determine the readiness of the first prototype and the very possibility of serial production.

Added to this is the fact that the Air Force is also apparently aware of this problem. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the information that appeared in 2011 that the possibility of equipping the PAK DA with four engines from the PAK FA fighter is being considered (it is not clear whether we are talking about the existing product "117", or about the promising "product 129"), while designing the bomber will allegedly be handled by the Sukhoi Design Bureau.

Little is also known about the weapons of the PAK DA. Probably, its final composition will depend on the results of research and development and what concept will be adopted by PAK DA. This is a platform for a significant number of long-range cruise missiles or a carrier of a small number of high-precision weapons to destroy point targets and break through powerful air defense.

Prospects of the project

Despite the fact that work on the PAK DA is obviously already underway and funds have already been spent on it, the question of the feasibility of creating such an aircraft still remains open. As of the beginning of 2012, there were 66 bombers in the deployed state of the Russian strategic aviation: 11 Tu-160 and 55 Tu-95MS, which have about 200 strategic charges (in fact, they can carry more). In addition, a number of aircraft were undergoing repairs and were in training units. Note that most of these aircraft were produced in the 1980s and 1990s and have insignificant flying time, that is, the residual resource allows these aircraft to continue to operate until at least 2030–2040s.

In this regard, the question arises of who should be replaced by the PAK DA and in what quantity, although the leadership of the Air Force makes it clear that it will replace the Tu-95MS / 160. In this regard, it should be noted that the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS in their present form are essentially carriers of long-range cruise missiles and have limited capabilities for the use of guided bombs, as well as for breaking through layered air defense. This is a significant difference from the US Air Force strategic aviation, which has 91 bombers (72 V-52H and 19 V-2A), where the B-52H is an analogue of the Russian Tu-95MS / Tu-160, and the V-2A is a carrier of guided bombs and designed to break through powerful air defense. At the same time, 64 B-1B bombers were actually retrained as front-line bombers and perform the functions of direct support of the ground forces.

That is, taking into account the significant resource of the existing fleet of strategic bombers, the development of a new cruise missile carrier to replace them in the current conditions looks somewhat redundant. The creation of a domestic analogue of the B-2A or the promising American Next Generation Bomber (also known as the Long-Range Strike-B) again seems to be too expensive a project for the economic realities of modern Russia. An indirect reference point can be an estimate of the cost of the program for the development of a new American bomber at $ 40-50 billion, which is one third of the procurement budget of the Russian Air Force, according to GPV-2020, as well as the cost of completing the Tu-160 "out of stock" in 2006, KAPO wanted to receive about 24 billion rubles.

In any case, it is clear that a one-to-one replacement is unlikely to be within the power of the domestic budget; moreover, the question of the role of the air component in the promising shape of strategic nuclear forces, for example, after 2020, remains behind the scenes. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the PAK DA program has opponents within the Ministry of Defense itself. In their opinion, Russia does not need such complexes, given the emphasis on the deployment of the Strategic Missile Forces. Moreover, for R&D on the PAK DA project, opponents give another argument, too much money is required.

In addition to questions regarding the concept of using the PAK DA and the number of aircraft purchased, the question of the ability of the Russian aviation industry to design such an aircraft, and the industry's ability to establish its serial production (taking into account the production of the necessary components), is no less acute. The epic with the development of a less complex aircraft, such as the T-50 fighter (PAK FA), which is still far from completion, the deployment of production of the Il-76MD-90 transport aircraft, "new" for Russian enterprises, delays and difficulties with the repair and modernization of the Tu-160 - all this indicates that the development of PAK DA may become an unbearable task for the industry and a "black hole" for the budget.

Even a cursory review of the existing production sites allows us to conclude that it will be possible to "stick" PAK DA either at KAPO named after Gorbunov (whose existing capabilities to produce PAK DA are questionable), or at a new plant. The first steps in this direction have been made: in June 2012, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced plans to create a new aviation enterprise based on KAPO named after Gorbunov, where the main product will be the An-70 military transport aircraft. But the possibility of issuing PAK YES was not ruled out. The price of the issue remains unknown.

The on-board radio-electronic equipment and electronic warfare system looks no less vulnerable to the program. The experience of operating the Tu-160 onboard radio-electronic complex, which has been brought to mind for almost 20 years, suggests that in the case of the PAK DA, history can repeat itself at least on the same scale, if not worse, taking into account the incommensurable capabilities of the radio-electronic industry of the USSR and Russia …

Alternative

In the current conditions and in the current situation in the domestic aviation-industrial complex, the most preferable according to the cost-effectiveness criterion is to keep at the current level the fleet of Tu-95MS / Tu-160 strategic bombers, which will be used exclusively as carriers of long-range cruise missiles with nuclear and conventional combat units launched from areas controlled by the Russian Air Force.

But the greatest effect can be achieved by modernizing the fleet of Tu-22M3 long-range bombers (about 100 deployed and about the same at storage bases), which seems to be the most versatile aircraft for Long-Range Aviation. Taking into account the fact that the new front-line bombers Su-34 will be assigned some of the current functions of the Tu-22M3, the latter involuntarily "move" into the niche of strategic aviation. GPV-2020 provides for the modernization of only 30 aircraft of this type, which is absolutely insufficient. Rather, it is this program that should receive priority, including at the expense of funds allocated for the PAK DA theme.

The modernization of the Tu-22M3 should go not only along the line of increasing the accuracy characteristics of the on-board sighting system and updating the avionics, but also by equipping the Tu-22M3 fleet with rods for refueling, as well as a new compact cruise missile, in weight and size characteristics written off from the Kh-15, but with a significantly increased range (not less than 1000 km). It is possible that the Tu-22M3 will be given the ability to use guided aerial bombs. This will also require an accelerated resumption of production of the NK-25 engines, probably even to the detriment of the NK-32M program. Thus, the Tu-22M3 will be able to become a kind of analogue of the American B-1B, but with the ability to use substrategic weapons and be truly a kind of bargaining chip in future conflicts. The depth and scope of development of the new aircraft will make it possible to load with work not only the Tupolev Design Bureau, but also KAPO, as well as enterprises of the radio-electronic and missile industries.

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