The fate of LP Beria, who was IV Stalin's deputy and "right" hand, was a foregone conclusion after Stalin's death. Members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the group of senior army officials who supported them seriously feared exposure by L. P. Beria, who had at his disposal all the information about their participation in mass repressions.
Before his appointment to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, the published biography of L. P. Beria did not contain any compromising information. In view of the fact that it is inaccessible to a wide range of readers, I will give its full text published in the historical-revolutionary calendar for 1940: “Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was born on March 29, 1899 in the village of Merheuli of the Sukhum region (Abkhaz ASSR), in the family of a poor peasant … He received his primary education at the Sukhum Higher Primary School, after which he went to study in Baku, where he entered the Polytechnic School and graduated in 1919 with a diploma of a technician-architect-builder. Ever since his youth, Comrade Beria joined the revolutionary movement.
In 1915, he took a leading role in organizing an illegal student revolutionary circle and actively participated in its work. In March 1917, Comrade Beria joined the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) and conducted active underground work during the period of the Mussavatists' domination in Azerbaijan.
In 1920, after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, Comrade Beria, on the instructions of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the headquarters of the XI Army, twice went to illegal Bolshevik work in Georgia, where the Georgian Mensheviks were then in power. Having contacted local Bolshevik organizations, Comrade Beria did a great deal of work in Georgia to prepare an armed uprising against the Menshevik government.
In connection with the failure of the illegal Central Committee of the Bolsheviks of Georgia in 1920, Comrade Beria was arrested by the Menshevik government and imprisoned in the Kutaisi prison. After several months of imprisonment, Comrade Beria, at the insistence of Comrade Kirov, who was then the plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia, was exiled from Georgia to Soviet Azerbaijan. In Baku, Comrade Beria first worked in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan, and then, in order to strengthen the apparatus of the Cheka of Azerbaijan, was appointed head of the secret-operational unit and deputy chairman of the Cheka of Azerbaijan.
In the fall of 1922, by the decision of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks), Comrade Beria was transferred to work in the Cheka of Georgia as head of a secret-operational unit, with a combination of the post of head of the Special Department of the Army. From that time until the end of 1931, Comrade Beria was continuously in the leadership of the KGB, successively occupying the posts of chairman of the Cheka of Georgia, deputy chairman of the GPU of the Transcaucasian Federation, chairman of the Transcaucasian and Georgian GPU, and plenipotentiary chairman of the GPU in the TSFSR. During the period of his work in the organs of the Cheka-GPU, Comrade Beria carried out an enormous amount of work to defeat and liquidate the anti-Soviet parties of Transcaucasia (Georgian Mensheviks, Mussavatists and Dashnaks).
Comrade Beria's merits in defeating the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist-Bukharin and bourgeois-nationalist gangs, as well as the party of Georgian Mensheviks, which in the first years of Soviet power in Georgia represented a significant counterrevolutionary force, actively fought against Soviet power, right up to the organization of an armed uprising, should be especially noted. At the same time, t. During this period, Beria carried out a great deal of work to expose the enemies of the people who had made their way to the party and Soviet leadership in Transcaucasia.
At the beginning of November 1931, Comrade Beria was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia and second secretary of the Zakraikom of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (b), and in 1932 - the first secretary of the Zakraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of the All-Union Communist Party of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (b) and first secretary Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia. As the head of the Bolshevik organizations in Georgia and Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria shows brilliant organizational talent, Leninist-Stalinist perseverance and intransigence towards the enemies of the people in the struggle to carry out the general line of the party. With his skillful and strong Bolshevik leadership, he directs the work of party organizations to implement the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to correct the gross distortions of the party's policy in the countryside, to improve industry, agriculture and culture in the Transcaucasian republics, and to raise and Bolshevik education of cadres.
Much credit goes to Comrade Beria in exposing the Trotskyist-Bukharin falsifiers of the history of Bolshevism. His famous work, written in 1935, "On the question of the history of Bolshevik organizations in the Transcaucasus", which was sold in a million copies and translated into many languages of the peoples of the USSR, is a most valuable contribution to the history of Bolshevism.
For military and revolutionary merits, Comrade Beria was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Battle and Labor Orders of the Red Banner of the Republic of Georgia, the Labor Order of the Red Banner of Azerbaijan, and two badges of the honorary Chekist.
In August 1938, Comrade Beria was transferred to work in Moscow. At present, Comrade Beria is the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Since the 17th Party Congress, Comrade Beria has been a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At the first plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), elected by the 18th Party Congress in March 1939, Comrade Beria was elected a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Comrade Beria is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ". [1]
It is noteworthy that in the subsequent published biographies of L. P. Beria, this information is either absent or reduced to a minimum.
In recent years, about L. P. Beria has written many publications. Most authors attempt to unravel the phenomenon of this controversial political figure. The average man is so sure that L. P. Beria was a political demon and a bloodthirsty murderer that he does not want to hear anything about the opposite assessment of his contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the preservation of the independence of the Soviet state. In connection with this denial, the author set himself a goal: to find out the true face of L. P. Beria.
In the previous article "The Riddle of Beria", the author made an attempt to prove that LP Beria not only was not the organizer of mass repressions, but was an active opponent of illegal methods of investigation. During the years of his leadership, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR released 185,571 people convicted of counter-revolutionary activities under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. After the death of JV Stalin, he initiated a large-scale amnesty and other democratic reforms.
During the war, L. P. Beria directed the entire military economy of the country and headed the nationwide work on the creation of domestic atomic weapons.
Let us try to analyze the chronology of events and assess the contribution of L. P. Beria to the implementation of the Soviet atomic project.
The first intelligence department of the NKVD, starting in the fall of 1941, through the created foreign agent network, received information about the work on the creation of atomic weapons carried out in the USA, England and Germany. Having received the information, L. P. Beria, not convinced of its complete reliability, was in no hurry to report this to I. V. Stalin. This is confirmed by the fact that LP Beria wrote a draft letter to JV Stalin about the content of intelligence materials and the need to organize work on the creation of atomic weapons. The draft letter was written between October 10, 1941 and March 31, 1942, but it was never sent.
L. P. Beria to report only on October 6, 1942, having invited J. V. Stalin to work out the issue of creating a scientific advisory body from authoritative persons under the State Defense Committee (GKO) [2] to coordinate, study and direct the work of all scientists, research organizations of the USSR dealing with the issue of atomic energy of uranium. Ensure the secret familiarization of prominent uranium specialists with the materials of the NKVD of the USSR for the purpose of their assessment and further use.
The letter also stated that from the top secret materials obtained by the NKVD of the USSR from England by secret agents, it followed that under the British War Cabinet a cabinet was created to study the problem of uranium for military purposes and to manufacture uranium bombs with great destructive power. 3]
The date of the beginning of the implementation of the Soviet atomic project is September 28, 1942. On this day, the USSR State Defense Committee signed order No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium" [4]. The order noted that the USSR Academy of Sciences (AS) should "resume work on studying the feasibility of using atomic energy by nuclear fission and submit a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel by April 1, 1943" [5].
Until May 1944, the activities of state bodies and scientific organizations on the uranium problem were supervised by the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee VM Molotov, who simultaneously served as the first deputy chairman of the government and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. However, due to his workload, in fact, these duties were assigned to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (SNK) and at the same time the People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry MG Pervukhin.
On May 19, 1944, MG Pervukhin wrote a note addressed to JV Stalin "On the problem of uranium", where he proposed to assign these functions to LP Beria in order to raise the status of the leadership of work on the use of intra-atomic energy on behalf of the state.
In the note, this proposal was stated as follows: “To create a Uranium Council under the State Defense Committee for day-to-day control and assistance in carrying out work on uranium in approximately the following composition:
1. t. Beria L. P. (Chairman of the Council); 2. T. Molotov V. M.; 3. T. Pervukhin M. G. (Deputy Chairman); 4. academician Kurchatov I. V. "[6]
This proposal indirectly showed the personal interest of M. G. Pervukhin in raising his status in the management of the project. This was manifested in the fact that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was assigned the role of an ordinary member of the council, and he offered to appoint himself to the post of deputy chairman of the council. The very appeal of MG Pervukhin to JV Stalin, bypassing VM Molotov, was also a violation of subordination. Most likely, he himself understood this, so the next day, May 20, 1944, he sent a letter of similar content to VM Molotov and LP Beria. [7]
On May 16, 1944, J. V. Stalin appointed L. P. Beria deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee and chairman of the Operations Bureau, whose tasks were to control the work of all the people's commissariats of the defense industry, railway and water transport, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, coal, oil, chemical, rubber, paper and pulp, electrical industry, power plants. Thus, from that time on, L. P. Beria began to lead the entire military economy of the country.
After discussing MG Pervukhin's note with the invitation of IV Kurchatov, VM Molotov made a decision to report the problem of uranium to IV Stalin, who agreed with the proposal to entrust LP Beria with the leadership of all work. Already on June 21, 1944, the first draft resolutions of the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR related to the atomic project were received from V. M. Molotov to L. P. Beria. From that time on, all scientific, industrial and other questions on the uranium problem were solved with the knowledge and with the direct participation of LP Beria.
After L. P. Beria was appointed responsible for the work on uranium, on September 29, 1944, I. V. Kurchatov sent a note to his name "On the unsatisfactory state of work on the problem." In it, he informed about the large-scale work abroad and the high concentration of scientific, engineering and technical forces involved in the uranium problem. In addition, IV Kurchatov expressed serious concern about the development of similar work in the USSR, especially in the field of the availability of raw materials and issues of separation, and asked LP Beria to give instructions on the organization of such work. [8]
The result of the appeal of IV Kurchatov dated September 29, 1944 - the adoption of the GKO decree No. 7102ss / s dated December 8, 1944 "On measures to ensure the development of mining and processing of uranium ores" [9]. This decree provided for the organization in the structure of the NKVD of the USSR, which continued to be headed by L. P. Beria, a research institute for uranium - the "Institute of Special Metals of the NKVD" (future NII-9 [10] in Moscow).
On December 3, 1944, JV Stalin signed GKO Decree No. 7069ss "On urgent measures to ensure the deployment of work carried out by Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences," the final point of which was to supervise the development of work on uranium. This clause has already legally secured the responsibility of LP Beria for the further fate of the atomic project. [11]
Having received broad powers, L. P. Beria gave the whole work a more organized and dynamic character. In order to ensure the secrecy of the tasks to be solved, the access of the participants in the work was limited only by the amount of information that is necessary to fulfill the duties assigned to them. L. P. Beria appointed experienced leaders from among the employees of the NKVD of the USSR to key positions in organizations involved in solving problems of creating atomic weapons.
The search, mining and processing of uranium ores was also transferred to the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the USSR. Responsibility for this area was assigned to Colonel-General A. P. Zavenyagin, deputy L. P. Beria. In addition, the commissariat was directly involved in solving the tasks of the Soviet atomic project: it carried out intelligence activities, assigned a special contingent of GULAG prisoners to the facilities under construction, and provided security at sensitive facilities.
One of the veterans and leaders of the nuclear industry AM Petrosyants [12] writes about the reasons for the appointment of LP Beria as the head of all work on the atomic problem: “Among all the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other top leaders of the country, Beria was the most prepared politics and technology. I know all this not by hearsay, but from personal contacts with him on many technical issues related to tank building and nuclear issues. In the interests of historical justice, it must be said that Beria, this terrible man, the head of the punitive body of our country, managed to fully justify Stalin's trust by using the entire scientific potential of nuclear scientists (Kurchatov, Khariton and many, many others) available in our country. He gave all work on the nuclear problem the necessary scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed tremendous energy and efficiency, was an organizer who knew how to bring every business he started to the end. He often went to the sites, got acquainted with the progress and results of the work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and severely dealt with negligent performers, regardless of rank and position. In the process of creating the first Soviet nuclear bomb, his role was immeasurable in the full sense of the word. His efforts and capabilities in using all types and directions of the country's industries in the interests of creating a nuclear industry, scientific and technical potential of the country and the huge masses of prisoners, fear of him ensured him complete freedom of action and victory for the Soviet people in this scientific and technical epic. " 13]
On August 20, 1945, the USSR State Defense Committee issued order No. 9887ss / op "On the Special Committee at the State Defense Committee" (since September 4, 1945, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR, since March 15, 1946 -under the Council of Ministers (CM) of the USSR).
The Special Committee (SC) was entrusted with "the management of all work on the use of the atomic energy of uranium." L. P. Beria was appointed the chairman of the Investigative Committee. In the indicated order of the State Defense Committee, clause 13 was stated as follows: “To instruct Comrade Beria to take measures to organize intelligence work abroad to obtain more complete technical and economic information about the uranium industry and atomic bombs, entrusting him with the leadership of all intelligence work in this area, conducted by intelligence agencies (NKGB [14], RUKA [15], etc.) "[16]
In connection with the reorganization of the people's commissariats that began in the country and their transformation into ministries, as well as great employment in the implementation of the most important secret tasks of special state significance, on December 29, 1945, L. P. Beria was relieved of his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. In March 1946 he was elected a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party and appointed deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Since that time, L. P. Beria began to oversee the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of State Control.
The SK operated for less than 8 years and was liquidated on June 26, 1953, immediately after the arrest of L. P. Beria. At the meetings of the Investigative Committee discussed, corrected and approved documents related to the atomic project, decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which were submitted for approval to I. V. Stalin. During the period of functioning of the SC, more than 140 meetings were held.
The approximate volume of minutes of SC meetings is 1000 typewritten sheets. In general, the office work of the IC has about 1700 cases containing more than 300 thousand pages of typewritten text. These documents include the materials of the meetings of the Technical and Engineering and Technical Councils, as well as correspondence with organizations and enterprises on the issues of the nuclear project.
By the decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU of January 26, 1953, the management of special work on the atomic problem instead of the UK was entrusted to the "troika" consisting of: LP Beria (chairman), NA Bulganin and GM Malenkov. By the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 16, 1953 No. 697-335ss / op SK was re-established and functioned until June 26, 1953, after which it was abolished in connection with the formation of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
Only that researcher or reader who at least simply flips through all 12 books of the three-volume collection “Atomic Project of the USSR. Documents and materials”and diagonally will get acquainted with the titles of the published declassified government documents, letters, certificates, memoranda, etc., will get an idea of the amount of information that LP Beria had to receive. Every day, taking full responsibility upon himself, he made government decisions.
If you carefully read the texts of these documents and official correspondence, the resolutions that LP Beria made, then this will give a more complete picture of the colossal burden that he had to face, holding in his hands all the threads of this multifaceted work. After all, each of the most serious state documents of L. P. Beria not only signed, he thoroughly understood it, behind every number and term was the work of entire scientific teams. All these documents and drafts of government decrees were then submitted to J. V. Stalin for signature.
In his book “Beria. The fate of the all-powerful People's Commissar "Boris Sokolov quoted the deputy of IV Kurchatov, Professor IV Golovin, who noted that" Beria was an excellent organizer - energetic and corrosive. If he took papers for the night, then by the morning the documents were returned with reasonable comments and practical suggestions. He was well versed in people, he checked everything personally, and it was impossible to hide mistakes from him … ".
Further, Boris Sokolov gives the impressions of the head of the "C" section of the NKVD (NKGB) of the USSR, who simultaneously served as the head of the "K" section of the NKGB of the USSR (counterintelligence support of the Soviet atomic project) P. A. Sudoplatov, who repeatedly took part in the meeting of the Investigative Committee: “The meetings of the Special Committee were usually held in Beria’s office. These were heated discussions. I was surprised by the mutual claims of the members of the government. Beria intervened in these disputes, called for order. And for the first time I saw that everyone in this special government body considered themselves equal in official position, regardless of who of them was a member of the Central Committee or the Politburo … Beria, rude and cruel in dealing with his subordinates, could be attentive, courteous, provide daily support to people engaged in important work, he defended these people from all sorts of intrigues of the NKVD organs or party authorities. He always warned the heads of enterprises about their personal responsibility for the strict fulfillment of the task, he had a unique ability to instill in people both a feeling of fear and inspire them to work … It seems to me that he took these qualities from Stalin - strict control, extremely high exactingness, and together with the ability to create an atmosphere of confidence in the manager, that in the case of successful completion of the task, support is provided to him”.
Contemporaries and colleagues who took part in this work with L. P. Beria noted his high physical working capacity, energy, purposefulness and responsibility in the process of supervising work on the uranium problem. He was not limited only to office work, often went on business trips directly to enterprises. He delved into not only organizational and economic problems, but also well versed in technical issues requiring special knowledge.
NS Khrushchev called him "an intelligent, businesslike and resourceful organizer." Similar assessments were given to him by the leaders of the military-industrial complex, nuclear scientists. This is how Yu. B. Khariton spoke about LP Beria in his memoirs: “It is known that in the beginning the general management of the Soviet atomic project was carried out by VM Molotov. The style of his leadership and, accordingly, the results were not particularly effective. IV Kurchatov did not hide his dissatisfaction.
With the transfer of the atomic project into the hands of Beria, the situation has changed dramatically. Although P. L. Kapitsa, who at first took part in the work of the Special Committee and the Technical Council on the atomic bomb, in a letter to Stalin responded sharply negatively about the methods of the new leader.
Beria quickly gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism. This man, who was the personification of evil in the modern history of the country, possessed both tremendous energy and efficiency. Our specialists, coming into contact with him, could not fail to note his intelligence, will and purposefulness. We were convinced that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to bring the matter to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria, who did not hesitate to show sometimes outright rudeness, was able to be polite, tactful and just a normal person due to circumstances. It is no coincidence that one of the German specialists N. Riel, who worked in the USSR, had a very good impression of his meetings with Beria.
The meetings he held were businesslike, always productive and never dragged out. He was a master of unexpected and non-standard solutions…. Beria was quick at work, did not neglect site visits and personal acquaintance with the results of work. When conducting our first atomic explosion, he was the chairman of the state commission. Despite his exceptional position in the party and government, Beria found time for personal contact with people who interested him, even if they did not possess any official distinctions or high titles. It is known that he repeatedly met with A. D. Sakharov, then a candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, as well as with O. A. Lavrentyev, a newly demobilized sergeant from the Far East.
Beria showed understanding and tolerance if one or another specialist was required to complete the work, who, however, did not inspire confidence in the employees of his apparatus. When L. V. Altshuler, who did not hide his sympathy for genetics and antipathies to Lysenko, the security service decided to remove from the facility under the pretext of unreliability, Yu. B. Khariton called Beria directly and said that this employee was doing a lot of useful work. The conversation was limited to the only question of the almighty man, which followed after a long pause: "Do you really need him?" Having received an affirmative answer and said: "Okay," Beria hung up. The incident was over.
According to the impression of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the country's nuclear project remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would be difficult to count on quick success in carrying out such a grandiose work.”[17]
As you know, JV Stalin was a very careful person. In many documents on the atomic project (including draft government decrees on testing the first atomic bomb), his signature was missing. For example, the draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On testing the first copy of the atomic bomb" dated August 18, 1949, remained unsigned by JV Stalin. Moreover, with the participation of J. V. Stalin, only one conference on nuclear topics took place. It was held on January 9, 1947. According to the register of visitors to the Kremlin office of I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, A. N. Voznesensky, V. A. Malyshev, as well as leading scientists and leaders involved in the atomic project. A year earlier, on January 25, 1946, I. V. Stalin in his Kremlin office heard the report of I. V. Kurchatov.
JV Stalin did not accept LP Beria's subsequent proposals on hearing reports or holding meetings, [18] therefore LP Beria was forced to take responsibility for himself. Before leaving for the test site for testing the first copy of the atomic bomb on August 26, 1949, at a meeting of the Investigative Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, consisting of L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, B. L. Vannikov, M. G. Pervukhin, A. P. Zavenyagin, IV Kurchatov and VA Makhnev adopted a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On testing the Soviet atomic bomb", which was never signed by JV Stalin. In the certificate to the draft resolution, member of the Investigative Committee V. A. Makhnev wrote by hand: "The chairman of the Investigative Committee returned both copies and said that the issue was discussed in the Central Committee and the decision will not be made." [19]
Despite this, the test of the RDS-1 atomic bomb, in which members of the SK L. P. Beria, M. G. Pervukhin, A. P. Zavenyagin, I. V. Kurchatov and V. A. Makhnev took part, took place on 29 August 1949 at the training ground number 2, 170 km. west of the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR.
On August 30, 1949, from the test area, L. P. Beria and I. V. Kurchatov wrote a report, which was presented to I. V. Stalin on August 31, 1949. It contained the preliminary test results:
“We report to you, Comrade Stalin, that through the efforts of a large team of Soviet scientists, designers, engineers, managers and workers of our industry, as a result of 4 years of hard work, your task to create a Soviet atomic bomb has been fulfilled. The creation of the atomic bomb in our country has been achieved thanks to your daily attention, care and assistance in solving this problem … ". [20]
On October 28, 1949, LP Beria presented to JV Stalin a final report on the results of testing the atomic bomb. The report was signed by L. P. Beria individually. Attached to it was a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the use of test results at test site No. 2". [21]
Thus, in a very short time, under the leadership of L. P. Beria, a colossal amount of research, development, production, and economic work was carried out in the country, the result of which was the successful test of the atomic bomb. All work was carried out in strict compliance with the state secret regime.
For the successful fulfillment of a special task of the government, more than 800 scientific, engineering and technical and managerial workers of scientific research, design organizations and industrial enterprises were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. Only on October 29, 1949, four awards were signed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (PVS) of the USSR, one separate decree of the Council of Ministers (CM) of the USSR and one joint decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
The signing of decrees and resolutions was preceded by a discussion of their projects at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on October 29, 1949 [22] As a result of the meeting, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 5039-1925ss was adopted, which approved the drafts of all decrees of the PVS of the USSR. The decrees were not subject to publication and were kept in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the USSR PVS in the manner prescribed for the storage of secret documents.
At the same meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 29, 1949, it was decided to award the Heroes of Socialist Labor B. L. Vannikov, B. G. Muzrukov and N. L. Dukhov with the second gold medal "Hammer and Sickle". In the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of October 29, 1949, it was noted that they were awarded "for exceptional services to the state in performing a special task of the government, giving them the right to confer the title of Hero of Socialist Labor." The awarded were given a corresponding certificate in the prescribed form.
B. L. Vannikov was the head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, B. G. Muzrukov was the director of plant number 817 (now the Production Association "Mayak" in the city of Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-40, Chelyabinsk region), N. L. Dukhov - Deputy Chief Designer of KB-11 (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Sarov (Arzamas-16), Nizhny Novgorod Region) Prior to the signing of decrees on awarding participants in the atomic project in the USSR, there were no precedents of re-awarding a gold star Hero of Socialist Labor.
By the following Decree of the PVS of the USSR of October 29, 1949, 33 scientific, engineering and technical and managerial workers of research, design organizations and industrial enterprises who took part in solving the problems of the Soviet atomic project, "for exceptional services to the state in the performance of a special assignment", including the German scientist Nikolaus Riehl, was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle gold medal.
A separate Decree of the PVS of the USSR of October 29, 1949 was awarded to the most distinguished 808 scientific, engineering and technical workers in the performance of a special task of the government. Of these: the Order of Lenin - 260 people, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor - 496 people, the Order of the Badge of Honor - 52 people. [23]
General A. S. Aleksandrov, who worked in the apparatus of L. P. Beria, who was later appointed deputy B. L. documents on awards: “Once Beria instructed me to prepare a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on incentive measures for the development of nuclear energy issues … While preparing the project, I got the idea: what will these comrades do with the money - you can’t buy anything with them in our conditions ! I went with this question to Beria. He listened and said: “Write down - they will build dachas at the expense of the state with complete furnishings. Build cottages or provide apartments, at the request of the awarded. Give them cars. " In general, what I intended to allow them to buy, all of this was now provided at the expense of the state. This project has been approved.”[24]
In addition to the decrees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I. V. Stalin signed the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 29, 1949 No. No. 5070-1944ss, in which it was noted that "as a result of the joint efforts of a large team of scientists, designers, engineers, managers, builders and workers of the Soviet industry, the task of a practical solution to the problem of using atomic energy in the USSR was successfully completed." The most distinguished Soviet and German scientists and specialists were awarded. Among the list of government awards - orders, Stalin prizes, dachas, cars, a lifetime right to free travel on all types of transport within the USSR, free education of children in any educational institutions of the country at the expense of the state, etc. [25]
German scientist - Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, head of the laboratory of plant No. 12 and the head of development and implementation in production of technology for the manufacture of pure metallic uranium was awarded the highest Soviet award "for exceptional services to the state in the performance of a special task." [26] He was also awarded the title of laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree, and a double salary was established for the entire period of work in the USSR. In addition to 350 thousand rubles and the Pobeda car, received in 1947, a prize in the amount of 350 thousand rubles was awarded and, at his request, a mansion house in Moscow with furnishings.
And how was the contribution to the implementation of the atomic project of his immediate leader - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L. P. Beria noted? By a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, gratitude was expressed to him and a Certificate of Honor was issued. In addition, by a separate decree of the PVS of the USSR, he was awarded the Order of Lenin and he was awarded the title of laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree. [27]
The draft joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was submitted for approval to JV Stalin, who wrote on the document: "For" and addressed it to GM Malenkov with a resolution: "For consideration of the five." GM Malenkov, VM Molotov, LM Kaganovich and NA Bulganin put their approving signatures. LP Beria himself did not take part in the discussion of the project. At least his name was not mentioned among the coordinating members of the five. JV Stalin signed the decree as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the government signed the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. M. Malenkov.
In the Decree of the PVS of the USSR on awarding LP Beria, the following wording was recorded: "For the organization of the production of atomic energy and the successful completion of the test of atomic weapons." [28] The decree was printed in triplicate. One copy was kept in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, one in the USSR PVS, and one copy was sent personally to LP Beria. [29]
For what reason was L. P. Beria not nominated for the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for the second time? Who else but he was worthy of it. For what reason was he awarded a separate Decree of the PVS of the USSR of October 29, 1949, in which there was no one besides his name? After all, all the decrees were still not subject to publication and the laureates were introduced to them only in terms of them.
Another question arises: was the contribution of B. L. Vannikov, B. G. Muzrukov, and N. L. Dukhov to the implementation of the atomic project greater than L. P. Beria? Were they more worthy of rewarding, and their merits more significant than L. P. Beria?
By the time of awarding LP Beria earlier, by the Decree of the PVS of the USSR dated September 30, 1943, he was awarded this title "for special services in the field of strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition in difficult wartime conditions."
One can also assume such a version as the modesty of the head of the atomic project. In defense of this version is the fact that, after LP Beria was awarded the military rank of Marshal, in official documents his surname in combination with this rank is practically not mentioned anywhere. Then why did JV Stalin not insist or suggest that his deputy be reintroduced to the title of Hero of Socialist Labor? While this mystery remains unsolved.
In the Soviet Union and modern Russia, the following practice has developed: the work manager, who was entrusted with the entire burden of responsibility for the implementation of important state tasks and projects, was accordingly awarded the highest and most valuable award after their successful implementation. The encouragement of the rest of the participants, who made the greatest contribution to the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, went according to the descending importance of the award, the size of the awards and the number of privileges. What then prevented an adequate assessment of the work of L. P. Beria?
Of course, the assessment of L. P. Beria's contribution to the implementation of the atomic project of the USSR can still be exclusively subjective, since he has not yet been rehabilitated by the state, but to refute the official negative information about his activities, which was disseminated at the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev and his immediate entourage, it is very difficult without the analysis of the originals of archival documents.
In March 1949 - July 1951. there was a significant strengthening of the positions of L. P. Beria in the leadership of the country. After the 19th Congress of the CPSU held in October 1952, LP Beria was included in the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.
On March 5, 1953, J. V. Stalin died. On the same day, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the PVS of the USSR was held, at which appointments to the highest posts of the party and government of the USSR were approved. LP Beria was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The created ministry united the previously existing ministries of the interior and state security.
Along with NS Khrushchev and GM Malenkov, LP Beria became one of the real contenders for leadership in the country. A week after the death of J. V. Stalin and until June 1953, L. P. Beria sent several proposals to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, initiated a number of legislative and political initiatives that directly or indirectly expose the repressions of 1930-1950. x years. Many of his proposals were implemented in the relevant regulatory legal acts.
The overthrow of L. P. Beria was being prepared long before his arrest. The author makes this assumption based on an analysis of the events that took place on the day of the arrest and liquidation of L. P. Beria - June 26, 1953 this day? The very next day, June 27, 1953, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee considered the appointment of the minister and his deputies.
A group of conspirators did everything possible to abolish the all-powerful body, which was headed by L. P. Beria, to wipe out from memory all the good that was done by him. He was immediately declared an enemy of the people, a fiend of hell, the culprit of the notorious mass repressions. Disinformation about a bloody executioner and a sexual maniac is spread throughout the country. Elena Prudnikova described in detail the version of the liquidation of LP Beria in his mansion in the center of Moscow, and this version is the most probable. [30]
On July 2, 1953, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was urgently convened. The first issue on the agenda: "On the criminal, anti-party and anti-state actions of Beria." The speaker on this issue was a member of the SC GM Malenkov. After the plenum, party meetings were organized in all party organizations and labor collectives. A great deal of experience has been accumulated in holding such meetings in the country, and the unanimity of the participants is explained by the predictable consequences of the manifestation of any dissent.
It took a little time to demonize the image of L. P. Beria in the eyes of the people. How much of it is needed in order to refute all this lie? Our compatriot is too trusting. Primary information for him is defining, despite the fact that it can be slander. But the reluctance to change this distorted information at the state level remains incomprehensible, even after the declassification of a number of important archival documents. If the state does not do this, then it is the duty of its active citizens, to whom the author of this publication belongs, to help compatriots themselves to understand the intricacies of political intrigues that have been, are and always will be.
In 2005The book "Heroes of the Atomic Project" was published, which published biographies of prominent Soviet citizens who made a significant contribution to the creation of domestic nuclear weapons, and who were awarded the titles "Hero of the Soviet Union", "Hero of Socialist Labor", "Hero of Russia". L. P. Beria is not among them. Is this fair? Perhaps the time has come to pay tribute to L. P. Beria according to his services to the country, which, unfortunately, no longer exists? Maybe the time has come to declassify all the secrets of the Kremlin putsch, which took place on June 26, 1953, and to make public all the materials related to the personality of L. P. Beria? Indeed, according to distorted historical facts, history textbooks have been compiled so far, according to which more and more generations of Russians are trained. Who benefits from hiding from their people the truth about the violent seizure of power in a country that has not been on the world map for more than 20 years? What new history textbook are officials preparing for us from education?
L. P. Beria in just five years was able to organize the work of key industries of the whole state and achieve the desired result. The country has strengthened its security and retained its independence. What would the modern world be like if the United States remained the monopoly owner of nuclear weapons? Would there be a state like Russia on the modern map of the world if the United States carried out a plan for nuclear bombing of the largest cities of the USSR? History, as they say, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood.
The creation of Soviet nuclear weapons today ensures reliable peace on planet Earth. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people were employed in the Soviet atomic project, and at the top of this whole "pyramid" was L. P. Beria, the protagonist of the atomic project.
[1] Historical and revolutionary calendar. M.: OGIZ State Socio-Economic Publishing House, 1940.185-187.
[2] GKO (GKO) - this abbreviation of the State Defense Committee was recorded in the texts of the resolutions.
[3] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. I. 1938-1945. Part 1. M., 1998. S. 244-245, 271-272.
[4] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. S. 269-271.
[5] Ibid. P. 269.
[6] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. S. 31.
[7] Ibid. S. 31-32.
[8] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. I. 1938-1945. Part 2. M., 2002. S. 169-175, T. 2, Book. 6, p. 127.
[9] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. I. 1938-1945. Part 2. M., 2002. S. 180-185.
[10] NII-9 is now the All-Russian Research Institute of Inorganic Materials named after V. I. A. A. Bochvara.
[11] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. I. 1938-1945. Part 2. M., 2002. S. 169-175, T. 2, Book. 6, p. 36.
[12] Petorsyants Andranik Melkonovich, 1947-1953. Deputy Head of the PGU under the Council of Ministers of the USSR for equipment and supply.
[13] Litvinov B. V. Nuclear energy isn't just for military purposes. Ekaterinburg, 2004. S. 24.
[14] NKGB - People's Commissariat of State Security.
[15] Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.
[16] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. S. 11-1.
[17] Myths and reality of the Soviet atomic project. Khariton Yu. B., Smirnov Yu. N., Arzamas-16, 1994. S. 40-43.
[18] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. S. 633-634.
[19] Ibid., P. 638.
[20] Ibid., Pp. 639-643.
[21] Ibid, pp. 646-658.
[22] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. S. 690.
[23] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 1. Moscow-Sarov, 1999. S. 565-605.
[24] Ibid. P. 46.
[25] Ibid. S. 530-562.
[26] Ibid. Pp. 564, pp. 578, 582, 599. In the text of the Decree, in the list at number 23, Nikolaus Ril was named as Nikolai Vasilievich.
[27] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 4. Moscow-Sarov, 2003. S. 342.
[28] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 6. Moscow-Sarov, 2006. S. 691.
[29] The atomic project of the USSR. Documents and materials. T. II. Atomic bomb. 1945-1954. Book. 4. Moscow-Sarov, 2003. S. 745.
[30] Prudnikova E. The truth about L. Beria. breaking dogmas and stereotypes. 2012-25-09
