It is rather difficult to predict what weapons and in what quantity the RF Armed Forces will receive in the new year - it depends on many economic and political factors, as well as on the situation at specific defense industry enterprises. Let's talk about what you need to buy for the RF Armed Forces, and what you can do without.
The clashes in the Donbass and the Middle East show that in a classic war the sides suffer huge losses in armored vehicles, and if they are simply very large in tanks, then in IFVs and armored personnel carriers - catastrophic. There is only one way out of this situation - strengthening active and passive protection, creating an infantry fighting vehicle based on a tank. Until now, only one country in the world has followed this path - Israel, which is quite logical. The Asian armies, which in this respect were very similar to the Soviet ones, traditionally strive to fulfill a combat mission, regardless of their own losses. But even at such a price, it is not always solved. Modern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States demonstrate the other extreme - a panic fear of losses, for the sake of preventing which the troops easily refuse to perform even a very important combat mission. Until now, Israel has represented a kind of golden mean - the desire to minimize losses with the obligatory completion of the task. Therefore, he became a pioneer in the creation of "armored infantry fighting vehicles", first on the basis of the old T-55 and "Centurions", then - the modern "Merkava". The second in this sense was Russia, which developed the "Armata" project. There was nothing of the kind in our military history: firstly, the creation of a new generation of armored vehicles (before, we were almost always catching up), and secondly, a completely unconventional approach for us to save the lives of servicemen.
It is important to note, however, that experience shows that quantity is just as important as quality. There must be a lot of equipment, otherwise its acquisition is meaningless both militarily and economically. The current European practice of purchasing new equipment in microscopic lots is a waste of money, which is flagrant in its senselessness. Better not to buy anything. "Armat" should be purchased for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation for several thousand T-14 and T-15. In this regard, the question arises about the expediency of purchasing BMP "Kurganets" and armored personnel carriers "Boomerang". Perhaps they are good, but they are built according to traditional concepts, which, as mentioned above, lead to huge losses both in the BMP-BTR themselves and in the infantry they carry. Isn't it easier to abandon these machines, to throw all your efforts and resources on "Armata"?
"God" lacks range
The experience of current conflicts shows that artillery has by no means lost its role as a "god of war", while reactive artillery is becoming more important than cannon, since it provides a much greater damaging effect. Russia has a unique weapon - the flamethrower MLRS TOS-1, which in its destructive properties is not inferior to a low-power nuclear charge, only without all its side effects such as penetrating radiation and radioactive contamination of the area. In addition, this vehicle has increased combat resistance, since it was built on a tank chassis. The Achilles' heel of the TOS-1 is a short firing range (only six kilometers, even for the TOS-1A). Elimination of this deficiency could provide the Russian army with a significant increase in firepower in both classical and anti-guerrilla wars.
Finally, the role of communications, intelligence and command and control facilities is extremely important. Russia is now rapidly making up the gap in these areas from the United States, Israel, and partly from China, but there is still a lot to be done. In particular, it is necessary to combine all ACS of the Armed Forces and combat arms into a single system, as well as to create shock UAVs.
The wings are short
Losses in aviation in current wars are much less than in armored vehicles, but their number is no less important. First, the aircraft are still out of order, and if both sides of the conflict have them, the losses will increase many times over. Secondly, even if the enemy does not have aviation, we also lack it, which naturally limits the result. This is best seen in Syria. No matter how efficiently Russian aviation operates there, there is too little of it. If our aviation group in this country were more powerful in terms of numbers, there would not have been, for example, the second surrender of Palmyra. Thus, if armored vehicles need to be purchased in thousands of units, then planes and helicopters - in hundreds.
In recent years, about 90 Su-34 front-line bombers, at least 20 Su-30M2 fighter-bombers and about 80 Su-30SM, more than 50 Su-35S fighters, over 80 Ka-52, 90 Mi-28N attack helicopters have been purchased for the Russian Aerospace Forces. and 50 Mi-35M. The production of all these machines continues, but in all cases more than half of the orders have already been completed. Whether this amount is enough is an extremely difficult question. Apparently, it should be considered a minimum minimum. It is advisable to issue additional orders for some of these machines, possibly by reducing the number of types (most likely, further production of the Su-30M2 and Mi-28 or Mi-35 should have been abandoned). In general, it is desirable to have at least 500 new aircraft and helicopters, coupled with the modernization of 200-300 old ones.
However, the lack of aircraft technology can be partly compensated for by missiles. Nine brigade kits of Iskander OTRK have already been delivered to the RF Armed Forces. Moreover, one of these nine brigades was formed in 2015 and immediately received Iskanders, and not instead of Tochki-U.
While Iskander partially replace strike aircraft, ground-based air defense systems make up for the shortage of fighters. The S-400 and S-300V4 air defense systems, the Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense missile systems are currently being put into service at the same time; the purchase of the S-350 is expected. Moreover, here there is also not only the rearmament of old brigades and regiments, but also the formation of new ones (either immediately with the latest samples, or with the S-300PS air defense missile system divisions that are released when the S-400 arrives). In this case, we can say that there is never too much air defense, the territory of the country, objects of the Armed Forces, the defense industry, infrastructure, and public administration should be covered as reliably as possible. Moreover, in this area, Russia, like nothing else, occupies a leading position in the world. The most important addition to ground-based air defense is electronic warfare, where our country has also achieved significant success. The combination of air defense and electronic warfare can neutralize the superiority of Russia's main potential adversaries in the number of combat and support aircraft.
Ocean for cormorants
The fleet is the most expensive and the longest-built type of aircraft, so we have the most problems with it. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Russian Navy is unified purely formally. In fact, it is divided into five (or even six, if we count separately the Primorsk and Kamchatka flotilla of the Pacific Fleet), the forces between which in the event of war is extremely difficult or even impossible to maneuver. At the same time, each of the associations (except for the Caspian Flotilla) in its ocean or sea theater of operations is significantly inferior to the navies of neighboring countries.
In recent years, the Russian Navy has received (and will receive in the near future) three Project 955 SSBNs, one Project 885 submarine, one Project 677 submarine and six Project 636 submarines, two Project 11356 frigates and one Project 22350, four Project 20380 corvettes, two Project patrol ships 11661, three IACs of project 21630 and five MRKs of project 21631. At least 10 more submarines and ships of these types are being tested and under construction, in addition, a significant number of patrol ships and boats were received by the border forces of the FSB. This is, of course, very good. But not enough. Moreover, almost all of them are ships of the maritime zone. True, submarines, submarines, frigates, patrol boats and MRKs are equipped with such effective weapons as the Caliber cruise missiles, which have been successfully used in Syria. They can be fired from coastal waters, where ships are covered by aircraft and air defense from land, and from the almost safe Caspian Sea. The creation of a full-fledged ocean-going surface fleet is currently beyond our capabilities. The loss of two perfectly serviceable carrier-based fighters (MiG-29K and Su-33) off the coast of Syria shows that even in greenhouse conditions, our only aircraft carrier, Kuznetsov, is only conditionally combat-ready. The construction of ships of this class in the foreseeable future is impossible for economic reasons and absolutely not necessarily for military reasons. Accordingly, there is no urgent need for new destroyers. It would be much more correct to spend the funds freed up on the construction of the submarine and coastal fleets and on the development of other types of the Armed Forces.
On the whole, the revival of the Armed Forces that has taken place over the past eight years is one of the main achievements of modern Russia. Both our own and world experience shows that it is categorically unacceptable to save money on the aircraft. But it is possible and necessary to spend funds as rationally as possible, decisively abandoning programs without which it is real to do, in favor of those without which it is impossible to do.
