According to GPV-2020, the Navy was supposed to receive 8 new multipurpose nuclear submarines of project 885 (M) by 2020.
In reality, he received only one (and with a "bouquet" of critical flaws described in the article AICR "Severodvinsk" handed over to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat effectiveness).
In fact, the program of modernization of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine was also disrupted.
At the same time, the question of the optimality of such a large multipurpose nuclear submarine like Yasen has been repeatedly raised in society, in the media, and among specialists. For example, the former head of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Rear Admiral I. G. Zakharov in his article "Modern trends in the development of warships" (magazine "Military Parade" No. 5 for 1996) wrote:
“An important circumstance in the development of multipurpose submarines will be, as it seems, a decrease in the cost of their creation while maintaining the achieved tactical and technical characteristics …
Quite difficult, but, apparently, a necessary task will become preservation of the previously achieved combat capabilities of multipurpose boats while reducing their displacement to 5000-6000 tons. "
There is a certain and controversial experience of the USSR Navy in the creation of a series of "small" multipurpose nuclear submarines of Project 705 (for more details - "Goldfish" of project 705: a mistake or a breakthrough in the XXI century?), which is assessed today mostly negatively.
Foreign experience
In the navies of foreign countries today the French Navy has the smallest submarines (submarines of the Rubis Amethyste series).
The history of the project PLA "Rubis" (Rubis Amethyste) actually began in the late 60s of the XX century.
However, initially, the military-political leadership of France had the highest priority program of strategic SSBNs. Therefore, despite the fact that the preliminary design of the multipurpose submarine was completed by 1972, the lead boat of the project was laid down only at the end of 1976. In 1979, the Ryubi was launched.
The construction of the first submarine cost 850 million French francs (equivalent to 325 million euros in 2019), which is an extremely low price not only for submarines (in fact, slightly more expensive than the "average" for modern non-nuclear submarines).
The main feature of the project was the use (for the first time in the world) of a monoblock nuclear reactor with a capacity of 48 megawatts with a high degree of natural circulation of the coolant and a turboelectric power plant. The maximum underwater speed was 25 knots. Autonomy was 60 days. Crew of 68 people, including eight officers.
Armament: four 533-mm bow torpedo tubes (TA) for firing anti-ship missiles SM-39 and torpedoes F-17 mod. 2 (ammunition 14 weapons).
Due to the original solutions for the power plant, the developers expected a very low noise level of the new submarine. However, due to a complex of little-studied problems, the real result turned out to be approximately at the level of American submarines built in the early 60s.
Given that the French SSBNs had similar noise problems, a large-scale program was launched to improve them (including low noise) "Improvement, tactics, hydrodynamics, silence, propagation, acoustics" (AMElioration Tactique Hydrodynamique Silence Transmission Ecoute).
The results of these measures, which required, among other things, lengthening the hull by 1 meter, changing the contours (and in the bow), were introduced starting with the fifth boat of the Amethyste series and the last Perle hull.
However, it is extremely interesting to carry out in (before 1995) a deep modernization of already built submarines, with their output in terms of the degree of low noise to levels close to our 3rd generation. Which, of course, is a very big success for French developers.
Currently, 4 multipurpose submarines are formally in the ranks of the French Navy: S 603 Casabianca (part of the Navy since 1987), S 604 Emeraude (1988), S 605 Amethyste (1992), S 606 Perle (1993).).
Note
Despite the fact that the next series of French submarines almost doubled in displacement, the experience of creating submarines of the Rubis Amethyste series should be considered very successful.
It is especially necessary to note the very high efficiency of modernization of the first submarines. This made it possible to bring them empirically to the level of modern requirements for detection and stealth means (for the 3rd generation).
This is confirmed by a number of examples of NATO naval combat training:
- In 1998, S 603 Casabianca managed to "sink" the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower and a cruiser from the US Navy aircraft carrier group.
- During the COMPTUEX 2015 exercise, the Saphir submarine successfully attacked the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt and its escort.
However, the pioneers of "small" multipurpose submarines were the US Navy, in the late 50-ies received two mass series of such submarines (Skate and Skipjack) and a single submarine (not in the series) Tullibee.
A series of submarines of the Skate type (lead SSN-578) was created on the basis of the first experience of the two-shaft nuclear powered submarine Nautilus based on the Tang diesel-electric submarine (diesel-electric submarine) project.
At the same time, for the sake of ensuring serial production, a step back was made in terms of the maximum underwater speed (with a decrease to 16 knots, according to various sources) and displacement (2400 surface and 2800 tons underwater - that is, less than that of the Rubis submarine).
Two submarines were ordered in the summer of 1955. Construction of the first boat began on July 21st. The second boat (and also the entire series of 4 submarines) was built before the end of 1959. The submarines had a fairly strong armament of 6 bow and two stern torpedo tubes and a total ammunition of 24 torpedoes.
The experience of the first exercises of the Nautilus submarine, which showed the great tactical value of high speed, the test results of the experimental diesel-electric submarine Albacor of a streamlined shape and the groundwork for a new steam-generating installation with the S5W reactor (unified for all promising submarines and submarines of the US Navy, including the second generation) led to the creation of a high-speed submarine Skipjack with a streamlined body ("albakor"), a powerful power plant with an S5W reactor.
At the same time, the short terms of creating new submarines did not allow introducing the latest developments in low noise and hydroacoustics into its project.
The maximum speed of the submarine was increased to 30-33 knots (while maintaining powerful weapons: 6 bow torpedo tubes and 24 torpedoes in ammunition load).
The entire series of 6 submarines was built before the end of 1960. At the same time, at about the same time, the first 5 US Navy SSBNs of the George Washington type were simultaneously built, created as a "missile version" of the Skipjack multipurpose submarine project.
The Tullibee submarine, which entered service in 1960, emerged as a result of the Nobska project, launched in 1956, to create a low-noise submarine with powerful sonar weapons.
For the sake of quietness and assessment of application prospects, a turboelectric power plant with an S2C reactor was used for the first time in the world, which, however, provided only a very moderate underwater speed of 17 knots. Taking into account the emphasis on anti-submarine tasks, the armament of the submarine was reduced to 4 onboard TA and 14 torpedoes.
The Tullibee submarine became the smallest combat submarine with an underwater displacement of 2,600 tons (with a crew of 66 people).
However, such a loss in speed of the US Navy was regarded as unacceptable.
And the subsequent development of the submarine was the result of the "crossing" of two "branches" - Tullibee (low noise, onboard TA, powerful hydroacoustics in the bow) and Skipjack (streamlining, high speed, S5W reactor). The result was the Thresher submarine project (with the inevitable increase in the underwater displacement already up to 4300 tons).
Subsequently, the new requirements for the US Navy submarines led to an even more significant increase in the submarine displacement (by 2.5 times for the SeaWolf submarine). Small submarines of the US Navy were in service until the end of the 80s and were actively used in the submarine confrontation of the Cold War.
However, the US Navy did not return to the real plans for creating small submarines.
The position of the designer of the nuclear submarine of project 885 "Ash" (SPBMT "Malachite").
A very interesting article by A. M. Antonova (SPBMB "Malakhit") "Displacement and cost - unity and struggle of opposites (or is it possible to create a cheap submarine by reducing the displacement)"?
“The point of view based on the principle“the less, the cheaper”is typical for a number of specialists, especially among the ordering bodies of the Navy (Navy).
For example, in the mid-90s, the US Navy, justifying the need for a transition to the construction of Virginia-class nuclear submarines, publicly stated that one of the main tasks of creating a new nuclear submarine is to reduce its cost compared to the Seawolf-class nuclear submarine by at least 20%, for which it is necessary to reduce the displacement of the new nuclear submarine by 15–20% …
It was decided to revise and reduce to an acceptable level the requirements for the combat qualities of nuclear submarines, as well as apply special technologies to reduce the cost of nuclear submarines.
It was considered possible: to maintain the acoustic secrecy of the nuclear submarine at the achieved level (that is, at the level of the Seawolf-class nuclear submarine), to restore the structure of strike weapons adopted on the Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine - 12 outboard air defense units for cruise missiles and 4 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber with 26 ammunition. … (against 50 units for the Seawolf-class submarine), equip the nuclear-powered submarine with a new S9G-type power plant of lower power (29.5 thousand kW) and limit the full speed to 34 knots (Seawolf has more than 35 knots).
The result of the measures taken turned out to be more than modest.
The surface displacement of the Virginia class submarine was reduced by only 9%. The average cost of building the first four Virginia-class nuclear submarines, compared to the average cost of two Seawolf-class nuclear submarines, has remained virtually unchanged. Taking into account inflation, it nominally even increased slightly.
At the same time, funds equivalent to the cost of building two nuclear submarines were spent on R&D for the creation of a new nuclear submarine, its weapons, technical means and equipment."
As a commentary, it should be noted that these seemingly “correct” conclusions are, in fact, very sly. And that's why.
First. The question of how much the price of a Seawolf-class submarine would have grown in the process of continuing its (hypothetical) serial construction is completely overlooked.
Second. The continuation of the Seawolf series would still require a significant amount of R&D to redesign it, taking into account the change of generations of the element-component base (and the termination of the production of the old one).
That is, the correctness of the conclusions indicated in the article without an objective analysis of these factors raises serious questions.
Undoubtedly, the Virginia submarines were considered by the US Navy as a more "budgetary" solution than the Seawolf-class submarines. However, it must be borne in mind that Virginia is not
"A consequence of the end of the cold war."
Its development (the "Centurion" project) began in the late 1980s. And the main message for creating a more "budgetary" (but massive) submarine was that no matter how perfect a single ship was, it could not be at two points at the same time. The fleet also needs the number (ships and submarines).
In fact, the meaning of A. M. Antonov - allegedly "optimality" of a very large and oversized multipurpose nuclear submarine of the 4th generation "Ash" (project 885).
The analysis of the relationship between the displacement of the ship and its
cost with the level of combat and operational qualities and with the level of technologies used allows us to draw the following conclusions, which are the answer to the question raised in the subtitle of the article:
1. Reducing the displacement due to the use of special technologies while maintaining the level of combat and operational qualities leads to an increase in the cost of the ship.
2. Reducing the displacement with a simultaneous increase in the level of combat and operational qualities requires a significant rise in the level of technology and leads to a significant increase in the cost of the ship.
3. Reducing the cost of a ship is possible by reducing the level of its combat and operational qualities and simplifying the technologies used. At the same time, the displacement is an uncertain value (that is, it can both increase and decrease depending on the ratio of changes in the level of combat and operational qualities and the level of technology).
The findings can be summed up in one phrase: "Good military equipment cannot be cheap."
However, this does not mean that it is useless to optimize the cost of the ship.
This problem, of course, needs to be solved, but not according to the principle "instead of a large and expensive submarine, you need the same one, but smaller and cheaper."
It is necessary to understand and accept the objective laws that determine the value of the ship.
In short, you need to "understand and accept" …
“Those who made the decision” “understood and accepted” (in GPV-2020).
Result of GPV-2020: a complete breakdown of the 4th generation nuclear submarine (the fleet received 1 nuclear submarine instead of 8, and in an almost incapacitated form), the modernization of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine was disrupted (where the SPBMT "Malachite" managed to disrupt not only the modernization of boats of the 971 project, but also "valiantly flunked" the modernization project 945 (A), according to which he performed a very dubious "operation" to "intercept rights and documentation" from the developer - SKB "Lazurit").
In this case, life still forced "Malachite" to reduce the displacement.
However, what was presented as a "promising nuclear submarine" of the 5th generation to the President a year ago in Sevastopol is not only puzzling.
But it also raises the fundamental question of the availability, in general, in the SPBMT "Malachite" potential and intellectual resources for solving the problem of creating a nuclear submarine of the 5th generation (and most importantly - proper leadership and organization).
Problems of the Yasen nuclear submarine and an effective model of a small nuclear submarine
First. The project is expensive, complex and small-scale.
Second. Significant lag behind US Navy submarines in terms of low-noise speed and a certain lag in stealth (this issue is especially acute against new multi-position search tools for submarines with low-frequency "illumination" of the water area, for which the submarine noise level is practically irrelevant).
Third. Critical shortcomings in the complex of underwater combat weapons: a deliberately outdated complex of underwater weapons and self-defense equipment. In fact, a degraded version of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine complex. Literal assessment of the developers themselves:
"Either cry or laugh."
And the issues of using modern torpedoes "Fizik-1", especially with telecontrol, were not brought to light.
but the most important thing - in fact, the absence of any effective anti-torpedo protection (PTZ): the "Module-D" complex was outdated back in the 90s at the development stage. And the equipment of the nuclear submarine with anti-torpedoes "Lasta" was deliberately disrupted.
Let me emphasize that what has been said is not a “version”, namely, facts confirmed, among other things, by materials of special open literature and cases of arbitration courts under project 885.
Arctic
Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the problem of using nuclear submarines in the Arctic, especially in areas with shallow depths.
There are two problems here: “normative” and “technical”.
All our submarines have very serious "regulatory" restrictions on operations at shallow depths. I will give just one example (from the public procurement website).
The drifting device PTZ "Vist-2" purchased by the Navy cannot be used at depths (shooting) of less than 40 meters. From the point of view of common sense, this is just nonsense.
(For example, our diesel submarine (diesel-electric submarine) charges batteries at periscope depth and is attacked by an airplane or submarine …).
However, those who wrote the corresponding "requirements" proceeded from the fact that for the smallest submarines of the Navy (diesel-electric submarines of project 877), the safe depth (from the ram of a surface ship) was set at 40 meters. Finding the submarine between the periscope and safe depth is prohibited by documents. And correspondingly, "War at depths less than 40 meters is canceled."
(It remains only to coordinate this with the enemy).
This example is far from the only one. But he clearly demonstrates that in many cases, instead of the real requirements and conditions of battle, the ships and weapons of the Navy are given frank delirium of "couch theorists" from the Central Research Institute of "Shipwreck" (and a number of similar organizations).
The second problem is “technical”.
Large displacement and dimensions (especially height) sharply limit the capabilities and actions of our submarines at shallow depths (up to the complete impossibility of using weapons).
In this case, the PLA
"So-called partners"
(VV Putin's expression) - The US and British navies have much less restrictions and weapons adapted for such conditions. And most importantly, they are actually practicing combat operations in such conditions (starting from research exercises and campaigns and ending with bilateral exercises of groups of submarines with the involvement of heterogeneous anti-submarine forces).
"Popularized" in some of our "popular" media that the Arctic is "ours", alas, has a very distant relationship to reality.
For the enemy (we will call a spade a spade) has there an effective instrument of force influence on us - a prepared grouping of submarines, which our Navy cannot oppose today.
In the event of real hostilities, our submarines will drown there just like kittens.
An even more acute problem is the deliberate lack of combat stability of the deployed NSNF grouping. And the possibility of covertly shooting our deployed strategic missile carriers opens up the enemy the possibility of delivering a strategic "disarming" strike.
Thus, the issue of a massive multipurpose (with the priority of anti-submarine tasks) nuclear submarine capable of effectively acting against modern and promising submarines (including in the Arctic), single ships and small detachments of warships is relevant.
The importance of anti-submarine tasks and especially the relevance of the application in the Arctic raise the question of the feasibility of developing and creating a small (but effective in its range of tasks) nuclear submarine, with a reasonable limitation of requirements for it, ensuring a moderate cost and mass serial construction.
At the same time, taking into account the significant reduction in ammunition, the key issues of the appearance and effectiveness of such a submarine are the "link": "search-destruction-protection". That is, the questions:
- effective search (which requires a powerful SAC and a power plant with a complex of noise suppression equipment, providing the maximum possible search moves, and in the near future - combat UOA);
- high-precision complex of torpedo weapons;
- effective means of countering weapons and means of detecting the enemy.
Taking into account the significant lag of the Yasen nuclear submarine from the US Navy submarine in search speed (and, accordingly, search performance), and with the objective impossibility of reaching the US Navy submarine levels in the medium term, it is of considerable interest to solve this problem by a small nuclear submarine with a powerful SAC and a low-noise turboelectric installation, which has (despite a significantly lower maximum speed than the Yasen-type submarine) a large search speed and (accordingly) surpasses it in search performance.
The key requirement is to achieve the highest possible (without excessive costs) search (low noise) speed
The complex of weapons and self-defense of the nuclear submarine should ensure a high probability of winning duel situations with foreign submarines. Moreover, excluding the possibility of dodging with a long stroke to break the distance (with a weapon to compensate for the lack of maximum speed).
Thus, the key is a high low-noise search speed with a reasonable limitation of the maximum one and compensation for this by the high combat capabilities of a high-precision torpedo weapon complex (for more details, see the article "On the appearance of modern submarine torpedoes" ("Arsenal of the Fatherland"). Link to it on "VO") and countermeasures.
It should also be noted here that the best anaerobic installation for submarines is atomic. And accordingly, the feasibility of building diesel-electric submarines for our ocean-going fleets (Northern Fleets and Pacific Fleets) has long been very doubtful. For even with a low power of a nuclear power plant, diesel-electric submarines with it will have many times greater efficiency.
Of considerable interest to us today are the search studies of the Canadian Navy at the end of the 80s of the appearance of promising submarines (with the provision of their long-term operations in ice conditions at shallow depths).
The "favorite" in terms of combat capabilities was the English submarine project Trafalgar, but the price was frankly "excessive" for the Canadians.
The French project PLA Rubis was considered with great interest. However, at that time, it had significant noise (the French had not yet had time to finish and implement the results of complex R&D on the secrecy and effectiveness of submarines).
And with extreme interest (and a direct recommendation of parliament), options for diesel-electric submarines for a small-sized nuclear power plant were considered. Several options have been explored. Briefly on them below.
Canadian small nuclear power plant ASMP. The thermal power of the reactor is 3.5 MW (with a compartment length of 8, 5 meters and 10 MW with a length of 10 meters), the diameter of the NPU compartment is 7, 3 meters. The mass of the 3, 5 MW variant is 350 tons. A study was carried out for the placement of the ASMP nuclear power plant for diesel-electric submarines with a displacement of about 1000 tons of projects 209 (Germany) and A-17 (Sweden), which ensured a speed of 4-5 knots. For large diesel-electric submarines of projects TR-1700 (Germany) and 471 (Sweden), a modification of the ASMP nuclear power plant was developed for an electrical power of 1000 kW, which provided a speed of about 10 knots for these submarines.
Very interesting was the project of the French company "Technikatom" with a monoblock pressurized water reactor with natural circulation in the primary circuit and a turbine generator capacity of 1 MW, which provided for the Agosta type submarine (the study was done for this project) an underwater speed of about 13 knots (with 100 kW allocated for ship needs). The mass of the reactor with biological shielding was 40 tons, with a height of 4 meters and a diameter of 2.5 meters.
However, the end of the Cold War closed the question of acquiring nuclear submarines for Canada.
Potential opportunities of the project 677 "Lada"
Speaking about the capabilities of promising domestic submarines of moderate displacement, it is necessary, first of all, to consider and focus on the scientific and technical groundwork of Project 677 "Lada".
Despite the dramatic history of its creation and the big delay in terms of project 677, it still has significant potential, including for the future.
However, the issue of anaerobic non-nuclear power plant is acute. Replacement of traditional lead-acid batteries with lithium-ion ones also seems to be an ambiguous decision at the current stage (including taking into account the real prospects for more powerful and safer batteries). In any case, these options give any significant range under water only at low speeds (that is, low search performance).
At the same time, the submarine project 677 has a powerful sonar complex (SAC), and the use of this SAC on a low-noise carrier with a significant search speed is of great interest. This requires a sufficiently powerful nuclear power plant (AUE). At the same time, the optimal task seems to be the optimization of the parameters precisely by the maximum value of the low-noise speed. Here the situation is quite real that the "line of 20 knots" of a low-noise search line cannot be taken. But even 15 nodes will be a very, very good result.
Taking into account the expediency of using unified and used units, it makes sense to consider the possibility of using serial turbine generators (TG) with the 4th generation nuclear submarine.
A dilemma immediately arises: with the installation of one (TG) or two?
Taking into account the cost factor and the allocation of the maximum volumes of a small case for acoustic protection means, the most interesting would be the use of one TG. At the same time, it is obvious that for the "large variants" of the 677 project, it will deliberately have insufficient capacity (one TG). In this regard, it makes sense to consider the possibility of using an NPP (with one TG) for the "small Lada" variants of the "Amur-950" project of a significantly smaller displacement.
Here it is advisable to put the type of reactor out of brackets.
The options are very different, including the use of a water-moderated "monoblock" with a high level of natural circulation of the coolant or LMC reactor.
Speaking about the Lada-Amur project, it is necessary to note the possibility of equipping it with very powerful weapons (including the Onyx and Zircon anti-ship missiles, even on the Amura-950 variant).
A solution that provides a large ammunition load for weapons and small-caliber anti-torpedoes is to place them in outboard launchers in the volumes of main ballast tanks, including aft ones, implemented on some recent projects of small submarines SPBMT "Malachite".
On the one hand, for a nuclear submarine operating under the ice, anti-ship missiles "seem to be unnecessary." However, the situation may change. And even a few "Zircons" on a covert mobile carrier are a threat that the enemy cannot ignore during surface operations.
In addition, the correct technical formulation of missile launchers should consist in the creation of a universal launcher - a cargo container, into which not only anti-ship missiles, but also mines, deployable means of illumination of the underwater situation can be loaded. And the "dimensions of Onyx" allow you to place a combat underwater vehicle with very high characteristics and capabilities.
At the same time, the task of delivering powerful strikes against ground targets (which requires a large number of cruise missiles) can also be solved by small nuclear submarines. Provided they are equipped with a "tactical backpack" - a hinged container with weapons (with a corresponding speed limit).
conclusions
1. The construction of obsolete diesel-electric submarines for ocean theaters, taking into account the development of the enemy's anti-submarine warfare means, is "a mistake worse than a crime."
2. An effective solution is to create as soon as possible and with a reasonable limitation of the requirements and cost of the project option 677, as a small nuclear submarine.
3. This option will be many times more effective than the Project 885 (M) nuclear submarine in duel situations and the Arctic.
4. Failure to meet the deadlines for the creation of the 4th generation nuclear submarines and the modernization of the 3rd generation nuclear submarines are the most serious problems of the 885 Ash project.
In this connection, the question arises of the need for a deep and objective analysis of the situation and the real achievements and problems of our multipurpose nuclear submarines.
And including the search for alternative ways of developing multipurpose submarines-nuclear submarines of the Navy.
