A huge amount of artillery (with its rather serious rate of fire) during the First World War 1914-1918. gave reason to expect a large consumption of artillery ammunition. But their actual consumption in that war exceeded the wildest expectations. The expense was enormous - especially for light guns (heavy guns were consumed less - due to the difficulty of supplying ammunition and a lower rate of fire).
French expense
Ammunition consumption figures are impressive.
So, during the 6-day preparation for the 1916 breakthrough, only 75-mm guns (444 units) fired more than a million grenades - that is, more than 2250 rounds per gun (this gives 375 grenades per gun per day).
Earlier, during the Verdun operation in the first half of the same year, the French were not able to spend so much ammunition for 75-mm guns - due to the duration of this operation (the delivery did not keep up: only occasionally, 75-mm batteries could receive 250 rounds per gun per day). At the same time, the Germans brought in a huge amount of ammunition for this operation - and wasted it wastefully.
When preparing the artillery unit of their breakthroughs in 1915, 1916 and 1917. (lasting 3, 6 and 11 days, respectively), the French often spent 500,000 rounds per day on a limited section of the front (25, 16 and 35 km.).
In the second half of 1918, during their 100-day offensive along the entire front, they consumed daily ammunition that exceeded the daily rate that was produced by French factories: 4000 - 5000 tons per day.
Expenditure in Bygone Wars
It is interesting to compare these figures with the consumption of ammunition in the battles of previous wars.
So, Napoleon's artillery fired the following number of shots in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 (figures are only for some days of the last): October 16 - 84,000 and October 18 - 95,000. Dividing these figures by the number of guns available (700), we get that on average each gun had 120 rounds on the first day and 136 rounds on the next.
During the Franco-Prussian War in the battle of Gravelotte on August 18, 1870, the French had 42 shots for each gun, and the Germans had 47; in the battle of Mars Latour on August 16, 1870 - the French had 47 shots each, the Germans - 72 shots each.
During the Russo-Japanese War: in the Liaoyang battle (somewhat over a wider period - August 15-25, 1904), the consumption was 240 shots per gun (i.e., on average 22 shots daily), in the Shah battle (period longer, from September 25 to October 15, 1904), 230 rounds per gun were consumed, and in the Mukden battle (taken from February 8 to March 10, 1905), 480 rounds per barrel were consumed. Finally, in the 5-day battle at Sandepu (January 1905), the 2nd Army, with 430 guns, consumed 75,000 shells - which gives an average of 35 rounds per gun per day.
These figures are striking in their insignificance.
On the one hand, the low consumption of shells per gun per day stemmed from the fact that many guns remained in reserve and, in essence, were inactive. In addition, not all days of these multi-day battles were sustained equally intense fighting. The official description of the war says that in the battle of Tashichao (July 11, 1904) "some batteries used up most of the entire stock of ammunition." "As one of the main reasons that prompted the withdrawal of our army from Liaoyang," Kuropatkin called the lack of cannon shots. During this battle there was a moment when not a single gun shot remained in the army's warehouses.
The official description of the war recognizes the consumption of gun rounds as very high.
Savings or wastefulness?
During the war of 1914 - 1918. the parties seemed to have completely abandoned the principle of economy in the expenditure of ammunition. At the same time, the statutes with which the opponents started the war, this principle was taken into account. Obviously, by virtue of this principle, it was required that artillery fire be conducted only at such distances at which it is considered valid; it was also forbidden to shoot in squares, along long lines and at invisible objects - due to the great extravagance in firing such a fire.
But in the First World War, and from the very beginning, instead of the principle of economy, the principle of wastefulness of ammunition consumption began to be applied. An example of this was set by Germany: due to the well-organized mass production of ammunition and thanks to the well-organized delivery of them to the front, it could be wasteful in spending - believing that the enemy would not keep up with it.
The French followed in the footsteps of the Germans - and from the very beginning of the war (in September 1914 in the battle on the Marne) they began to practice long-range firing from their 75-mm cannons, and contrary to the statute, such firing was legalized in December 1916 (the Germans did it even earlier).
Already in the first months of the war, the French began to shoot across squares, along more or less long lines, at invisible objects. The troops demanded that artillery fire even at night.
At the same time, barrage of fire, requiring a large expenditure of ammunition, begins, and soon, following the example of the Germans, such wasteful shooting as pylonage. The latter was widely used by the Germans already in the Verdun operation (first half of 1916) and since then has become their general rule in conducting offensives.
Already at the beginning of the war, the French troops demanded continuous and continuously repeated barrage from artillery. They also demanded a prolonged "preparation for the mastery of the terrain" with artillery fire, causing a huge expenditure of ammunition - the kind of preparation that, as they began to think, would result in the act of mastering the terrain. They began to say (and from the very first weeks of the war): "in this war the artillery takes over, and then the infantry takes over." Often, after such training, they did not even care about the occupation of the corresponding terrain by the infantry. Often (and on the same day) this preparation was repeated.
Is such extravagance advisable? Was it justified by the benefits it brought?
The French artillery authority Gascouin hardly protests against her. Such extravagance is legitimate - unless it is useless.
But in the second half of 1918, the extravagance of artillery fire led to a terrible decrease in its productivity - at least in relation to the number of disabled people. Thus, in August 1914, each French artillery shot, on average, incapacitated one German; in the first months of the war, on average, one ton of ammunition put out of action by killed 4 - 5 Germans (which was already far from the situation in the very first month of the war); and in the second half of 1918, for each killed German, the French already spent 4 - 5 tons of ammunition.
Citing these data, Gaskoen ascribes them, however, not to the wastefulness of the shooting, but to a number of other reasons, the main ones of which are as follows:
1. Significant reduction in artillery ammunition by 1918 in the proportion of shrapnel: in 1914 there were at least 50%, and in 1918 - only 10%.
2. A decrease in the strength of the explosive composition (in qualitative terms) of the explosive charge in the projectiles and the deterioration by 1918 of the qualities of the projectile itself.
3. Lack of "long-range" tubes for projectiles in 1918
4. A significant decrease in the available composition of German military units, especially their less dense location in front of the French artillery in the 1918 campaign.
5. Decrease in the art of shooting by French artillery officers by 1918
Interestingly, in the final period of the war, the French shot more artillery ammunition than the Germans.
However, the Germans were also wasting their ammunition unproductively at the end of the war. Here are some figures (let's take into account that 75% of combat losses during the First World War were caused by artillery).
During the French offensive:
in April - May - June 1915, 143 thousand French were killed, disappeared and died of wounds, and 306 thousand French were evacuated from the battlefields;
during the breakthrough on September 22 - October 7, 1915, 120 thousand French were killed, disappeared and died of wounds, and 260 thousand French were evacuated from the battlefields;
during the victorious offensive on July 18 - November 11, 1918, 110 thousand Frenchmen were killed, disappeared and died of wounds.
Moreover, if in the first case these are local offensives in different sectors of the front for 3 months, then in the second - the results of the offensive in 15-16 days on the 25-km front, and the figures in the third column show us the result of the offensive in 113 days - and throughout To the French front.
While not protesting against the large waste of ammunition in battles in general, Gaskoin considers, at the same time, some of the methods of artillery fire practiced by the French in that war as unproductive. He points to the inexpediency of the doctrine of complete or almost complete destruction of barbed wire, fortifications, batteries; he finds that the dogma of destroying everything with the help of heavy artillery led to too long preparation of assaults in the production of breakthroughs (3 - 11 days) and to an incredible expenditure of ammunition, which often exceeded 500,000 rounds per day (and in a limited section of the front); he condemns the addiction to pylon, to shooting in squares and to the abuse of long-range shooting - which by the end of the war turned into shooting "from afar", that is, "white light like a pretty penny."
Describing the artillery firing of the Germans in the final period of the war, he notes signs of a certain demoralization: “with particular haste, the German artillery sometimes squandered their ammunition supplies,” he says.
As a result, Gaskoen is not at all in favor of saving ammunition. On the contrary, he puts forward the opposite principle - the power consumption (puissanсe de debit) of ammunition, which lasts for hours both in defense and in attack. This he wished for the French and in the future war.
