The last months have become relatively fruitful for news about the prospects and various projects of promising Russian aircraft carriers. At the same time, what is interesting, we are talking about completely different ships: until recently, the model of the aircraft carrier of the project 23000 "Storm", with a displacement of under 100 thousand tons, which could be equipped with both a nuclear and a conventional power plant, was proudly demonstrated to the whole world, and right there - information about a relatively light and exclusively non-nuclear ship of the order of 40,000 tons, but with an unconventional orientation towards the "semi-catamaran" hull design, and so on. As you can see, the "spread" in the proposals is extremely wide, and there is a natural desire to systematize information about the development of aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation, if possible, to evaluate the concepts existing today, and to understand where the military and design thought in terms of aircraft-carrying ships is moving today.
However, in order to do this, it is necessary to see the basis, the starting point from which the design of aircraft carriers in the post-Soviet Russia began.
A bit of history
As you know, at the end of the USSR, domestic industry began to create the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Ulyanovsk", according to the then classification, was listed in heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers. Alas, they did not have time to finish building it, and the hull of the giant ship was dismantled in the now "independent" Ukraine.
But, of course, numerous developments on this ship have survived: here are the calculations, and sets of drawings, and the results of numerous research projects on various components, weapons, aggregates, etc., as well as tactical developments of the military on the use of this ship, and much more. In addition to what was preserved in paper and metal, practical experience was added to the operation of the first and only aircraft carrier in the Russian fleet, capable of supporting flights of horizontal take-off and landing jet fighters. We are, of course, talking about the aircraft carrier of project 1143.5 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".
The author has already talked about the history of the development and operation of the latter in the corresponding series of articles, and it makes no sense to repeat it. It is only worth recalling that the concept of Kuznetsov itself, that is, a non-nuclear aircraft carrier with only one springboard without catapults with an air group of limited size, was never what the fleet was striving for.
As you know, the cycle of creating a new type of weapons begins with the awareness of the tasks that need to be solved within the framework of a general strategy, but which cannot be effectively solved by the means at the disposal of the armed forces. Having identified such tasks, the military is able to determine a means for solving them and formulate a tactical and technical task (TTZ) for such a means. And then the work of designers and industry is already on the design and creation of new weapons. Although, of course, it also happens that the TTZ turns out to be impracticable, and if a compromise cannot be reached between the desires of the military and the current capabilities, the project may be terminated. Thus, with the correct order of creation, the latest weapons system should always represent, so to speak, a conscious need for the military, embodied in metal.
Alas, nothing of the kind happened to Kuznetsov. The tactical and technical characteristics and features of this aircraft carrier did not determine the needs of the fleet, but a forced compromise between them and the position of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov. The Navy wanted ejection and nuclear-powered aircraft-carrying ships with a displacement of at least 65-70 thousand tons, and better - more. But D. F. Ustinov, believing in the bright future of VTOL aircraft, agreed only to a non-nuclear ship of 45,000 tons: it was with great difficulty that he was persuaded to allow an increase in displacement at least to 55,000 tons, and he did not want to hear about catapults.
As a result, in the form of TAKR 1143.5, the fleet received absolutely not what it wanted to get and what it needed, but only what the industry could give it within the limits allowed by the all-powerful minister of defense at that time. Thus, "Kuznetsov" could not become, and did not become, an adequate answer to the tasks facing the aircraft carrying ships of the USSR and the Russian Federation.
Dear readers will surely remember that the author has repeatedly allowed himself to reproach D. F. Ustinov in voluntarism in relation to the issues of aircraft-carrying ships of the fleet. Therefore, I consider it my duty to remind also that the merits of Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov to the country are immeasurable in the literal sense of the word: they have not yet invented such a measure … Becoming on the recommendation of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (and it was not easy to earn a recommendation from him) the USSR People's Commissar of Armaments on June 9 1941, he was one of the organizers of the evacuation of the industrial potential of the USSR to the east. And we can safely say that in the chaos of the first year of the war, he and his associates succeeded in literally the impossible. After the war, he served as Minister of Armaments and made a lot of efforts to create and develop the missile industry of the USSR. His service in the military-industrial complex was marked by many achievements and victories, his contribution to the formation of the post-war armed forces of the USSR is enormous. Without a doubt, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was a great man … but still, just a man who, as you know, tends to make mistakes. At one time S. O. Makarov quite rightly noted that only the one who does nothing is not mistaken, and D. F. Ustinov did a lot for his country. And the adherence to VTOL, according to the author of this article, was one of the not so many mistakes of this, in every respect, an outstanding statesman.
As you know, Dmitry Fedorovich died untimely on December 20, 1984. And in the same month, the Nevsky Design Bureau was entrusted with the design of a large-displacement nuclear aircraft carrier with an increased wing. By this time, the future "Kuznetsov" had been on the slipway for 2 years and 4 months, and there were still almost 3 years before it was launched, and almost a year remained before the start of work on the TAKR 1143.6 of the same type, which later became the Chinese "Liaoning". TTZ for the atomic aircraft carrier was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov. But the design process was not simple, and the preliminary design was reviewed only in April 1986. The design was approved by Admiral of the Fleet V. N. Chernavin and the Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry I. S. Belousov, and in July of the same year the Nevskoe Design Bureau received an order to prepare and approve a technical design by March 1987. At the same time, the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant (ChSZ), where our aircraft carrier was created, was allowed to begin work even before the approval of the technical design, and to ensure the unconditional laying of the ship in 1988, which was done: the official laying of the ship took place on November 25, 1988.
As you can see, the procedure for designing a nuclear aircraft carrier in the USSR turned out to be very slow, and, despite all the accumulated "baggage" of knowledge, experience in the development and construction of non-nuclear aircraft carrier projects 1143.1-1143.5 and many early studies of atomic ejection aircraft-carrying ships, the laying of the Ulyanovsk ATACR took place later 4 years after the start of work on this ship. It is necessary to take into account, of course, the fact that ChSZ had to be seriously modernized for laying Ulyanovsk: the building berths were reconstructed, a new outfitting embankment and a number of additional production facilities were built, which cost about 180 million rubles. at the rate of 1991. The ChSZ received modern laser and plasma equipment, installed the latest Japanese machines for processing large-sized metal sheets, as well as the Swedish assembly-welding line ESAB. The plant has mastered a number of new industries, including non-combustible plastics and onboard aircraft lifts, but most importantly, it got the opportunity to carry out large-block construction. "Ulyanovsk" was "divided" into 29 blocks, each of which had a mass of up to 1,700 tons (the launch weight of the TAKR was about 32,000 tons), and the assembly of finished blocks was carried out using two 900-ton Swedish-made cranes, each of which had an unladen weight of 3,500 tons and a span of 140 m.
In other words, ChSZ has turned into a first-class plant for the construction of large-tonnage warships, and even in the latest, "block" method.
Why was Ulyanovsk built in general?
The main tasks for ATAKR, according to the project assignment, were:
1. Giving combat stability to the formations of surface ships, strategic missile submarines, naval missile-carrying aviation in the areas of combat mission.
2. Reflecting enemy air strikes and gaining air superiority.
3. Destruction of formations of enemy ships and submarines.
In addition, the auxiliary tasks of the ATACR were also listed:
1. Ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces.
2. Overlapping enemy missile salvos by electronic warfare aircraft.
3. Providing long-range radar detection and target designation for diverse fleet forces.
ATACR and strike aircraft carrier - conceptual differences
As a matter of fact, already from the above tasks, the difference in the approach to the construction of aircraft-carrying ships in the USA and the USSR is obvious. America created shock (in the full sense of the word!) Aircraft carriers, the main task of which was to deliver strikes on the coast, including nuclear weapons. Of course, the US strike aircraft carriers were also supposed to engage in the destruction of the enemy navy, including its surface, submarine and air components, but this task, in essence, was seen only as a necessary stage in order to begin "work" on coastal targets. Thus, the Americans still saw the "fleet against the coast" as the main form of military operations for the navy.
At the same time, the Soviet ATACR was originally created for completely different tasks. In essence, Ulyanovsk can be viewed as an air defense / anti-aircraft defense aircraft carrier, but first of all - air defense. The Americans believed that carrier-based aircraft would reign in the war at sea, and saw in it the main means of destroying the enemy's air, surface and submarine forces. In the USSR, the basis of the fleet (not counting SSBNs) was seen as surface and submarine ships equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles, and land-based naval missile-carrying aircraft, which at that time consisted of Tu-16 and Tu-22 missile carriers of various modifications, including the most advanced Tu-22M3. Thus, in the concept of the United States, the aircraft carrier played a key role in naval warfare, but in the USSR, the ATAKR was supposed to perform, in essence, providing the function of providing cover from the air for a group of dissimilar forces, which was supposed to defeat the main forces of the enemy's fleet, and thus decide the outcome of the war. on the sea. We will return to this thesis later, but for now let's look at the design of the Soviet ship.
What did our designers and shipbuilders do?
"Ulyanovsk" became the largest warship laid down in the USSR. Its standard displacement was 65,800 tons, full - 74,900 tons, the largest - 79,000 tons. The data are given at the time of the approval of the design TTE of the ship by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which took place on October 28, 1987, later they could slightly change. The maximum length of the ship was 321.2 m, at design waterline - 274 m, maximum width - 83.9 m, at design waterline - 40 m. The draft reached 10.6 m.
The power plant was four-shaft, provided for the installation of four reactors and was, in fact, a modernized power plant for heavy nuclear missile cruisers of the Kirov type. The full speed was 29.5 knots, the economic speed was 18 knots, but there were also auxiliary, reserve boilers operating on non-nuclear fuel, the power of which was sufficient to ensure a speed of 10 knots.
Constructive protection
The ship received very serious constructive protection, both surface and underwater. As far as can be understood from the sources, the basis of the surface protection was the spaced armor covering the hangar and cellars with weapons and aviation fuel: that is, first there was a screen designed to make the fuse go off, and 3.5 meters behind it - the main layer of armor … For the first time, such a booking was applied on the Baku aircraft carrier, and there its weight was 1,700 tons.
As for the PTZ, its width reached 5 m in the "thickest" places. I must say that the design of this protection during the design of the ship became the object of many disputes, and it is not a fact that the optimal solution was chosen based on the results of "departmental squabbles". In any case, one thing is known - the anti-torpedo protection was designed to withstand the detonation of ammunition equivalent to 400 kg of TNT, and this is one and a half times less than on American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers of the Nimitz type, whose PTZ was supposed to protect against 600 kg of TNT.
Active protection
It is very often indicated that the Soviet aircraft carrier, unlike foreign aircraft carriers, had a very powerful air defense system. However, this is an incorrect statement: the fact is that, starting from "Baku", air defense systems were not installed on our aircraft-carrying ships, not only large, but even medium-range, without which it is generally impossible to talk about the developed air defense of the ship. But what could not be taken away from the Soviet aircraft carrier was the strongest anti-missile defense, focused, of course, at destroying not ballistic, but anti-ship missiles and other ammunition aimed directly at the ship. And in this matter, "Ulyanovsk" really left behind any aircraft carrier in the world.
The basis of its air defense was the Kinzhal short-range air defense system, whose missiles could hit air targets traveling at speeds up to 700 m / s (that is, up to 2,520 km / h) at a range of no more than 12 km and an altitude of 6 km. It seems to be not so much, but quite enough to defeat any anti-ship missile or guided aerial bomb. At the same time, the complex worked fully automatically and had a relatively short reaction time - about 8 seconds for a low-flying target. In practice, this should have meant that by the time the anti-ship missile system approached the maximum range of fire, the air defense missile system should already have a ready-made "solution" for its defeat and was in full readiness for the use of missiles. At the same time, "Ulyanovsk" had 4 radar fire control stations, each of which was capable of "directing" the firing of 8 missiles at 4 targets in the 60x60 degree sector, and the total ammunition load of the missiles was 192 missiles in 24 vertical launchers, grouped into 4 packages of 6 PU.
In addition to the "Dagger", it was planned to install 8 "Kortik" air defense missile systems on "Ulyanovsk", whose missiles had a range of 8 km and an altitude of 3.5 km, and rapid-fire 30-mm cannons - 4 and 3 km, respectively. A feature of the project was that the "Daggers" and "Daggers" had to be under the control of a single CIUS, controlling the state of targets and distributing air defense targets between them.
Of course, modern air defense systems do not create an "impenetrable dome" over the ship - in reality, the destruction of air targets by ship means is an extremely difficult process, due to the transience of the air attack, low visibility and the relatively high speed of even subsonic missiles. So, for example, the British Sea Wolfe air defense system, created for similar tasks to the Dagger, knocked down 114-mm shells without any problems, but in practice, during the Falklands conflict, it showed about 40% efficiency on much larger and well-observed targets like Skyhawk subsonic attack aircraft. But there is no doubt that the capabilities of the Daggers and Daggers of the Ulyanovsk are by an order of magnitude superior to the 3 Sea Sparrow SAM systems and 3 20-mm Vulcan-Phalanxes installed on the Nimitz aircraft carrier.
In addition to anti-aircraft weapons, Ulyanovsk was also equipped with the Udav anti-torpedo system, which was a 10-tube rocket launcher equipped with special anti-torpedo ammunition of various types, and a separate high-frequency GAS was used to detect targets. As conceived by the creators, the attacking torpedo must first collide with traps and deviate from them, and if this did not happen, enter the impromptu curtain-minefield created by the "Boa constrictor" in the path of the torpedo movement. It was assumed that the modernized version of the "Udav-1M" is capable of disrupting an attack of a straight-forward unguided torpedo with a probability of 0.9, and a controlled one with a probability of 0.76. It is possible, and even very likely, that in combat conditions the real effectiveness of the complex would be much lower. but, in any case, the presence of active anti-torpedo protection, even if imperfect, is much better than its absence.
Electronic warfare means
It was planned to install the Sozvezdiye-BR jamming and electronic warfare system on Ulyanovsk. It was the newest system, which was put into service in 1987, and during its creation and adaptation to Ulyanovsk, special attention was paid to its integration into a single circuit along with other systems to protect the ship from air attack. Unfortunately, the author does not know the exact performance characteristics of the "Constellation-BR", but she had to automatically detect the radiation of the ship, classify it and independently choose the necessary equipment and modes of counteraction to the emerging threat. In addition, great attention was paid to the compatibility of various radio equipment of the ship: the fleet has already encountered a problem when there are many radars installed on one ship, communications equipment, etc. they simply interfered with each other's work and could not function at the same time. This lack should not have existed in Ulyanovsk.
Situation controls
In terms of radar, it was originally planned to equip Ulyanovsk with a Mars-Passat system with a phased radar, but taking into account that it was dismantled at the Varyag TARK, most likely the same would have happened at Ulyanovsk. In this case, ATAKR with a high degree of probability would have received a new at that time "Forum 2" radar complex, the basis of which was 2 "Podberezovik" radars. These radars worked quite effectively at a range of up to 500 km, and, unlike Mars-Passat, did not require a specialized radar for detecting low-flying targets "Podkat".
As for the underwater environment, it was planned to equip the Ulyanovsk with the Zvezda State Joint Stock Company, but judging by the photographs of the hull in the building, it is possible that the ATAKR would have received the "good old" Polynom.
Here we will pause in the description of the Ulyanovsk design: the following material will be devoted to the capabilities of its air wing, aircraft maintenance, catapults, hangar and strike weapons. In the meantime, let's try to draw some conclusions from the above.
"Ulyanovsk" and "Nimitz" - similarities and differences
Of all the Soviet warships, the Soviet ATACR in terms of its displacement turned out to be the closest to the American supercarrier "Nimitz". However, the different concept of using ships obviously affected the composition of the equipment and design features of these ships.
Today, when discussing the usefulness of aircraft carriers in modern naval combat, two statements regarding aircraft carriers are constantly emerging. The first is that an aircraft carrier is not self-sufficient and in a war with a more or less appropriate enemy in terms of level requires a significant escort, whose ships have to be torn away from their direct missions. The second is that domestic aircraft carriers do not require an escort, since they may well defend themselves. I must say that both of these statements are wrong, but both contain seeds of truth.
The statement about the need for a large escort is true only for "American" type strike aircraft carriers, which are, in fact, the best floating airfield that can only be obtained in the amount of under 100 thousand tons, but that's all. However, this is fully justified within the framework of the American concept of domination of carrier-based aircraft, which is entrusted with the solution of the main tasks of "fleet against fleet" and "fleet against shore". In other words, the Americans intend to solve problems with carrier-based aircraft: in such concepts, separate groups made up of surface ships and not having an aircraft carrier in their composition can be formed only to solve some secondary tasks. That is, separate formations of missile cruisers and / or destroyers of the US Navy are not really needed. Aircraft carrier strike groups, submarines, which are needed primarily to counter an underwater threat, frigates for convoy service - that is, in fact, all that the American fleet needs. Of course, there are also amphibious landing units, but they operate under the close "tutelage" of the AUG. Thus, the US Navy does not "tear off" destroyers and cruisers to escort aircraft carriers, they build cruisers and destroyers to support the work of carrier-based aviation, which also solves those tasks that were assigned to cruisers and destroyers in our fleet.
At the same time, of course, a large escort is an integral attribute of a strike aircraft carrier, if the latter is opposed by a more or less equal enemy.
At the same time, domestic TARKRs, including Ulyanovsk, are representatives of a completely different concept, they are just ships supporting the operation of the main forces of the fleet. The USSR Navy was not going to build an ocean-going fleet around carrier-based aircraft; it was going to provide carrier-based aircraft for the operations of its ocean (and not only) fleet. Therefore, if, within the framework of the American concept of aircraft-carrying ships, destroyers and cruisers that support the actions of an aircraft carrier perform their main task, for which they were actually built, then within the framework of the Soviet concept, ships that ensure the safety of aircraft carriers are really distracted from their own main tasks.
At the same time, the American aircraft carrier is designed to solve a wider range of tasks than the Soviet aircraft carrier or even the ATAKR. The latter was supposed to either provide zonal air supremacy, or the air defense of the strike formation, as well as the anti-aircraft defense, but the carrier-based aircraft of the American "super" was also supposed to solve strike missions. In fact, by eliminating the "strike" function (it was purely auxiliary on the Soviet aircraft carrier), our admirals and designers were able to create smaller ships, or better protected, or both together. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what we see in Ulyanovsk.
Its total displacement was more than 22% inferior to the Nimitz, but the active air defense systems were much stronger. On "Ulyanovsk" there was a system for countering torpedoes (how effective is another question, but it was!), And "Nimitz" had nothing of the kind, in addition, the Soviet ship had very powerful constructive protection. Alas, it is impossible to compare it with the one that the Nimitz possessed due to the secrecy of the latter, but nevertheless it should be noted that the PTZ of the American ship, most likely, turned out to be better.
As for the installation of a powerful hydroacoustic complex, this is a very controversial issue. On the one hand, of course, the equipment of SJSC Polinom weighed under 800 tons, which could be used to increase the number of the ship's air wing, or the quality of its use. But on the other hand, the presence of a powerful SAC on ATAKR significantly increased its situational awareness and thereby reduced the number of ships needed for its direct escort, which means it freed up additional ships for solving combat missions.
At the same time, it would be completely wrong to consider the domestic aircraft carrier or ATAKR of the USSR era as a ship capable of conducting combat operations completely independently. Firstly, it is simply not intended for this, because its role is air defense and anti-aircraft defense, but not the independent destruction of enemy surface ship groups, however, this issue will be considered in more detail only in the next article. And secondly, he still needs an escort - another question is that thanks to the strong (although not having a "long arm") air defense, powerful electronic warfare, and so on. his escort may be significantly less numerous than that of an American aircraft carrier.
