Let's finish the conversation about the consumption of artillery ammunition by the French and German artillery during the First World War, begun in the previous article of the cycle (see Fire consumption. Should artillery be economical?)
Experience of the Russo-Japanese War
It is interesting how the experience of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was used. Germans, French and Russians regarding the consumption of ammunition in a combined arms battle.
The high consumption of rapid-fire artillery ammunition among the Russians was recognized as nothing more than an abuse, which had to be fought in every possible way. During the First World War, the limitations (for objective reasons) of the amount of ammunition in the Russian field artillery, on the one hand, became a very important factor for increasing the effectiveness of the latter (accuracy, the latest methods of zeroing and firing, advanced tactics to some extent compensated for the lack of ammunition), but, on the other hand, had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of a number of important combat operations requiring more abundant artillery support.
And the French and especially the Germans saw in this a new factor in their strength - and took all measures to ensure that this expenditure at the right moments of the war was as intense as possible.
The power of ammunition consumption did not mean wasting them. The Germans, as a rule, did not spare artillery ammunition - and the hurricane of fire affected the fate of many battles. They did not skimp on shells (in order to immediately fill the enemy with them), but they fired such a very short time (maximum several hours) - and then immediately exploited its result, conducting a decisive attack. Condensing the force of artillery defeat in time, the Germans used their powerful and amply supplied artillery to achieve tactical surprise. This method was highlighted during the spring offensive of 1918.
In preparing for this offensive, the Germans do not set themselves the goal of systematic destruction and annihilation, but want to force the enemy to go into closure in order to paralyze his defense. They open fire immediately to defeat, without zeroing in, reaching surprise.
But where a special methodology of shooting is needed, as in the rolling of barrage curtains, they conduct it with remarkable methodology.
The French, on the other hand, almost until the end of the war did not adhere to such a reasonable economy in the expenditure of ammunition: they achieved the complete destruction of fortifications and barbed wire, preparing the area for "seizure" - and often without the latter. This caused many days of artillery fire and, therefore, a large waste of ammunition, not entirely and not always productive.
In preparing the breakthrough in 1916, the French artillery even went beyond what was really necessary: it completely destroyed not only the enemy's defenses, but also all the paths and passages through which it was possible to penetrate the enemy's location - which made it difficult for their own troops to attack (which, after occupying the captured area, brought into a chaotic state by heavy artillery, for some time could neither establish communications, nor establish ammunition supply for their artillery).
The French abandoned such a system only at the end of the war, expressing this in the directive of the Supreme Commander of 12 July 1918.
The unproductive waste of ammunition was in the hands of the enemy - and therefore, in the First World War, special measures were taken to involve the enemy in such expenses. Among these measures: the organization of false batteries, towers, observation posts, etc. All this was widely used by all parties to the conflict.
Manufacturing and delivery of ammunition to the troops
"Shell hunger" affected all opponents - but each in its own time period. And everyone overcame it in their own way.
France started the war with a large set of ammunition: for each 75-mm gun, there were 1,500 rounds. But immediately after the battle on the Marne in 1914 (early September), there was a lack of ammunition for these guns - that is, 35-40 days after the announcement of mobilization and only three weeks after the start of large-scale hostilities.
By virtue of this alone, it was necessary to resort to the use of old-style guns (the Banja system) - after all, they had the same ammunition reserve as the 75-mm guns (1,500 rounds each). Only with this did the French then manage to disguise the lack of ammunition for the 75-mm guns.
At the same time, the Germans also felt a lack of ammunition, which, according to Gascouin, was the main reason for their decision to retreat from the Marne.
The French in 1915 felt such a shortage of ammunition that they considered it necessary to resort to using even old-style cast-iron grenades for Banj's guns.
And although almost from the very beginning of the war, the French launched a mass production of ammunition, but in the first months of the war they could produce no more than 20,000 cannon shells a day. At the beginning of 1915, they tried to increase this number, bringing it to 50,000 per day. Production was significantly expanded, to which not only factories that had previously produced completely different items were attracted (moreover, in April 1915, most of the factory workers called up during mobilization into the army were returned to enterprises), but wider tolerances were also allowed. that is, the requirements for product acceptance have been weakened. The latter circumstance had sad consequences - the barrels of the guns began to wear out quickly and, in large numbers, torn.
It is noteworthy that at a time when the French found it possible to allow a deterioration in the manufacture of their shells, the Germans, whose shells at the beginning of the war were worse than those of the French, began to improve quality (both in material and manufacture) from 1915. and material and dressing.
After the sad results of 1915, which led to a massive rupture of the barrels of 75-mm guns, the French switched to making shells for these guns from the best steel, and also paid attention to the dimensional accuracy. And in 1916, massive barrel ruptures stopped. At the beginning of the same year, the number of ammunition produced daily increased significantly (and without compromising quality) - 150,000 shells for 75-mm cannons began to be produced per day. And in 1917 - 1918. volumes rose to 200,000 per day.
In the second half of 1918, ammunition (charges and shells) for guns of all calibers was produced daily in an amount with a total weight of 4000 - 5000 tons, which, as we previously indicated, was on the verge of a daily requirement (the same 4000 - 5000 tons).
But from the second half of 1918, the quality of both shells and explosives deteriorated again. As we noted earlier, the percentage of shrapnel (making shrapnel was more time-consuming - compared to a high-explosive grenade) in the ammunition of a field gun in 1918 compared to 1914 decreased from 50 to 10% - this despite the fact that the shrapnel was again, as needed, as in 1914. After all, in the last military campaign, maneuverable hostilities began again - when artillery had to act mainly not on closings, but on living targets.
The matter of supplying ammunition is not only about making them. The ammunition must also be delivered to the guns - that is, brought by rail, and from the latter - by trucks or horses. If the supply is not powerful enough, then even with an abundance of supplies at the bases, the supply of ammunition will not correspond to the level of demands for combat consumption.
Gascouin argues that the shells of the French 75-mm cannon were too bulky, heavy and clumsy - and therefore, there was an unproductive consumption of vehicles for their delivery, both by rail and by trucks, and then by charging boxes. The same applied to the ammunition of all guns of the flat trajectory of fire, as well as to the ammunition of large-caliber guns.
Moreover, the specialist even defended the need to abandon too much flatness of fire (less charge weight - shorter and lighter projectile), and from large calibers, which was important for periods of mobile war, giving greater effectiveness of destruction (after all, artillery had to hit mainly live targets outside of major closings).
