Recently, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev spoke out rather harshly about the Euro-Atlantic missile defense system. A lot has already been said about this statement, and the same amount will be said. Among other things, it spoke about the deployment of Iskander tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad region as a symmetrical response to the deployment of radars and interceptors in Europe.
Probably, it is not worth saying what the missilemen will have to do near Kaliningrad in the appropriate case. However, when striking missile defense targets, there are some characteristic and not always pleasant features. First, tactical missiles have a relatively short range and, as a result, can “work” on targets in a very, very limited area. Second, so far Russia has too few Iskander missiles to reliably shield its strategic missiles from foreign countermeasures in all potentially dangerous areas. The conclusion is obvious - to maintain nuclear parity, strategic missiles must have their own missile defense breakthrough systems.
Although the first experiments on the creation of anti-missile defense were carried out half a century ago, for quite a long time strategic missiles did not require special tricks to successfully break through them. At the same time, the designers of the missiles placed the main emphasis on electronic countermeasures: until now, the main means of detection are radars, susceptible to interference. In addition, the first missile defense systems had a relatively short detection range. As a result of all this, the banal shooting of dipole reflectors gives anti-missile forces a lot of problems, because reliable identification takes time, which, as always, is not enough. Some sources indicate that using only passive radio interference, the domestic R-36M missile could deliver at least half of the warheads to targets, "breaking through" the American Sentinel system, which was created at about the same time as it. However, the Sentinel was never able to fully deploy and enter service normally. The R-36M, in turn, were serially built in several modifications.
Domestic and foreign missiles eventually began to be equipped with active jamming stations. They had a number of advantages over passive ones: firstly, a small device without much difficulty can, at least, prevent the ground radar from “seeing” and identifying the warhead normally. Secondly, the jamming station can be installed directly on the warhead without any special losses. Thirdly, the station does not need to be dropped, and the centering of the block does not change, due to which its ballistic characteristics do not deteriorate. As a result, the SDTS (selection of moving targets) systems used on radars to separate passive targets from real ones become almost useless.
Realizing what problem radio interference could pose in the future, the Americans decided in the late 60s to transfer the detection of missile warheads to the optical range. It would seem that optical radar stations and homing heads are not sensitive to radio-electronic interference, but … After entering the atmosphere, not only the warhead, but everything that it drops, becomes hot and does not accurately determine the real target. Of course, no one even thought to launch a couple of dozen interceptor missiles on each infrared illumination.
On both sides of the Arctic Ocean, designers tried to determine the warhead of an enemy missile by its dynamic characteristics: speed, acceleration, braking in the atmosphere, etc. An elegant idea, but it also did not become a panacea. The missile separation stage can be carried not only directly by the warheads, but also by their mass and size simulators. And if it can, then it will - by sacrificing a couple of blocks, the designers of the rocket can increase the likelihood of the remaining ones hitting the target. In addition to constructive and combat advantages, such a system also has political ones. The fact is that the installation of both warheads and imitators on one missile simultaneously allows maintaining the offensive power of the Strategic Missile Forces and at the same time remaining within the limits on the number of warheads prescribed by international treaties.
As you can see, any existing equipment for missile defense and for its breakthrough is not omnipotent. So, a number of missile warheads will be shot down on the approach to the target. However, a shot down warhead can only hinder the anti-missile forces. Even now, schoolchildren who do not skip OBZh lessons know that one of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion is electromagnetic radiation. Accordingly, if an interceptor missile causes an explosion in the nuclear part of the warhead, a large illumination will appear on the radar screen. And it is not a fact that it will disappear quickly enough to have time to detect and attack a new target.
It is clear that at the speeds at which strategic missiles fly, every minute, if not a second, counts. Therefore, back in the late 50s, both superpowers took care of the creation of missile attack warning systems (EWS). They were supposed to detect enemy missile launches and give anti-missile forces more time to react. It should be noted that both the Euro-Atlantic and Russian missile defense systems have such radars, so the concept of an early warning system is still not outdated. Moreover, modern radars, including over-the-horizon, can not only record the fact of a missile launch, but also track it down to the separation of warheads. Due to their large distance from the launch complex, it is quite difficult to interfere with them. So, for example, it makes no sense to use traditional jamming stations located on missiles: to effectively “jam” the frequency, the station must have the appropriate power, which is not always feasible or advisable. Probably, the missiles would not be offended if they were also helped to break through such an anti-missile defense system from their home territory.
At the end of this November, information about a certain revolutionary source of interference appeared in a number of publications. It is argued that with its small size and simple operation, it can counteract all existing types and instances of radars. The principle of operation of the device is not disclosed, if, of course, this unit exists at all. Some sources say that the new jammer somehow mixes up certain frequencies to the enemy's radar signal, which turn his signal into a "mess". Moreover, as stated, the level of interference is directly proportional to the power of the enemy radar. Representatives of science, industry and the Ministry of Defense have not yet said anything on this matter, so the new jamming system remains at the level of rumors, even if very expected. Although you can roughly imagine its appearance: judging by the description, the system somehow changes the state of the ionosphere used by over-the-horizon radars (the most common type of early warning radars), and prevents it from being used as a "mirror".
It can be assumed that the emergence of such "anti-radar" systems will lead to the next international negotiations on a new treaty, similar to the agreements on missile defense of 1972, SALT or START. In any case, such "boxes" can significantly affect the parity in the field of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Naturally, such systems will first be classified - it is even possible that the aforementioned domestic "jammer" already exists, but so far it is hiding behind the secrets. So the general public will be able to track the emergence of such systems solely by indirect indications, for example, at the beginning of the relevant negotiations. Although, as has happened more than once, the military can even "boast" of a new outfit in plain text.
